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ABSTRACT 
This thesis employs a computable general equilibrium modelling approach to investigate three 
distinctive preferential trading issues. Essay 1 seeks to estimate the extent to which customs 
union outcomes are sensitive to the regional market size and the degree of sectoral market 
imperfection, using hypothetical data. Further, Essay 1 adjusts the common external tariff 
rates to obtain necessarily welfare-improving outcomes for the world economy, thereby 
completely eliminating the trade-diversion effect under various market structure types. The 
results confirm that each member’s welfare gain is robustly proportional to the size of the 
other member, and that the degree of market imperfection significantly alters the welfare 
outcomes as the economies of scale enhance firm productivity within the grouping. Finally, as 
regards a customs union with endogenous common external tariffs, union members gain less 
whilst the whole world gains more since non-members do not experience the welfare loss 
entailed by trade diversion. 
Essay 2 carries out an impact analysis for certain bilateral preferential trading agreements that 
Thailand has reached with Japan, China, India, Australia and New Zealand. Accordingly, the 
model constructed in Essay 1 is extended to accommodate the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) 6.0 database. It explicitly determines commodity market competition by sector; and a 
labour market paradigm by skill level, in order to better reflect economic reality. Among the 
Thai bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) entered into force thus far, in terms of the 
Equivalent Variation (EV) for Thailand, the Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership 
Agreement (JTEPA) is the best, while the Thailand-New Zealand Closer Economic 
Partnership Agreement (TNZCEPA) turns out to be the least beneficial FTA. However, real 
gains from bilateral FTAs are trivial compared to the benefits from the groupings that include 
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a whole; moreover, unilateral trade 
liberalisation boosts the economy of Thailand almost as much as global free trade. On the 
whole, trade diversion is offset by trade creation, thus for the world economy all of the 
Thailand’s FTAs are welfare-improving, albeit at a marginal level. 
Essay 3 investigates a range of tax policy issues in India. Specifically, it estimates the welfare 
implications of various types of domestic tax reforms tailored to the rebalancing of 
government revenue after the formation of an FTA among India, China, Japan and ASEAN 
(i.e. ASEAN+3). Although welfare appears to be adversely affected, domestic taxes may be 
raised to neutralise revenue, and hence to help finance the sizable public investment on 
infrastructure. An income tax emerges as the most appropriate revenue-neutralising tool, since 
it does not hamper production and consumption as much as the other taxes considered. In 
contrast, a production tax appears as the least favourable choice as the FTA benefits are offset 
on the whole. However, once the existence of untaxable economic activity is taken into 
account, the most benign options measured by real output become consumption, production, 
income and factor input taxes, respectively. However, the introduction of a substitution 
elasticity between taxable and untaxable goods significantly alters the welfare outcomes. 
Therefore, this thesis supports the argument that the informal sector ought not to be neglected 
if the government is to gauge the true economic effects of domestic tax tools. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Objectives and Methodology 
The worldwide movement towards bilateral and plurilateral negotiations during the past two 
decades has stimulated intense public discussion on the controversial impact of regional trade 
liberalisation on economic growth and welfare distribution. Notwithstanding the fact that 
trade economists have established a succinct justification of general trade liberalisation, 
preferential economic integration remains controversial. As such, this study is aimed at 
advancing the understanding of issues surrounding preferential trading arrangements through 
the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modelling approach. Hence, this thesis is 
composed of three distinct essays on the topic of regional economic integration.  
To begin with, the study considers the variability in Customs Union (CU) welfare results after 
regional size ratios and commodity market structures are altered in a hypothetical framework. 
Therefore, the first goal is to establish the groundwork for an empirical study of preferential 
trading arrangement. The base model is developed from the EcoMod model (2006) and the 
consistency of simulation results with trade theories is scrutinised to ensure that the model is 
set ready for empirical policy studies in the following chapters.  
Subsequently, the second objective is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the regional 
groupings between one country, Thailand, and her major trading counterparts with precise 
details on the production scale adjustment within sectors under imperfect competition. Indeed, 
it is the main objective of this thesis to predict the accurate welfare outcomes of all the Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) Thailand has concluded so far, since they are undoubtedly matters 
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of great public concern. Notably, the model departs from the mainstream modelling 
approach.1 In order to improve the reflection of economic reality, the model firstly relaxes the 
assumption that production sectors in all regions operate under the same degree of market 
competition – e.g. perfect competition, monopolistic competition or Cournot oligopoly – as 
predominantly assumed in the CGE literature. Hence, a particular industry in country A could 
be less perfectly competitive than in country B.  Additionally, the model is more flexible in 
that it allows for ‘asymmetric’ degrees of wage and unemployment rigidity of labour markets 
in different countries and of different skill levels.   
Lastly, since India, one of Thailand’s trading partners, may lose from the bilateral trading 
arrangement with Thailand, the third objective is to contemplate a number of domestic tax 
options for India to maintain total tax revenue at the pre-agreement level. This is predicated 
on the fact that the government anticipates a huge loss in tariff revenue after the union, and is 
unwilling or has no capacity to sacrifice public spending for such a cause. Furthermore, the 
study takes into consideration the parallel presence of the untaxable informal economy, 
essentially not only to prove that the informal sector functions as one of the hidden drives 
forcing a small country’s government into the manipulation of domestic tax in the face of the 
considerable revenue loss after a preferential tariff removal, but also that a failure to take it 
into account substantially may distort the perception of the trading bloc’s economic outcomes. 
Seeing that the theoretical study of preferential trading issues often yields ambiguous welfare 
implications even under ceteris paribus assumptions, this thesis utilises the theoretically 
consistent CGE modelling framework – within which the effects of exogenous policy shocks 
can be quantitatively assessed in a multi-region, multi-good and multi-factor general 
equilibrium setting – to pursue the above research objectives. Given the characteristics of the 
economy in a particular benchmark time period, the CGE model explicitly specifies the 
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 For instance, see Hertel (1998). 
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microeconomic foundations of the whole economy as to how economic agents rationally 
interact through market mechanisms under restrictive assumptions. Specifically, economic 
agents simultaneously and interdependently adjust to a policy change, hence the cross-sector 
effects are precisely observed through the ensuing shifts in demand and supply curves. This 
feature is imperative, since the policy impact on production efficiency and income equity can 
be estimated at the same time. Coupled with its flexibility in evaluating a wide range of 
policies using a universal framework, the static CGE study is particularly fit for the purpose 
of ex-ante policy appraisal, as macroeconometric models are suitable for the ex-post analysis 
of the dynamic response to an economic shock in aggregate terms. In other words, given solid 
microfoundations, the CGE approach is more useful than other alternatives in 
comprehensively assessing economic impacts of trade policy options on individual economic 
agents (e.g. the government, the household and the bank), production sectors, primary factors 
and regions, especially when the policies have yet to enter into force.  
The history of general equilibrium modelling began with Arrow and Debreu (1954) who 
proposed theoretically the existence of a multi-market equilibrium in which no excess 
demand or supply exists. Johansen (1960) constructed a multi-sector general equilibrium 
model with the system of linearised equations for Norway. This modelling approach was then 
adopted by many researchers, both for single- and multiple-region models, including the 
ORANI model of the Australian economy by Dixon et al. (1982), which is developed in log 
differentials and is closest to the Johansen model among the recent CGE models; Dervis, de 
Melo and Robinson (1982) and Shoven and Whalley (1984) on the developments in levels; 
the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade for fiscal and trade policy analyses after 
the Uruguay Rounds by Deardorff and Stern (1985); and importantly the GTAP model by 
Hertel (1998) which has largely reproduced the success of the Australian ORANI model by 
creating the leading intercontinental community of CGE-based researchers, to which many 
contribute either by advancing the GTAP model or regularly updating the GTAP database. 
Although linearisation error randomly occurs when simulating a large amount of policy 
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change, the linearised system is widely adopted since it is relatively flexible and imposes no 
modification on the solution algorithm as model dimension is expanded. Nevertheless, the 
non-linear model has recently gained popularity since the introduction of the computer 
software called GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System) with more flexibility to handle 
large-scale CGE models. GAMS has been used in complex models such as the IFPRI 
(International Food Policy Research Institute) model by Lofgren et al. (2002) and the 
GreenMod model by Bayar et al. (2006). Given these recent developments, the thesis 
constructs a non-linearised static CGE model in GAMS, then primarily uses the GTAP 6.0 
database for Thailand’s and India’s preferential trading analyses while deriving 
supplementary data from external sources such as World Development Indicators (World 
Bank, 2007) and the online database of the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD, 2007). 
1.2 Background to the Research Problem 
As regards general trade liberalisation, Ricardian theory has firmly established that 
international trade can be mutually beneficial when technological differences are observed 
across countries.2 This simple, yet powerful, model with two countries, two goods and one 
economy-wide mobile factor input that is typically labour, is successively extended into the 
Ricardo-Viner model originally discussed by Viner (1931), then mathematically formalised 
by Jones (1971) and Mussa (1974). In this model, the incorporation of sector-specific factors, 
coupled with the relaxation of the constancy assumption of marginal product of labour, has 
simultaneously invalidated the Ricardian prediction that every individual within each 
economy is made better off as a result of trade liberalisation. Given that factors of production 
cannot move instantaneously and costlessly across industries, owners of factors specific to 
each economy’s export sector gain while those specific to the import-competing sector lose 
since the variation in production mix has discrete effects on the demand for different factors 
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 The classic Ricardian model is first published in On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817). 
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due to sectoral dissimilarity in factor intensity. As examined by Mussa (1974), once sector-
specific factors are allowed to be mobile over time, the Ricardo-Viner model will replicate the 
Heckscher-Ohlin equilibrium in the long run. When both countries produce two goods using 
two mobile factors, the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem is renowned for leading to the proof of the 
‘magnification effect’ of trade in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem that a rise in the relative 
price of a good intensive in a particular factor will exaggeratedly shift the distribution of 
income in favour of that factor. As a result, the owner of the relatively abundant factor will be 
better off while the owner of the scarce one will lose in the face of international trade. 
Nevertheless, all the above influential theories unanimously propose that, at the national level, 
the two countries engaged in international trade will reciprocally gain from it as the world 
price of each country’s export good increases in relation to the import-competing one. 
On the other hand, customs union theory yields more complex implications for regional 
welfare. Ambiguity in the consequence of a customs union on each country was introduced by 
Viner (1950) using the static, partial-equilibrium concepts of ‘trade creation’ and ‘trade 
diversion.’ While a customs union that shifts production from a higher- to a lower-cost source 
within the grouping is trade-creating and welfare-increasing for the union and the world as a 
whole; the other type that shifts production and trade from a lower-cost source outside the 
union to a higher-cost source within it is trade diverting and welfare-decreasing for the union 
and the world as a whole. This backbone of customs union theory was elaborated by Meade 
(1955) in a general equilibrium framework; Lipsey (1957) and Johnson (1960) on the 
favourable consumption effect that might ultimately increase welfare in the face of a trade-
diverting customs union; and Mundell (1964) on the lucrative terms-of-trade effect that is 
proportionate to the pre-union tariff level. In spite of such attempts to clarify the aggregate 
effect of regional trade liberalisation on each economy, it has never been firmly pinpointed in 
theory whether preferential trading arrangement should unambiguously lead to an improved 
economic equilibrium.  
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To make matters worse, the issue becomes more convoluted when taking into consideration 
the existence of differences in the economic size of each country and the degree of market 
competition in each sector. As regards the asymmetry in size, the well-established works by 
Cooper and Massell (1965), Johnson (1965) and Bhagwati (1968), have demonstrated that 
developing countries can theoretically reach a target level of industrialisation at lower cost by 
specialising among themselves through regional trade integration. Nonetheless, the welfare 
changes for developing economies after joining a customs union can be more explicitly 
analysed in the context that developing countries are ‘small’ in comparison to other union 
counterparts and the rest of the world. This analytical aspect is of a particular interest, because 
developing countries in recent years have extensively altered their preferential trading 
arrangement strategy in favour of larger counterparts, in the midst of public concerns over the 
proportionately strong union effects on small members as a result of the overwhelmingly 
disparate economic size. Particularly, anticipation is raised amongst the group of 
comparatively sheltered producers that a North-South customs union will be welfare 
reducing.  However, when focusing on net regional welfare change, Tovias (1978) has shown 
in a partial equilibrium model that if a preferential trade integration is to be formed between 
small and big economies, given that the non-member’s economy is significantly larger than 
the union size, the small member will unambiguously gain, the big member will definitely 
lose from trade diversion with no improvement in the terms of trade with the rest of the 
world, and the non-member economy is unaffected by the change. Nevertheless, the general 
equilibrium model of preferential trading that primarily focuses on the impact of the 
differential economic size on the welfare outcome remains to be systematically formalised, 
especially in consideration of another parallel customs union that can be small, identical, or 
large in comparison to the union at issue. Therefore, Essay 1 firstly extends the discussion in 
Tovias (1978) to include these additional cases, and to demonstrate that large regions may 
ultimately lose if trade diversion – entailed by a union with a very small region – is 
substantial enough to cancel out all the potential benefits, while small regions tend to gain 
more as the size of the other member is enlarged. More importantly, the essay endeavours to 
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shed light on the fact that the customs union’s welfare outcomes would be non-negligibly 
affected when another customs union formed by the rest of the world is introduced to the 
model. 
Besides the size issue, the second problem of preferential trading is concerned with the 
welfare implication of customs unions in the presence of scale economies. Corden (1972) 
pointed out that under imperfect competition – besides trade creation and trade diversion – 
there are two additional union effects to be relied on. The positive outcome is called the ‘cost-
reduction effect,’ obtained as a group of producers capture the unionised market, then produce 
at lower costs of production as a result of internal scale economies. The negative outcome is 
called the ‘trade-suppression effect,’ which occurs as the newly established producer takes 
over the whole union market and diverts production from a lower-cost source outside the 
union to the higher-cost source within the union. Although Corden (1972) believes that the 
cost-reduction effect tends to be more significant than the trade-suppression effect, the net 
welfare outcome cannot be easily defined. Whilst in a partial equilibrium framework, the 
result largely depends on the initial level of monopolistic or oligopolistic production in each 
country; in a general equilibrium framework, further complications arise. For instance, we 
observe the sectoral demand curve shift due to the variations in income distribution and cross-
sector substitution elasticities, and the endogenous preservation of the balance of payments 
through exchange-rate adjustment. However, it is noteworthy that Corden’s cost-reduction 
effect is not unique to the customs union, but is also commonly observed in all kinds of trade 
liberalisation provided that increasing returns to scale exist. This producer’s gain, however, 
will not be fully obtained if there is a lower bound for the number of firms, possibly due to 
rigorous competition policy. The negative effect of the stringency in firm population on 
producer’s welfare is also perceived in Brander (1981), yet in a different context. Given the 
Cournot setting, Brander (1981) demonstrated that two symmetric monopolists located in 
different countries will be reciprocally inclined to generate a duopolistic competition in each 
other’s market under free trade, but if competition policy is in place, each firm’s total profit 
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then becomes lower in the new equilibrium as the increased competition lowers the mark-up 
rate. Consequently, consumers in both markets gain through lower prices. Built on these 
results, Bliss (1994) then further examined customs union theory under imperfect 
competition, using a general model of three symmetric countries, each endowed with one 
Cournot producer that produces an homogeneous good, given the same demand function 
across countries. While agreeing with the above propositions by Corden (1972) and Brander 
(1981), Bliss (1994) demonstrated that, if all producers survive the competition from other 
member countries, the union market will become more competitive and lower prices within 
the union will unambiguously worsen non-member’s profit as it loses share in the union 
market. On the other hand, members’ profits may equally rise or fall, depending on the 
‘countervailing effects’ of the greater intra-union competition that reduces firms’ mark-ups, 
and the higher intra-union market share as trade barriers are removed. However, in case some 
producers are driven out of business as their profits fall, the rest will prosper from the export-
promotion effect, akin to the above-defined cost-reduction effect; thereby world efficiency is 
promoted. In any case, consumers benefit from an increase in competition.  
Apart from the above impact analysis of imperfect competition with product homogeneity, 
monopolistic competition has progressively become one of the most discussed features in 
trade issues since Grubel and Lloyd (1975) pointed out the substantial amount of intra-
industry trade between industrialised countries with similar economic structures. In line with 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) on the specification of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous 
products, Krugman (1979, 1980, 1981) convincingly showed that, given this feature, 
international trade enables countries to take advantage of internal scale economies, even in 
the absence of comparative advantage. Although Krugman’s approach has been adopted by 
many researchers including Ethier and Horn (1984) and Saxonhouse (1993), the clear-cut 
analysis of the impact of monopolistic competition on the welfare outcome of customs union 
remains fairly uncultivated. As such, the second part of Essay 1 handles the issue of imperfect 
competition by contrasting the variability in customs union’s welfare under perfect 
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competition, Cournot oligopoly and monopolistic competition. In addition, since Corden 
(1972), Brander (1981) and Bliss (1994) previously pointed out that the rigidity in firm 
population can alter producer’s welfare gain, the barriers to enter and exit the market are also 
introduced in the end. Thus, in a highly controlled hypothetical general equilibrium setting in 
which regions are truly identical, the first essay endeavours to pin down the customs union’s 
respective welfare effects on producers and consumers under different market structures, 
hence to confirm that under imperfect competition, union members are supposed to gain more 
whilst the rest of the world tends to lose to a greater extent. 
In view of the afore-mentioned theoretical ambiguity in its welfare implication, the standard 
argument is that a customs union be handled as an empirical issue. Although, in reality the 
arrangement is typically far from the very definition of customs union that demands a 
common external tariff, as usually adopted in the theoretical framework; and also not exactly 
in line with the taxonomy of an FTA that requires completely free intra-union trade. Hence, 
the welfare results could be sectorally biased, especially when taking into consideration the 
disparity in the degree of market competition, among other things.  
Given that the world economy is on course for regionalisation, particular interest is paid to the 
regional groupings among countries in Asia and the Pacific region for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, this set of nations includes emerging economies such as China3, India and those of 
Southeast Asia, which in the past several decades have experienced remarkable economic 
expansion. While China, India and Southeast Asia respectively represent only 4.2%, 1.5% and 
2.9% of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2001 (Table 4.1, Dimaranan, 2006); China 
has achieved average growth of 10.6% per year during 1990-2000, although slowing to 9.6% 
per year during 2000-05 (Table 4.1, World Bank, 2007). In comparison with China, India has 
observed moderate average growth of 6% per year during 1990-2000; while expanding at the 
                                                     
3
 Henceforth, “China” refers to the People’s Republic of China (PDR), inclusive of special administrative regions (Hong Kong 
and Macau), yet exclusive of Taiwan. 
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greater annual rate of 7% during 2000-05. The same source also indicated that, among 
Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam has experienced the highest average annual growth of 
7.9% during 1990-2000, while Cambodia on average has grown at 8.9% per year during 
2000-05.  
Since these countries possess great potential as the next prevailing economies in the world 
market, their enthusiasm for regional economic arrangement is worth elaborating, both in 
terms of welfare implications for individual members and the countries outside the groupings. 
In fact, given the dormant multilateral trade negotiations under the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) was called for by Malaysia in 1990 to 
encompass the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, China, South 
Korea and Japan, in response to the emerging trading blocs in Europe and the Americas. 
However, EAEC was strongly opposed by the United States, Australia and New Zealand, as 
the bloc is basically APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) without the above three 
Western nations. Although EAEC was ultimately formalised as ASEAN Plus Three in 1999, 
while the APEC free trade negotiation has by and large become a second priority for some 
members, the grouping is somewhat overshadowed by the expanding East Asia Summit 
(EAS) initiated in 2005, which currently involves ASEAN Plus Three with India, Australia 
and New Zealand. However, as the relationship between ASEAN Plus Three, EAS and APEC 
is complex, the negotiation is always behind schedule in comparison to the bilateral or 
smaller-scaled plurilateral arrangements. In particular, Thailand stands out as a good case 
since the country is one of the small developing countries that has been vigorously engaged in 
trade negotiations with a large number of countries in Asia and the Pacific region. Thus, 
Essay 2 accordingly undertakes the comparative static CGE analysis of preferential trading 
arrangements already agreed upon between Thailand and some of her trading partners, in 
order to clarify the circumstance of Thailand as a small developing country at the heart of the 
global advancement towards regionalisation, and specifically to substantiate the positive 
variability in welfare gain when forming a preferential trading arrangement with a larger 
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group of regions, thus showing the very dilemma of a small country wishing for broader 
integration, despite the lack of bargaining power in general. 
At the same time, the interest of small countries in trade union raises another concern over 
public finance, since their government tax revenues tend to rely considerably on import 
tariffs, firstly as many import-competing producers are heavily protected, and secondly since 
it is the hardest type of tax to avoid in comparison to other types of taxes. As also confirmed 
in World Bank (Figure 4.12a, 2006), rich countries depend more on direct taxes on income 
and property, while poor countries are likely to rely on indirect taxes on international trade of 
goods and services. Precisely, as small economies are usually endowed with large informal 
sectors where taxation cannot apply, customs duties are more often than not their main 
sources of tax revenues. As such, an FTA formation may reduce national welfare, because the 
reduction in government welfare can potentially offset those gains in private consumption and 
investment, with no substantial improvement in the terms of trade with non-members to 
expect for when the FTA scope is comparatively negligible for the rest of the world. Hence, 
Essay 3 examines this feature on India which uniquely observes reduction in Equivalent 
Variation (EV) after trade unions with Thailand and a couple of other Asian countries (Essay 
2). It focuses on the evaluation of the effectiveness of domestic tax alternatives in neutralising 
government revenues while maximising the benefits to individual economic agents and also 
to the economy as a whole. Specifically, it shows how the introduction of the informal 
economy alters the scope of domestic tax policy efficacy in a way that the welfare variability 
across tax types is narrowed down as consumers have supplementary consumption choices in 
the black market. 
1.3 Organisation of Thesis 
The thesis is organised as follows. The first essay (Chapter 2) begins with the detailed 
explanation of the static CGE model structure under perfect competition, along with the 
welfare decomposition for the hypothetical impact analysis of a small economy forming 
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customs unions with regions of different market sizes, with and without another parallel CU 
formation by the rest of the world. Subsequently, the essay additionally illustrates sectoral 
market structures under Cournot oligopoly and monopolistic competition in contrast with the 
previous perfectly competitive setting, particularly when the firm mobility constraint applies. 
Under these variants, the essay once again scrutinises welfare implications of the unions and 
importantly how to set up a necessarily welfare-improving CU by adjusting import tariffs so 
as not to alter bilateral trade with non-CU trading partners, given various degrees of market 
imperfection. Thus, it examines whether governments can collaboratively adjust their tariff 
rates to isolate trade diversion from the benefits of an FTA formation. Therefore, the last part 
of this essay is aimed at addressing the possibility of designing an FTA which could be a 
benign stepping stone towards global trade liberalisation. In the end, the essay tests the 
sensitivity of welfare results to key elasticity parameters, the exchange rate regime, the 
expansion of the public sector, pre-union tariffs, the benchmark size ratio of the small to the 
large economy and the initial size of firm population. 
The second essay (Chapter 3) then turns to the empirical study of preferential trading 
arrangements Thailand has actually established with Japan, China, India, Australia and New 
Zealand. As China has been supportive of the negotiations with ASEAN as a whole, the 
analysis follows the actual deal, hence is implemented under the ASEAN-China framework, 
while the rest of Thailand’s FTAs remain bilateral. After briefly explaining the CGE model 
structure developed from the first essay to comply with the GTAP 6.0 database, the criteria 
for the aggregation of region and sector, and the determination of asymmetric commodity 
market structure and labour market paradigm, are elaborated. Once the additional data derived 
from external sources along with its calibration method are described, the essay analyses the 
welfare outcomes of the above FTAs, and subsequently simulates a number of enlarged FTA 
zones that ultimately involve the world as a whole. Finally, the second essay runs sensitivity 
tests on the elasticity parameters not present in the first essay; the endogeneity of government 
transfers; and the benchmark asymmetric structures of commodity and labour markets. 
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Leading from Chapter 3, the final essay (Chapter 4) then builds on how India could be 
adversely affected by joining an FTA, principally from the viewpoint of the government. The 
essay thus contemplates the variability in welfare outcomes if the government is to opt for 
active domestic tax policies to counteract the decline in total revenue. With this respect, 
particular interest is paid to the variability in regional disposable income and welfare of 
private, public and investment sectors, as domestic taxes on consumption, output, factor input 
and income are consecutively increased, both in uniform and selective manners. Hence, the 
essay starts with a partial equilibrium analysis of the revenue-neutral trade liberalisation 
assuming that India is a small, net-importing country, then using Kemp and Wan’s (1976) 
diagrammatic analytical framework, the essay extends the analysis to the revenue-neutral 
preferential trading arrangement assuming that India is a large net-importing economy. 
Subsequently, the essay disaggregates the representative household into the rich and the poor, 
and then it sequentially evaluates the additional imposition of taxes on income, consumption, 
production and factor input. The chapter ends with the incorporation of the informal 
untaxable economy and how this alters the welfare results in sectoral and regional terms. 
Lastly, Chapter 5 concludes with policy recommendations and implications for further 
research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
MARKET SIZE, MARKET STRUCTURE AND WELFARE-
IMPROVING REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
2.1 Introduction 
The recent revival of interest in economic integration is propelled by the proliferation of 
regional Customs Unions (CUs) and Free Trade Areas (FTAs) in the world trading system 
since the early 1980s as a result of faltering trade negotiations under the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Chart 2-1 illustrates the accelerated movement towards 
regional economic integration in the past few decades. 
Chart 2-1: Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) notified to the GATT/WTO and 
currently in force 
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Source: WTO database, accessed 10 February 2008 < http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/eif_e.xls> 
Note: The number of agreements is plotted by the period of entry into force. 
In order to deepen the understanding of the welfare implications of progression towards 
preferential trade liberalisation, Chapter 2 seeks to quantify the economic outcomes of CUs, 
since in comparison with other types of RTAs, the welfare changes after the formation of a 
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CU should be easier to interpret, as common external tariffs are imposed by union members 
in accordance with GATT rules. Adopting the CGE approach to the analysis of a hypothetical 
world economy, this study is aimed at capturing the actual causes of regional welfare 
changes, while maintaining model simplicity. 
The theory of regional economic integration has been a subject of debate since Jacob Viner 
(1950) first examined the economics of the formation of a CU. Assuming constant unit costs 
and perfectly inelastic demand,1 Viner (1950) refuted the assumption that discriminatory tariff 
removal was necessarily welfare-improving, and famously proposed the static concepts of 
trade creation and trade diversion in analysing the welfare effects of a CU.2 In his analysis, 
establishment of a CU could cause welfare-increasing trade creation in some sectors but 
welfare-decreasing trade diversion in others. However, the analysis of possible cross-sector 
economic effects was ruled out due to the nature of the partial equilibrium setting. Influenced 
by Viners work, many trade theorists contributed to developments of the formal analytical 
framework of CU formation. Among others, Meade (1955) was early in providing a complete 
general-equilibrium analysis of preferential trading in The Theory of Customs Unions. 
Meades contribution included showing that, when trade creation and trade diversion were 
present under the assumption of flexible terms of trade, the world welfare outcomes depended 
on parameters such as pre-union tariffs and cross-product complementarity. 
Soon afterwards, Lipsey (1957) suggested that although the concepts of trade creation and 
trade diversion introduced by Viner were fundamental to the understanding of how a customs 
union might change the pattern of world trade and production, the argument that trade 
diversion was always welfare-decreasing would not be valid once allowance was made for the 
positive consumption effects induced by lower prices of imported goods in union member 
                                                     
1 The perfectly inelastic demand assumption essentially ruled out the consumption effect of CU formation. When demand is not 
perfectly elastic, trade diversion may be welfare-increasing. This point is illustrated later by Lipsey (1957). 
2 The concepts of trade creation and trade diversion are previously defined in Chapter 1 (Introduction). 
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countries. Thus, a trade-diverting customs union could also be beneficial to its members, and 
could result in higher world welfare. Johnson (1960) then elaborated on this point by 
explicitly defining the consumption effect  which facilitated higher trade flows for member 
countries and consequently increased world welfare  as another source of trade creation, thus 
providing a more direct link between the definitions and the welfare analysis of CUs. 
Subsequently, Mundell (1964) analysed the impact of the changes in the terms-of-trade, both 
among CU members and between the union and the rest of the world. He showed that the 
higher the pre-union tariffs of other partner countries, the larger the gains to a country that 
joined the preferential tariff-cutting scheme. This result was critical, since it was the last piece 
of the puzzle that completed the basic analytical framework for the customs union issue. In 
consequence, the production effect, consumer effect, and terms-of-trade effect are by default 
regarded as the core elements of the welfare changes entailed by CU formation.  
Customs union membership was once viewed as one of the more promising industrialisation 
strategies for developing countries. Although Cooper and Massell (1965), Johnson (1965), 
and Bhagwati (1968) have proved theoretically that South-South trade integration can be 
beneficial for member countries, when the degree of economic development is narrowly 
defined with regard to the scale of production at the national level, how the economic size of 
a CU member in relation to her counterparts and the rest of the world may affect the welfare 
outcomes remains to be clarified systematically. Accordingly, after briefly explaining the 
general CGE model design in Section 2.2, Section 2.3 addresses this question by simulating 
the formation of unions between regions of disparate sizes. 
The early contributions to customs union theory assumed that markets were perfectly 
competitive. The analysis of CU formation under imperfect competition was primarily 
initiated by Corden (1972), Ethier and Horn (1984), Saxonhouse (1993), and Bliss (1994). 
Among others, Corden (1972) identified some of the complexities in a general equilibrium 
framework that make it difficult to generalise the economic linkages between economies of 
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scale, market structures and the welfare outcome of a union. Section 2.4 seeks to extend the 
analysis of this issue by introducing imperfectly competitive market structures to the initial 
CGE model.   
The final issue of Chapter 2 is concerned with the negative welfare impact of CU formation 
on non-member economies. In this context, a seminal paper by Kemp and Wan (1976) argued 
that any subset of countries forming a customs union could set common external tariffs that 
allowed member countries to achieve higher welfare levels without lowering those of non-
members. This Pareto-improving solution can be found by setting the common external tariffs 
at levels that do not alter trade flows between CU members and the rest of the world. Perhaps 
more importantly, such tariffs remove the risk that non-member countries might retaliate to 
the reduction of their welfare due to the formation of the customs union, and thus the risk of a 
tariff-war. Accordingly, Section 2.5 focuses on how these Pareto-improving outcomes are to 
be achieved under various forms of imperfect competition. Subsequently, Section 2.6 tests the 
robustness of the model to a number of parametric changes, and then Section 2.7 summarises 
the key findings in this chapter.  
2.2 General Model Design 
The model constructed for the CU analysis in this chapter is a static, four-region, three-sector 
and three-factor CGE model, with production and final demand structures that are primarily 
developed from the single-region EcoMod model (2006).3 That CGE model consists of 1) five 
agents: producers, a household, a government, a bank and the rest of the world; and 2) two 
markets: primary factor markets and commodity markets, with an Armington aggregation that 
differentiates domestic outputs from imports in each region. The model is kept simple, since 
                                                     
3 The complete lists of parameters, variables and equations of this model are given in Appendix A2-1. 
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the main purpose is to identify how economic agents adjust to the CU shock in a theoretical 
framework. Assume that the world economy comprises four regions:4 
reg = {REG1, REG2, REG3, REG4}. 
Regions are completely symmetric with respect to the patterns of factor endowments, 
producer technologies and consumer tastes. In each region, firms are engaged in three 
production sectors. Of the three commodities, SEC1 and SEC2 are tradable (secT) and 
demanded by the private sector; while SEC3 is non-traded (secTN) and consumed only by the 
government as a public good. The production costs are minimised subject to the nested 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function explained later in this section. 
Therefore, the set of all commodities is expressed as: 
sec = {secT, secTN}, where: 
secT = {SEC1, SEC2} and secTN = {SEC3}. 
In each sector, intermediate inputs and three primary inputs: capital (K), labour (L) and land 
(H), are used to produce the final good. All the primary inputs are immobile across regions, 
while within regions capital and labour are mobile across production sectors (facM) but land 
is sector-specific (facS). To be precise, the set of all factors of production is:  
fac = {facM, facS}, where: 
facM = {K, L} and facS = {H}. 
The household owns the primary factors. It supplies them to firms and earns rental payments 
in return. The household also receives income from the government in the form of transfers, 
namely unemployment benefits and lump-sum transfers. The household spends a part of this 
income on purchasing private commodities and paying direct income taxes. The remainder of 
the household income is then saved in the bank. Firms use intermediate inputs and purchase 
                                                     
4 At least four regions are required when analysing the customs union effects on regions with different market sizes in Section 
2.3. 
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the services of primary factors from the household to produce value added, sell their outputs 
to domestic and foreign consumers, and pay ad valorem factor taxes to the government. The 
government collects taxes from various sources, and the government revenue net of saving is 
then allocated between transfers to the representative household and public good 
consumption. Since government saving is fixed in real terms, the government primarily 
spends its disposable income on unemployment benefits which are directly proportional to the 
level of unemployment. The level of public good consumption is passively determined as the 
residual of government disposable income net of transfers to the household. Since the public 
good (SEC3) is consumed solely by the government, an increase in such provision would not 
directly add to the households well-being.5 Hence, it does not appear in the households 
utility function. However, the household benefits from an increase in government revenue 
through the heightened factor demands from the public sector. This specification of the public 
sector is in line with the simplified model structure developed by EcoMod Network (2006).     
Both the household and the government maximise their respective utility functions, and thus, 
since these are Cobb-Douglas, a constant expenditure share is allocated to each final demand 
commodity. The regional bank receives savings from the household, the government and the 
rest of the world, and then allocates a constant share to each sector in the form of investment. 
The macroeconomic closure rule is that the foreign savings transferred to or from the rest of 
the world are equal to the difference between the total values of imports and exports for each 
region.6 
Next, we discuss market clearance in the CGE model. As in all standard CGE models, there 
are two types of markets: the commodity markets (domestic and international) and the factor 
                                                     
5 Since government saving is fixed and transfers to the household are proportional to unemployment, the level of government 
consumption of the composite public good (SEC3) is derived as the residual of the tax revenue. Hence, consistent with EcoMod 
Network (2006), the government is modelled as a passive economic agent in that the size of the public sector essentially reflects 
government revenue. 
6 See Subsection 2.2.8 for the discussion of macroeconomic closure rules. 
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markets. With the exception of the labour market, in the perfectly competitive long-run 
equilibrium price flexibility ensures that supplies equal demands, so that the markets clear. In 
the labour market, the market clearing condition is modified to allow for unemployment.7 
For tradable commodities, the markets are supplied by imported and domestically-produced 
commodities. The commodities are then purchased by production sectors as intermediate 
inputs, by the household as final products and by the bank as investment goods. Commodity 
markets contribute to government revenues by paying ad valorem commodity taxes and 
import tariffs. For simplicity, the possibility of trade deflection is excluded from the model,8 
and thus only domestically-produced commodities will be exported. The market for the non-
traded commodity is more simple. The public sector (SEC3) is modelled as that part of the 
government that produces an aggregate public good, which is then exclusively funded by the 
government. Hence, the economic activity of this sector is completely free of tax.  
There exists an international market for each tradable commodity. In this market, exports and 
imports are traded bilaterally among regions, and the total values of exports and imports 
traded in the global market of each commodity will always be identical, i.e. the global 
markets clear.9 
The household in each region owns the domestic endowments of primary factors  of which 
the total amounts are fixed  and sells them on the domestic factor markets, and production 
                                                     
7 This assumption takes us away from the neo-classical model. 
8 Trade deflection is observed when non-members attempt to access the union market through the border of the region with 
lowest tariff levels, and then re-export to other union members. Supposedly, forming a union that allows for trade deflection 
should generally enhance the overall welfare of both member and non-member regions, since the consumption effects of tariff 
removal on member regions are further improved, while non-members are less negatively affected by preferential trade 
liberalisation. At the same time, it is analytically essential to take into account the redistributive aspect of trade deflection, as the 
country of final destination loses tariff revenue, while the other union member earns more revenue as a result of charging lower 
tariff rates on imports. However, trade deflection is not incorporated in this model because member states of a customs union 
share common external tariffs. Even if import tariffs against non-members are allowed to differ, the rules of origin will make 
certain that trade deflection is kept minimal. 
9 International transport costs will be introduced to the model to ensure global market clearance subsequently in Chapters 3 and 4 
as the GTAP 6.0 database used in these chapters identifies the existence of international transport costs. 
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sectors purchase them to add value to the intermediate inputs in producing final goods. In the 
capital market, the model calibrates return rates to capital inputs so that all capital 
endowments are fully employed in each region. In the labour market, the wage is determined 
by labour demand, rather than being at the level that ensures full employment. The real wage 
is correlated with the unemployment rate, using the relationship specified by the 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1995) wage curve, which negatively associates the change in the 
unemployment rate with the adjustment in real wage. As explained in more detail in 
Subsection 2.2.7 the real wage is modelled as a linear function of unemployment with a 
negative slope. In contrast to the above two primary factors, the land market is unique in that 
land is not mobile across sectors. This implies that each production sector will use a fixed 
amount of land; so that the rental rate of land may vary across sectors. 
2.2.1 Production 
Each production sector sec in region reg demands factor inputs 
regfacF ,sec  and intermediate 
goods from sectors secc regcIO sec,sec  to produce a final product denoted by 
regQZsec . The demand 
structure is a nested CES tree, illustrated in Figure 2-1:  
Figure 2-1: Production input demand structure 
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denote a particular element in the sets of factors (fac), sectors (sec), or regions (reg), the 
value-added aggregate under the CES technology is made up of demands for two mobile 
factors (i.e. capital K and labour L) and one sector-specific factor (i.e. land H); while 
the intermediate aggregate nest under the Leontief technology requires fixed shares regcio sec,sec of 
intermediate inputs from non-public goods (i.e., SEC1 and SEC2). Note that the demand 
for land in each sector is exogenous and thus is specifically marked with a straight line above 
the variable (
" ",
sec
H reg
F ), whilst for simplicity, hereafter the symbol 
regfacF ,sec  is used when 
referring to factor demands in collective terms. Intermediate demand may be expressed as:  
sec ,sec sec ,sec sec .
reg reg reg
c cIO io QZ   (2-1) 
The Value Added aggregate in each sector is modelled using CES production function so as 
to allow for flexible substitution at a given elasticity between primary factor inputs: 
  regreg F
fac
Fregfacregfacregreg FFaFQZ sec
sec
1
,
sec
,
secsecsec
UUJ »¼
º«¬
ª  ¦ , (2-2) 
where the value of parameter regaFsec  determines how efficient sector sec is in using primary 
inputs to produce the final product, regfacF ,secJ is the share parameter for each factor input, where 
the sum of the share parameters is unity: 
 ;1,sec  ¦
fac
regfacFJ   
and regFsecU  is the substitution elasticity parameter of the value-added production function. 
Assuming that firms minimise primary factor costs for given output levels, 10  the typical 
demand function for factor inputs is derived as: 
                                                     
10 Dividing Equation (2-3) by total output, we obtain the demand function for unit factor inputs. Hence, in this model, firms 
simultaneously minimise their unit factor costs as well as total factor costs. 
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 (2-3) 
where regFsecV  represents 1/(1- regFsecU ) in Equation (2-3) as well as previously in Figure 2-1 for 
simplicity; regfactf ,sec is the ad valorem factor tax rate imposed on producers; 
,fac regPFM  is the 
rate of return to each mobile factor (facM fac) in region reg, and is the same across sectors 
within the same region, and ,sec
fac regPFS  is the rate of return to sector-specific factor (facS 
 fac). The term  , ,sec$ ( ) $ ( )fac reg fac regPFM facM fac PFS facS fac  thus tells the GAMS 
software to use the former price if the factor is mobile, and the latter one otherwise.11  
Given the functions for the intermediate and factor demands in Equations (2-1) and (2-3), the 
perfect competition assumption implies that in the long-run equilibrium firms will equate total 
revenues with total costs (the long-run zero-profit condition): 
   , , , ,sec sec sec sec sec
sec sec ,sec
sec
1 $ ( ) $ ( )reg reg fac reg fac reg fac reg fac reg
fac
reg reg
c c
c
PZ QZ tf PFM facM fac PFS facS fac F
PA IO
     
 
¦
¦
 (2-4) 
where regPZsec  is the producer price, and 
reg
cPAsec  is the price of a composite commodity secc. 
2.2.2 Household and Government 
In this model, the household consumes the tradable commodities, SEC1 and SEC2 (secT), 
while the government consumes the non-traded good, SEC3 (secTN). The household and 
                                                     
11 See Appendix A2-1 for the definition of the dollar command ($) in the GAMS language. 
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government both similarly maximise their Cobb-Douglas utility functions, subject to their 
budget constraints. Although the government consumes only one good, the government utility 
function is incorporated into this model because it is relatively effortless to further extend the 
model analysis later on to the case in which the government consumes many goods. With this 
in mind, Subsection 2.2.2.2 explains the general property of the government demand function 
applicable to the model that has multiple public consumption goods. Given the derived Cobb-
Douglas consumption demand functions, household and government income flows are 
explained below.  
2.2.2.1 Household 
The household demand function is derived as: 
  regregTregTregTregT CBUDHHCPAtc   secsecsecsec1 D , (2-5) 
where regCBUD  is the consumption budget of household, spent on final goods 
sec
reg
TC ; sec
reg
THHD  
is the constant expenditure share of commodity secT consumption for household, the shares 
summing to one: 
 ;1
sec
sec  ¦
T
reg
THHD  
and the commodity tax rate is denoted by 
reg
Ttcsec . Thus, the real consumption budget level 
reg
T
reg PACBUD sec/  is the key determinant of the consumption quantity of a final good secT. The 
consumption budget, on the other hand, depends on the following income balance equation, 
which states that the household allocates its income to consumption, savings regSHH  and 
income tax payments regTRY : 
regregregreg TRYSHHCBUDINC  , (2-6) 
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where the income tax payment is proportional to total household income, i.e. there is a fixed 
ad valorem income tax rate 
regty : 
regregreg INCtyTRY  ; (2-7)  
and the household saving is a fixed proportion, denoted by 
regmps , of the total household 
income, net of the income tax payment: 
)( regregregreg TRYINCmpsSHH  . (2-8) 
As for income sources, the household receives government transfers regTRNF  in addition to 
factor incomes from the domestic production sectors: 
 , , ,sec sec
sec
$ ( ) $ ( ) .reg fac reg fac reg fac reg reg
fac
INC PFM facM fac PFS facS fac F TRNF   ¦¦  (2-9) 
Total transfers from the government to the household, in turn, consist of unemployment 
benefits and other transfers: 
" ", reg regreg reg L reg regTRNF trep PFM UNEMP TRO CPI     , (2-10) 
In this equation, the government pays unemployment benefits to the household as a fixed 
proportion, labelled as the replacement rate trepreg, of the household income lost from being 
unemployed ( " ",L reg regPFM UNEMP ); and also transfers other lump-sum benefits which are 
fixed in real terms at 
reg
TRO , e.g. income subsidies. To maintain the homogeneity of the 
equation, other transfers are made nominal by the multiplication of the Laspeyre consumer 
price index 
reg
CPI , which is defined in the presence of endogenous taxes as: 
sec sec sec
sec
sec sec sec
sec
(1 )
(1 ) 0
reg reg reg
reg
reg reg reg
tc PA C0
CPI
tc PA C0
  
   
¦
¦ , (2-11) 
where the value of a variable at the base year is appended with the italic number 0.  This 
consumer price index is chosen as the regional numéraire. Hence, it is exogenous in this 
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model (denoted by a bar), and all other domestic price changes are reported relative to this 
variable.12 
Subsequently, Figure 2-2 summarises the income flows of the representative household. 
 
Figure 2-2: Household income flows  
2.2.2.2 Government 
The government purchases the non-traded public good (SEC3), based on the following 
demand function: 
regreg
TN
reg
TN
reg
TN CGBUDCGCGPA   secsecsec D , (2-12) 
where regCGBUD  is the government budget spent on secTN (
reg
TNCGsec ); and 
reg
TNCGsecD  is the 
expenditure share of commodity secTN consumption for government, the shares summing to 
one: 
.1
sec
sec  ¦
TN
reg
TNCGD  
                                                     
12 See the discussion on the specification of numéraire in Subsection 2.2.8. 
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Thus, the real consumption budget level 
reg
TN
reg PACGBUD sec/  is the key determinant of the 
consumption quantity of a final good secTN. The consumption budget, on the other hand, 
depends on the following government income balance equation, which states that the 
government allocates its total tax revenues 
regTREV  to the consumption budget, fixed savings 
reg
SG  and total transfers to the household: 
reg regreg reg regTREV CGBUD SG CPI TRNF    . (2-13) 
The sources of revenue for the government are tax receipts in the forms of household income 
taxes ( regTRY ); commodity taxes ( regTRC ); factor usage taxes ( regTRF ); and import tariffs 
( regTRM ): 
regregregregreg TRMTRFTRCTRYTREV  . (2-14) 
As the household income tax is already defined in Equation (2-7), the other elements are 
defined as follows: 
¦  
T
reg
T
reg
T
reg
T
reg PACtcTRC
sec
secsecsec ;  (2-15) 
¦¦  
sec
,
sec
,
sec
,
sec
fac
regfacregfacregfacreg PFFtfTRF  ; (2-16) 
, , ,
sec sec sec
sec
( )
reg reg regg reg regg regg reg reg
T T T
T regg
reg
TRM tm QBM PWE EXC
z
   ¦ ¦ .  (2-17) 
Note that in Equation (2-17), bilateral imports to region reg from region regg are denoted by 
reggreg
TQBM
,
sec , while tariff revenues from these imported goods are converted to the local 
currency by multiplying the corresponding world prices 
regregg
TPWE
,
sec  by the exchange rate 
regEXC . Figure 2-3 thus summarises the income flows of the government in a region: 
 
2-15 
 
Figure 2-3: Government income flows 
2.2.3 Bank 
The investment bank models how outputs from production sectors are demanded for 
investment within a region. As this model attempts to isolate the non-traded public sector 
(SEC3) from the rest of the world in order to examine how a CU shock could affect such an 
isolated sector through domestic price adjustment, again, investment is not allocated to SEC3, 
which is the non-traded sector that specifically produces to meet the governments final 
demand. Thus, the investment demand function is expressed as: 
regreg
T
reg
T
reg
T SIIPA   secsecsec D , (2-18) 
where regS  is the total savings in region reg that will be allocated to investment demands in 
sector secT (
reg
TI sec ); and 
reg
TI secD  is the investment share of sector secT that sums up to one: 
.1
sec
sec  ¦
T
reg
TID   
The bank then collects savings from household, government and the rest of the world (the 
income-balance condition): 
( )
reg reg regreg regS SHH SG SF CPI    , (2-19) 
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while subsequently spending these savings on investment demands. In this model, foreign 
savings (
reg
SF ) are fixed in real terms and denominated in local currency. 
2.2.4 Rest of World 
The balance of payments is essentially the zero-profit condition required to maintain the 
macroeconomic balance of a region. Evaluated in world currency, it defines the nominal 
foreign savings as equal to the total value of imports less that of exports: 
, , , ,
sec sec sec sec
sec ( ) sec ( )
reg reg
reg regg regg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T reg
T regg reg T regg reg
SF CPI
QBM PWE QBE PWE
EXCz z
§ ·    ¨ ¸© ¹¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ,  (2-20) 
where 
reggreg
TQBE
,
sec  denotes bilateral exports of commodity secT from region reg to region regg. 
Note that in this model all regions operate a flexible exchange regime, thus their exchange 
rates with respect to the world currency adjust in order to stabilise the real foreign savings. As 
all regions are symmetric in this model,13 trade balances are set to be neutral.14 Hence, we 
have total exports equal to total imports and the foreign savings (which is in the second term 
on the right hand side), are fixed at zero in the benchmark year. This also implies that the sum 
of savings collected from the household and government will be equal to total domestic 
investment demands, as implied in Equations (2-18) and (2-19).     
2.2.5 Domestic Commodity Markets 
This section explains the market structures for commodities produced in a region. The value 
flow of each commodity depends on its tradability. While tradable goods are supplied to 
                                                     
13 Even if I assume products to be differentiated by country of origin, all regions can be symmetric in the sense that the 
Armington demand functions and their associated elasticities are universal and that products are all equivalently differentiated 
from each other. 
14 Trade balances of the four regions in the world economy must sum up to zero. Since all regions are modelled as completely 
symmetric, regional trade balances are fixed to zero in order to prevent asymmetry in form of trade deficits and trade surpluses. 
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domestic and foreign markets, non-traded goods are produced only for the domestic market. 
Figure 2-4 illustrates such flows for both cases in this model.  
 
Figure 2-4: Value flows of tradable and non-traded commodities in region reg 
For tradable goods, 
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TPEsec  is the aggregate export price paralleling the aggregate export 
quantity 
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TPM sec  is the aggregate import price paralleling the aggregate 
import quantity 
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TQM sec ; and 
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,
sec  represents the bilateral import price paralleling the 
bilateral import quantity 
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,
sec . As observed in Figure 2-4, direct re-exportation is not 
allowed in this model.  
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For both types of goods, 
regPDsec  denotes the price of the domestically-produced commodity 
supplied to the domestic market 
regQDS sec , which equals the level demanded for domestic 
consumption 
regQDDsec ; and lastly, aggregate demands are denoted by 
regQAsec  paralleling the 
domestic price 
regPAsec  previously introduced.  
Now, to elaborate on the market structures in Figure 2-4, the relationships between the above 
quantities and prices with respect to tradability are explained in Subsections 2.2.5.1 and 
2.2.5.2 as follows. 
2.2.5.1 Tradable Commodity Markets 
For tradable products, firstly, the supply value flows are summarised as follows: 
.secsecsecsecsecsec
reg
T
reg
T
reg
T
reg
T
reg
T
reg
T QEPEQDSPDQZPZ    (2-21) 
That is, the nominal values of domestically-produced commodities are equal to the sum of 
those supplied to domestic and to foreign markets. Further, the values of aggregate exports 
are the sum of bilateral exports supplied to other regions regg: 
, ,
sec sec sec sec
( )
.reg reg reg regg reg reggT T T T
regg reg
PE QE PBE QBE
z
  ¦  (2-22) 
In Figure 2-4, it is further specified that domestically-produced commodities supplied to the 
domestic market are equal to the quantities demanded15: 
reg
sec
reg
sec TT QDDQDS  . (2-23) 
                                                     
15  As with Equations (2-21) and (2-22), Equation (2-23) can also be expressed in value terms, such that both sides are 
equivalent when multiplied by the market price of the domestically-produced commodity (denoted by 
reg
TPDsec ), which in turn 
highlights the fact that the demand and supply of the domestically-produced good always share the same market price. 
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The demand side of the economy is specified as follows. In the upper level, the nominal 
demand for the domestic composite good 
reg
TQAsec  equals the sum of nominal demands for 
domestically-produced goods 
reg
TQDDsec  and aggregate imports 
reg
TQMsec :
16 
reg
T
reg
T
reg
T
reg
T
reg
T
reg
T QMPMQDDPDQAPA secsecsecsecsecsec   . (2-24) 
The model specifies that, in the lower level of the sectoral demand structure, the values of 
aggregate imports should equal the sum of demands for bilateral imports from other regions 
regg in nominal terms: 
, ,
sec sec sec sec
( )
.reg reg reg regg reg reggT T T T
regg reg
PM QM PBM QBM
z
  ¦  (2-25) 
Under perfect competition, the long-run market clearance condition holds, and prices of 
composite goods 
reg
TPAsec  are determined by equating 
reg
TQAsec with domestic demands from the 
household, bank and firms17: 
.sec
sec
secsecsecsec
reg
T
reg
T,
reg
T
reg
T QAIOIC   ¦  (2-26)  
If, in tradable sector secT, all prices listed above are identical, we can say that exports, 
domestically-oriented products, and imports are homogeneous, i.e. not differentiated from 
each other, which is the case for the supply side of the economy. However, on the demand 
side, it is clearly observable in empirical data that two-way trade exists.18 This phenomenon 
is modelled by assuming imperfect substitutability in consumption between commodities 
                                                     
16 The zero-profit conditions in Equations (2-24) and (2-25) apply since the respective upper- and lower-level (CES) Armington 
functions in Equations (2-28) and (2-32) are homogeneous of degree one (i.e. linear homogeneity). According to Eulers 
theorem, for any multivariate function Q = f(q1,...,qn) that is homogeneous of degree m [hence, f(t·q1,...,t·qn) = t
m·f(q1,...,qn) for 
any t>0], f1·q1+...+ fn·qn = m·f(q1,...,qn), where fx stands for the partial differentiation of Q with respect to qx. 
17 As with Equation (2-23), Equation (2-26) can also be expressed in value terms, such that both sides are multiplied by the 
Armington domestic price (
reg
TPAsec ). 
18 In many cases some of this two-way trade is a consequence of the aggregation of a range of goods. 
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produced in different countries, the Armington Assumption. 19  With such product 
differentiation, 
reg
TPAsec , 
reg
TPDsec , 
reg
TPM sec  and 
reggreg
TPBM
,
sec  in Equations (2-24) and (2-25) are 
allowed to deviate from each other, hence the sum of the domestically-produced quantity 
reg
TQDDsec  and the aggregated imported quantity 
reg
TQMsec  will no longer equal the aggregate 
demand 
reg
TQAsec ; and the sum of bilateral imports 
reggreg
TQBM
,
sec  will not necessarily equal the 
aggregate import demand 
reg
TQM sec . Accordingly Armington demand functions for 
reg
TQDDsec , 
reg
TQM sec  and 
reggreg
TQBM
,
sec  need to be separately derived. 
The Armington good is composited by minimising costs: 
reg
T
reg
T
reg
T
reg
T QDDPDQMPM secsecsecsec  , (2-27) 
subject to the CES Armington function:  
,sec
secsec
1
secsecsecsecsecsec
reg
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reg
T
reg
T AAreg
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reg
T
Areg
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reg
T
reg
T
reg
T QDDADQMAMaAQA
UUU JJ »¼
º«¬
ª   (2-28) 
where 
reg
TaAsec is the efficiency parameter, 
reg
TAM secJ and regTADsecJ are the share parameters 
 1secsec   regTregT ADAM JJ  and regTAsecU is the elasticity parameter for Armington composite good 
production. When )1/(1 secsec
reg
T
reg
T AA UV  , Equations (2-24), (2-27) and (2-28) are solved, and 
the upper-level Armington demand functions are: 
sec
sec sec1 sec
sec sec sec sec
sec
( ) ( )
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sec
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sec
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reg
T
reg
T ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§ 
V
VV J  (2-30) 
                                                     
19 See Armington (1969). The compatibility of the CES differentiation of products from different sources with theoretical general 
equilibrium trade models are then illustrated by de Melo and Robinson (1989). 
 
2-21 
Thus, demands for domestically-produced and imported commodities are determined by the 
Armington aggregate demand 
reg
TQAsec , and their relative prices to the Armington price 
reg
TPAsec . 
In the lower-level of the Armington demand structure, bilateral imports from different regions 
are also differentiated from each other. Therefore, the Armington demand function for 
aggregate imports can similarly be composed by minimising costs: 
, ,
sec sec
( )
,reg regg reg reggT T
regg reg
PBM QBM
z
¦  (2-31) 
subject to the CES Armington function:  
  secsec
1
, ,
sec sec sec sec
( )
,
regreg
TT
BMBM
reg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T
regg reg
QM aBM BM QBM
UUJ
z
ª º  « »¬ ¼¦  (2-32) 
where 
reggreg
TaBM
,
sec  is the efficiency parameter, 
reggreg
TBM
,
secJ  is the share parameter:  
,
sec
( )
1;reg reggT
reg regg
BMJ
z
 ¦  
and
reg
TBM secU is the elasticity parameter for the Armington aggregate import. When 
)1/(1 secsec
reg
T
reg
T BMBM UV  , the Armington demand function for bilaterally-imported goods is: 
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sec,
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2.2.5.2 Non-Traded Commodity Markets 
For non-traded goods, the commodity flows are fairly simple. The nominal value of a non-
traded commodity should be identical all through the supply chain, hence we get: 
reg
TN
reg
TN
reg
TN
reg
TN
reg
TN
reg
TN
reg
TN
reg
TN PAQAPDQDDPDQDSPZQZ secsecsecsecsecsecsecsec     . (2-34) 
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That is to say, the value of domestic output is equal to the value of the same product supplied 
as well as demanded within the domestic market. Since product differentiation does not apply 
to the non-traded commodity, their quantities and prices are universal by sector and region: 
reg
TN
reg
TN
reg
TN
reg
TN QAQDDQDSQZ secsecsecsec    ; and (2-35) 
reg
TN
reg
TN
reg
TN PAPDPZ secsecsec   . (2-36) 
Since the non-traded good is also a public good, produced under perfect competition, the 
market clearance condition holds, so that domestic prices are determined by equating 
domestic supplies with final demands from the government: 
reg
TN
reg
TN QACG secsec  . (2-37)  
2.2.6 International Commodity Market 
We now consider the market clearing condition in an international commodity market. The 
bilateral import demand for commodity secT by region reg from region regg should be 
identical to the matching export supplies from region regg to region reg. Hence, the sum of 
sectoral export values traded in the international market must be equal to that of the import 
values. This property is modelled by specifying that the world price (
reggreg
TPWE
,
sec ) adjusts so 
that the international market is always cleared under perfect competition. As for the 
relationship between the world price and border prices, the border price of an exported good 
is converted into the world currency as: 
.,sec
,
sec
regreggreg
T
reggreg
T EXCPWEPBE   (2-38) 
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Similarly, the world price is converted into the border price of an imported commodity 
inclusive of tariffs:20 
regregregg
T
reggreg
T
reggreg
T EXCPWEtmPBM  ,sec,sec,sec )1( . (2-39) 
2.2.7 Factor Markets 
In the factor markets, the standard assumption is that primary endowments are fully 
employed, so that the sum of the primary inputs demanded by production sectors is equal to 
the relevant endowment. However, as stated at the beginning of Section 2.2, here this 
property only holds for the capital market. The market clearing condition does not apply to 
the land market, since land is sector-specific, and these primary factor inputs are thus fixed by 
sector. In the labour market, the sum of factor demands equals the labour endowment less the 
unemployed labour. That is, this model assumes that the labour market does not necessarily 
clear, but that some of the unemployed labour may be supplied to production sectors when a 
positive policy shock is imposed on the economy (and, of course, vice versa). The labour 
wage is still flexible, but it does not necessarily ensure that the labour market will clear, as 
unemployment is endogenised and negatively associated with real wage (Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1995). Following the conception of the wage curve by Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1995), and using the technical specification by EcoMod (2006), the wage curve is defined 
such that the wage curve elasticity (Ȧreg) is -0.1 for all regions, and the downward-sloping 
relationship between real wage and unemployment is simplified to:21 
 " ", " ", 1 ( ) 1 .L reg L reg reg reg regPFM PFM 0 UNEMP UNEMP0Z ª º   ¬ ¼  (2-40) 
                                                     
20 The derivation of this price definition in accordance with the accounting identity and behavioural assumption with respect to 
taxes is demonstrated later in Subsection 2.3.1. 
21 Labours nominal wage PFM L,reg is to be divided by the consumer price index CPI reg to derive real wage, however, it can be 
abbreviated since the price index is fixed as the regional numéraire in this model. 
 
2-24 
Since variables in the benchmark year (appended with zeroes) are fixed parameters, Equation 
(2-40) can be rearranged as: 
 " "," ", " ",1 .reg L regL reg reg reg L regregPFM0PFM UNEMP PFM0UNEMP0Z Z§ ·    ¨ ¸© ¹  
Thus, the real wage is a linear function of unemployment with a negative slope. 
2.2.8 Macroeconomic Closure Rules and Numéraire 
2.2.8.1 Theory 
2.2.8.1.1 Macroeconomic Closure Rules 
In mathematical terms, all CGE models are square economic systems in the sense that every 
variable must be matched with an equation. Hence, closure rules refer to the decisions on 
endogenous and exogenous variables based on the theoretical preferences of model builders. 
Since simulation outcomes can be significantly altered by the selection of closure rules (Sen, 
1963), this subsection elaborates on the alternative set of closure rules and hence the 
justification of the choices. According to Lofgren et al. (2002), three macroeconomic balances 
are to be maintained through the specification of closure rules, namely the external balance, 
the government balance and the savings-investment balance.  
The external balance can be maintained by endogenising the real exchange rate (
regEXC ) 
while fixing foreign savings (
regSF ). Hence, trade balances converge to zero in the new 
equilibrium as the real exchange rate adjusts to the proposed policy change. More explicitly, 
trade deficits are corrected by the depreciation of the real exchange rates that simultaneously 
reduce import demands and increase export supplies. The alternative external closure rule is 
to specify that the real exchange rate is fixed while foreign savings are flexible. Under this 
approach, trade deficits are not corrected and thus we observe more foreign savings (capital 
inflows) in the new equilibrium. Although the former situation is arguably uncommon in the 
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real world as trade balances are rarely zero, given that the present CGE model uses a 
comparative static framework, the simulation result is interpreted as a long-run equilibrium. 
Therefore, the endogenisation of capital flows (foreign savings) across borders can yield 
misleading welfare outcomes. In a dynamic CGE framework however, the latter closure 
would be more suitable, since regional investment volumes depend on capital inflows and 
thus the capital accumulation process is better captured using the fixed exchange rate 
approach.22 
For the government balance, there are two closure rules discussed in Lofgren et al. (2002). 
The first government closure fixes tax rates, and thus government revenues (
regTREV ) are 
given. As government expenditures (
regCGBUD ) are not adjustable, the difference between 
government revenues and government expenditures (i.e. government savings 
regSG ) is 
residually determined. Alternatively, tax rates can be specified as endogenous variables that 
adjust to the targeted levels of government savings. Since in reality, government savings can 
be more easily adjusted than tax rates, the former approach is common in the CGE literature. 
Although not preferred by Lofgren et al. (2002), another way to close the model, according 
to EcoMod Network (2006), is to endogenise government expenditures while fixing tax rates 
and government savings. Although the three approaches alter the welfare outcomes especially 
in terms of the composition of production and consumption of an economy, the choice largely 
depends on the assumption of the government behaviour. 
For the saving-investment balance, closure rules are either savings-driven or investment-
driven. The savings-driven closure specifies that regional investment (
regS ) is endogenous 
and determined by the sum of savings from the household, the government and the rest of the 
world. Under this approach, the households marginal propensity to save (
regmps ) is fixed, so 
the economy is savings-driven as investment is a residual of savings. The alternative closure 
                                                     
22 The implications of the external balances closure rules are explored in the sensitivity analysis (see Subsection 2.6.3). 
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is investment-driven, in which total investment is fixed and the government implements 
policies that generate savings to finance the targeted level of investment. As such, the 
households marginal propensity to save is endogenised under this closure. 
Given the three balances that must be maintained, the Neo-Classical closure, which is the 
most widely used, is the combination of the fixed foreign savings closure, the savings-driven 
closure, and one of the three government closures introduced above. Therefore, real 
investment adjusts the sum of household, government and foreign savings. On the other hand, 
the Johansen closure adopts the investment-driven closure, i.e. investment is fixed, requiring 
consumption to endogenously adjust as the marginal propensity to save becomes flexible. 
Since both sets of closure rules assume full employment, aggregate GDP will not be affected 
by the choice of closure rules. The interaction between macroeconomic variables and labour 
demands can be additionally specified by introducing the Keynesian closure to the model. As 
a variant of structuralist CGE models, 23 labour unemployment (or total labour supply) is 
endogenised by specifying the real wage as exogenous. The structuralist macro models 
encompass the short-run elements that the level of output is determined by the level of 
aggregate demand as production resources are flexibly provided to generate the increase in 
output in response to the augmented demand (and vice versa). This approach is therefore 
advocated by its proponents for its reflection of structural rigidities in markets and institutions 
relatively specific to developing economies. Another way to incorporate unemployment to the 
model is to explicitly introduce the wage curve relationship between the real wage and 
unemployment, which is, so to speak, a balanced labour market closure as both variables are 
endogenous while the level of labour employment adjusts to the changes in real wage with 
respect to the elasticity of wage curve (Ȧreg), as explained in Subsection 2.2.7.24 
                                                     
23 See Taylor (1990) for the detailed description of the structuralist approach. 
24 The implications of the labour market clearing rules are explored in the sensitivity analysis of Chapter 3 (see Subsection 3.6.5). 
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2.2.8.1.2 Numéraire 
The specification of the numéraire is in compliance with Walras Law that if (n-1) markets in 
an economic model composed of n distinctive markets are in equilibrium then equilibrium in 
the last one will be guaranteed. For that reason, exogenising one of the nominal price 
variables will prevent redundancy and will allow changes in all other price variables to be 
measured in relation to the chosen numéraire. The required number of numéraires is an on-
going theoretical issue. While the GTAP model (Hertel, 1998), among others, specifies an 
international price to be the only numéraire, many models adopt multiple numéraires, that is a 
domestic price for each region plus an international price for the world market (for instance, 
the GTEM model in Pant, 2002; and the GreenMod model in Bayar et al., 2006). The latter 
approach is taken throughout this thesis since it is argued in Pant (2002) that there are two 
redundancies in the model: the first one is the market clearing conditions for regional 
currencies (the regional budget constraint), while the other one is the market clearing 
condition for international savings and investment (the global budget constraint), since the 
accounting identity of the global market that global trade always balances and global transfer 
payments always sum up to zero.  
2.2.8.2 Model Specifications of Closure rules and Numéraire 
As explained in Subsections 2.2.1 to 2.2.7, for the external balance, the current model 
adopts the flexible exchange rate closure (fixed foreign savings), which is suitable given the 
static nature of the model. For the government balance, tax rates and government savings 
are fixed while government consumption, and thus government expenditures, is specified as 
endogenously determined by the Cobb-Douglas public demand function. Since this model has 
only one composite public good, SEC3, the counterfactual public demand is then driven by 
the levels of domestic economic activities, as they eventually determine gross tax revenues 
given that tax rates are fixed. Thus, the government remains a passive economic agent that 
distributes the collected tax revenues as received from the private sector. For the saving-
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investment balance, the model is specified as savings-driven and real investment is 
determined by the target (fixed) saving rates, which is consistent with the formerly-stated 
external balance closure that foreign savings are exogenous. Lastly the labour-market 
closure is subject to the wage curve definition, and thus factor prices are not completely fixed 
but are rigidly determined by the level of labour demand in the production function at a fixed 
wage curve elasticity. 
As stated above, the consumer price index (
regCPI ) is chosen as the regional numéraire while 
the exchange rate of region REG1 (
" "REG1EXC ) is fixed as the numéraire for the world market. 
2.2.9 Welfare Decomposition: The Equivalent Variation (EV) Approach 
This study mainly utilises the standard EV method in analysing the welfare effects of CU 
formation. It measures the income change induced by regional trade liberalisation, given the 
price in the benchmark year.25 Following Varian (1992), the EV can be expressed as: 
1,0
reg
reg reg
reg
Y
EV Y0
WPI
  ,  (2-41) 
where regional incomes in the benchmark year and after the proposed change are denoted by 
Y0 reg and Y reg, respectively. The counterfactual regional income Y reg is then deflated by: 
1,0
reg
reg
reg
WPI
WPI
WPI0
 ,  
where WPI0 reg and WPI reg respectively represent the regional welfare price indices in the 
benchmark year and after the proposed change. Consistent with Blake (1998), these regional 
                                                     
25 Although the economic theoretic basis for the EV presumes full employment, which does not hold in the implementation of the 
current model with unemployment; the method is used as the standard measure of welfare variation throughout this thesis, firstly 
because thus far there is no superior measure to the EV, and secondly because the gap between wage and marginal productivity 
of labour as a result of the unemployment specification is trivial and will not be large enough to alter the direction of welfare 
change in the simulation results. 
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welfare price indices are the geometric averages of the price indices perceived by the 
household, the government and the bank, weighted by their budget shares in the Cobb-
Douglas form: 
      ,   regregreg SPIregHPIregGPIregreg SPIHPIGPIWPI DDD   (2-42) 
where GPI reg, HPI reg and SPI reg stand for consumer price indices of the government, the 
household and the bank respectively; while ĮGPI reg, ĮHPI reg and ĮSPI reg denote the budget 
shares of the government, the household and the bank respectively in the regional income. 
These price indices are defined as the geometric average of aggregate prices, weighted by 
their respective expenditure shares of the Cobb-Douglas utility function: 
 
sec
sec
sec)(
regCGregreg PAGPI
D  (2-43) 
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sec
sec
sec regIregreg PASPI D  (2-45) 
The budget shares of the government, the household and the bank are those in the benchmark 
year, and necessarily sum to one ( 1  regregreg SPIHPIGPI DDD ). Therefore the Cobb-
Douglas property holds. That is to say, 
reg
reg
reg
CGBUD0
GPI
Y0
D   (2-46) 
reg
reg
reg
CBUD0
HPI
Y0
D   (2-47) 
,  where
reg
reg
reg
S0
SPI
Y0
D   (2-48) 
.reg reg reg regCGBUD0 CBUD0 S0 Y0    (2-49) 
From the EV definition in Equation (2-41), the EV can be decomposed into the real income 
effect and the consumer surplus effect. The real income effect is the nominal change in 
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regional income deflated by regWPI 0,1 ; and the consumer surplus effect shows the effect of 
changes in prices on welfare: 
1,0 1,0
real income effect consumer surplus effect
1
1 .
reg reg
reg reg
reg reg
Y Y0
EV Y0
WPI WPI
§ ·   ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹	
 	

 (2-50) 
2.2.9.1 The Real Income Effect 
The real income effect is decomposed into the production effect, the tax-revenue effect and 
the capital-inflow effect. To derive these effects, the first term is decomposed as following: 
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 (2-51) 
2.2.9.1.1 The Production Effect by Sector 
The production effect is the change in the value-added after a shock, deflated by 
regWPI 0,1 . 
Further, we can disaggregate the production effect by sector as: 
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2.2.9.1.2 The Tax-revenue Effect by Type of Taxes and by Sector 
Using Equation (2-14), the tax-revenue effect comprises the welfare effects of changes in 
commodity taxes, factor usage taxes, import tariffs and income taxes. However, the change in 
income tax revenues is not shown in the regional tax-revenue effect, since they are paid by the 
household, so that they are internally transferred and do not affect the regional income. 
The commodity tax revenue effect is defined as 1,0( ) /
reg reg regTRC TRC0 WPI , its effect by 
sector being decomposed as:  
 sec sec sec sec sec
1,0
reg reg reg reg reg
T T T T T
reg
tc PA C PA0 C0
WPI
  
. (2-53) 
As for the factor usage tax revenue effect, we have 1,0( ) /
reg reg regTRF TRF0 WPI , and thus its 
effect by sector is:  
, ,
, , ,
sec sec sec
, ,
sec sec
1,0
$ ( ) $ ( )
$ ( ) $ ( )
fac reg fac reg
fac reg fac reg fac reg
T T T
fac reg fac regfac
T T
reg
PFM facM fac PFM 0 facM fac
tf F F0
PFS facS fac PFS0 facS fac
WPI
ª º§ · § · « »¨ ¸ ¨ ¸  « »¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹ © ¹¬ ¼
¦
.  (2-54) 
Since factor usage taxes are ad valorem, the factor tax revenue effect is proportionate to the 
production effect in Equation (2-52).  
Lastly, the import tariff revenue effect is 1,0( ) /
reg reg regTRM TRM 0 WPI , thus we know that its 
effect by sector is expressed as: 
, ,
sec sec
,
sec
, ,( )
sec sec
1,0
regg reg reg reg regg
T T
reg regg
T
regg reg reg reg reggregg reg
T T
reg
PWE EXC QBM
tm
PWE0 EXC0 QBM0
WPI
z
§ ·  ¨ ¸¨ ¸ © ¹
¦
 . (2-55) 
Note that no tax revenue effects are observed in the non-traded sector (SEC3), as it is assumed 
to be a public sector, i.e. there is no tax/tariff imposed. 
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2.2.9.1.3 The Capital-Inflow Effect 
The regional capital-inflow effect shown as the third term of Equation (2-51) is not further 
decomposed. Furthermore, since foreign savings are fixed to zero, there is no capital-inflow 
effect in this model.  
2.2.9.2 The Consumer Surplus Effect 
The consumer surplus effect in the second term of Equation (2-50) can be decomposed into 
the effects on the government, the household and the investment bank. From Equation (2-49), 
we know that the consumer surplus effect is 1,0(1/ 1)
reg regWPI CGBUD0  for the government; 
1,0(1/ 1)
reg regWPI CBUD0  for the household; and 1,0(1/ 1)reg regWPI S0  for the investment bank. 
Hence, by definition, the benchmark budget constraints (i.e. 
regCGBUD0  for the government, 
regCBUD0  for the household, and 
regS0  for the bank) are key determinants of their respective 
consumer surplus effects. 
2.3 CU Simulation Regarding Relative Market Size 
Section 2.3 considers CU formation in a perfectly-competitive world economy with four 
regions, different in their economic sizes, although identical in their production technologies 
and consumer tastes. The model also specifies that the ratio of each type of factor endowment 
(i.e. labour, capital and land) to total factor endowment is identical across regions. Two 
regions (REG1 and REG2) are defined as small while the others (REG3 and REG4) are 
defined as large, not with respect to their impacts on world prices (i.e. in a traditional sense, 
a price change in a small country will not affect world prices), but in terms of their relative 
economic sizes. In other words, although referred to as small, they are not negligibly small 
and a CU formed between them will have some influence on the international market. 
As one of the smaller regions, REG1 considers liberalising trade with another region in order 
to facilitate its economic growth. First, this section explores the welfare effects of REG1 
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forming a CU with the other small region (REG2), and when the rest of the world (REG3 and 
REG4) also forms another CU at the same time. Then, the second option for REG1 is also 
investigated, where it forms a CU with one of the large regions (REG3), and where that 
triggers another CU formation between the rest of the world (REG2 and REG4). 
Prior to the analyses of simulation results in Subsection 2.3.3, Subsection 2.3.1 firstly 
introduces the concept of the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) and its role in clarifying the 
accounting identities with respect to taxes that underlie the price definitions in the afore-
mentioned CGE model. After elaborating on the values of benchmark variables and 
parameters and the price normalisation procedure, Subsection 2.3.2 then gives specific details 
of the policy experiments conducted in the first part of the chapter. 
2.3.1 The Data 
2.3.1.1 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) and Price Definitions 
The relationship between SAMs and CGE models is explicitly identified in Pyatt (1988) and 
McDonald (2007). A complete and consistent SAM is a square matrix that covers all 
transactions in an economy, and every income for an economic agent has a corresponding 
expenditure by another agent. The rows and columns of a SAM must be identically ordered, 
and by tradition, receipts of agent i are entered in row i and expenditures by agent j are 
entered in column j. Hence, payments to i by j is read at the point where row i and column j 
intersect, and a balanced SAM must have equivalent totals of the matching rows and columns. 
As Pyatt (1988) suggested, every economic model has a corresponding SAM, and therefore 
the present CGE model can be accounted for in a SAM format. Table 2-1 shows the SAM for 
the small regions and Table 2-2 shows that for the large ones.  
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Table 2-1: Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the small regions (REG1 and REG2) 
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 1  Commodity SEC1 6 6 6 15 2 35
 2  Commodity SEC2 6 6 6 15 2 35
 3  Commodity SEC3 26 26
 4  Sector SEC1 23 6 29
 5  Sector SEC2 23 6 29
 6  Sector SEC3 26 26
 7  Labour 5 5 5 15
 8  Capital 5 5 5 15
 9  Land 4 4 4 12
10 Household 15 15 12 2 44
11 Government 6 2 2 2 6 13 31
12 Commodity taxes 3 3 6
13 Labour taxes 1 1 2
14 Capital taxes 1 1 2
15 Land taxes 1 1 2
16 Tariffs 3 3 6
17 Income taxes 13 13
18 Savings 1 3 0 4
19 Rest of the world 6 6 12
    TOTAL 35 35 26 29 29 26 15 15 12 44 31 6 2 2 2 6 13 4 12  
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Table 2-2: Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the large regions (REG3 and REG4) 
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 1  Commodity SEC1 60 60 60 150 20 350
 2  Commodity SEC2 60 60 60 150 20 350
 3  Commodity SEC3 260 260
 4  Sector SEC1 230 60 290
 5  Sector SEC2 230 60 290
 6  Sector SEC3 260 260
 7  Labour 50 50 50 150
 8  Capital 50 50 50 150
 9  Land 40 40 40 120
10 Household 150 150 120 20 440
11 Government 60 20 20 20 60 130 310
12 Commodity taxes 30 30 60
13 Labour taxes 10 10 20
14 Capital taxes 10 10 20
15 Land taxes 10 10 20
16 Tariffs 30 30 60
17 Income taxes 130 130
18 Savings 10 30 0 40
19 Rest of the world 60 60 120
    TOTAL 350 350 260 290 290 260 150 150 120 440 310 60 20 20 20 60 130 40 120
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These SAMs are consistent with the description of the model structure in Section 2.2 that the 
income-balance, zero-profit and market-clearing conditions hold for all economic 
transactions, i.e. the corresponding row and column totals equate. The SAMs consist of five 
broad categories of accounts, namely commodities, activities (by production sectors), factors, 
institutions (i.e. the household, the government and the bank) and trade (with the rest of the 
world). To explicitly identify the detailed sources of government tax revenues, tax accounts 
(i.e. commodity taxes, factor taxes, tariffs and income taxes) are also included. 
By definition, each element in a SAM is in value terms, i.e. the product of a price and a 
quantity. As CGE models are Walrasian in spirit, prices only matter in relative terms. 
Moreover, the accounting identities that accord with the economic logic perspective require 
that transaction quantities in each row are purchased at a common single price so that all 
entries in the same row represent commensurate units. Therefore, the price system embedded 
in the present CGE model in Section 2.2 is implicitly SAM-based, since the common price for 
each row reflects the average revenue that should be identical to the average cost in the 
corresponding column. This rule implies that all prices are derived from accounting identities 
whether or not the data are represented as a SAM (McDonald, 2007). 
To illustrate, the definition of import prices in home currency is derived as follows. Denote by 
SAM(i,j) the entry in the ith row and the jth column of a SAM. Assuming that imports are not 
differentiated by origin, and the superscript reg is abbreviated for brevity, the import value of 
secT in home currency can be calculated as a simple accounting identity: 
sec sec ("Rest of the world","Commodity sec ")
("Tariffs","Commodity sec ")
T TPM QM SAM T
SAM T
  

 
As each SAM entry can be expressed as a price multiplied by quantity, the right-hand side of 
the above equation reads: 
sec sec sec sec sec sec sec
sec sec sec
( ) ( )
( )
T T T T T T T
T T T
PM QM PWE EXC QM tm PWE EXC QM
PM 1 tm PWE EXC
       
?    
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when tariffs are imposed at ad valorem rates. McDonald (2007) stresses that the price 
definition of aggregate import in this sense is the average revenue that is determined by the 
average cost given that the quantity is commensurate. 
2.3.1.2 Description of Benchmark Variables and Parameters 
In Table 2-1 and Table 2-2, benchmark data are symmetric across regions, although the 
values in small regions (REG1 and REG2) are 10 % of those in the large regions (REG3 and 
REG4). Capital and land endowments thus equal the aggregate of primary inputs to 
production sectors. However, labour endowments are the sum of those supplied to production 
sectors and of the unemployed labour, which are 1 unit in the small regions and 10 units in the 
large ones. Total government transfers to the household are $2 in small regions and $20 in 
large ones.26 The replacement rate is 0.5 in all regions, thus according to Equation (2-10), 
25% of the transfers is in the form of unemployment benefits.27 
Substitution elasticities are identical in all sectors and regions. The substitution elasticity 
between the three factor inputs is 0.8; while that of the Armington production function is 2 for 
the upper level, and 4 for the lower level.  
As regards consumption and investment demands by commodity, the government only 
consumes commodity SEC3, leaving SEC1 and SEC2 to household consumption and 
investment. Household savings are $1 in small regions and $10 in large ones; while 
government savings are $3 in small regions and $30 in large ones. Their savings are passed on 
to the regional banks to purchase investment commodities. Since the symmetry requires that 
the balance of payments is zero for all regions, foreign savings are zero, and household plus 
government savings equals the aggregate of the investment demands in each region.  
                                                     
26 Domestic values can be referred to in world currency, $, as the benchmark exchange rates are set to one for all regions. 
27 The replacement rate has been defined in Equation (2-10) as the ratio of unemployment benefits to wage incomes that the 
household would have earned if employed. 
 
2-38 
Since products are differentiated at the border, modelled using the Armington demand 
function, there is cross-hauling of tradable commodities (SEC1 and SEC2) in Table 2-3, 
where imports are read along the rows and exports are read down the columns. To maintain 
the symmetry, the model assumes identical two-way trade data between any pair of regions, 
and due to their economic sizes, small regions can only trade small volumes with the rest of 
the world. Large regions, on the other hand, can trade big volumes with each other.  
Table 2-3: Bilateral trade values of goods (SEC1 and SEC2) in world currency ($) 
Trade values REG1 REG2 REG3 REG4 Total 
REG1   2 2 2 6 
REG2 2  2 2 6 
REG3 2 2  56 60 
REG4 2 2 56  60 
Total 6 6 60 60  
Lastly, taxation is introduced to the production and consumption of non-public goods (SEC1 
and SEC2). Factor usage taxes are $1 in small regions and $10 in large ones, while 
commodity tax revenues are $3 in small regions and $30 in large ones. Income taxes are $13 
in small regions, and $130 in large ones. Tariff revenues, on the other hand, are summarised 
in Table 2-4, where each cell represents the import tariff payments by the exporting region in 
the column to the importing one in the row: 
Table 2-4: Bilateral tariffs on tradable goods (SEC1 and SEC2) in world currency ($) 
Bilateral Tariffs REG1 REG2 REG3 REG4 Total 
REG1  1 1 1 3 
REG2 1  1 1 3 
REG3 1 1  28 30 
REG4 1 1 28  30 
2.3.1.3 Price Normalisation Procedure 
In conjunction with the value flows in Figure 2-4, this subsection explains how commodity 
prices are calibrated at the base year. The benchmark output prices in region reg (
sec
regPZ0 ) are 
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normalised to one. As outputs are not differentiated by destination, the prices of domestically-
produced goods (
sec
regPD0 ), aggregate exports ( sec
regPE0 ) and bilateral exports ( ,sec
reg reggPBE0 ) are 
also equal to one. The exchange rates are set to one, as also are the bilateral world prices 
( ,
sec
reg reggPWE0 ). The ad valorem tariff rates drive a wedge between world and domestic import 
prices, therefore the domestic prices of bilateral imports from region reg in region regg 
( ,
sec
regg regPBM 0 ) is higher than one, i.e. inclusive of tariffs. Given the nested Armington 
function, prices are differentiated by origin, so at the lower-level aggregate import prices are 
calibrated from the relationship in Equation (2-25) that the values of aggregate imports are a 
function of total bilateral import values. More specifically, since the model calibrates 
aggregate import volumes to be identical to the sum of bilateral ones: 
,
sec sec
regg regg reg
reg
QM 0 QBM 0 ¦  
domestic aggregate import prices (
sec
reggPM 0 ) are hence the average prices of the 
corresponding bilateral ones, and thus higher than one. At the upper-level of the Armington 
function, since 
sec sec1 and >1
regg reggPD0 PM 0 , and the Armington goods are calibrated as: 
sec sec sec ,
regg regg reggQA0 QD0 QM 0   
according to Equation (2-24) the Armington prices are then the weighted averages of the two 
prices: sec sec sec(=1)
regg regg reggPD0 PA0 PM 0  .  
2.3.2 Policy Experiments 
The motivation behind the simulation of a small region forming CUs with either small or 
large regions is to pinpoint the welfare effects of CU formations with regions of different 
market sizes. The chapter assumes that, even though the world economy is perfectly 
competitive, and Heckscher-Ohlin based comparative advantage is ruled out since the model 
presumes symmetry in factor abundance among regions, a small region (REG1) may still 
 
2-40 
substantially benefit from regional trade liberalisation, because under the Armington 
assumption, product differentiation between domestically-produced goods and imports from 
other regions implicitly yields monopolistic powers to commodities from different origins. 
Thus, even though regions are completely symmetric, regional market expansion with 
Armington preferences should yield positive gains to member regions. 
Therefore, the four policy experiments are designed as follows. The first one, labeled as 
REG1+REG2, is a simulation of a CU formation between two small regions. More 
specifically, the tariffs one small region  REG1  imposes on the bilateral imports from the 
other small region  REG2  are completely eliminated, and vice versa. Since common import 
tariff rates are applied to imports from all regions at the exogenous level, the tariff removal 
implicitly means that a customs union with common external tariffs is formed. The second 
experiment is subsequently conducted by assuming that the other two large regions (REG3 
and REG4) also form another CU in the presence of the previous one, henceforth referred to 
as REG1+REG2 & REG3+REG4. For the third one, labeled as REG1+REG3, a CU is 
simulated between the two regions of different sizes, i.e. the small REG1 and the large REG3; 
and then for the last scenario, labeled as REG1+REG3 & REG2+REG4, the other two 
regions of different sizes (REG2 and REG4) also form another CU in the presence of the 
REG1+REG3 CU. 
2.3.3 Simulation Results 
The simulation results from the four CU scenarios are compared in Chart 2-2, Table 2-5, 
Table 2-6a and Table 2-6b. In Chart 2-2 and Table 2-5, similar adjustments are observed in 
the real GDP, the level of unemployment, and the volumes of imports and exports by sector. 
For REG1, these real variables respond most positively to the CU formation with a large 
region (REG3), and it is more likely that REG1 will gain at a higher rate than REG3, since in 
relation to each regions total trade, the small members dependence on trade with the large 
member is greater than the large members reliance on the small one due to the varied degrees 
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of production capacity constraints (see Table 2-1 to Table 2-4 for the baseline SAMs and 
bilateral trade and tariff data).  
Chart 2-2: Relative market size simulation results (percentage changes in real GDP) 
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Source: Simulated by author.  
Table 2-5: Percentage changes in key variables given four types of CU formations 
                              CU scenarios 
Percentage change 
REG1+REG2 
REG1+REG2 
 REG3+REG4 
REG1+REG3 
REG1+REG3 
REG2+REG4 
REG1 -53.23% -29.82% -70.83% -60.63% 
REG2 -53.23% -29.82% 12.67% -60.63% 
REG3 1.32% -99.93% -7.68% -2.47% 
Unemployed 
labour 
REG4 1.32% -99.93% 5.16% -2.47% 
REG1 (secT28) 32.01% 20.52% 42.06% 36.78% 
REG2 (secT) 32.01% 20.52% -5.84% 36.78% 
REG3 (secT) -0.62% 64.26% 4.22% 1.17% 
Aggregate 
imports   
sec
reg
TQM  
REG4 (secT) -0.62% 64.26% -2.40% 1.17% 
REG1 (secT) 33.32% 32.02% 38.59% 37.88% 
REG2 (secT) 33.32% 32.02% -2.49% 37.88% 
REG3 (secT) -0.26% 64.80% 4.21% 3.32% 
Aggregate 
exports   
sec
reg
TQE  
REG4 (secT) -0.26% 64.80% -1.01% 3.32% 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: Numbers in bold letters are those of the regions involved in a CU formation. 
                                                     
28 For simulation results reported in the table format, note that secT and secTN are used to indicate the welfare effects of CU 
formations on individual tradable and non-traded sectors, respectively. 
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Table 2-6a: Terms-of-Trade (TOT) index for each region under various CU formations 
                         CU scenarios 
Terms-of-Trade index 
REG1+REG2 
REG1+REG2 
REG3+REG4 
REG1+REG3 
REG1+REG3 
REG2+REG4 
REG1 1.19 1.12 1.24 1.21 
REG2 1.19 1.12 0.97 1.21 
REG3 1.00 1.36 1.03 1.01 
REG4 1.00 1.36 0.99 1.01 
    Source: Simulated by author. Note: Numbers in bold letters are those of the regions involved in a CU formation. 
Even if the rest of the world forms another CU at the same time, REG1 would still find 
REG1+REG3 more beneficial than regional economic integration with the other small 
region (REG2). Not surprisingly, if REG1 is a member of the REG1+REG2 CU and faces a 
similar grouping by the rest of the world (the REG3+REG4 CU), the welfare gains will be 
lowest among the four options. As for other regions, the percentage changes in real variables 
turn negative if they are left outside regional groupings, and the losses get bigger as the size 
of the CU economy grows. 
In Table 2-6a, the terms-of-trade (TOT) index reported is calculated as the ratio of the 
Laspeyre price index of regional exports to that of imports:  
sec sec sec sec
sec sec
sec sec sec sec
sec sec
reg reg reg reg
T T T T
reg T T
reg reg reg reg
T T T T
T T
PE QE0 PM QM0
TOT
PE0 QE0 PM 0 QM 0
§ · ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹
¦ ¦
¦ ¦ . (2-56) 
By definition, this index captures the terms-of-trade change effect for each region, which 
improves when TOTreg > 1; is neutral when TOTreg = 1; and deteriorates when 0 < TOTreg < 1. 
Since the terms of trade is one of the factors that cause welfare gains or losses after a CU 
formation, the value of the TOT index should be consistent with the simulation results 
observed in Chart 2-2 and Table 2-5. As predicted, Table 2-6a shows that the TOT index 
improves with the economic size of the regional grouping, among which small members gain 
more than the large ones; the terms-of-trade gains are reduced if the CU faces the formation 
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of another CU formation by the rest of the world; and non-members find their terms of trade 
progressively worsen as the CU size grows.  
In essence, the differential results of the small region, REG1, forming a CU with the other 
small region, REG2, and with the large region, REG3, arise from the differences in trade 
shares, which is the only cross-country asymmetry reflecting the size discrepancy among the 
four regions. To identify the source of gains for the terms of trade in Table 2-5a, Table 2-6b 
further reports the percentage changes in bilateral trade volumes among the four regions. 
Table 2-6b: Percentage changes in the volumes of bilateral exports of individual 
tradable sectors (secT) under various CU scenarios 
Trading partners 
Exporters  Importers  
REG1+REG2 
REG1+REG2 
REG3+REG4 
REG1+REG3 
REG1+REG3  
REG2+REG4 
Small REG2 140.29% 171.44% -22.44% -36.43% 
Large REG3 -20.17% -37.70% 162.22% 173.73% Small REG1 
Large REG4 -20.17% -37.70% -24.01% -23.68% 
Small REG1 140.29% 171.44% -15.69% -36.43% 
Large REG3 -20.17% -37.70% 2.11% -23.68% Small REG2 
Large REG4 -20.17% -37.70% 6.13% 173.73% 
Small REG1 -15.38% -41.61% 179.50% 190.94% 
Small REG2 -15.38% -41.61% 0.12% -18.88% Large REG3 
Large REG4 0.82% 72.40% -1.90% -2.59% 
Small REG1 -15.38% -41.61% -17.95% -18.88% 
Small REG2 -15.38% -41.61% 5.41% 190.94% Large REG4 
Large REG3 0.82% 72.40% -0.63% -2.59% 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: Numbers in bold letters are those of the regions involved in a CU formation. 
It is observed in Table 2-6b that initial trade shares play an important role in determining the 
level of welfare impact on each economy. While the REG1+REG2 CU yields identical 
results to the two small member regions; the REG1+REG3 CU affects the small and large 
members in a different manner. According to the benchmark trade flows reported in Table 2-
3, initial trade shares of individual regions of all sizes in a small regions total trade are 
completely identical. Meanwhile, each small regions trade share in a large regions total 
trade is specified to be 28 times smaller than the other large regions share at the benchmark 
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year. Therefore, the small members domestic prices and terms of trade are impacted to a 
greater extent than the large members when the CU between REG1 and REG3 is launched, 
and similarly the effects on the ratios of trade to GDP of the two members become 
asymmetric.  As the real exchange rate of the small member appreciates considerably more 
than that of the large counterpart, under the flexible exchange rate regime with fixed foreign 
savings (and thus the zero trade balance in equilibrium), bilateral trade between the two 
members will also be adjusted in the sense that the net bilateral import volumes from the 
large member to the small member is positive. More to the point, as with the results in Table 
2-6b that REG1 exports more to REG3 by 162.22% while REG3 in return exports more to 
REG1 by 179.50%. 
To elaborate on the patterns of welfare changes given economic size differentials, Chart 2-3 
and Table 2-7 to Table 2-10 summarise the welfare effects of four types of CU formations in 
terms of the decomposed EVs in world currency ($) as defined in Subsection 2.2.9. 
Chart 2-3: Relative market size simulation results (regional EVs in world currency: $) 
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      Source: Simulated by author.  
Chart 2-3 confirms that the regional EV results are consistent with the variation in real 
variables and terms of trade previously discussed. Hence, if regions differ only in terms of 
their economic sizes, the best option for a small region (REG1) is to form a CU with a larger 
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economy, since the economic gains will be substantial enough to cancel out the potential 
negative effects when the rest of the world counteracts by forming another CU. The large 
region, on the other hand, may not find a regional grouping with a small region attractive in 
economic terms, as it incurs adjustment costs with little gains expected. Nevertheless, a CU 
between small and large regions may still be formed for political reasons. 
Table 2-7: The EVs as a small region (REG1) forms a CU with another small region 
(REG2) 
Decomposed EVs (in world currency: $) 
REG1 & 
REG2 
(small) 
REG3 & 
REG4   
(large) 
secT 1.55 -0.20 Production 
effect 
secTN 0.91 -0.58 
Commodity taxes (secT) 0.26 -0.06 
Factor taxes (secT) 0.33 -0.04 
Real income 
effect 
Tax revenue 
effect 
Tariffs (secT) -0.85 -0.11 
Household -0.50 0.18 
Government -0.43 0.16 
Consumer 
surplus 
effect 
Bank -0.07 0.02 
Regional EV 2.48 -1.04 
Source: Simulated by author. 
Table 2-8: The EVs as the rest of the world forms a “REG3+REG4” CU concurrently 
with the “REG1+REG2” CU 
Decomposed EVs (in world currency: $) 
REG1 & 
REG2 
(small) 
REG3 & 
REG4   
(large) 
secT 1.28 30.71 Production 
effect 
secTN -0.30 14.24 
Commodity taxes (secT) 0.14 4.83 
Factor taxes (secT) 0.28 6.61 
Real income 
effect 
Tax revenue 
effect 
Tariffs (secT) -1.20 -18.59 
Household -0.14 -8.78 
Government -0.13 -7.61 
Consumer 
surplus 
effect 
Bank -0.02 -1.17 
Regional EV 0.40 43.80 
Source: Simulated by author. 
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Table 2-9: The EVs as a small region (REG1) forms a CU with a large region (REG3) 
Decomposed EVs (in world currency: $) REG1 (small) 
REG2 
(small) 
REG3  
(large) 
REG4  
(large) 
secT 1.89 -0.20 1.99 -0.79 Production 
effect 
secTN 1.55 -0.55 1.75 -2.26 
Commodity taxes (secT) 0.34 -0.06 0.37 -0.25 
Factor taxes (secT) 0.41 -0.04 0.43 -0.17 
Real income 
effect 
Tax 
revenue 
effect 
Tariffs (secT) -0.84 -0.10 -0.82 -0.42 
Household -0.71 0.18 -0.80 0.72 
Government -0.62 0.15 -0.69 0.62 
Consumer 
surplus effect 
Bank -0.10 0.02 -0.11 0.10 
Regional EV 3.71 -1.00 4.07 -4.08 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: Numbers in bold letters are those of the regions involved in a CU formation. 
Table 2-10: The EVs as the rest of the world forms a “REG2+REG4” CU concurrently 
with the “REG1+REG3” CU 
Decomposed EVs (in world currency: $) 
REG1 & 
REG2 
(small) 
REG3 & 
REG4 
(large) 
secT 1.78 1.22 Production 
effect 
secTN 1.03 -0.60 
Commodity taxes (secT) 0.29 0.12 
Factor taxes (secT) 0.38 0.26 
Real income 
effect 
Tax-revenue 
effect 
Tariffs (secT) -0.98 -1.03 
Household -0.56 -0.06 
Government -0.49 -0.06 
Consumer 
surplus effect 
Bank -0.08 -0.01 
Regional EV 2.82 -0.13 
Source: Simulated by author.  
In Subsections 2.3.3.1-2.3.3.4, the welfare effects of the four types of CU formations are 
separately decomposed and analysed. It is noteworthy that under all scenarios, the production 
effects are the biggest sources of welfare changes, since higher trade volumes facilitate 
production increases in the tradable sectors. Adjustments to the union between small regions 
are explained in Subsection 2.3.3.1; and similar mechanisms are observed in the other types 
of CU formations, although with certain differences in the distribution of welfare gains due to 
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the differences in economic sizes and thus trade shares of partner regions, as explained in 
Subsection 2.3.3.2 to Subsection 2.3.3.4. 
2.3.3.1 The Welfare Effects of a CU Formation between Two Small Regions 
(“REG1+REG2”) 
2.3.3.1.1 Small CU Members (REG1 and REG2) 
As bilateral tariffs between members are abolished, the corresponding imports become 
available more cheaply, causing bilateral trade between CU members to increase by 140.3%. 
As a secondary effect of the regional grouping, the domestic prices of imports from non-
members become higher than those from the CU counterpart, reducing imports from non-
members by 15.7%. 29  Simultaneously, consumers in the CU countries substitute for 
domestically-produced commodities with imports from the other member, causing the 6.0% 
fall in domestic sales of the domestically-produced goods. Overall, the Armington demands in 
member regions increase by 4.1% due to the expansion in the private sector given the 
enlarged economic size. Even taking into account the 20.2% drop in export volumes to non-
members, their aggregate export volumes still increase by 33.3% and domestic production 
thus expands. 
Higher import demands from other members unanimously increase the returns to primary 
factors. Although, given the existence of unemployed labour, the variation in the labour wage 
after the shock is smaller than that for capital, owing to the higher flexibility in the labour 
supply since the unemployed can enter the market whenever production expands. Thus, 
labour employment tends to incur lower costs per production unit. Actually, capitals rental 
rate rises by 10% while the labour wage increases by only 5.3%. Due to the higher factor 
                                                     
29 The extent to which bilateral import demands increase with prices depends on the elasticity of substitution ( reg
TBM secV ), as 
observed in Equation (2-33). 
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demands, the production effect, which is the biggest component of the change in regional EV, 
is equivalent to $1.55 in each tradable sector. Also, note that the production effect is 
strengthened by the Stolper-Samuelson magnification effect that makes the factor price 
change higher than the variation in the parallel commodity price.  
As for the production effect in the non-traded sector (SEC3), production factors are bid away 
to produce more tradable goods. As a result, production in SEC3 falls while the price rises 
due to excess demand. Consequently, nominal returns to primary factors increase, although 
not by as much as in tradable sectors.30  
Equations (2-52) and (2-54) imply that the factor tax revenue effect is a fixed proportion of 
the production effect in the same sector. On the other hand, the tariff revenue effect is 
unambiguously negative as members eliminate import tariffs within the grouping, and tariff 
revenues received from non-members also deteriorate as imports are diverted from non-
members to the union counterpart. The commodity tax revenue effect, on the other hand, 
depends on private and investment demands. Since returns to the primary factors owned by 
the household significantly increase, household income increases by 8.66%, and we observe a 
positive commodity tax revenue effect given the increased consumption demand. The higher 
household income also raises savings and eventually regional investment.   
With respect to the consumer surplus effects in member regions, from the definition in 
Subsection 2.2.9.2, the key variable is the regional welfare price index ( regWPI 0,1 ), which 
depends on the change in the Armington price. As the Armington price rises, we observe that 
regWPI 0,1 > 1, and the consumer surplus effects on the household, the government, and the bank 
in member regions become negative, their values being proportionate to their respective ex-
ante consumption and investment budget constraints.  
                                                     
30 Note that the production effects on SEC3 remain ambiguous in general. Once the fall in its production exceeds the rise in its 
price, the production effect may turn negative as we observe in later scenarios. 
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2.3.3.1.2 Large Non-Members (REG3 and REG4) 
The elimination of import tariffs between CU members stimulates total demand and trade in 
the world market. Hence, it improves the world prices of members exports by 5.9%. Since 
output prices are not differentiated by destination, non-members likewise face higher world 
export prices that reduce import demands by the member regions. Non-members adjust to 
such changes by trading more between themselves. In spite of that, the CU formation still 
reduces the aggregate imports of non-members, by 0.6%.31 This, in turn, expands domestic 
production by 0.1% to meet with the relatively stable domestic demands. Regarding aggregate 
exports, the decrease in exports to CU members lowers non-members exports by 0.3%. 
Therefore, the CU formation worsens the real GDP of non-members, though this is marginal 
in percentage terms, as non-members are relatively large, and thus are not strongly affected 
by the formation of a small CU (Chart 2-2).  
Inevitably, the diminishing import demands from CU members lower non-members output 
prices and payments to production factors. As a result, the production effect on each tradable 
sector is negative. The tariff revenue also drops since import demands decline following the 
CU formation. As incomes in non-member regions decline, household consumption falls, and 
the commodity tax-revenue effect is negative. Thus, total tax revenues as well as public 
demand decrease. This mechanism also explains the relative negativity of the production 
effect on the public sector (SEC3) compared to the private sectors (SEC1 and SEC2).  
The economic contraction reduces the regional welfare price indices.32 As a consequence, the 
regional EVs of non-members are negative, although not strongly because the proportion of 
trade with the small CU members in total consumption of a large non-member region is small. 
                                                     
31 The difference in economic sizes is the reason behind such a smaller percentage change in non-member countries. 
32  See Equation (2-42) for the definition of the regional welfare price index. 
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2.3.3.2 The Welfare Effects of CU Formation between the Two Small Regions 
(“REG1+REG2”), in the Presence of Another CU between the Two Large Regions 
(“REG3+REG4”) 
2.3.3.2.1 Small CU Members (REG1 and REG2) 
Here the economic effects of CU formation between small members given the existence of 
another union between the two large regions (REG3+REG4) are compared with those in 
Subsection 2.3.3.1. In general, the small regions benefit less from their union than in the 
previous scenario. Under this setting, bilateral imports between the members of the small 
CU increase by 171.4%, much more than in Subsection 2.3.3.1, due to the fact that the small 
regions now face higher barriers from non-members. However, their aggregate imports rise 
only by 20.5%, compared to the 32.0% increase in Subsection 2.3.3.1; and aggregate exports 
expand only by 7.9%, since the large CU also divert imports from small regions to their 
counterparts. As a result, the real income and consumer surplus effects in Table 2-8 are lower 
than that in Table 2-7, and the tariff revenue effect becomes more negative since the decline 
in tariff revenue is not only entailed by the intra-group tariff removal, but also exacerbated by 
the previous formation of the other CU that causes the inter-group trade to eventually drop by 
41.6%. The production effect on the non-traded sector (sec3) is now negative, as the 
diminishing commodity and factor demands in the non-traded sector outweigh the moderate 
increase in their corresponding prices, owing to the decreased total tax revenues and the 
increased mobile factor prices. Since lands rental rate, which is specific to this sector, drops 
by 3.2%, the adverse effect on the public sector is to be expected.   
2.3.3.2.2 Large CU Members (REG3 and REG4) 
The simulation outcomes for the large regions are comparable to those reported in Subsection 
2.3.3.1 for CU members, with the magnitude accentuated by the ten-times larger market sizes. 
Also, in this scenario, the welfare outcomes for large regions are less affected by the 
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formation of the CU between the small regions, because bilateral trade with these regions is 
relatively small compared to their economic sizes. 
2.3.3.3 The Welfare Effects of a CU Formation between Small and Large Regions 
(“REG1+REG3”) 
2.3.3.3.1 Small and Large CU Members (REG1 and REG3) 
As Chart 2-2, Table 2-5 and Table 2-6a show, the percentage changes in key variables for the 
small region (REG1) are approximately ten times higher than those observed in the large 
region (REG3), as its economic size and trade flows are only 10% of those in the large 
partner. Thus, the results generally indicate that the proportional variations in economic 
indicators of member regions are inversely proportionate to their ex-ante economic sizes. 
Given the adjustment in variables mentioned above, between the two CU members, the 
direction of change is generally consistent with the outcomes in Subsection 2.3.3.1 (Table 2-
9). Since the increase in the regional price index is larger in the relatively smaller member, 
under REG1+REG3, the small members welfare gain (EV) becomes slightly lower than that 
of the large partner. 
2.3.3.3.2 Small and Large Non-Members (REG2 and REG4) 
Creation of this CU has similar welfare effects on the small and large economies outside the 
grouping, and the outcomes are similar to those already discussed in Subsection 2.3.3.1. 
Moreover, as was the case for the member regions in Subsection 2.3.3.3.1, the magnitudes of 
the decomposed EVs on non-members are proportionate to their economic sizes, although the 
discrepancies in the decomposed EVs among non-member regions are greater than those 
among CU members. That is to say, in absolute terms, the large region (REG4) is more 
adversely affected by the CU formation than the small one (REG2). This is captured in the 
third column (REG1+REG3) of Table 2-5, in that the proportional changes in real indicators 
for the small non-member region (REG2) are double those for the large non-member (REG4), 
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despite the fact that its economy is ten times smaller. Hence, while we know that the non-
members (REG2 and REG4) are certainly worse off as a result of trade diversion after the 
formation of the REG1 and REG3 CU, the union does enhance the trade relationship between 
the two non-member economies. For that reason, the absolute loss for REG2 is smaller than 
that for REG4, since REG2 has relatively better access to the large market in REG4, while 
REG4 has to re-direct its trade from the large CU member to the smaller market in REG2. 
2.3.3.4 The Welfare Effects of CU Formations between Regions of Different Sizes 
(“REG1+REG3” and “REG2+REG4”) 
2.3.3.4.1 Small CU Members (REG1 and REG2) 
The regional EVs for small regions in Table 2-10 are smaller than those reported in Table 2-9. 
The emergence of the counteracting union certainly lessens small members welfare gains, 
since it reduces small members bilateral imports from countries outside the union, so that the 
positive union effects on prices and quantities of small regions are exacerbated.  
2.3.3.4.2 Large CU Members (REG3 and REG4) 
In Table 2-10, the regional EVs for the large regions fall markedly due to the strong trade 
diversion effect. Given the benchmark elasticity of substitution between imports from 
members and non-members, imports from the large region outside the grouping are replaced 
by the relatively cheaper small union member. In this scenario, the welfare of the large 
regions deteriorates since they cannot expect strong trade creation from the union with a 
region that is 10% of their size. It was observed in Subsection 2.3.3.3 that even without the 
formation of the counteracting CU by the rest of the world, the agreement between regions of 
different sizes still has a non-negligible trade diversion effects on each large member (REG3 
or REG4) since they do not gain significantly more than the small partner (REG1 or REG2). 
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The large members decomposed EVs in Table 2-10 identify various sources of negative 
regional EVs. As this table shows, large members also experience considerable losses in 
import tariff revenues that subsequently reduce public demand. As a result, the production 
effect in secTN turns strongly negative. However, the simulation results in the fourth column 
of Table 2-5 and Table 2-6a indicate that the large regions still benefit moderately from the 
regional groupings as real variables consistently respond to the shock in a positive way. 
2.4 CU Simulation Regarding Market Structure 
Section 2.4 examines how different types of market structures alter the simulation results of 
preferential trade liberalisation. In the first scenario, this section analyses the formation of the 
CU between REG1 and REG2, assuming perfect competition in all markets. The second 
scenario allows for Cournot oligopoly in homogeneous commodity markets without barriers 
to entry or exit; and the third assumes Cournot oligopoly with entry/exit barriers. In the fourth 
and fifth scenarios, the Cournot oligopoly assumption is replaced by monopolistic 
competition with horizontal product differentiation.  
2.4.1 Imperfect Competition and CGE Modelling 
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, markets are usually perfectly competitive, 
and in the long-run equilibrium commodity prices are equal to average costs. Since marginal 
costs do not vary with the scale of production, average costs are also equal to marginal costs. 
On the other hand, imperfect competition is often associated with the presence of economies 
of scale (Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr, 1997). When production incurs fixed costs  as 
average costs are the sum of fixed and variable costs per unit of production; and marginal 
costs only refer to variable costs per unit  average costs are greater than marginal costs and 
must be decreasing functions of outputs (see Appendix A2-2). There we have the internal 
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economies of scale, which usually imply imperfect competition as firms always have an 
incentive to expand their production scales.33 Imperfect competition tends to imply welfare 
losses, since firms are able to set market prices above marginal costs. After trade 
liberalisation, overseas competition will lower domestic prices and reduce the domestic 
market power of Cournot oligopolistic firms (Brander, 1981). Also, under monopolistic 
competition, international trade simultaneously offers consumers a greater variety of products 
and lower prices (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2000). Francois and Roland-Holst (1997) stressed 
that in general the economic gains directly linked to scale economies and/or imperfect 
competition may be some of the most substantial effects following from trade liberalisation.  
Following Willenbockel (2004), imperfect competition is incorporated into the model 
described in Section 2.2 to investigate how commodity markets operate under internal 
economies of scale (See Appendix A2-3 for details). In a world economy comprising four 
regions, only one tradable private sector (SEC1) is modelled as perfectly competitive, 
henceforth denoted by pc. The other tradable private sector (SEC2) and the non-traded public 
sector (SEC3) are imperfectly competitive, denoted by ic. The set of commodities is thus: 
sec = {pc, ic}, where: 
pc = {SEC1} and ic = {SEC2, SEC3}. 
The imperfectly competitive sectors have
reg
icNOF  firms producing homogeneous 
commodities. Without entry barriers, the number of firms adjusts to ensure sectoral zero 
profits. Fixed factor inputs for each firm are denoted by
regfac
icff
,
. Hence, fixed factor inputs for 
each sector depend solely on the number of firms. When denoting variable factor inputs for 
each sector by 
regfac
icFV
,
, total factor inputs read: 
                                                     
33 See Chapter 6 of International Economics by Krugman and Obstfeld (2000), for example, in page 119: when increasing 
returns enter the trade picture, then, markets usually become imperfectly competitive, and in page 122: ...internal economies of 
scale lead to a breakdown of perfect competition.  
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, , , ,fac reg fac reg reg fac regic ic ic icF FV NOF ff    (2-57) 
where variable factor demands by firms in sector ic (
regfac
icFV
,
) are determined by factor prices 
and output levels. Therefore, the CES production function in Equation (2-3) is replaced by:  
 
,
, , ,
,
,
, ,
,
(1 ) $ ( ) $ ( )
$ ( )
( ) (1 )
$ ( )
reg
ic
reg
ic
F
fac reg
reg ic
ic fac reg fac reg fac reg
ic icfac reg
ic
fac reg
Freg fac reg fac reg
ic ic ic
fac reg
ic
F
QZ
tf PFM facM fac PFS facS fac
FV
PFM facM fac
aF F tf
PFS facS fac
V
V
J
J
§ ·¨ ¸ ¨ ¸  © ¹ 
ª § ·¨ ¸  ¨ ¸© ¹
1 1
reg
ic
reg reg
ic ic
F
F F
fac
V
V V ­ ½º° °« »® ¾« »° °¬ ¼¯ ¿
¦
 
 (2-58) 
2.4.1.1 Cournot Oligopolistic Sectors with Homogeneous Products 
2.4.1.1.1 Profit Maximisation under Cournot Oligopoly 
The total profits of the identical firms are expressed as: 
Ȇ = PZ · qz  MC · qz, (2-59) 
where PZ represents sectoral commodity prices; qz denotes output levels of firms; and MC 
stands for marginal costs. 34 Firms maximise profits with respect to output quantities, thus 
they produce where Ȇ /qz = 0. In other words, marginal revenues read: 
 
.11
,
¸¸¹
·
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w 
PZ
qz
qz
QZ
QZ
PZ
PZ
PZ
qz
qz
PZ
PZqz
qz
PZ
PZMR
MC
qz
qzPZ
MR
 
Following Nicholson (2002), Cournot oligopoly assumes that each firm recognises that its 
own output decision (qz) affects market price (PZ) but not the output decisions of other firms 
                                                     
34 For brevity, subscripts (ic) and superscripts (reg) are abbreviated here, but will be appended again later when referring to 
certain equations in the model. 
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since it is completely uninformed about other firms policies (QZ/qz = 1). In other words, 
firms are myopic in that they maximise profits based on the assumption that whatever 
quantities rival firms choose to produce will be permanent. Hence it differs from the 
conjectural variations case, in which the effects of a firms output decision on other firms are 
taken into account (QZ/qz  1). Thus, marginal revenues may be written as: 
¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§ w
w 
QZ
qz
PZ
QZ
QZ
PZ
PZMR 1 . (2-60) 
As each firm produces the same output level, we know that qz/QZ = 1/NOF, therefore: 
,
11
1 MC
NOFEDM
PZMR  ¹¸
·
©¨
§   (2-61) 
where EDM denotes the elasticity of demand perceived by firms:  
¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§ ww 
PZ
PZ
QZ
QZ
EDM . (2-62) 
Using the symbol  to represent the proportional change in a variable, EDM can also be 
expressed as EDM = ZPZQ / . Since the mark-ups of firms equal sectoral commodity prices 
(PZ) less marginal costs (MC), they increase with the prices and are inversely proportional to 
the elasticity of demand and the number of firms: 
NOFEDM
PZ
MCPZMUP   . (2-63) 
Hence, the following mark-up pricing equation is added to the previous model structure 
(explained in Section 2.2) to ensure that MR = MC, thus firms maximise profits under 
Cournot oligopoly: 
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,
,
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For each sector under oligopoly, Equation (2-64) can be interpreted as: 
PZ  MUP = VC/QZ, (2-65) 
where VC denotes sectoral variable costs. Now, this section returns to the general property of 
imperfect competition. For the whole industry, the freedom of entry assumption ensures that 
the zero-profit condition in Equation (2-4) still holds: total revenues equal total costs, or TR = 
TC. When sectoral fixed costs are denoted by FC, Equation (2-4) can also be expressed as: 
QZ ·PZ = FC + VC. (2-66) 
Dividing by sectoral outputs to derive average costs (AC): 
PZ = FC/QZ + VC/QZ = AC.  (2-67) 
Therefore, under imperfect competition with free entry and exit of firms, it is always true that 
PZ = AC > MC = MR. Moreover, from Equations (2-65) and (2-67), as sectoral profits are 
always zero, mark-ups will be just high enough to cover unit fixed costs, thus: 
FC/QZ = MUP. (2-68) 
2.4.1.1.2 Perceived Price Elasticity of Demand under Cournot Oligopoly 
The price elasticities of demand (
reg
icEDM ) are perceived differently in non-traded and 
tradable sectors, and thus are derived separately as follows. 
2.4.1.1.2.a Non-Traded Sector 
From Equations (2-35) and (2-37), domestic demands for non-traded goods should be equal to 
total outputs in each sector: 
.secsec
reg
TN
reg
TN CGQZ   (2-69) 
Take the natural logarithm of Equation (2-69) to find the expression for the perceived 
elasticity of demand: 
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Since
reg
TN
reg
TN PZPA secsec  , and firms have no influence on regCGBUD , total differentiation of 
Equation (2-70) yields: 
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. sec
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TNreg
TN ZP
QZ
CG
ZQ   (2-71) 
Therefore, from Equation (2-62), the perceived elasticity of demand for non-traded sectors 
under Cournot oligopoly is: 
reg
TN
reg
TN
reg
TN
reg
TN
reg
TN QZCGZPZQEDM secsecsecsecsec
   . (2-72) 
2.4.1.1.2.b Tradable Sector 
This chapter further assumes that domestic firms in tradable sectors under Cournot oligopoly 
do not regard foreign firms as their competitors. Thus, the perceived elasticity of demand 
does not take into account reactions from domestic or foreign rival firms, just as it 
assumes no retaliation by domestic rivals in the same sector. In addition, from Subsection 
2.2.5.1, markets are internationally integrated such that the law of one price reigns globally, 
and firms charge common supply prices across regional market segments. In other words, 
there is no differentiation between prices of domestic goods produced for the domestic market 
and for exports:
reg
T
reg
T
reg
T PEPDPZ secsecsec   . 
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Given the above assumptions, the perceived elasticity of demand for tradable sectors is thus 
the weighted average of such elasticities within own and foreign markets: 
¦
z
 
regregg
reggreg
Treg
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regregg
Tregreg
Treg
T
reg
Treg
T EDM
QZ
QBM
EDM
QZ
QDD
EDM ,sec
sec
,
sec,
sec
sec
sec
sec
, (2-73) 
where 
reg
T
regregg
regregg
T
reg
T QZQBMQDD sec
,
secsec   ¦
z
.  
Accordingly, to find a solution for Equation (2-73), such perceived elasticities of demand 
within own and foreign markets are to be calculated separately.  
The former elasticity  regregTEDM ,sec  is derived by log differentiating Equation (2-29):  
reg
T
reg
T
reg
T
reg
T
reg
T
reg
T AQDPAAPADDQ secsecsecsecsecsec
  VV . (2-74) 
Since this elasticity is defined as 
reg
T
reg
T
regreg
T DPDDQEDM secsec
,
sec
/ , Equation (2-74) can be 
rewritten as follows: 
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Since 
reg
T
reg
T DPAP secsec
/  reflects the share of the expenditure on domestically-produced goods 
( sec sec
reg reg
T TQDD PD ) in Armington composite commodity group expenditure ( regTregT PAQA secsec  ), 
or: 
sec sec sec
sec secsec


reg reg reg
T T T
reg regreg
T TT
PA PD QDD
PA QAPD
  ; (2-76) 
and by assumption, 1/ secsec  regTregT APAQ , as firms perceive themselves to have no influences 
on the aggregate group expenditure (
reg
T
reg
T PAQA secsec  ) given any change in regTPAsec due to the 
Cobb-Douglas domestic demand property; Equation (2-75) can be rewritten as: 
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Similarly, the perceived elasticity of demand for bilateral imports from region reg to region 
regg (
reggreg
TEDM
,
sec ) in Equation (2-73) can be derived by log differentiating the following 
equation, in which Equation (2-30) is substituted into Equation (2-33): 
 
 
sec
sec
sec
sec
,
1
, sec sec
sec sec ,
sec
1
sec sec
sec sec
sec
   .
regg
T
regg
T
regg
T
regg
T
BM
regg reg regg
BM
regg reg regg T T
T T regg reg
T
A
regg regg
A
regg reggT T
T Tregg
T
BM PM
QBM aBM
PBM
AM PA
aA QA
PM
V
V
V
V
J
J


§ ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
§ · ¨ ¸© ¹
 (2-78) 
The log differentiation yields: 
  reggTreggTreggTregreggTreggTreggTreggTreggTregreggT AQAPAMBPBMMPABMMBQ secsecsec,secsecsecsecsec,sec   VVVV . 
This equation can be rephrased as following: 
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As with Equation (2-76), 
regregg
T
regg
T MBPMP
,
secsec
/ and 
regregg
T
regg
T MBPAP
,
secsec
/ represent the shares of 
imports from region reg in total import values and composite commodity group expenditures 
of region regg, respectively. Therefore, the perceived elasticity of demand for Cournot 
oligopolistic commodity group secT in region regg is expressed as: 
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Hence, the perceived demand elasticities in tradable sectors are derived by substituting 
Equation (2-77) and (2-79) into Equation (2-73):  
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2.4.1.2 Monopolistic Competition Sectors with Horizontal Heterogeneous Products 
This section explains how to incorporate monopolistic competition with the Dixit-Stiglitz 
(1977) Love-of-Variety preferences. In monopolistically competitive sectors, consumers 
regard products in the same sector as perfectly substitutable, yet distinguishable. Since 
products from different firms are heterogeneous by definition, they possess a certain kind of 
monopolistic power. 
2.4.1.2.1 Intra-Industry Product Differentiation: Love-of-Variety Preference 
Figure 2-5 illustrates the structure of the quantity group index of sector SEC2 in a region. 
Perfectly substitutable products are heterogeneous but can be grouped into sectors, with firms 
using similar production technologies across varieties within a sector.  
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Figure 2-5: Structure of the commodity group index comprising outputs from individual 
firms in SEC2 
At the upper level, consumers maximise their utility by allocating their consumption budgets 
across commodity groups (Xsec), the values of which depend entirely on their corresponding 
price indices (Psec), according to the Cobb-Douglas demand property. At the lower stage, Xsec 
is a composite index of outputs from heterogeneous firms (xsec,i) dual to the individual prices 
denoted by psec,i; and the number of firms in each group is denoted by NOFsec, where i = {1, 2, 
, NOFsec} is a set of individual varieties in sector sec.  
Green (1964) argues that commodity groupings are strictly justified if: 
x The product of Xsec and Psec equals the sum of consumption expenditures on 
individual varieties. 
x The two-stage maximisation procedure is consistent, which means that the optimal 
individual commodity consumption determined by this procedure is identical to the 
amount which would have been purchased had utility been maximised with respect to 
the individual prices without any grouping. 
The first requirement can be phrased as: 
¦    sec1 sec,sec,secsec NOFi ii xpXP . (2-81) 
Since these varieties are perfect substitutes, individual prices and quantities are universal 
within a sector, and thus equation (2-81) can be re-written as: 
secsecsecsecsec xpNOFXP   . (2-82) 
As for the second requirement, the two-stage maximisation consistency is satisfied when 
either weak or strong separability holds. Weak separability35 requires that if there are only 
                                                     
35 The condition of the grouping is also termed as functional separability by Leontief (1947). 
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two groups in the economy, the necessary and sufficient conditions for individual quantities 
and prices to be grouped in terms of Xsec and Psec, respectively are that the marginal rate of 
substitution between any pair of individual commodities in a group shall be independent of 
any quantities outside the group. Green (1964) proved that if there are more than two groups, 
weak separability is no longer sufficient for the grouping. Strong separability, on the other 
hand, satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions for the two-stage maximisation 
consistency, and thus justifies the grouping, even when the number of groups is higher than 
two. It only requires that each group output index Xsec be a function that is homogeneous of 
degree one in its individual outputs (xsec). Thus, a ș% change in individual commodity 
consumption will result in an equivalent ș% change in the commodity group index and the 
consumers total expenditure, holding prices constant. 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) meet the above requirements by specifying a homothetic utility 
function: U = u(X "SEC1", X "SEC2", X "SEC3"), in which the quantity index is expressed as a CES 
function of individual quantities: 
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where ıLVsec is the elasticity of substitution between varieties within a group36. As with 
Equation (2-82), the demand function for perfectly substitutable individual varieties in 
Equation (2-83) can be rewritten as: 
    sec1sec11secsecsec secsecsec
sec
sec
sec
xNOFxNOFX LV
LVLV
LV
LV
LV  »¼
º«¬
ª   VVV
V
V
V
. (2-84) 
Accordingly, the price index dual to Xsec can be derived as: 
                                                     
36 As the function is homogeneous of degree one in its xsec, we know that 0< 1-1/ secıLV  <1. Therefore, secLVV >1. 
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> @  > @   sec1 1sec1 11secsec1 11 1sec,sec secsecsecsecsec sec pNOFpNOFpP LVLVLVLVNOFi LVi     ¦ VVVVV . (2-85) 
Thus, Equations (2-84) and (2-85) satisfy Equation (2-82), and are homogeneous of degree 
one in their individual outputs and prices, respectively. Subsequently, we can derive the 
demand function for individual variety from these two equations: 
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V
 (2-86) 
2.4.1.2.2 Profit Maximisation by Heterogeneous Firms 
As in the case of Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous products, under monopolistic 
competition individual firms maximise profits with respect to their output levels, thus 
equating marginal revenues (MRsec) to marginal costs (MCsec): 
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 (2-87) 
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Marginal revenues and marginal costs thus can be expressed as: 
¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§   
sec
secsecsec
1
1
EDM
pMCMR ,  (2-89) 
where secsecsec / pxEDM   stands for the elasticity of demand for each variety. 
2.4.1.2.3 Monopolistic Competition and Elasticity of Demand for Each Varietys Output  
The model assumes that the number of firms is large enough to prevent individual firms from 
influencing the groups price index (Psec). From Equation (2-86), we may derive the elasticity 
of demand for each variety as: 
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From Equations (2-84) and (2-85), the elasticity of demand under monopolistic competition 
with product differentiation is: 
secsec LVEDM V . (2-91) 
2.4.1.2.4 Model Application 
This section explains the modification of a perfectly competitive sector into a sector under 
monopolistic competition with heterogeneous products. Such modification is mainly 
concerned with consumption demands, since consumers are now assumed to prefer product 
variety. The market clearing condition for such a monopolistically competitive sector is: 
,
sec
sec, ¹¸
·
©¨
§   ¦ regicregicregicregicregicregic qaIOqaFDNOFqaNOFQA  (2-92) 
where 
reg
icQA  is the composite output demand; and 
reg
icqa represents the demand for the 
individual variety of commodity ic, which can be decomposed into final and intermediate 
demands, denoted by 
reg
icqaFD  and 
reg
icqaIO ,sec  respectively. From Equation (2-86), these 
individual demands can also be expressed as functions of group demands: 
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where 
reg
icPA  is the group price index; and 
reg
icpa  represents the price of the individual variety 
of commodity ic. From Equation (2-85), Equations (2-93) and (2-94) are rewritten as: 
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regicregicregicLVLVregicregic CGICNOFqaFD regicregic  VV1 , and (2-95) 
   regicLVLVregicregic IONOFqaIO regicregic sec,1sec,  VV . (2-96) 
Substituting Equations (2-95) and (2-96) into Equation (2-92) gives: 
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Therefore, there is a scaling effect of the Love-of-Variety preference on the group indices of 
final and intermediate demands, of which the magnitude depends on the size of the scaling 
vector in Equation (2-97).37 From Equation (2-85), the group price index (
reg
icPA ) can now be 
expressed as:  
  .1 1 regicLVregicregic paNOFPA regic  V  (2-98) 
Again, the scaling effect of monopolistic competition is observable in this equation. The 
nominal values of final group demands are: 
  regicLVregicregicregicregic paNOFCPAC regic   V1 1 ; (2-99) 
  regicLVregicregicregicregic paNOFIPAI regic   V1 1 ; and (2-100) 
  regicLVregicregicregicregic paNOFCGPACG regic   V1 1 . (2-101) 
Similarly, for intermediate inputs, the nominal values of intermediate group demands are: 
  regicLVregicregicregicregic paNOFIOPAIO regic   V1 1sec,sec, . (2-102) 
Accordingly, given Equation (2-89), the mark-up pricing equation is then re-expressed as: 
                                                     
37 Note that since the number of firms is positive and reg
icLVV >1, the scaling vector is always positive. The model description in 
Section (C) of Appendix A2-3 refers to this scaling vector as 
reg
icAUX . 
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where the subscript icc stands for the set of monopolistic competition sectors alias to ic; and 
the elasticity of demand for individual varietys output is fixed and equal to the elasticity of 
substitution between varieties, as shown in Equation (2-91). 
2.4.1.3 Barriers to Entering and Exiting an Imperfectly Competitive Sector 
Under imperfect competition with the economies of scale, incumbent firms have a strong 
incentive to prevent potential rivals from entering the market, since market prices and then the 
profits of these firms tend to decrease as the number of firms increases. In addition, a high 
ratio of fixed to variable costs could naturally become an entry barrier to new entrants.  
 As firm mobility is restricted (i.e. 
reg
icNOF ), firms in imperfectly competitive sectors are able 
to reap positive profits (rents). Accordingly, these newly derived firms profits are then 
transferred to the representative household. Thus, the definition of household income sources 
formerly shown in Equation (2-9) is replaced by: 
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where the sum of sectoral profits (
reg
icPROFIT ) is added to the original equation. The zero-
profit condition in Equation (2-4) is modified such that total revenues are equal to total costs 
plus sectoral profits:  
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where the prices of intermediate inputs (  ) are calculated as the group price indices  
  sec11sec secregreg LV regNOF paV    
when the intermediate inputs are purchased from monopolistically competitive markets.  
Equation (2-105) can be simplified with scripts abbreviated as:  
QZ ·PZ = (FC + VC) + PROFIT. (2-106) 
Divide Equation (2-106) by sectoral outputs (QZ) to find commodity prices (PZ) equal 
average costs plus unit profits: 
PZ = (FC / QZ + VC / QZ) + PROFIT / QZ. (2-107) 
From Equations (2-106) and (2-107), total revenues are higher than total costs, thus prices 
(i.e. average revenues) are higher than average costs. Nevertheless, marginal revenues are still 
equal to marginal costs (PZ  MUP = VC/QZ) as in Equation (2-65). Therefore, with 
entry/exit barriers, we know that: PZ > AC > MC = MR. Moreover, as profits are positive, a 
firms mark-up comprises fixed costs and unit profits:  
FC/QZ + PROFIT/QZ = MUP.  (2-108) 
Compared to Equation (2-68), the mark-up, which is the gap between the output price and 
marginal costs, is not only entailed by fixed costs, but also includes profits per unit of output. 
2.4.2 CU Simulation Results 
In order to capture the differences in CU simulation outcomes under different market 
structures, this section modifies the set of data previously used in the CU simulations on 
regions of different market sizes (see Subsection 2.3.1 for the description of the previous data 
set). Since all regions are now absolutely symmetric, the value flows in regions REG1 and 
REG2 equivalently are increased by ten times, and thus the SAMs of all regions are identical 
to those of the large regions reported in Table 2-2. As reported in Appendix A2-4, the 
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bilateral trade values are $20 and the corresponding bilateral tariff revenues are now $10 
across all trading partners; whilst the elasticity parameters are assumed to be unchanged in 
order to maintain the economic characteristics of the sectoral responsiveness to external 
shocks. Sector SEC1 remains perfectly competitive while the others are now either 
oligopolistic or monopolistically competitive. This specification makes it easier to make 
comparisons of sectoral adjustments under the different market structures. 
The policy experiments are set up as follows. Since the four regions are symmetric, it is not 
important which pair of regions are to form a CU. For simplicity it is assumed that REG1 and 
REG2 decide to eliminate import tariffs against each other. For the first experiment, all 
sectors in all regions are perfectly competitive. The other four experiments are conducted 
under imperfect competition, with and without firm mobility constraints, as explained at the 
beginning of Section 2.4. 
Chart 2-4: Market imperfection simulation results (percentage changes in real GDP) 
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Source: Simulated by author.  
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Chart 2-5: Market imperfection simulation results (percentage changes in tradable 
sectors’ outputs per firm) 
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Source: Simulated by author. 
Table 2-11: Percentage changes in macroeconomic variables under different market 
structures 
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SEC1 47.53% 46.85% 44.58% 47.16% 45.89% CU 
member 
SEC2 47.53% 52.40% 51.26% 52.05% 50.14% 
SEC1 -4.44% -2.96% -2.61% -3.14% -3.23% 
Aggregate 
exports  
sec
reg
TQE
 
Non-
member 
SEC2 -4.44% -6.82% -7.32% -6.50% -6.31% 
SEC1 46.19% 48.09% 46.77% 47.92% 46.79% CU 
member 
SEC2 46.19% 47.44% 45.93% 47.62% 46.19% 
SEC1 -10.28% -11.27% -11.63% -10.99% -11.11% 
Aggregate 
imports 
 
sec
reg
TQM
 
Non-
member 
SEC2 -10.28% -9.63% -9.67% -9.79% -9.88% 
Source: Simulated by author. 
The simulation results are reported in Chart 2-4, Chart 2-5, and from Table 2-11 to Table 2-
16. Chart 2-4 plots the real GDP change in CU member and non-member regions, and Chart 
2-5 shows the percentage change in output per firms under imperfect competition. Table 2-11 
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then reports the percentage changes in sectoral trade; and Table 2-12 to Table 2-16 
decompose regional EVs into the real income and consumer surplus effects. Chart 2-4, Chart 
2-5 and Table 2-11 suggest that CU members are better off in real terms, and that their 
welfare gains will more than offset the losses suffered by non-members, so that the CU shock 
will improve world welfare as a whole. For CU members, the real GDP increase is greater 
when we assume that SEC2 (tradable) and SEC3 (non-traded) are imperfectly competitive; 
and such positive effects are weakened when imperfect competition is coupled with the firm 
immobility constraint.   
Considering first aggregate exports by sector, the tradable imperfectly competitive sector 
(SEC2) exploits its scale economies by expanding production and increasing its exports to the 
global market. That, in turn, bids away production resources from the non-traded 
imperfectly competitive sector (SEC3) and the tradable sector that is perfectly competitive 
(SEC1). Hence, in the latter, the aggregate export volume falls compared to the situation when 
all sectors are under perfect competition. Consequently, aggregate imports of SEC1 under 
perfect competition increase more than those of the imperfectly competitive SEC2, and also 
are higher than the percentage change when the world economy is entirely perfectly 
competitive.   
Furthermore, as shown in Chart 2-5, the percentage changes in output per firm of imperfectly 
competitive sectors suggest that, for CU members, an oligopolistic market structure yields 
higher benefits than under a monopolistically competitive one, as it enables member regions 
to exploit their scale economies more fully. These results are consistent with the real GDP 
changes reported in Chart 2-4. 
For non-members, the restricted access for their goods increases their welfare losses as the 
introduction of increasing returns to scale further increases the detrimental trade diversion 
effect. As a consequence, the magnitude of the proportional change in non-members real 
variables is consistent with that observed in member regions, although the two are of opposite 
sign. 
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Table 2-12: The EVs of regions REG1 and REG2 forming a CU: Perfect Competition 
Decomposed EVs (in world currency: $) CU members: 
REG1 & REG2 
Non-members:   
REG3 & REG4 
SEC1 22.22 -3.48 
SEC2 22.22 -3.48 
Production effect 
SEC3 11.63 -9.82 
SEC1 3.58 -1.08 Commodity 
taxes 
SEC2 3.58 -1.08 
SEC1 4.78 -0.74 Factor taxes 
SEC2 4.78 -0.74 
SEC1 -12.87 -1.84 
Real income 
effect 
Tax 
revenue 
effect 
Tariffs 
SEC2 -12.87 -1.84 
Household -6.74 3.16 
Government -5.84 2.74 
Consumer 
surplus 
effect 
Saving-investment -0.90 0.42 
Regional EV 33.56 -17.78 
Source: Simulated by author. 
 
Table 2-13: The EVs of regions REG1 and REG2 forming a CU: Cournot oligopoly 
without barriers to entry/exit 
Decomposed EVs (in world currency: $) CU members: 
REG1 & REG2 
Non-members:   
REG3 & REG4 
SEC1 25.29 -3.50 
SEC2 23.57 -4.97 
Production effect 
SEC3 12.48 -9.17 
SEC1 3.94 -1.15 Commodity 
taxes 
SEC2 3.94 -1.15 
SEC1 5.44 -0.75 Factor taxes 
SEC2 5.10 -1.07 
SEC1 -12.46 -2.05 
Real income 
effect 
Tax 
revenue 
effect 
Tariffs 
SEC2 -13.23 -1.85 
Household -5.62 1.96 
Government -4.87 1.70 
Consumer 
surplus 
effect 
Saving-investment -0.75 0.26 
Regional EV 42.83 -21.74 
Source: Simulated by author. 
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Table 2-14: The EVs of regions REG1 and REG2 forming a CU: Cournot oligopoly 
with barriers to entry/exit 
Decomposed EVs (in world currency: $) CU members: 
REG1 & REG2 
Non-members:   
REG3 & REG4 
SEC1 23.63 -3.44 
SEC2 27.22 -6.15 
Production effect 
SEC3 18.55 -9.30 
SEC1 3.48 -1.16 Commodity 
taxes 
SEC2 3.48 -1.16 
SEC1 5.08 -0.73 Factor taxes 
SEC2 5.90 -1.33 
SEC1 -12.50 -2.11 
Real income 
effect 
Tax 
revenue 
effect 
Tariffs 
SEC2 -13.43 -1.85 
Household -5.19 2.11 
Government -4.50 1.83 
Consumer 
surplus 
effect 
Saving-investment -0.69 0.28 
Regional EV 51.04 -23.00 
Source: Simulated by author. 
 
Table 2-15: The EVs of regions REG1 and REG2 forming a CU: monopolistic 
competition without barriers to entry/exit) 
Decomposed EVs (in world currency: $) CU members: 
REG1 & REG2 
Non-members:   
REG3 & REG4 
SEC1 24.33 -3.17 
SEC2 23.48 -4.34 
Production effect 
SEC3 10.59 -9.15 
SEC1 3.76 -1.08 Commodity 
taxes 
SEC2 3.76 -1.08 
SEC1 5.23 -0.68 Factor taxes 
SEC2 5.10 -0.93 
SEC1 -12.63 -1.96 
Real income 
effect 
Tax 
revenue 
effect 
Tariffs 
SEC2 -13.25 -1.81 
Household -4.24 2.11 
Government -3.67 1.83 
Consumer 
surplus 
effect 
Saving-investment -0.57 0.28 
Regional EV 41.90 -19.96 
Source: Simulated by author. 
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Table 2-16: The EVs of regions REG1 and REG2 forming a CU: monopolistic 
competition with barriers to entry/exit)  
Decomposed EVs (in world currency: $) CU members: 
REG1 & REG2 
Non-members:   
REG3 & REG4 
SEC1 23.30 -3.53 
SEC2 24.23 -5.37 
Production effect 
SEC3 16.17 -9.49 
SEC1 3.59 -1.13 Commodity 
taxes SEC2 3.59 -1.13 
SEC1 5.01 -0.75 Factor taxes 
SEC2 5.26 -1.16 
SEC1 -12.62 -2.02
Real income 
effect 
Tax 
revenue 
effect 
Tariffs 
SEC2 -13.21 -1.84 
Household -5.79 2.53 
Government -5.02 2.19 
Consumer 
surplus effect 
Saving-investment -0.77 0.34 
Regional EV 43.74 -21.35 
Source: Simulated by author. 
2.4.2.1 Perfect Competition 
Table 2-12 reports the outcomes of REG1 and REG2 forming a CU under the assumption of 
universal perfect competition. The mechanism through which preferential tariff elimination 
alters regional welfare and real macroeconomic variables is analogous to that underlying the 
results reported in Table 2-5 to Table 2-7 in Subsection 2.3.3.1. The changes in key indicators 
have the same signs, and the differences in EV results are primarily due to the differences in 
economic size. Hence, the following explanation of Table 2-12 is abbreviated, although the 
results will be compared with those from various degrees of market competitiveness in the 
following subsections. 
2.4.2.2 Cournot Oligopolistic Competition with Homogeneous Products in Sectors 
SEC2 and SEC3 (Free Entry/Exit) 
2.4.2.2.1 CU Members (REG1 and REG2) 
For CU members, the expansion of trade within the grouping clearly outweighs the fall in 
demands for import from non-members and domestic output. Hence, as in Equation (2-80), 
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the perceived elasticity of demand for SEC2 increases by 6.65%. This implies that a change in 
domestic price will now result in greater changes in consumption. Consequently, mark-ups in 
SEC2 decline (Equation (2-63) demonstrates the negative relationship between the two 
variables). The lower mark-up forces 4.0% of oligopolistic firms to exit, which then reduces 
sectoral fixed costs.38 Equation (2-68) implies that the first-hand effect of the fall in the mark-
up is the profit loss, since the new mark-up no longer covers unit fixed cost. As a 
consequence, under the free entry and exit assumption, some firms will leave the market, 
allowing the unit fixed cost to fall until they equate with the ex-post mark-up level. Therefore, 
consistent with Horstmann and Markusen (1986), regional liberalisation will entail an exit of 
firms from the oligopolistic sector (SEC2), while the surviving firms expand their outputs (by 
10.2% in this case). As a result, aggregate output is increased relative to that of the perfectly 
competitive sector (SEC1), a consequence of increasing returns to scale.  
In Table 2-13, the production effect and factor tax revenue effect on SEC2 are positive yet 
slightly lower than those in SEC1. On the other hand, since SEC2 has lower unit costs than 
SEC1, the product becomes more affordable and we observe a stronger commodity tax 
revenue effect than in Table 2-12 due to an increase in final demand.  
The increase in total tax revenue raises public sector demand for SEC3 output by 0.7%. Since 
SEC3 is also oligopolistic, this expansion increases factor productivity, more output per firm, 
and lower unit factor inputs. Since the reduction in unit factor demand is outweighed by the 
increase in price of the mobile factors that is additionally driven up by the demand from 
tradable sectors, the production effect on SEC3 is positive. Overall, the regional EV reported 
in Table 2-13 is higher than that in Table 2-12, and such productivity improvement is 
attributable to the positive scale economy effects on the CU economies after the union. 
                                                     
38 To avoid technical problems during the simulation process, the number of firms in this model is specified as continuous. 
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2.4.2.2.2 Non-Members (REG3 and REG4) 
The CU formation tends to drive up the world prices of members exports as intra-union trade 
is promoted. Nevertheless, since the scale economies reduce unit costs after the union, the CU 
export price of SEC2 is comparatively low in the world market. Consequently, non-members 
perceive the imports of SEC2 from CU members as more affordable, thus their oligopolistic 
exports and outputs drop by 6.8% and 0.8% respectively in aggregate terms. In contrast, the 
perfectly competitive sector (SEC1) reduces its exports by 3.0% while increasing output by 
0.4%. Thus, under oligopoly, the contraction in SEC2 has more undesirable effects on the 
non-member economies than in the perfect competition model. Overall, when perfect 
competition is replaced by oligopoly, the trade diversion effect on non-members is more 
accentuated. Thus, in Table 2-13, we find higher negative values of the decomposed EVs than 
in Table 2-12. 
2.4.2.3 Cournot Oligopolistic Competition with Homogeneous Products in Sectors 
SEC2 and SEC3 (Barred Entry/Exit) 
Table 2-13 and Table 2-14 show that the firm mobility assumption does not alter the signs of 
the decomposed EVs. In comparison to the results in Table 2-13, the exogenisation of the 
number of firms increases members EV gains and non-members losses. These outcomes are 
in contrast to the results reported in Chart 2-4, where the firm mobility constraint reduces the 
variation in real GDP of members and non-members alike. The difference is attributable to 
the fact that the model fixes the number of firms, which is a real variable, while endogenising 
firms profit, which is a nominal one. As a consequence, the world economy becomes less 
affected in real terms, while being more exposed in nominal terms, since the adjustment in the 
number of firms after the CU formation is transformed into the variation in profits accruing to 
household income, making the sectoral fixed factor cost exogenous. The welfare changes for 
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2.4.2.3.1 CU Members (REG1 and REG2) 
After CU formation the mark-ups drop and, from Equation (2-108), profits decline as unit 
fixed factor demand is exogenised with the firm population. Consequently, output per firm 
does not grow as much as under the barred entry assumption.39 Thus, the economies of scale 
are not fully taken advantage of when firm mobility is restricted, and the real effects are not 
as pronounced as under the free entry assumption. However, as reported in Table 2-14, the 
overall EVs of CU regions are still increased, and the main gains come from the oligopolistic 
production effect. As sectoral fixed factor demand does not adjust downward following the 
policy change, total factor demands by oligopolistic producers become considerably higher 
after the union. 
2.4.2.3.2 Non-Members (REG3 and REG4) 
The CU effects on non-members are similar to those previously explained in Subsection 
2.4.2.2, although further accentuated by the fixing of the number of firms. In this scenario the 
mark-up increases with the decline in the Cournot demand elasticity as bilateral trade between 
CU members increases after the union. Since the number of firms is constant, each firms 
profit increases with the mark-up. Thus, the rise in profits, coupled with the fall in output 
prices due to the lower overseas demand, results in a fall in factor demands, which explains 
why we see further contraction when there is no mobility of firms. In fact, Table 2-14 reports 
that non-members welfare losses are mainly from the negative production effect on the 
Cournot sectors.  
                                                     
39 This statement refers to the results of percentage changes in outputs per firm in Chart 2-5. 
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2.4.2.4 Monopolistic Competition with Heterogeneous Products in Sectors SEC2 and 
SEC3 (Free Entry/Exit) 
The welfare effects of CU formation under monopolistic competition (Table 2-15) are 
moderate when compared with the previous results under perfect competition (Table 2-12), 
and under Cournot oligopoly (Table 2-13). Since the elasticity of demand is constant under 
monopolistic competition, firms are less endowed with price-setting power in comparison to 
the oligopolistic case. Nonetheless, they are not pure price takers, since consumers prefer 
product variety. Since monopolistic competition and Cournot oligopoly both incur fixed 
production costs, the magnitudes of welfare variations under monopolistic competition are 
closer to those under Cournot oligopoly as opposed to perfect competition. However, the 
mark-ups are modelled differently and the group price index is newly introduced. Under 
monopolistic competition, the mark-up is independent of the number of firms, but 
nevertheless is a function of the fixed demand elasticity and individual supply price.  
Equation (2-85) implies that the group price index is proportional to the scaling vector, which 
is a function of the number of firms and the elasticity of substitution between product 
varieties. Since the number of firms must be positive, and the elasticity is higher than one, the 
scaling vector is always positive and inversely proportional to the number of firms. As the 
number of firms approaches unity, the scaling vector does the same, implying that under 
monopoly the group price index is equivalent to the individual price index. Under 
monopolistic competition, however, the number of firms is more than one, implying that the 
scaling vector ranges between zero and one. Thus, the relationship between the number of 
firms and the group price index is derived as follows. If the number of firms is higher than 
one, the group price index is always lower than the individual price index; hence the sum of 
individual outputs is lower than total demand in each sector. As the number of firms 
approaches infinity, the group price index falls relative to the individual index, raising total 
sectoral demand relative to the sum of individual firms outputs.  
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2.4.2.4.1 CU Members (REG1 and REG2) 
Under the monopolistic competition assumptions used here, changes in tariffs do not affect 
the demand elasticity, and thus the mark-up rate remains unchanged. However, the access to a 
larger market, the heightened international competition, and the efficiency gains due to the 
fall in the number of firms invariably reduce the unit fixed costs and raise the output per firm, 
though not as strongly as under oligopoly (as the demand elasticity is fixed). Hence the 
production effect on the monopolistically competitive sector (SEC2) is positive but lower than 
would be the case under oligopoly.  
As the decline in the number of firms increases the scaling vector, the group price index is 
raised (see Equation (2-98)). Thus, final demands for commodity SEC2 fall as consumers 
maximise their Cobb-Douglas utility levels. Coupled with the fixed elasticity of demand, it is 
generally observed that in the CU member economies the consumption of the 
monopolistically competitive products does not expand as strongly as under Cournot 
oligopoly. As a consequence, all the decomposed tax revenue effects reported in Table 2-15 
are lower than those in Table 2-13. Hence, the public good demand (SEC3) declines more 
than when under oligopoly. 
2.4.2.4.2 Non-Members (REG3 and REG4) 
For non-member regions, the changes in real economic flows hardly differ from those 
observed under the oligopoly specification. However the percentage changes in unemployed 
labour and real GDP are lower due to the fixed demand elasticity. Since the mark-up is not 
affected by the shock, the entry of inefficient firms is barred. Thus, non-members experience 
lower negative effects than under oligopoly. 
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2.4.2.5 Monopolistic Competition with Heterogeneous Products in Sectors SEC2 and 
SEC3 (Barred Entry/Exit) 
According to the previous EV results, the differences between the CU welfare effects with 
and without firm mobility restrictions under monopolistic competition are similar to those 
under Cournot oligopoly. The EV outcomes for member and non-member regions are 
likewise accentuated when the number of firm population is exogenised. Therefore, overall, 
the barred entry assumption yields robust and consistent welfare effects for the world 
economy. 
2.5 Aiming At the Formation of a Necessarily Welfare-Improving 
CU 
Building on the previous simulations in Section 2.4, Section 2.5 then explores the concept of 
policy-determined external tariffs developed by Kemp and Wan (1976), thus investigating the 
channels through which countries can set up a welfare-enhancing CU while adjusting their 
import tariffs against non-members so as to maintain trade, and hence welfare, with the rest of 
the world at the pre-CU level, and thus increasing welfare for the world as a whole. Hence, 
consistent with the WTO requirements, the ultimate goal is to eliminate the trade diversion 
that induces efficiency losses during the process. In line with the framework proposed by 
Waschik (2006), this chapter pursues the simulation of CU formation under three types of 
market structure.40 The section uses the dataset from Section 2.4, in which SEC1 is always 
under perfect competition whereas the other sectors operate under oligopoly and/or 
monopolistic competition. The main finding is that imperfect competition does not 
substantially alter the welfare implication of a grouping with endogenous external tariffs.  
                                                     
40 Note that the cases of imperfect competition with free entry are not analysed in this section, since in reality, most of the 
imperfectly competitive sectors are subject to entry barriers for a number of reasons explained in Section 2.4. 
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Table 2-17: Percentage changes in bilateral imports under various market structures 
                                                 Market structures 
 
% changes in bilateral imports 
Perfect 
competition 
Cournot 
oligopoly 
(barred 
mobility) 
Monopolistic 
competition 
(barred 
mobility) 
SEC1 187.57% 183.54% 185.60% From CU 
member 
SEC2 187.57% 194.22% 192.38% 
SEC1 -14.38% -12.12% -12.87% 
CU 
member 
imports 
From non-
member 
SEC2 -14.38% -17.16% -16.15% 
SEC1 -22.50% -24.90% -23.97% From CU 
member 
SEC2 -22.50% -20.22% -20.98% 
SEC1 15.43% 16.43% 16.03% 
Scenario 0 
(Trade 
creation and 
trade 
diversion) 
Non-
member 
imports 
From non-
member 
SEC2 15.43% 12.36% 13.36% 
SEC1 169.95% 167.49% 169.23% From CU 
member 
SEC2 169.95% 173.05% 172.17% 
SEC1 (fixed) (fixed) (fixed) 
CU 
member 
imports 
From non-
member 
SEC2 (fixed) (fixed) (fixed) 
SEC1 0.00% -3.08% -1.78% From CU 
member 
SEC2 0.00% 3.12% 1.87% 
SEC1 0.00% 1.94% 1.11% 
Scenario 1  
(No trade 
diversion) 
Non-
member 
imports 
From non-
member 
SEC2 0.00% -1.85% -1.29% 
SEC1 169.95% 167.10% 169.00% From CU 
member 
SEC2 169.95% 172.96% 172.13% 
SEC1 (fixed) (fixed) (fixed) 
CU 
member 
imports 
From non-
member 
SEC2 (fixed) (fixed) (fixed) 
SEC1 (fixed) (fixed) (fixed) From CU 
member 
SEC2 (fixed) (fixed) (fixed) 
SEC1 0.00% -0.01% 0.00% 
Scenario 2 
(No trade 
diversion; non-
members fix 
their imports 
from CU 
members) Non-
member 
imports 
From non-
member 
SEC2 0.00% 0.26% 0.00% 
Source: Simulated by author. 
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Table 2-18: Percentage changes in tariff rates necessary to maintain the corresponding 
bilateral imports at the benchmark levels 
                                                Market structures 
 
Percentage changes in tariff rates 
Perfect 
competition 
Cournot 
oligopoly 
(barred 
mobility) 
Monopolistic 
competition 
(barred 
mobility) 
SEC1 -42.87% -40.20% -41.17% Scenario 1 
(No trade diversion) 
Members tariff rates on 
imports from non-members 
SEC2 -42.87% -45.30% -44.36% 
SEC1 -42.87% -39.82% -40.84% Members tariff rates on 
imports from non-members 
SEC2 -42.87% -45.93% -44.63% 
SEC1 0.00% -4.31% -2.63% 
Scenario 2 
(No trade diversion; 
non-members fix 
imports from 
members) 
Non- members tariff rates 
on imports from members 
SEC2 0.00% 4.65% 2.67% 
Source: Simulated by author. 
First, the percentage changes in bilateral imports are summarised in Table 2-17. For Scenario 
0, CU members only reduce import tariffs among themselves; hence the results replicate those 
in Section 2.4, where trade diversion is present. Then, tariffs are endogenised in Scenario 1, 
where CU members adjust their common external tariff rates on imports from non-members 
in a way that trade volumes are maintained at the benchmark levels, and the detrimental 
effects of trade diversion are eliminated. Lastly, in Scenario 2, non-members also endogenise 
their individual tariff rates on imports from CU members. Table 2-18 then shows the required 
adjustments in tariff rates between members and non-members, given that the initial bilateral 
tariff revenues are 50% of their import values in world currency (the $). Finally, Table 2-19 
reports the welfare implications of the above scenarios at the macroeconomic level. 
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Table 2-19: Welfare implications under different market structures 
Perfect competition Cournot oligopoly (barred mobility) Monopolistic competition (barred mobility)  
CU 
member 
Non-CU 
member World 
CU 
member 
Non-CU 
member World 
CU 
member 
Non-CU 
member World 
Real GDP (%¨) 1.81% -0.48% 0.67% 2.47% -1.32% 0.58% 2.36% -1.02% 0.67% 
Total imports* (%¨) 52.94% -9.85% 21.54% 53.20% -10.24% 21.48% 53.33% -10.09% 21.62% 
Total exports** (%¨) 47.53% -4.44% 21.54% 47.92% -4.96% 21.48% 48.01% -4.77% 21.62% 
Regional income (%¨) 8.02% -3.98% 2.02% 7.95% -4.34% 1.81% 8.13% -4.22% 1.96% 
Equivalent Variation*** 33.56 -17.78 31.56 51.04 -23.00 56.07 43.74 -21.35 44.78 
     Real income effect 47.04 -24.11 45.86 61.41 -27.22 68.39 55.33 -26.41 57.84 
Scenario 0 
(Trade creation 
and trade 
diversion) 
     Consumer effect -13.48 6.33 -14.30 -10.38 4.22 -12.32 -11.59 5.06 -13.05 
Real GDP (%¨) 2.00% 0.00% 1.00% 2.49% 0.03% 1.26% 2.40% -0.04% 1.18% 
Total imports* (%¨) 56.65% 0.00% 28.33% 56.76% 0.03% 28.39% 56.90% -0.00% 28.45% 
Total exports** (%¨) 56.65% 0.00% 28.33% 56.77% 0.02% 28.39% 56.93% -0.03% 28.45% 
Regional income (%¨) 7.86% 0.00% 3.93% 7.77% 0.07% 3.92% 7.89% -0.03% 3.93% 
Equivalent Variation*** 32.56 0.00 65.11 53.71 1.72 110.85 43.47 -0.02 86.90 
     Real income effect 46.09 0.00 92.18 64.71 2.01 133.44 55.28 -0.02 110.53 
Scenario 1 
(No trade 
diversion) 
     Consumer effect -13.53 0.00 -27.06 -11.01 -0.29 -22.59 -11.81 -0.01 -23.63 
Real GDP (%¨) 2.00% 0.00% 1.00% 2.42% 0.08% 1.25% 2.36% 0.00% 1.18% 
Total imports* (%¨) 56.65% 0.00% 28.33% 56.68% 0.04% 28.36% 56.85% 0.00% 28.43% 
Total exports** (%¨) 56.65% 0.00% 28.33% 56.68% 0.04% 28.36% 56.85% 0.00% 28.43% 
Regional income (%¨) 7.86% 0.00% 3.93% 7.69% 0.12% 3.91% 7.86% 0.00% 3.93% 
Equivalent Variation*** 32.56 0.00 65.11 53.35 1.70 110.10 43.43 0.00 86.87 
     Real income effect 46.09 0.00 92.18 64.30 1.98 132.57 55.24 0.00 110.48 
Scenario 2 
(No trade 
diversion; non-
members fix 
imports from 
members) 
     Consumer effect -13.53 0.00 -27.06 -10.96 -0.28 -22.47 -11.81 0.00 -23.61 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: * Total import is the sum of bilateral imports, not the Armington aggregate; and ** total export is the sum of bilateral exports, not the CET aggregate. Regional income is the sum of 
disposable incomes of the household, the government, and the bank; and *** the Equivalent Variation consists the real income effect and consumer surplus effect, in world currency: $.
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2.5.1 Perfect Competition 
In Scenario 0 each CU member increases its imports from the other member while importing 
less from non-members (Table 2-17). However the fall in those imports is smaller than the 
fall in the corresponding exports to the same non-member. This result is robust across market 
structures, since imports are differentiated by origin due to the Armington assumption, while 
exports are not distinguished by destination. At the same time, non-members increase trade 
among themselves, which offsets some of the loss from trade diversion. From Table 2-19 it is 
clear that the members EV gains do offset the non-members welfare losses, and the welfare 
effect on the world as a whole is unambiguously positive. The total trade volume grows by 
21.5%, increasing the worlds real GDP and gross income by 0.7% and 2.0%, respectively.  
In Scenario 1 CU members keep bilateral imports from non-members at the pre-CU levels by 
endogenously cutting their tariff rates by 42.9%. Given perfect competition, this arrangement 
consequently fixes bilateral exports to non-members, keeping them completely isolated from 
the unfavourable trade diversion. As a result, both Scenarios 1 and 2 yield identical outcomes 
under perfect competition. The welfare of member economies and the world as a whole 
becomes higher than in Scenario 0. However, the rise in bilateral trade within the CU is 
smaller since members no longer replace imports from non-members with those from their 
partner. Nevertheless, as reported in Table 2-19, the overall imports, exports and real GDP in 
member regions are boosted, signifying that the avoidance of trade diversion commonly 
benefits all regions.41 
2.5.2 Cournot Oligopoly with Barriers to Entry/Exit 
The changes in bilateral imports in the Cournot oligopoly model are generally similar to those 
from the perfect competition model (Table 2-17). However, the magnitudes of changes under 
                                                     
41 Although members benefit more in real terms, the governments inevitably lose to a greater extent as tariffs against non-
members are endogenised (Table 2-18). Thus, their income gains decrease in the latter two scenarios. 
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oligopoly (SEC2) are stronger than in the perfectly competitive sector (SEC1) because of the 
economies of scale and flexibility in the elasticity of demand. Hence the CU members benefit 
from a greater expansion in real GDP and trade compared to Subsection 2.5.1.  
The trade diversion effect on SEC2 is stronger than that in SEC1. Thus the CU members must 
set lower tariffs on SEC2 imports than in the previous case in order to eliminate trade 
diversion (Scenario 1, Table 2-18). As a consequence, members total trade flows increase by 
than in Scenario 0, resulting in higher outcomes for regional EV and real GDP expansion. 
However income decline slightly as the governments lose more revenues due to the 
endogenisation of tariffs against non-members (Table 2-19).  
Interestingly, once tariff endogenisation takes place (Scenario 1), the real aggregate indicators 
of non-members become positively affected. Under Cournot oligopoly, the demand elasticity 
in Cournot sectors increases in accordance with the variation in expenditure shares as total 
imports and demands by CU members are augmented. Thus, the higher the sensitivity to 
price, the more it effectively reduces mark-up rates and increases market efficiency. As a 
result, CU formation with external tariff endogenisation under Cournot oligopoly yields the 
highest welfare gains to each region and to the world as a whole among all scenarios. In 
particular, the gains for non-members in Scenario 2 are not as high as in Scenario 1, because 
the policy of maintaining non-members imports from the CU zone prevents the CU members 
from making the fullest use of the increasing returns to scale. 
2.5.3 Monopolistic Competition with Barriers to Entry/Exit 
Sectors under Cournot oligopoly or monopolistic competition commonly share the property of 
scale economies, which ensures that imperfectly competitive sectors will expand 
proportionally more than perfectly competitive ones as the formation of a customs union of 
trading partners takes place. Thus, we find that the variation in trade patterns under both types 
of imperfectly competitive market structure is comparable. In terms of magnitude, however, 
monopolistic competition results in weaker effects on real variables compared to oligopoly, 
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because of the fixed elasticity of demand in the former. Thus, for all scenarios, we find the 
changes in bilateral imports and aggregate outcomes under monopolistic competition to be 
greater than under perfect competition but still smaller than under Cournot oligopoly. As this 
applies to members and non-members alike, it is not clear which type of imperfect 
competition is more beneficial to the world economy. 
Although the world unambiguously gains after the endogenisation of CU tariffs on non-
members (Scenario 1), the welfare effects for non-members remain marginally negative, 
firstly since the demand elasticity does not adjust to the new trade regime as under oligopoly, 
and hence there are no oligopolistic gains, and secondly because imperfect competition 
implies greater negative effects on non-members. 
If non-members also fix their bilateral imports from the grouping (Scenario 2), trade diversion 
is completely eliminated, although the extent of welfare improvement is not substantial, and 
probably less than the potential adjustment costs. Moreover, CU members gain less, and the 
world welfare is similarly diminished.  
In summary, the welfare results illustrated in Subsections 2.5.1-2.5.3 suggest that Scenario 1 
will yield the most efficient outcome for the world economy, and a substantial welfare 
improvement from non-members endogenising tariffs on imports from CU members is 
unlikely. 
2.6 Sensitivity Tests 
This Section examines the sensitivity of simulation results to elasticity parameters and 
macroeconomic closures given different types of market structure. 
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2.6.1 Elasticity of Substitution between Primary Factors (ıF) 
The sensitivity of the CU simulation results to the substitutability between capital, labour and 
land in the CES production function (ıF) is reported in Table 2-20. In general, a 100% 
increase in this elasticity yields very small changes in real variables and regional EVs: 
Table 2-20: The sensitivity of key variables to the substitution elasticity between 
primary factors (ıF) in the CU simulations under different market structures 
(benchmark: ıF = 0.8) 
Perfect competition Cournot oligopoly (barred mobility) 
Monopolistic 
competition  
(barred mobility) 
                         Market structures 
Changes  
in real values (%)   
and regional welfares ıF = 0.4 ıF = 0.8 ıF = 0.4 ıF = 0.8 ıF = 0.4 ıF = 0.8 
CU members 11.25% 12.11% 10.76% 11.81% 11.21% 12.33% Household 
consumption Non-members -3.87% -3.55% -3.94% -3.82% -3.90% -3.73% 
CU members 2.81% 3.05% 2.70% 2.96% 2.87% 3.16% 
Investment 
Non-members -0.97% -0.89% -0.98% -0.96% -0.97% -0.93% 
CU members -1.61% -1.36% -0.74% 0.16% -1.08% -0.37% Government 
consumption Non-members -2.25% -2.62% -3.46% -3.91% -2.99% -3.43% 
CU members 1.25% 1.81% 1.51% 2.47% 1.49% 2.34% 
Real GDP 
Non-members -0.40% -0.48% -1.08% -1.32% -0.82% -1.02% 
CU members 52.00% 52.94% 51.93% 53.20% 52.10% 53.33% 
Total imports 
Non-members -10.02% -9.85% -10.33% -10.24% -10.19% -10.09% 
CU members 46.54% 47.53% 46.54% 47.92% 46.69% 48.01% 
Total exports 
Non-members -4.55% -4.44% -4.94% -4.96% -4.78% -4.77% 
CU members 30.09 33.56 46.21 51.04 39.31 43.74 
Regional EV 
Non-members -17.85 -17.78 -23.77 -23.00 -21.83 -21.35 
Source: Simulated by author. 
World welfare gains increase with the level of ıF. To explain why a higher substitution 
elasticity enhances the benefits arising from a CU formation, consider the unit isoquant 
diagram given three factor inputs in Figure 2-6. 
In Figure 2-6, the relative prices of these three factors determine the three-dimensional slope 
of the relative cost pane. The curvature of the unit isoquant is derived from the benchmark 
values, and the equilibrium point is where the isoquant is tangent with the cost pane. If land is 
sector-specific, then the amount of land inputs to that sector is fixed, and the equilibrium 
 
2-88 
point after a change is always located on the fixed land input pane, parallel to the capital-
labour pane. Hence, when a policy shock alters the slope of the relative cost pane, the 
substitution elasticity determines the extent to which producers will substitute a relatively less 
expensive factor for another. Since the land input is fixed, even though the shift in the relative 
cost pane is three-dimensional, the key determinant of the equilibrium factor inputs is the 
relative rental rates of labour and capital. While the simulation outcomes also depend on 
factor intensities, in general, a change in the relative prices of these two factors of production 
will cause a larger change in the capital-labour ratio in the sector with the higher elasticity of 
substitution. 
Figure 2-6: Three-dimensional unit isoquant given three factor inputs 
  
2.6.2 Trade Elasticities (ıA and ıBM) 
This section considers the sensitivity of welfare outcomes to Armington trade elasticities, 
comprising the upper-level substitution elasticity between domestic products and aggregate 
imports (ıA); and the lower-level elasticity between imports from different origins (ıBM).  
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Table 2-21: The sensitivity of key variables to the substitution elasticities between 
domestic products and imports (ıA); and imports from different origins (ıBM) in the 
CU simulations under different market structures (benchmark values: ıA = 2 and ıBM 
= 4) 
Perfect competition Cournot oligopoly (barred mobility) 
Monopolistic 
competition 
(barred mobility) 
                     Market structures 
 
Changes in 
real values (%)   
and regional welfares 
ıA= 1.5 
ıBM= 3 
ıA= 2 
ıBM= 4 
ıA= 1.5 
ıBM= 3 
ıA= 2 
ıBM= 4 
ıA= 1.5 
ıBM= 3 
ıA= 2 
ıBM= 4 
CU members 10.93% 12.11% 10.62% 11.81% 10.99% 12.33% Household 
consumption Non-members -3.42% -3.55% -3.58% -3.82% -3.54% -3.73% 
CU members 2.73% 3.05% 2.66% 2.96% 2.82% 3.16% 
Investment 
Non-members -0.86% -0.89% -0.89% -0.96% -0.88% -0.93% 
CU members -1.41% -1.36% -0.05% 0.16% -0.56% -0.37% Government 
consumption Non-members -2.12% -2.62% -3.27% -3.91% -2.88% -3.43% 
CU members 1.63% 1.81% 2.26% 2.47% 2.09% 2.34% 
Real GDP 
Non-members -0.47% -0.48% -1.16% -1.32% -0.93% -1.02% 
CU members 37.47% 52.94% 37.69% 53.20% 37.71% 53.33% 
Total imports 
Non-members -7.70% -9.85% -7.97% -10.24% -7.87% -10.09% 
CU members 31.90% 47.53% 32.29% 47.92% 32.27% 48.01% 
Total exports 
Non-members -2.13% -4.44% -2.58% -4.96% -2.43% -4.77% 
CU members 29.62 33.56 45.00 51.04 38.57 43.74 
Regional EV 
Non-members -16.25 -17.78 -20.39 -23.00 -19.50 -21.35 
Source: Simulated by author. 
Under each type of market structure, Table 2-21 reports the percentage changes in real values 
and regional EVs of members and non-members given two different sets of trade elasticities, 
of which the counterfactual values of ıA and ıBM are 75% of the benchmark ones. Higher 
trade elasticity considerably increases consumer demands in CU regions, and the percentage 
changes in total imports and exports are stronger for all regions. Total imports and exports 
adjust to a greater extent given higher Armington elasticities, which means that both trade 
creation and trade diversion effects become stronger. Hence, CU members reap higher 
benefits, and non-members lose further from the proposed change. Overall, the welfare effects 
of preferential tariff cuttings are very sensitive to this set of parameters. 
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2.6.3 Macroeconomic Closure Rules for the External Balance 
The sensitivity of the results to the macroeconomic closure rule is reported in Table 2-22, 
where the real effects of the regional grouping are reasonably robust across the exchange rate 
regime, while the import prices in domestic markets are directly affected by the closure rule. 
Table 2-22: The sensitivity of key variables to the macroeconomic closure in the CU 
simulations under different market structures (benchmark: flexible exchange rate 
regime) 
Perfect competition Cournot oligopoly (barred mobility) 
Monopolistic 
competition     
(barred mobility) 
   
                 Market structures 
 
Changes in 
real values (%)   
and regional welfares 
Flexible 
exchange 
rate 
Fixed 
exchange 
rate 
Flexible 
exchange 
rate 
Fixed 
exchange 
rate 
Flexible 
exchange 
rate 
Fixed 
exchange 
rate 
CU members 12.11% 11.62% 11.81% 11.25% 12.33% 11.75% Household 
consumption Non-members -3.55% -2.99% -3.82% -3.32% -3.73% -3.18% 
Total (world) 2.16% 2.16% 2.00% 1.98% 2.23% 2.22% 
CU members 3.05% -12.52% 2.96% -11.02% 3.16% -11.12% Investment 
 Non-members -0.89% 14.68% -0.96% 13.00% -0.93% 13.34% 
CU members -1.36% -1.97% 0.16% -0.57% -0.37% -1.06% Government 
consumption Non-members -2.62% -2.05% -3.91% -3.24% -3.43% -2.78% 
CU members 1.81% 1.74% 2.47% 2.30% 2.34% 2.21% 
Real GDP 
Non-members -0.48% -0.40% -1.32% -1.16% -1.02% -0.87% 
CU members 52.94% 50.44% 53.20% 50.86% 53.33% 50.97% Total 
imports Non-members -9.85% -7.57% -10.24% -8.16% -10.09% -7.96% 
CU members 47.53% 50.91% 47.92% 50.84% 48.01% 51.02% Total 
exports Non-members -4.44% -8.04% -4.96% -8.14% -4.77% -8.01% 
CU members 33.56 24.14 51.04 42.14 43.74 34.56 
Regional EV 
Non-members -17.78 -8.34 -23.00 -14.59 -21.35 -12.19 
Source: Simulated by author. 
Under the flexible exchange rate regime, CU formation leads to an appreciation of the local 
currency of member regions, thus they are encouraged to import more and export less than 
under the fixed exchange rate regime. Their foreign savings are not affected by the policy 
change. On the other hand, the CU members under the fixed rate regime adjust to the shock 
through capital outflows, so that we observe a decline in domestic savings and investment. 
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Consequently, the fixed exchange rate regime yields less positive effects on real variables and 
regional EVs of the CU members than does the flexible regime.  
Under the flexible rate regime, the exchange rates of non-members tend to depreciate against 
the CU member currency after the formation. Hence, the welfare effects of switching between 
the two regimes are the opposite of those perceived in CU regions, and the capital flows from 
the CU economies to these regions will boost their investment demands and lessen the 
negative impacts of being left outside the grouping. Note that the difference in the domestic 
investment demand increases under the two regimes can be explained by the row reporting 
the world investment demand increase, for which the rates under different regimes are 
nearly identical. Therefore, the exchange rate regime is the determinant of the allocation of 
international investment.  
Summarising, the fixed exchange rate regime tends to reduce welfare gains in the CU regions 
and welfare losses for non-members, which is the result of resource reallocation and changes 
in trade patterns and world demands for tradable goods after the policy change. 
2.6.4 The Wage Curve Elasticity (Ȧ) 
Since the wage curve represents the downward-sloping relationship between unemployment 
and real wages, its elasticity must be negative.42 When the elasticity is increased, the labour 
market becomes less flexible in that the rise in the unemployment rate is smaller for a given 
fall in real wages. This explains why the 100% increase in the wage curve elasticity decreases 
the percentage changes in the unemployment rates by approximately 35-39%. As a 
consequence, the welfare effects of CU formation are weakened in all regions, but not to a 
marked extent, except for the government consumption, which is more sensitive to the wage 
curve elasticity. The reason for this is that the unemployment benefits transferred by the 
                                                     
42 The relationship between these two variables was already explained in Equation (2-40). 
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government to the household largely depend on this elasticity. Nonetheless, the results in 
Table 2-23 are generally robust against the level of the wage curve elasticity.  
Table 2-23: The sensitivity of key variables to the wage curve elasticity (Ȧ) in the CU 
simulations under different market structures (benchmark: Ȧ = -0.1) 
Perfect 
competition 
Cournot oligopoly 
(barred mobility) 
Monopolistic 
competition 
(barred mobility) 
                       Market structures 
Changes  
in real values (%)   
and regional welfares Ȧ=-0.1 Ȧ=-0.2 Ȧ=-0.1 Ȧ=-0.2 Ȧ=-0.1 Ȧ=-0.2 
CU members -74.39% -45.25% -80.21% -51.90% -74.60% -47.94% 
Unemployment 
Non-members 22.53% 13.73% 20.69% 13.55% 21.02% 13.61% 
CU members 12.11% 11.84% 11.81% 11.13% 12.33% 11.72% Household 
consumption Non-members -3.55% -3.48% -3.82% -3.72% -3.73% -3.62% 
CU members 3.05% 2.96% 2.96% 2.79% 3.16% 3.01% 
Investment 
Non-members -0.89% -0.87% -0.96% -0.93% -0.93% -0.90% 
CU members -1.36% -2.28% 0.16% -1.08% -0.37% -1.48% Government 
consumption Non-members -2.62% -2.34% -3.91% -3.61% -3.43% -3.13% 
CU members 1.81% 1.15% 2.47% 1.50% 2.34% 1.49% 
Real GDP 
Non-members -0.48% -0.27% -1.32% -1.07% -1.02% -0.77% 
CU members 52.94% 52.25% 53.20% 52.12% 53.33% 52.36% 
Total imports 
Non-members -9.85% -9.83% -10.24% -10.23% -10.09% -10.06% 
CU members 47.53% 46.77% 47.92% 46.73% 48.01% 46.95% 
Total exports 
Non-members -4.44% -4.34% -4.96% -4.84% -4.77% -4.64% 
CU members 33.56 30.00 51.04 47.20 43.74 40.20 
Regional EV 
Non-members -17.78 -16.87 -23.00 -22.41 -21.35 -20.63 
Source: Simulated by author. 
2.6.5 Public Sector Expansion 
To examine the sensitivity of the welfare results to the size of the government, the domestic 
taxes in each region (i.e., income taxes, commodity taxes and factor usage taxes) are all raised 
by 10%, so that the public sector is neutrally enlarged. This gives some insight into the 
probable outcome of CU formation, which we would expect to reduce government tariff 
revenues. Thus, if the governments are to keep their public good consumptions at the pre-
grouping levels, then they need to adjust their domestic tax rates accordingly. 
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Table 2-24: The sensitivity of key variables to a larger public sector (SEC3) in the CU 
simulations under different market structures 
Perfect competition Cournot oligopoly (barred mobility) 
Monopolistic 
competition  
(barred mobility) 
 
                      Market structures 
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real values (%)   
and regional welfares B
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CU members 12.11% 6.30% 11.81% 6.43% 12.33% 6.60% Household 
consumption Non-members -3.55% -8.70% -3.82% -8.51% -3.73% -8.71% 
CU members 3.05% 3.20% 2.96% 3.24% 3.16% 3.36% 
Investment 
Non-members -0.89% -0.61% -0.96% -0.56% -0.93% -0.61% 
CU members -1.36% 2.46% 0.16% 5.08% -0.37% 4.06% Government 
consumption Non-members -2.62% 0.76% -3.91% 0.41% -3.43% 0.46% 
CU members 1.81% 1.40% 2.47% 2.85% 2.34% 2.34% 
Real GDP 
Non-members -0.48% -0.89% -1.32% -1.04% -1.02% -1.09% 
CU members 52.94% 49.54% 53.20% 50.75% 53.33% 50.36% 
Total imports 
Non-members -9.85% -11.78% -10.24% -11.63% -10.09% -11.76% 
CU members 47.53% 44.23% 47.92% 45.55% 48.01% 45.13% 
Total exports 
Non-members -4.44% -6.47% -4.96% -6.42% -4.77% -6.54% 
CU members 33.56 21.90 51.04 41.76 43.74 33.62 
Regional EV 
Non-members -17.78 -29.73 -23.00 -33.10 -21.35 -31.93 
Source: Simulated by author. 
The results in Table 2-24 show that the domestic tax raise does increase demands for public 
goods (SEC3), while also hampering production in the private sectors (SEC1 and SEC2). 
Since factor demands in public sectors increase, such a contraction in the private sectors is 
aggravated as factor inputs are bid away (Figure 2-7). This crowding-out effect is clearly 
observable in Table 2-24, where the expansion in the public sectors not only increases 
government consumption while reducing household demands, but also affects the 
macroeconomic indicators adversely (i.e. total imports and exports, real GDPs and regional 
EVs). As a consequence, consumer prices fall, and a slight reduction in nominal investments 
allows real investments to increase with the size of the government. Note that falls in nominal 
investments are low because government and foreign savings are exogenous in this model. 
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Hence, total savings only weakly affected by the expansion, and the impact on investment is 
lower than that on household consumption. Hence, real investment demands may increase, 
but the rest of the economy inevitably faces undesirable outcomes.  
Figure 2-7: Expansion of the public sector (SEC3) and the crowding-out effect on the 
other private sectors 
 
The extent to which each region is required to adjust its domestic tax rates in order to 
maintain the public good provision at the pre-grouping level ranges from 1 to 3%, which is 
much smaller than the 10% increase reported in Table 2-24. Thus, the economic outcomes 
will not be as detrimental as suggested above. 
Note that as the public sector expands, the positive change in real GDP remains at the same 
level under monopolistic competition and increases under oligopoly. The reason is that 
stronger market imperfection implies more positive effects on domestic consumption due to 
the scale economies. In nominal terms, the regional EVs improve with the degree of imperfect 
competition so that, for CU members, when the domestic tax rates are raised by 10%, their 
EVs drop by 34.74% under perfect competition; 23.14% under monopolistic competition; and 
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18.18% under oligopoly. Since similar outcomes are observed in non-member regions, it 
seems that the aggregate effects of imperfect competition are beneficial to both regional and 
world economies. 
2.6.6 Initial Import Tariff Rates 
Table 2-25: The sensitivity of key variables to the initial import tariff rates in the CU 
simulations under different market structures (benchmark = 50%)43 
Perfect competition Cournot oligopoly (barred mobility) 
Monopolistic 
competition   
(barred mobility) 
                             
                    Market structures 
 
Changes in 
real values (%)   
and regional welfares 
Pre-CU 
tariff 
rate: 
50% 
Pre-CU 
tariff 
rate: 
60% 
Pre-CU 
tariff 
rate: 
50% 
Pre-CU 
tariff 
rate: 
60% 
Pre-CU 
tariff 
rate: 
50% 
Pre-CU 
tariff 
rate: 
60% 
CU members 10.25% 12.94% 10.01% 12.59% 10.37% 13.10% Household 
consumption Non-members -3.02% -3.72% -3.24% -4.00% -3.17% -3.90% 
CU members 2.56% 3.24% 2.51% 3.16% 2.66% 3.36% 
Investment 
Non-members -0.76% -0.93% -0.81% -1.00% -0.79% -0.97% 
CU members -0.46% -0.61% 1.03% 1.21% 0.49% 0.57% Government 
consumption Non-members -2.22% -2.78% -3.30% -4.14% -2.91% -3.64% 
CU members 1.51% 1.89% 2.23% 2.73% 2.05% 2.56% 
Real GDP 
Non-members -0.40% -0.50% -1.11% -1.38% -0.87% -1.08% 
CU members 42.66% 52.31% 43.01% 52.72% 43.02% 52.81% 
Total imports 
Non-members -8.47% -9.81% -8.77% -10.19% -8.65% -10.04% 
CU members 37.96% 46.90% 38.44% 47.45% 38.42% 47.51% 
Total exports 
Non-members -3.77% -4.40% -4.20% -4.93% -4.04% -4.74% 
CU members 30.08 37.73 45.27 55.99 38.78 48.70 
Regional EV 
Non-members -15.12 -18.74 -19.38 -24.10 -18.13 -22.46 
Source: Simulated by author. 
This section examines how the initial tariff rates may alter the welfare implication of CU 
formation. Accordingly, the benchmark Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) is modified by 
increasing the import tariff rates by 20%, and the SAM is re-balanced by reducing all 
                                                     
43 In order to prevent infeasibility problems, the simulations for all scenarios are conducted by reducing the tariff rates between 
members by 88% in both simulations. 
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commodity tax rates from 25% to 19%. Table 2-25 shows that the higher initial tariff rates 
accentuate the trade creation and trade diversion outcomes of the regional trade liberalisation. 
Therefore, the welfare gains from opening up to trade (within the CU) increase with the initial 
tariff levels, but the region will also lose more if it is left outside the grouping. Also, the result 
interpretation is straightforward, since the 20% higher initial tariff rates alter the percentage 
changes in real variables and regional EVs by some 20-25%. 
2.6.7 Initial Regional Size Ratio 
This subsection focuses on the sensitivity of the market size simulation results in Section 2.3, 
and so investigates how the market size ratio will affect the welfare outcomes. As the initial 
scales of production are expanded by 400% in small regions and reduced by 30% in large 
ones, the market size ratio adjusts from 1:10 to 4:7, leaving the worlds total outputs and the 
input-output structure in each region unaffected. The sensitivity results are reported in Table 
2-26. 
As described in Section 2.3, for a CU member, the magnitude of the welfare gains from 
preferential tariff cuttings largely depends on the initial economic size of its counterpart. 
Under the first two CU scenarios (between regions of identical sizes), as the economies of 
small regions are initially four times larger, the real variables in small regions are positively 
affected; whereas large CU regions in the second scenario are worse off as their size is 
reduced by 30%. A similar logic can be applied to the simulation results of CU formations 
between regions of different sizes. On the other hand, for a region outside the grouping, the 
magnitude of the welfare losses increases with the initial size of CU members, and decreases 
with that of the other non-member region. For example, in the first scenario (REG1+REG2), 
large non-members are notably worse off after the initial market size ratio is altered. This is 
not only because non-members economies become smaller (which implies lower demand for 
trade), but also because the larger CU triggers stronger trade diversion effects.  
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Table 2-26: The sensitivity of key variables to the initial market size ratio in the CU 
simulations with regions of different sizes (benchmark ratio: small/large = 1/10) 
REG1+REG2 
REG1+REG2  
REG3+REG4 
REG1+REG3 
REG1+REG3  
REG2+REG4 
                       
                     Scenarios 
 
Changes 
in real  
values (%) and  
regional welfares 
GDP 
size 
ratio 
1:10 
GDP 
size 
ratio 
4:7 
GDP 
size 
ratio 
1:10 
GDP 
size 
ratio 
4:7 
GDP 
size 
ratio 
1:10 
GDP 
size 
ratio 
4:7 
GDP 
size 
ratio 
1:10 
GDP 
size 
ratio 
4:7 
REG1 8.66% 8.94% 4.81% 5.59% 11.61% 10.32% 9.89% 8.37% 
REG2 8.66% 8.94% 4.81% 5.59% -2.00% -2.33% 9.89% 8.37% 
REG3 -0.21% -1.37% 16.58% 12.24% 1.23% 5.80% 0.39% 3.02% 
Household 
consumption 
REG4 -0.21% -1.37% 16.58% 12.24% -0.82% -2.75% 0.39% 3.02% 
REG1 2.17% 2.24% 1.20% 1.40% 2.90% 2.58% 2.47% 2.09% 
REG2 2.17% 2.24% 1.20% 1.40% -0.50% -0.58% 2.47% 2.09% 
REG3 -0.05% -0.34% 4.14% 3.06% 0.31% 1.45% 0.10% 0.75% 
Investment 
REG4 -0.05% -0.34% 4.14% 3.06% -0.21% -0.69% 0.10% 0.75% 
REG1 -0.66% -0.42% -4.17% -3.44% 0.66% 0.27% -0.77% -1.55% 
REG2 -0.66% -0.42% -4.17% -3.44% -1.46% -1.70% -0.77% -1.55% 
REG3 -0.15% -0.99% -2.38% -2.19% 0.11% 0.07% -0.52% -2.19% 
Government 
consumption 
REG4 -0.15% -0.99% -2.38% -2.19% -0.59% -2.02% -0.52% -2.19% 
REG1 1.30% 1.33% 0.82% 0.92% 1.67% 1.50% 1.47% 1.28% 
REG2 1.30% 1.33% 0.82% 0.92% -0.27% -0.31% 1.47% 1.28% 
REG3 -0.03% -0.18% 2.42% 1.83% 0.18% 0.86% 0.08% 0.52% 
Real GDP 
REG4 -0.03% -0.18% 2.42% 1.83% -0.11% -0.37% 0.08% 0.52% 
REG1 36.51% 37.11% 29.41% 30.64% 48.62% 42.39% 45.21% 39.11% 
REG2 36.51% 37.11% 29.41% 30.64% -5.64% -6.57% 45.21% 39.11% 
REG3 -0.58% -3.80% 65.06% 51.36% 4.89% 23.58% 2.58% 16.69% 
Total imports 
REG4 -0.58% -3.80% 65.06% 51.36% -2.37% -7.87% 2.58% 16.69% 
REG1 33.32% 33.42% 32.02% 32.25% 38.59% 35.68% 37.88% 35.39% 
REG2 33.32% 33.42% 32.02% 32.25% -2.49% -2.90% 37.88% 35.39% 
REG3 -0.26% -1.69% 64.80% 50.44% 4.21% 20.87% 3.32% 18.82% 
Total exports 
REG4 -0.26% -1.69% 64.80% 50.44% -1.01% -3.43% 3.32% 18.82% 
REG1 2.48 10.50 0.40 3.28 3.71 12.89 2.82 8.61 
REG2 2.48 10.50 0.40 3.28 -1.00 -4.66 2.82 8.61 
REG3 -1.04 -4.76 43.80 22.02 4.07 12.60 -0.13 2.52 
Regional EV 
REG4 -1.04 -4.76 43.80 22.02 -4.08 -4.44 -0.13 2.52 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: Numbers in bold letters are those of the regions involved in a CU formation. 
It is noteworthy that the welfare of the large regions forming a CU with smaller ones in the 
fourth scenario is largely improved after the market size ratio modification, especially in 
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terms of the regional EVs. The results imply that if the size of a CU counterpart relative to the 
rest of the world is sufficiently small then large regions would rather maintain the status quo, 
since trade diversion might dominate the welfare outcomes. 
2.6.8 Initial Number of Firms in Cournot Oligopolistic Sectors 
This section examines the sensitivity of the FTA simulation results in Section 4 to the number 
of firms. This is only of concern when sectors operate under Cournot oligopoly, in which few 
firms compete against each other. The effects of increasing sectoral competition by 100% are 
compared in Table 2-27: 
Table 2-27: The sensitivity of key variables to the initial number of firms (NOF) in 
Cournot oligopolistic sectors (benchmark: NOF = 3) 
Cournot oligopoly 
(free mobility) 
Cournot oligopoly 
(barred mobility) 
                                      Market structures  
Changes                                             
in real values (%)                                      
and regional welfares NOF = 3 NOF = 6 NOF = 3 NOF = 6 
CU members 13.40% 12.77% 11.81% 12.06% Household 
consumption Non-members -3.79% -3.63% -3.82% -3.64% 
CU members 3.36% 3.19% 2.96% 3.02% 
Investment 
Non-members -0.95% -0.91% -0.96% -0.91% 
CU members 0.73% -0.61% 0.16% -0.91% Government 
consumption Non-members -3.85% -3.07% -3.91% -3.08% 
CU members 3.50% 2.47% 2.47% 1.99% 
Real GDP 
Non-members -1.34% -0.80% -1.32% -0.77% 
CU members 54.79% 53.71% 53.20% 52.98% 
Total imports 
Non-members -10.06% -9.92% -10.24% -9.98% 
CU members 49.62% 48.40% 47.92% 47.61% 
Total exports 
Non-members -4.89% -4.60% -4.96% -4.63% 
CU members 42.83 37.28 51.04 40.28 
Regional EV 
Non-members -21.74 -19.23 -23.00 -19.78 
Source: Simulated by author. 
Provided that the initial total real factor costs are kept at the same level, if an oligopolistic 
sector starts off with more firms then those firms face lower real fixed costs and higher real 
variable costs as the market becomes more competitive. This in turn decreases the 
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economies of scale, and the welfare changes are reduced. The results in Table 2-27 are in 
general consistent with this prediction. However, in member regions, government 
consumption declines; and household consumption and investment with barred entry respond 
to the shock more positively. For the government, since higher market competition reduces 
tax revenues, the increase in the number of firms is unfavourable to government consumption. 
As for the final demands of the household and the bank, under free entry, the number of firms 
adjusts to keep up production efficiency after the shock, thus the sectoral zero-profit condition 
always holds. If this adjustment is barred, then the incumbent firms in member regions face 
fewer profit losses after the regional grouping.44 That implies higher incomes of the firm 
owner, and household consumption and investment increase as we assume a higher initial 
number of firms given barred entry.  
2.6.9 Substitution Elasticity between Varieties under Monopolistic Competition 
Below, Table 2-28 illustrates the sensitivity of the simulation results in Section 2.4 with 
respect to the elasticity of substitution between varieties (ıLV) in monopolistically 
competitive sectors.  
The results in Table 2-28 indicate that a higher ıLV reduces the welfare changes in real 
variables and regional EVs, regardless of the assumption made about firm mobility. As 
described in Section 2.4, ıLV is specific to sectors with heterogeneous products, and equals 
the demand elasticity. As ıLV increases, the mark-up rates drop, and the market becomes 
more competitive with less potential to exploit economies of scale. That is to say, the 
monopolistic power under monopolistic competition depends on the preference for varieties. 
If consumers become more flexible in substituting between varieties, the mark-up rates then 
inevitably drop, and thus we would expect weaker effects from regional trade liberalisation. 
                                                     
44 Recall the results from Section 2.4 that under imperfect competition, firms inside the CU grouping will lose their profits as the 
mark-up rates fall due to higher competition from abroad. 
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Table 2-28: The sensitivity analysis for the elasticity of substitution between varieties in 
monopolistically competitive sectors (benchmark: ıLV = 4) 
Monopolistic 
competition         
(free mobility) 
Monopolistic 
competition   
(barred mobility) 
Market structures 
Changes in 
real values (%) 
and regional welfares ıLV = 4 ıLV =6 ıLV = 4 ıLV =6 
CU members 12.78% 12.50% 12.33% 12.22% 
Household consumption 
Non-members -3.54% -3.50% -3.73% -3.63% 
CU members 3.25% 3.14% 3.16% 3.08% 
Investment 
Non-members -0.86% -0.86% -0.93% -0.91% 
CU members -0.77% -1.12% -0.37% -0.85% Government 
consumption Non-members -3.33% -3.01% -3.43% -3.06% 
CU members 3.52% 2.80% 2.34% 2.08% 
Real GDP 
Non-members -1.08% -0.82% -1.02% -0.77% 
CU members 54.80% 54.01% 53.33% 53.11% 
Total imports 
Non-members -10.01% -9.95% -10.09% -9.98% 
CU members 49.61% 48.73% 48.01% 47.75% 
Total exports 
Non-members -4.82% -4.67% -4.77% -4.61% 
CU members 41.90 38.39 43.74 39.19 
Regional EV 
Non-members -19.96 -18.90 -21.35 -19.81 
Source: Simulated by author. 
From Figure 2-8, a higher level of the substitution elasticity between varieties also raises the 
scaling vector ( )1/(1 LVNOF V ), given that there must be more than one firm under monopolistic 
competition.  
 
Figure 2-8: The Elasticity of Substitution between Varieties as a Determinant of the 
Auxiliary Scaling Vector Given the Number of Firms (ıLV > 1) 
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It is obvious from Equation (2-85) that an increase in the scaling vector lowers the ratio of the 
individual price to the group price index. From Equation (2-97), this change in turn suggests 
that the group quantity index should decrease in relation to the total outputs from individual 
firms. Therefore, higher flexibility in consumer preferences requires that monopolistically 
competitive producers lose some of their price-setting powers. 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter examines the properties of regional trade liberalisation in low-dimensioned 
models with highly-controlled datasets. From the CU simulations between regions of different 
market sizes under perfect competition, it is clear that the larger the CU counterpart is, the 
bigger are the regional welfare gains to be expected. Thus, a large region may potentially be 
worse off when forming a CU with a smaller region, if the rest of the world concurrently 
forms another CU. As a consequence, the trade-creating effect arising from regional trade 
liberalisation may be strongly offset by the trade-diverting effect, measured by the reduction 
in trade volume and tariff revenue as relatively large economies are left outside the grouping.  
The simulations of CUs among regions of identical sizes yet under various market structures 
suggest that the welfare effects of forming a CU in the presence of imperfect competition are 
stronger than those under a perfectly competitive setting. By the same token, Cournot 
oligopoly yields higher benefits from regional trading arrangements than monopolistic 
competition, due to greater procompetitive effects. As for the barriers to enter and exit the 
market, models with restrictive firm mobility find lower expansion of real GDP within the 
grouping; however, since the gains from CU formation are instead transferred to the 
household in the form of the augmented profits of firms, this firm immobility assumption 
consequently raises the estimated EVs of union counterparts.  
In the experiment on the elimination of trade diversion, the endogenisation of CU members 
common external tariffs on imports from non-members, with the intention of keeping the 
external import demands at the pre-union levels, significantly enhances regional and world 
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welfare under all types of market structure. Moreover, provided that members adjust their 
common external tariffs appropriately when forming a union, non-members will only be 
marginally influenced under imperfect competition and completely unaffected under perfect 
competition. Thus, there is no real incentive for non-members to retaliate with a counteracting 
trade policy so as to keep themselves isolated from this external CU shock.  
Finally, the sensitivity tests have been investigated. In general, the variability in the CU 
welfare results in relation to the values of numerous parameters are reasonably robust and 
theoretically sensible. However, the specification of the exchange rate regime affects 
investment demand and border price in a non-negligible way, with the flexible exchange rate 
regime likely to be more welfare-enhancing. In addition, a bigger government tends to worsen 
regional welfare due to the substantial crowding-out effect, and the higher are the ex-ante 
tariff rates, the stronger are the magnitude of welfare effects of the regional grouping. In 
particular, in the simulation of CU formation between regions of disparate sizes, the 
sensitivity test that alters the relative market size ratio confirms that the members welfare 
gains increase with the relative sizes of their counterparts. Hence, it is once again confirmed 
that regions always have a strong incentive to seek for a regional economic integration with 
larger economies in a model without endowment differences and no adjustment costs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EVALUATION OF THAILAND’S PREFERENTIAL 
TRADING ARRANGEMENTS WITH AUSTRALIA, NEW 
ZEALAND, JAPAN, CHINA AND INDIA 
3.1 Introduction 
Thailand has become progressively more open since the Industrial Promotion Act (IPA) was 
revised in 1972. Over the last quarter century, the country has kept abreast of many other 
developing countries, such that the economy has shifted from import-substituting to export-
oriented industrialisation regimes, although the real acceleration of trade liberalisation dates 
back to the 1980s. In the wake of the Asian crisis in 1997, temporary import surcharges to 
protect vulnerable sectors were imposed, but overall tariff protection continued to decline, 
although certainly more slowly than in many other emerging economies such as China and 
India.  
The current deteriorating momentum of trade liberalisation in Thailand is attributable to the 
lacklustre pace of the Doha Round of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and thus the 
consequent attractiveness of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) initiatives in Asia and the Pacific. 
Effectively, bilateral and plurilateral economic partnership has grown prominent in Thai 
economic policy since 2001 under the Shinawatra administration. Historically, Thailand’s 
leading trading partners are Japan, the United States, the European Union (EU), and the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), with nearly equal shares of 15-20% of 
total Thai trade; while trade with Australia, New Zealand, China, and India altogether account 
for 10% of total trade (see Table 3-1). Accordingly, since 2001, Thai FTA initiatives have 
issued thick and fast, involving large trading partners in East and South Asia such as China, 
Japan, Korea and India, and also Australia, New Zealand, Bahrain, Peru, the United States, 
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and European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Some of the above are supplemented by 
plurilateral initiatives involving all other members of ASEAN. In addition, there is also talk 
of the East Asia Summit (EAS), bringing together ASEAN, China, Japan, Korea, and 
potentially South Asia. Despite the Thai government’s bold take on this matter, few initiatives 
have been implemented, due to domestic political controversy ignited by preferential tariff 
cuts in a number of sectors, namely, the fierce reaction of ‘the losers.’ In consequence, so far, 
merely five FTAs between Thailand and each of Australia, New Zealand, Japan, China, and 
India, have come into force, while the rest of FTA negotiations are stalled. 
Table 3-1: Merchandise bilateral trade between Thailand and her FTA partners, 2001-
2006 
2001-02 2003-04 2005-06 
Country Trade flows 
(million 
baht) 
Share in 
total trade 
Trade flows 
(million 
baht) 
Share in 
total trade 
Trade flows 
(million 
baht) 
Share in 
total trade 
Exports             
Australia     130,725  2.25%     188,585 2.62%     292,242  3.12% 
New Zealand      16,904  0.29%      24,105 0.34%      40,765  0.44% 
Japan     866,431  14.94%  1,013,277 14.10%  1,228,257  13.12% 
China     279,337  4.82%     521,237 7.25%     811,868  8.67% 
India      39,057  0.67%      63,028 0.88%     129,382  1.38% 
ASEAN 1,136,867 19.61% 1,533,530 21.33% 2,001,633 21.38% 
Rest of World 3,328,852 57.41% 3,844,763 53.48% 4,857,481 51.89% 
Total exports  5,798,173  100%  7,188,525 100%  9,361,628  100% 
Imports             
Australia     124,579  2.26%     154,397 2.22%     260,784  2.71% 
New Zealand      17,464  0.32%      18,302 0.26%      22,224  0.23% 
Japan  1,252,633  22.68%  1,657,017 23.88%  2,025,705  21.04% 
China     376,767  6.82%     580,733 8.37%     964,696  10.02% 
India      63,221  1.14%      82,176 1.18%     112,612  1.17% 
ASEAN 913,224 16.53% 1,162,443 16.75% 1,767,556 18.36% 
Rest of World 2,775,964 50.25% 3,284,878 47.33% 4,472,015 46.46% 
Total imports  5,523,854  100%  6,939,947 100%  9,625,593  100% 
Source: Compiled by author from Customs Department of Thailand (2007). 
Such a fast-paced pursuit of preferential trading arrangements naturally raises questions 
regarding the suitability of the government’s choice of negotiating partners. By and large, it is 
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perceived that the Thai government approached Japan – one of the established export markets 
for Thailand – in order to retain market access and expand access for new product lines; while 
Australia, New Zealand, China and India were chosen as Thailand’s other negotiating 
partners since they are large markets with great potential for trade expansion. Thus, if a 
choice of a negotiating partner is to be evaluated with respect to the importance of trade with 
Thailand, Table 3-1 broadly supports the argument that trade relations are enhanced by such 
groupings: since Thailand became vigorously engaged in FTA negotiations in 2001, the 
import and export shares of Thai FTA partners in total Thai trade has gradually increased, 
except for Japan, as the FTA between Thailand and Japan has just been signed in 2007. 
However, the government may take into account other factors when seeking an FTA partner. 
In a comprehensive study by the Fiscal Policy Research Institute of Thailand (FPRI, 2005), 
180 countries were ranked with respect to their attractiveness as FTA partners for Thailand. 
The index used was the weighted average of each country’s attractiveness in terms of 1) 
relative economic size, population, and trade; 2) its leadership and role as a gateway to other 
countries in a particular region; 3) its abundance in natural resources; and 4) the index of 
economic freedom, indicative of the extent of government intervention, for instance, the 
granting of exclusive rights for some companies to operate in domestic markets, the scale of 
trade barriers, and the degree of investment and economic cooperation between Thailand and 
her negotiating partners. Among the five FTAs entered into force, India has the highest score; 
followed by China and Japan, which are equally attractive as negotiating partners; and lastly 
Australia and New Zealand, which are ranked in the middle range among all countries. Thus, 
according to FPRI (2005), the concluded FTAs may be regarded as sensible deals mainly on 
political grounds. Nevertheless, it remains very important for the government and the private 
sector to fully understand the potential economic effects of these FTAs on individual sectors 
and the country as a whole.  
Accordingly, Chapter 3 is organised as follows. Firstly, Section 3.2 highlights a number of 
modifications of the model previously constructed in Chapter 2. Next, Section 3.3 explains 
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the treatment of the data, chiefly obtained from the GTAP 6.0 database, along with the criteria 
for the aggregation of data by region and sector, and the asymmetric determination of the 
commodity market structure (the degree of market competitiveness) and the labour market 
closure (the relationship between real wage and unemployment). Subsequently, Section 3.4 
discusses the detailed commitments of the free trading arrangements that Thailand has 
reached with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, China and India, and Section 3.5 then analyses 
the welfare implications of these groupings through the CGE approach. Finally, Section 3.6 
tests the sensitivity of the results, and Section 3.7 concludes. 
3.2 General Model Structure 
 
Figure 3-1: Flow of payments in the model 
In Chapter 3, the model constructed in Chapter 2 is modified to reconcile with the GTAP 6.0 
database, while transportation costs are treated as in the GTAP-EG model (Rutherford and 
Paltsev, 2000). The flow of payments within each region is shown in Figure 3-1, and 
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Appendix A3-1 describes the model structure in full details. In this version of the static CGE 
model, production is constrained by the size of factor endowments in each region, namely 
capital, skilled labour, unskilled labour, land, and natural resources. Capital, skilled and 
unskilled labour are mobile across production sectors but not across regions, whereas land 
and natural resources are completely immobile, so that factor returns may vary by sector. 
Capital, land, and natural resources are fully employed at each point of time, while there is 
unemployment in the labour markets in some regions due to wage rigidity. Factor costs in 
each sector are minimised on the assumption of Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
production functions, with the estimated sectoral elasticity of substitution among primary 
factors ranging between 0.20 to 1.68 (these parameters are taken from the GTAP 6.0 
database, and are labelled as esubvasec). Firms also demand intermediate inputs – which are 
Armington composites of differentiated domestically-produced and imported goods – as a 
fixed proportion of final output (i.e. via a Leontief production function). Firms pay factor 
usage taxes in proportion to factor costs as in the previous model. In addition, this model 
introduces production taxes on producers as a fixed proportion of the value of output, in order 
to reconcile the model with the GTAP 6.0 database. For perfectly competitive sectors, the 
final products supplied to domestic and overseas markets are differentiated by destination via 
Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) functions, with a fixed mark-up for international 
transport added to each traded commodity. On the other hand, there are two types of 
imperfectly competitive sectors. Under monopolistic competition, goods are horizontally 
differentiated by product variety (Krugman, 1979), and there is freedom of entry. Therefore, 
there are no residual profits in the long run. However, under Cournot oligopoly, goods are 
homogeneous and there is no freedom of entry. Hence, the firms’ residual profits accrue to the 
capital owner, i.e. the household. 
Each region has a representative household, which is endowed with the natural and labour 
resources, land, and capital stocks, i.e. the household receives factor incomes from the 
production sectors. Where unemployment exists, the household also receives benefits 
 3-6 
proportional to the level of unemployment, in addition to other lump-sum transfers from the 
government. The household in turn pays income taxes as a fixed proportion of total incomes, 
then saves a fixed proportion of the residual income, and spends the rest on private good 
consumption in accordance with the nested CES utility function.  
The government receives tax revenues from various sources and then spends them on 1) 
public good consumption with respect to its CES utility function and 2) transfers to the 
household. The residual is identified as government savings (or deficits when negative), 
which are in turn passed on to the regional bank. The regional bank receives savings from the 
household, government, and the rest of the world. Foreign savings transferred from the rest of 
the world are fixed in real terms under the assumed flexible exchange rate regime, and their 
value always equals net regional imports in nominal terms. The bank then spends all regional 
savings on investment final demands subject to a CES utility function. 
In addition to the above general description of the model prepared for the analysis of the Thai 
FTAs, specific features newly incorporated into the model are explained below. 
3.2.1 Trade: Armington and CET Functions 
As in Chapter 2, regional economies are internationally linked through bilateral trade flows. 
Bilateral imports from different regions of goods in each given market are combined into an 
import composite, which is further aggregated with domestically-produced goods into a single 
Armington good, ultimately purchased by production and final demand sectors. The 
distinction between bilateral imports of the same good from different origins and between 
domestically-produced and aggregate import goods is again modelled through a nested 
Armington CES function, with trade elasticities ranging between 3.80 to 16.81 for the import 
aggregate; and from 1.90 to 5.20 for the final Armington good (respectively, the parameters 
called esubmsec and esubdsec in the GTAP 6.0 database). 
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On the supply side, domestic production is either sold to the domestic market or exported to 
foreign markets. In this chapter, producers differentiate outputs sold in domestic and overseas 
markets while maximising their total profits subject to the nested CET transformation 
function. The CET elasticities between tradable outputs supplied to domestic and the 
aggregate foreign market ( secregTTV ) and between exports destined for the various overseas 
markets ( secregTBEV ) are similarly specified as -2 (Bayar et al., 2006). 
Figure 3-2 summarises the flow of tradable commodities secT in each region. 
 
Figure 3-2: CET distributions and Armington aggregations in region reg’s tradable 
sectors 
3.2.2 Household, Government, and Bank: CES Utility Function 
There are three final demand sectors, namely private, public, and investment. Each sector 
purchases imported commodities (as Armington aggregates), as well as goods from domestic 
producers. Instead of the Cobb-Douglas functional form utilised in Chapter 2, in this chapter, 
final consumption products are substitutable under the CES utility function with the elasticity 
  reg
TTsecV
reg
TBEsecV  
reg
TBM secV  
reg
TAsecV
Armington product 
reg
TQAsec  
Domestic consumption
reg
TQDDsec  
Aggregate import 
reg
TQMsec  
Bilateral imports from other regions (regg)
reggreg
TQBM
,
sec
 
Aggregate export 
reg
TQEsec  
Domestic production 
reg
TQZsec  
Bilateral exports to other regions (regg) 
reggreg
TQBE
,
sec
 
 3-8 
of substitution of ıDreg (see Figure 3-3). The household, the government, and the bank share a 
common substitution elasticity equivalent to 1.43.1 
 
Figure 3-3: Final demand aggregation for household, government, and bank 
3.2.2.1 Household 
Denote by CBUDreg the ‘real’ disposable income (as opposed to the nominal disposable 
income in Chapter 2), net of income taxes and household savings, and PCBUDreg the 
household’s disposable income deflator. Given the CES distribution parameter ( regHHsecJ ) and 
the substitution elasticity parameter (ȡDreg), the household demand for each commodity 
)( secregC  is derived by maximising the CES utility function: 
,)(
1
sec
secsec
reg
reg DDregregreg CHHCBUD
UUJ »¼
º«¬
ª  ¦  (3-1) 
subject to the budget constraint: 
,)1(
sec
secsecsec¦   regregregregreg CPAtcCBUDPCBUD  (3-2) 
where regPAsec  is the sectoral consumer price of each commodity, and regtcsec  is the ad valorem 
commodity tax rate.2 This budget constraint requires that the household spends all its income, 
net of saving and income tax payment, on purchasing consumption goods. Since the elasticity 
                                                     
1
 This CES elasticity is derived from the GRACE model by Aaheim and Rive (2005). 
2
 As in Equation (2-98) of Chapter 2, the sectoral consumer price of commodity mc in region reg under monopolistic competition 
is henceforth defined as the function of individual consumer price of each product variety:    1 1sec regmcLVreg reg regmc mc mcPA NOF paV   . 
        … 
 
Goods and services  
 
regDV
Final demand 
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of substitution between final goods is defined as )1/(1 regreg DD UV  , the maximisation of 
the household utility in Equation (3-1) yields the following household final demand function: 
sec sec
sec sec
.(1 )
regD
reg
reg reg reg
reg reg
PCBUD
C CBUD HH
tc PA
V
Jª º  « » ¬ ¼
 (3-3) 
3.2.2.2 Government 
The government’s ‘real’ disposable income net of savings and transfers to the representative 
household, denoted by CGBUDreg, is deflated using the government’s disposable income 
deflator, PCGBUDreg. Given the same elasticity of substitution between products as in the 
case of the household (ıDreg), the CES distribution parameter is defined as secregGVJ , and the 
government utility is thus optimised when: 
,
sec
secsec
regD
reg
reg
regregreg
PA
PCGBUD
GVCGBUDCG
V
J »¼
º«¬
ª   (3-4) 
providing that the government spends all its income, net of saving and household transfer, on 
purchasing consumption goods: 
.
sec
secsec¦   regregregreg CGPACGBUDPCGBUD  (3-5) 
3.2.2.3 Bank 
Given the bank’s ‘real’ money inflow, Sreg, which is equivalent to its nominal inflow deflated 
by price PSreg, the CES utility-optimising investment demand with the distribution parameter 
sec
regIJ
 is derived as: 
,
sec
secsec
regD
reg
reg
regregreg
PA
PS
ISI
V
J »¼
º«¬
ª   (3-6) 
providing that the bank spends all the saving on purchasing investment goods:  
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.
sec
secsec¦   regregregreg IPASPS  (3-7) 
3.2.3 International Transport  
Transport costs function as another barrier to trade. They drive a wedge between world prices 
of bilateral exports and imports. Thus, producers, especially under oligopoly, may refrain 
from exporting to an overseas market if transport margins drive up their consumer prices in 
that market to a level at which they become uncompetitive in comparison with local 
producers.3  
For that reason, transport costs are explicitly incorporated in line with the GTAP-EG model 
(Rutherford and Paltsev, 2000). In this model, the representative global shipping company 
pools a Cobb-Douglas composite of transport services from individual regions as demanded 
by exporters. Denote by trsp the subset of sec comprising transport service sectors, producers 
in region reg then export their services regtrspTRSPR  to the global shipping company at the 
export price of regtrspPE . Thus, the values of their regional exports are constant shares 
reg
trspTRSPRD  of the global transport service trspTRSPG  with the price of trspPTRSPG : 
  ,  andreg reg regtrsp trsp trsp trsp trspPE TRSPR TRSPR PTRSPG TRSPGD     (3-8) 
.¦ 
reg
reg
trsptrsp TRSPRTRSPG  (3-9) 
When commodity secT is exported from region regg to region reg, a price premium 
equivalent to: 
,
,sec
regg reg
trsp trsp T
trsp
PTRSPG G¦  
                                                     
3
 Note that this negative effect of international transport service should be lower when a sector is perfectly or monopolistically 
competitive, since each and every country/region will export some quantity to each other country/region, primarily owing to the 
Armington configuration. 
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is automatically paid by its exporting destination to the global transport company, and thus 
consumers in region reg bear transport costs by facing a higher import price in world 
currency, denoted by ,sec
reg regg
TPWM : 
.
,
sec,
,
sec
,
sec ¦  
trsp
regregg
Ttrsptrsp
regregg
T
reggreg
T PTRSPGPWEPWM G  (3-10) 
To determine Equation (3-10), the price premium is specified to be proportional to the 
parameter called reggreg Ttrsp ,sec,G , which is the ‘real’ international transport margin per unit of trade, 
calculated as a fixed fraction of benchmark bilateral trade data. Therefore, the following 
relationship also holds: 
, ,
,sec sec
sec
.
reg regg reg regg
trsp trsp T T
reg regg T
TRSPG QBEG ¦¦¦  (3-11) 
Lastly, to ensure consistency with the GTAP 6.0 database structure, transport services 
supplied to the international transport sector are explicitly modelled as transport margins, and 
thus are distinguished from other types of transport services supplied to domestic and export 
markets.  
3.2.4 Commodity Market Structure: The Degree of Market Imperfection 
Based on the specification of commodity market structures explained in Chapter 2, the model 
in this chapter specifies three types of market structure:  
x Perfect competition,  
x Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous products and entry/exit barriers, and  
x Monopolistic competition under which consumers prefer product variety and firms 
are free to enter and exit the market.  
This subsection briefly reviews the modelling of the three market structures and then 
describes how sectors are ‘identified’ as perfectly competitive, oligopolistic, or 
monopolistically competitive. 
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3.2.4.1 Commodity Market Structure Designs 
In Chapter 2 it was assumed that all sectors were perfectly competitive, and all firms in a 
given sector produced homogeneous goods under constant returns to scale.4 Freedom of entry 
and exit from such sectors ensures that in the long-run there are only ‘normal’ profits, i.e. 
price is equal to average cost. 
On the other hand, a market is likely to become imperfectly competitive when producers 
enjoy increasing returns to scale, since in the presence of a sizeable fixed cost, average cost 
exceeds marginal cost, thus average cost declines as the scale of production is increased. This 
type of internal economy of scale encourages firms to merge in order to benefit from the 
wedge between selling price and average cost. However, if firms are free to enter and exit the 
market, then price will converge to average costs, and the rent will eventually become zero. 
As firms maximise profits at the point where marginal cost equals marginal revenue (MR), 
with entry and exit barriers, we derive: PZ > AC > MC = MR; and without the barriers, this 
relativity becomes: PZ = AC > MC = MR.  
Accordingly, Cournot oligopolistic sectors with restricted firm mobility, and monopolistically 
competitive sectors with free mobility of firms, are respectively incorporated into the current 
CGE model as follows. 
3.2.4.1.1 Cournot Oligopoly with Firms Entry and Exit Barriers (Homogeneous Products) 
In the standard model, Cournot oligopoly is usually associated with manufacturing and 
service sectors, where a small number of firms ‘compete’ in terms of quantities. In general, 
oligopolistic firms in each sector produce homogeneous products, and in making their 
decisions they assume that the other firms have myopic foresight and so will not react. They 
seek to maximise profits – i.e. they set marginal cost equal to marginal revenue. Also, due to 
                                                     
4
 Perfectly competitive sectors may also operate under decreasing returns to scale, however, such a possibility is not strongly 
emphasised in this model. 
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the limited level of market competition, firms are usually assumed to be able to set prices. 
Since oligopolists price in accordance with the perceived price elasticity of demand 
( regsecEDM ) rather than total demand (Ruffin, 2003), a low elasticity of demand implies high 
sectoral profits ( regsecPROFIT ). Additionally, in a Cournot oligopolistic sector, the number of 
firms is fixed (henceforth denoted by regsecNOF ), whilst sectoral profit is endogenous.  
Although the model maintains the above assumptions about Cournot oligopoly, factor prices 
are endogenous to each region. Production is assumed to use CES technology.5 Furthermore, 
in each region the domestic good is not a perfect substitute for imported goods, and goods 
originating in other regions are also imperfect substitutes for each other (i.e. the Armington 
assumption is made). Moreover, oligopolistic firms, while playing the standard Cournot game 
where firms decide on the quantities they will produce and sell in the various markets, are 
obliged to pay taxes on production and factor use, although they may enjoy protection in their 
own market via tariffs on imported equivalent goods.  
Note that the above oligopolistic assumptions are mainly taken from the model developed in 
Chapter 2, except for the additional incorporation of production taxes ( regsectz ), taken from the 
output taxes in the GTAP 6.0 database. Hence, Equation (2-105) in Chapter 2 now becomes:  
,
, ,
,
sec
$ ( )(1 ) (1 )
$ ( )
.
fac reg
reg reg reg fac reg fac reg
sec sec sec sec secfac reg
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reg reg reg
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¦
 (3-12) 
Thus, the condition still holds for all oligopolistic sectors sec in region reg that total revenue 
less total cost equals sectoral profit. The mark-up pricing condition for oligopolistic firms in 
Chapter 2, i.e. Equation (2-64), equating marginal revenue with marginal cost, is modified in 
accordance with the newly introduced production taxes as follows: 
                                                     
5
 The detailed specification of production under imperfect competition has already been discussed in Chapter 2. 
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The derivation of the perceived price elasticity of demand under Cournot oligopoly is 
analogous to that introduced in Chapter 2, although with a number of modifications. First, the 
perceived elasticity of demand for ‘non-traded’ commodities ( sec secregTNEDM  ) is derived by 
firstly taking the natural log of the market clearing condition where total supply equals the 
sum of final and intermediate demands: 
sec sec sec sec sec ,sec
sec
.
reg reg reg reg reg
TN TN TN TN TNQZ C I CG IO   ¦  
In contrast with Equation (2-69) in Chapter 2, it is assumed that non-traded sectors no longer 
supply solely to the government. Therefore, the perceived elasticity of demand for non-traded 
goods is re-calculated by subsequently totally differentiating the natural log of the above 
market clearing condition: 
   sec sec sec sec sec sec sec sec ,secˆ ˆ ,reg reg reg reg reg reg reg regTN TN TN TN TN TN TN TN TNEDM QZ PZ C I CG QZ IO       (3-14) 
which is comparable, but not identical, to Equation (2-72) in Chapter 2.  
However, the perceived price elasticity of demand for ‘tradable’ sectors under oligopoly 
( sec secregTEDM  ) remains the same weighted average of the demand elasticities in the domestic 
and foreign markets, denoted respectively by ,sec sec
reg reg
TEDM   and 
,
sec sec
reg regg
TEDM  , as formerly 
indicated in Equation (2-73). The own-market demand elasticity is derived by log 
differentiating the Armington demand function for domestically-produced products in 
Equation (2-29) to derive the expression previously derived in Equation (2-75): 
.
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As in Equation (2-76), the elasticity of the Armington price to the domestically-produced 
price ( regTregT DPAP secsec ˆ/ˆ ) reflects the ratio of the expenditure on a domestically-produced good to 
total Armington expenditure. However, given the CES demand function assumed here, the 
elasticity of Armington demand to its own price ( sec secˆ ˆ/reg regT TQA PA ) is the negative of the 
elasticity of substitution between Armington composite goods in a region (-ıDreg). This is 
because the greater the value of –ıDreg, the more consumers substitute products in other 
sectors as the price of the Armington good increases. Hence, the perceived own-market 
demand elasticity in Equation (2-77) is redefined as: 
 , sec secsec sec sec
sec sec
.
reg reg
reg reg reg reg reg T T
T T T reg reg
T T
PD QDD
EDM A A D
PA QA
V V V       (3-15) 
Similarly, the foreign-market demand elasticity ( ,sec secreg reggTEDM  ) is derived by log 
differentiating the nested Armington demand function for imports from different origins in 
Equation (2-78) to obtain the following expression: 
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The perceived demand elasticity in foreign markets is then: 
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 (3-16) 
As a result, given the results from Equations (3-15) and (3-16), the perceived elasticity of 
demand for tradable sectors under Cournot oligopoly in Equation (2-80) of Chapter 2 is 
redefined as: 
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3.2.4.1.2 Monopolistic Competition with Free Entry and Exit of Firms (Heterogeneous 
Products) 
Under monopolistic competition, a large number of independent firms produce commodities 
which are close but not perfect substitutes, differentiable in terms of their characteristics and 
the marketing strategy used. Firms are free to enter and exit the market, as under perfect 
competition, and the long-run profits will converge to zero, i.e. the profit variable in Equation 
(3-12) is exogenous under monopolistic competition.  
As in Chapter 2, this model adopts the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) Love-of-Variety modelling 
approach by expressing sectoral demand as a CES function of individual demands that is 
homogeneous of degree one. Ceteris paribus, consumer utility is an increasing function of the 
number of varieties. The mark-up is inversely proportional to the perceived elasticity of 
demand,6 and so the mark-up pricing condition (MR = MC) in Equation (3-13) becomes: 
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As the adjustment in the number of firms drives sectoral profit to zero in the long run, the 
mark-up of a monopolistically competitive sector is relatively low compared to that in 
                                                     
6
 It is debatable whether the perceived demand elasticity under monopolistic competition exceeds that under Cournot oligopoly. 
While higher competition in the market under monopolistic competition implies the greater elasticity of demand; at the same 
time, the availability of product variety lowers the elasticity. 
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oligopolistic sectors with no entry and exit of firms. Given the definition of the demand 
function for each individual variety in Equation (2-86), the perceived demand elasticity for 
individual varieties is again sec sec ,
reg regEDM LVV 
 where sec
regLVV is the elasticity of substitution 
between product varieties within each sector. A commonly specified value for this elasticity is 
4.7  
While still based on the structure of group and individual demands in Equation (2-84), the 
commodity market clearing condition is now rewritten in terms of the Armington aggregated 
demand, i.e. it is a function of final and intermediate group demands: 
  sec11sec sec sec sec sec sec,sec
sec
.
regreg reg reg reg reg regLV
c
c
QA NOF C I CG IOV § ·    ¨ ¸© ¹¦  (3-19) 
Finally, from Equation (2-85), the Armington sectoral price is redefined as a function of the 
prices of individual varieties: 
  sec11sec sec sec .regreg reg regLVPA NOF paV   (3-20) 
3.2.4.2 Determination of Sectoral Market Structure: The Threshold 
There are thus three types of sectoral market structures in this model, and these will be 
distinguished using the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index ( secregHHI ) – the measure of the degree 
of market concentration – to determine the type of market structure. This approach was 
utilised by Gasiorek, Smith and Venables (1992) in assessing the economic effects of 
European integration under imperfectly competitive market structures. The index is defined as 
the sum of the squared firms’ market shares in percentage ( sec,regiS ), where i is the set of 
individual varieties in sector sec of region reg populated with sec
regNOF
 firms: 
                                                     
7
 See for example the GreenMod model (Bayar et al., 2006). 
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The value of this index ranges between 0 and 10,000, whereby the latter represents the most 
extreme case, that of monopoly. The official U.S. government guideline sets its antitrust 
standard such that sectors with an HHI index lower than 1,000 (more than 10 equal-sized 
firms competing) are regarded as unconcentrated; those with an HHI higher than 1,800 (fewer 
than 6 equal-sized firms competing) as highly concentrated; and those in between as 
moderately concentrated. This chapter thus assumes that, in each region, sectors with an HHI 
under 100 (more than 100 equal-sized firms competing) are perfectly competitive; those with 
indices ranging between 100 and 1,000 are under monopolistically competitive; and the rest, 
with indices greater than 1,000, operate as Cournot oligopolies.8  
3.2.5 Labour Market Closure: The Endogeneity of Unemployment and Wages 
The model used in Chapter 2 assumes that the set of factor prices that ensure full employment 
by equating factor endowments with demands from production sectors may be found for all 
but the skilled and unskilled labour markets. In each of these markets, the wage is 
endogenously determined and is inversely proportional to the level of unemployment, which 
in turn is determined by labour demand within each region. To better reflect this aspect of 
economic reality, which may have a non-negligible economic implication for household 
welfare, this chapter adopts a modelling approach that allows dissimilarity in the rigidity of 
real wages and unemployment rates across countries and labour skill levels. 
Bontout and Jean (1998) identified three labour market paradigms:  
x The Flexible Wage Approach: a fully flexible wage ensures full employment, 
therefore unemployment is exogenous and fixed to zero; 
                                                     
8
 Table 3-3 in Subsection 3.3.2.2 reports on the specification of commodity market structure in compliance with the above 
criteria, based on market concentration data from various sources. 
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x The Rigid Wage Approach: the nominal wage is bound to the consumer price index, 
thus the real wage is fixed and unemployment becomes endogenous; 
x The Wage Bargaining Approach: labour wages are a consequence of complex 
bargaining between employers and workers, and thus both wages and unemployment 
levels are endogenous.  
Although relevant to the labour market paradigm in advanced economies, the wage 
bargaining approach is comparatively data-intensive because it needs, among others, real data 
estimates of the probabilities of losing and finding jobs, unemployment subsidies, and the 
inter-temporal utilities of employed and unemployed workers. In addition, as this study 
focuses on the Thai economy where labour union power is not exceptionally strong, the 
adoption of the bargaining approach is not considered as an appropriate choice.  
An alternative approach to endogenising both unemployment and the real wage of each labour 
type is the wage curve relationship, proposed by Blanchflower and Oswald (1995). In line 
with Faris (2002) and Küster et al. (2007), the real wage is a non-linear function of the level 
of unemployment, explicitly defined as:9 
,
, ,
, ,
,
0 0
flab reg
flab reg flab reg
flab reg flab reg
PFM UNEMP
PFM UNEMP
Z§ · ¨ ¸© ¹
 (3-22) 
where Ȧflab,reg represents the wage curve elasticity of labour flab, skilled and unskilled labour 
(respectively denoted by “SkLab” and “UnSkLab”) in region reg, which is estimated to be 
approximately -0.1 in numerous countries (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2005). Accordingly, 
                                                     
9
 Labour’s nominal wage PFM flab,reg is to be divided by the consumer price index CPI reg to derive real wage, however, it can be 
abbreviated since the price index is fixed as the regional numéraire in this model. 
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Chart 3-1 plots a wage curve assuming that the benchmark real wage is unity and the 
benchmark unemployment is 100.10   
Chart 3-1: Wage curve relationship between real wage and unemployment 
 
   Source: Calculated by author.  
As such, these three approaches – namely the flexible wage, the rigid wage, and the wage 
curve approaches – are used to specify labour market structures in accordance with the 
characteristics of skilled and unskilled labour markets in different regions. 
3.2.6 Macroeconomic Closure Rules and Numéraire 
The current CGE model adopts the same macroeconomic closure rules as Subsection 2.2.8, 
that all economies are savings-driven with fixed foreign savings (and hence the flexible 
exchange rate regime). Also, the government balance is maintained by fixing tax rates and 
government savings, while endogenising government consumption given the CES substitution 
elasticity among public goods. As for the choice of numéraire, the consumer price index 
                                                     
10
 Although the benchmark unemployment is calibrated to be different across regions and skill levels, the curvature of the graph 
in Chart 3-1 is marginally varied with this fixed parameter. 
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( regCPI ) is once again chosen as the regional numéraire; whilst the exchange rate of Thailand 
( " "THAEXC ) becomes the international numéraire instead of REG1 in the previous chapter.11 
3.2.7 Equivalent Variation and Regional Welfare Price Indices 
As in Chapter 2, the standard EV, reflecting the income change induced by regional trade 
integration given the price at the benchmark year, is adopted as the measure of the aggregate 
welfare effects of the Thai FTAs. While the utility function in Chapter 2 was assumed to be 
Cobb-Douglas, this chapter specifies that the utility functions of the government, the 
household, and the bank take the CES functional form, explicitly elaborated in Subsection 
3.2.2. The reason for the modification of the demand structure being that the CES function 
renders more flexibility in the specification of consumption behaviour, especially in terms of 
substitutability of final products. 
Accordingly, the consumption price indices perceived by the government (GPIreg), the 
household (HPIreg) and the bank (SPIreg) as previously shown in Equation (2-43) to Equation 
(2-45) in Chapter 2 are now re-expressed as:  
   
1
11
sec sec
sec
;
regreg reg DD D
reg reg regGPI GV PA
VV VJ ª º « »¬ ¼¦  (3-23) 
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sec sec sec
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11
sec sec
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.
regreg reg DD D
reg reg regSPI I PA
VV VJ ª º « »¬ ¼¦  (3-25) 
In accordance with the derivation of Equation (2-42) in Chapter 2, these price indices are 
subsequently weighted by their corresponding consumption budget shares in the Cobb-
                                                     
11
 The choices of model closures and numéraire in Chapter 4 are set up in the same way. For that reason the explanation for the 
later set of models and policy experiments will be abbreviated. 
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Douglas form to obtain the regional welfare price index, which is used as the price deflator 
for the regional disposable income. As previously expressed in Equation (2-41) of Chapter 2, 
the change in the deflated regional income is hence the EV at the regional level.    
3.3 The Data 
The model employs the GTAP database which provides the input-output data accounting for 
economic linkages among sectors in a region, and also bilateral trade, transport, and various 
protection data that characterise economic ties among regions in the 2001 reference year 
(Dimaranan, 2006). Version 6.0 of the database consists of data for 87 regions and 57 sectors, 
which have been aggregated into 15 regions and 22 sectors in the current model. This section 
explains the aggregation of data by region and by sector, the determination of labour market 
structures, the structure of regional SAMs, and finally the derivation of data for the savings 
and elasticity parameters. 
3.3.1 Regions: Aggregation Criteria 
As noted previously, in this model, 87 regions in the GTAP database are aggregated into 15 
groups: 
1. Thailand (THA)  
2. Australia (AUS) 
3. New Zealand (NZL) 
4. India (IND) 
5. Japan (JPN) 
6. China (CHN)12 
7. North ASEAN (NASN)13 
8. South ASEAN (SASN)14 
                                                     
12
 Region China (CHN) comprises China (chn) and Hong Kong (hkg). 
13
 Region North ASEAN (NASN) is consisted of Singapore (sgp) and Malaysia (mys). 
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9. Korea (KOR)15 
10. United States (USA) 
11. Canada (CAN) 
12. Mexico (MEX) 
13. United Kingdom (UK) 
14. Rest of Europe (XEUR)16 
15. Rest of World (ROW)17  
Australia, New Zealand, India, Japan, and China are the countries whose bilateral FTAs with 
Thailand are to be analysed in this chapter. The regions left outside the groupings are broadly 
divided into ASEAN (excluding Thailand), Korea, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), Europe, and the rest of the world. 
Subsequently, ASEAN is further disaggregated into the North and the South, since the income 
disparity is clearly observable (see Chart 3-2). As the structures of factor endowments in rich 
and poor regions are so dissimilar, we usually find also dissimilarities in production patterns, 
labour market structures, and thus diversified adjustments to a change in trade policy. Since 
countries with significantly different economic structures tend to experience asymmetric 
impacts from the same trade policy change, ASEAN is accordingly split with respect to the 
regional income level. By the same token, Mexico is taken out of the NAFTA group. On the 
other hand, the rest of NAFTA (comprising USA and Canada) is further disaggregated, 
because the USA is engaged in FTA talks with Thailand.18 Finally, the United Kingdom is 
                                                                                                                                                        
14
 Region South ASEAN (SASN) involves the rest of ASEAN, i.e., Indonesia (idn), the Philippines (phl), Vietnam (vnm), and 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Lao PDR (xse). 
15
 Region Korea (KOR) exclusively refers to South Korea (kor). 
16
 Region Rest of Europe (XEUR) includes the rest of Europe: Austria (aut), Belgium (bel), Denmark (dnk), Finland (fin), France 
(fra), Germany (deu), Greece (grc), Ireland (irl), Italy (ita), Luxembourg (lux), the Netherlands (nld), Portugal (prt), Spain (esp), 
Sweden (swe), Switzerland (che), Rest of EFTA (xef), Rest of Europe (xer), Albania (alb), Bulgaria (bgr), Croatia (hrv), Cyprus 
(cyp), Czech Republic (cze), Hungary (hun), Malta (mlt), Poland (pol), Romania (rom), Slovakia (svk), Slovenia (svn), Estonia 
(est), Latvia (lva), Lithuania (ltu), Russian Federation (rus), and Rest of Former Soviet union (xsu).  
17
 Region Rest of World includes all other regions not mentioned elsewhere. 
18
 However, negotiations are currently on hold, due to political instability in Thailand since 2007. 
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taken out of the European group, as its labour market structure is different in the sense that 
the UK regional wages are more flexible than those on the continent. 
Chart 3-2: Gross National Income (GNI) per capita and income category by region 
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Source: Compiled by author from World Development Indicators, World Bank (2007). Note: The compilation of GNI per 
capita is based on the Atlas Method; and income categorisation is consistent with the definition by World Bank. 
3.3.2 Sectors: Aggregation Criteria and Determination of Market Structure 
3.3.2.1 Sectoral Aggregation: The Criteria 
The GTAP 6.0 database comprises 57 sectors in each region (See Appendix A3-2). These 
sectors are then aggregated with respect to factor intensity and sectoral export and import 
shares in total trade of Thailand, since the country is placed at the focal point of this analysis 
as a small open economy undergoing FTA talks with her trading partners. The thresholds for 
sectoral clusters are as follows. 
Upper middle income 
Lower middle income Low income 
 High income 
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Table 3-2: Factor intensity and sectoral trade share in total trade value (net of tax and 
transportation cost): THAILAND 
Trade shares Factor intensity (% of total factor input value) 
  
Export 
share 
in total 
export 
SQEsec 
Import 
share in 
total 
import 
SQMsec 
TCIsec TCIsec 
ranking 
Land Unskilled 
labour 
Skilled 
labour 
Capital Natural 
resource 
Cluster 1         
1   pdr 0.10% 0.00% 0.1 48 51.43% 41.47% 0.04% 7.06% 0.00% 
2   wht 0.00% 0.22% 0.22 43 51.43% 41.47% 0.04% 7.06% 0.00% 
3   gro 0.08% 0.01% 0.1 49 51.43% 41.47% 0.04% 7.06% 0.00% 
4   v_f 0.55% 0.11% 0.65 33 51.43% 41.47% 0.04% 7.06% 0.00% 
5   osd 0.01% 0.44% 0.46 40 51.43% 41.47% 0.04% 7.06% 0.00% 
6   c_b 0.00% 0.00% 0 56 51.43% 41.47% 0.04% 7.06% 0.00% 
7   pfb 0.01% 0.81% 0.82 30 51.43% 41.47% 0.04% 7.06% 0.00% 
8   ocr 2.40% 0.20% 2.6 21 51.43% 41.47% 0.04% 7.06% 0.00% 
9   ctl 0.00% 0.04% 0.04 53 51.43% 41.47% 0.04% 7.06% 0.00% 
10 oap 0.13% 0.40% 0.53 39 51.43% 41.47% 0.04% 7.06% 0.00% 
11 rmk 0.00% 0.00% 0 55 51.43% 41.47% 0.04% 7.06% 0.00% 
12 wol 0.00% 0.07% 0.07 50 51.43% 41.47% 0.04% 7.06% 0.00% 
Cluster 2         
13 frs 0.01% 0.16% 0.17 46 0.00% 33.33% 0.03% 57.68% 8.95% 
14 fsh 0.16% 0.04% 0.2 45 0.00% 13.36% 0.01% 47.20% 39.42% 
15 coa 0.00% 0.25% 0.25 42 0.00% 20.48% 2.12% 39.43% 37.97% 
16 oil 0.02% 6.93% 6.95 5 0.00% 12.37% 2.68% 32.84% 52.11% 
17 gas 0.00% 0.88% 0.88 29 0.00% 12.04% 1.96% 48.03% 37.97% 
18 omn 0.07% 0.51% 0.57 36 0.00% 13.14% 2.02% 75.22% 9.63% 
Cluster 3         
19 cmt 0.01% 0.03% 0.03 54 0.00% 26.92% 4.56% 68.52% 0.00% 
20 omt 1.36% 0.08% 1.44 25 0.00% 25.74% 4.37% 69.89% 0.00% 
21 vol 0.11% 0.05% 0.17 47 0.00% 10.30% 2.29% 87.41% 0.00% 
22 mil 0.11% 0.52% 0.63 34 0.00% 24.90% 3.95% 71.15% 0.00% 
23 pcr 2.06% 0.00% 2.06 23 0.00% 30.59% 5.83% 63.58% 0.00% 
24 sgr 0.69% 0.02% 0.71 32 0.00% 23.50% 5.23% 71.27% 0.00% 
25 ofd 6.83% 2.68% 9.51 4 0.00% 17.85% 3.97% 78.18% 0.00% 
26 b_t 0.23% 0.35% 0.58 35 0.00% 19.00% 2.84% 78.16% 0.00% 
Source: Compiled by author from GTAP 6.0 database, Dimaranan (2006). Note: TCIsec is the Trade Concentration Index of 
sector sec in Thailand, and bold figures indicate sectors ranked top fifteen with respect to the level of TCIsec. 
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Table 3-2 (Continued): Factor intensity and sectoral trade share in total trade value (net 
of tax and transportation cost): THAILAND 
Trade shares Factor intensity (% of total factor input value) 
  
Export 
share in 
total 
export 
SQEsec 
Import 
share in 
total 
import 
SQMsec 
TCIsec TCIsec 
ranking 
Land Unskilled 
labour 
Skilled 
labour 
Capital Natural 
resource 
Cluster 4         
27 tex 3.93% 2.50% 6.42 7 0.00% 28.56% 4.46% 66.98% 0.00% 
28 wap 3.86% 0.21% 4.07 15 0.00% 34.04% 5.04% 60.92% 0.00% 
29 lea 2.36% 0.53% 2.89 18 0.00% 20.83% 3.20% 75.97% 0.00% 
30 lum 2.11% 0.54% 2.65 20 0.00% 29.50% 3.83% 66.67% 0.00% 
31 ppp 1.04% 1.31% 2.35 22 0.00% 18.99% 3.81% 77.20% 0.00% 
32 p_c 1.25% 0.10% 1.35 26 0.00% 10.02% 2.04% 87.94% 0.00% 
33 crp 8.94% 10.83% 19.77 3 0.00% 23.47% 5.61% 70.92% 0.00% 
34 nmm 2.02% 1.38% 3.4 16 0.00% 21.44% 3.70% 74.86% 0.00% 
35 i_s 0.87% 4.10% 4.97 10 0.00% 27.25% 4.51% 68.24% 0.00% 
36 nfm 0.56% 3.54% 4.1 14 0.00% 27.04% 5.07% 67.89% 0.00% 
37 fmp 1.45% 1.41% 2.86 19 0.00% 20.38% 3.74% 75.88% 0.00% 
38 mvh 2.25% 3.43% 5.68 9 0.00% 24.47% 5.05% 70.49% 0.00% 
39 otn 0.60% 2.34% 2.94 17 0.00% 38.17% 7.87% 53.96% 0.00% 
40 ele 24.16% 20.44% 44.6 1 0.00% 15.96% 4.02% 80.02% 0.00% 
41 ome 12.34% 16.89% 29.23 2 0.00% 21.60% 5.43% 72.97% 0.00% 
42 omf 4.29% 2.64% 6.93 6 0.00% 28.31% 3.75% 67.94% 0.00% 
Cluster 5         
43 ely 0.02% 0.25% 0.27 41 0.00% 13.99% 6.67% 79.34% 0.00% 
44 gdt 0.01% 0.06% 0.07 51 0.00% 9.34% 4.46% 86.20% 0.00% 
45 wtr 0.03% 0.02% 0.04 52 0.00% 24.15% 11.52% 64.33% 0.00% 
46 cns 0.34% 0.23% 0.57 37 0.00% 24.96% 4.40% 70.64% 0.00% 
47 trd 1.64% 2.66% 4.31 12 0.00% 11.66% 2.37% 85.97% 0.00% 
Cluster 6         
48 otp 3.04% 1.40% 4.44 11 0.00% 26.18% 5.33% 68.49% 0.00% 
49 wtp 0.45% 0.33% 0.78 31 0.00% 21.70% 4.41% 73.89% 0.00% 
50 atp 3.24% 1.01% 4.25 13 0.00% 21.59% 4.39% 74.01% 0.00% 
Source: Compiled by author from GTAP 6.0 database, Dimanaran (2006). Note: TCIsec is the Trade Concentration Index of 
sector sec in Thailand, and bold figures indicate sectors ranked top fifteen with respect to the level of TCIsec. 
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Table 3-2 (Continued): Factor intensity and sectoral trade share in total trade value (net 
of tax and transportation cost): THAILAND 
Trade shares Factor intensity (% of total factor input value) 
  
Export 
share in 
total 
export 
SQEsec 
Import 
share 
in total 
import 
SQMsec 
TCIsec TCIsec 
ranking 
Land Unskilled 
labour 
Skilled 
labour 
Capital Natural 
resource 
Cluster 7         
51 cmn 0.23% 0.32% 0.55 38 0.00% 11.40% 8.89% 79.71% 0.00% 
52 ofi 0.06% 0.14% 0.2 44 0.00% 15.28% 11.91% 72.81% 0.00% 
53 isr 0.18% 1.13% 1.31 27 0.00% 29.72% 23.16% 47.11% 0.00% 
54 obs 2.26% 3.79% 6.05 8 0.00% 18.28% 14.25% 67.47% 0.00% 
55 ros 1.23% 0.76% 2 24 0.00% 24.33% 18.97% 56.70% 0.00% 
Cluster 8         
56 osg 0.31% 0.90% 1.21 28 0.00% 35.14% 54.05% 10.81% 0.00% 
Cluster 9         
57 dwe 0.00% 0.00% 0 57 0.00% 15.56% 0.00% 84.44% 0.00% 
Source: Compiled by author from GTAP 6.0 database, Dimanaran (2006). Note: TCIsec is the Trade Concentration Index of 
sector sec in Thailand, and bold figures indicate sectors ranked top fifteen with respect to the level of TCIsec. 
Table 3-2 reports on the sectoral data that are derived directly from the GTAP 6.0 database. 
Given the characteristics of Thai production sectors, sectors are bundled together if their 
factor intensity is clearly analogous; for example, similarly capital-intensive service sectors 
are aggregated as Cluster 7. As a result, initially nine clusters of commodity and service 
sectors are created as follows: 
1. Agricultural products  : pdr, wht, gro, v_f, osd, c_b, pfb, ocr, ctl, oap, 
rmk, wol 
2. Natural-resource intensive products  : frs, fsh, coa, oil, gas, omn 
3. Processed agricultural products  : cmt, omt, vol, mil, pcr, sgr, ofd, b_t 
4. Manufacturing products : tex, wap, lea, lum, ppp, p_c, crp, nmm, i_s, 
nfm, fmp, mvh, otn, ele, ome, omf 
5. Utility, construction, and trade  : ely, gdt, wtr, cns, trd 
6. Transportation services  : otp, wtp, atp 
7. Private services  : cmn, ofi, isr, obs, ros 
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8. Public services  : osg 
9. Dwellings  : dwe19 
Subsequently, sectoral trade share in regional trade value is used as the criterion to distinguish 
important tradable sectors from the above nine clusters. As in Table 3-2, denoting by SQEsec 
sector sec’s export share (%) in Thailand’s total export value; and similarly SQMsec as sector 
sec’s import share (%) in Thailand’s total import value, the Trade Concentration Index 
(TCIsec) is defined as: 
TCIsec  = SQEsec+ SQMsec,  (3-26) 
Where the two sectoral trade shares are derived from the GTAP database: 
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we know that a sector recording a high TCIsec is more open to trade than other sectors. As 
such, the index is a ‘balanced’ measure since it takes into account the exposure of a sector to 
trade, both in terms of export and import activities. Accordingly, all GTAP sectors are ranked 
                                                     
19
 Dwellings are the only non-traded sector in the GTAP database. 
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with respect to this index in Table 3-2. Among the 15 top-ranked tradable sectors – 
specifically oil, ofd, tex, wap, crp, i_s, nfm, mvh, ele, ome, omf, trd, otp, atp, and obs – two 
transport sectors (otp and atp) are exempted from disaggregation, as none of Thailand’s 
ongoing FTA negotiations focus primarily on these sectors. Thus, the other 13 production 
sectors are disaggregated from their groups, and 57 sectors are consequently clustered into 22 
aggregate sectors, where DWE (dwellings) is the only non-traded sector in this model. 
1. Agricultural products (AGR) 
2. Forestry, fishing, coal, gas, and other minerals (NRS) 
3. Oil (OIL) 
4. Meat, vegetable oil, dairy products, processed rice, sugar, beverage, and tobacco 
products (PAGR) 
5. Other food products (OFD) 
6. Manufacturing products (MNF) 
7. Textiles (TEX) 
8. Wearing apparels (WAP) 
9. Chemical, Rubber, Plastic products (CRP) 
10. Ferrous metals (I_S) 
11. Other Metals (NFM) 
12. Motor vehicles and parts (MVH) 
13. Electronic equipment (ELE) 
14. Other machinery and equipment (OME) 
15. Other manufactures (OMF) 
16. Electricity, Gas, Water, and Construction (MSR) 
17. Trade (TRD) 
18. Transportation services (TRP) 
19. Communication, Financial services, Insurance, and other services (CFI) 
20. Other business services (OBS) 
21. Public services (OSG) 
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22. Dwellings (DWE) 
3.3.2.2 Determination of Sectoral Market Structure 
As described in Subsection 3.2.4.2, commodity market structures are determined by the level 
of the externally derived HHI data, except that agricultural goods (AGR) are produced under 
perfect competition in all regions.20 The market concentration indices for all other sectors in 
each country are calculated from various national and international data sources. The data for 
Thailand are extracted and compiled from Table 9.2 in Year Book of Labour Statistics 2000 
published by the Department of Labour Protection and Welfare, Thailand (2001). As for 
Australia, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2007) website provides the Industry 
Concentration Statistics for the 1998/99 financial year, showing the proportion of sales, 
persons employed, and industry gross products that are concentrated among the 20 largest 
enterprise groups in each industry. The ‘largest 20’ are further subdivided into groups of four, 
once again in order of their sizes. Likewise, New Zealand Official Yearbook 1996 reports in 
Table 21.2 the market concentration data in 1995, as collected by Statistics New Zealand. On 
the other hand, the most recent Indian HHI data at the SIC 3-digit level are reported by 
Kambhampati and Kattuman (2003) for those medium- and large-sized firms operating in 
1997.21 Similarly, the HHI data for Japanese industries are reported in Table 13 of Fukao and 
Ito (2001). Using market shares of the top 10 firms in each industry, Xiao (2005) provided in 
Table 1.4 and Table 1.5 the index of industry concentration for China at the 2-digit and 3-
digit industry level. The market concentration indices in manufacturing sectors for Korea, 
Canada, and Mexico are derived from OECD Economic Surveys for the fiscal years of 1997, 
                                                     
20
 Agricultural sectors are commonly regarded as perfectly competitive in applied CGE models, including the Michigan model 
(Brown et al. (2000). 
21
 Although not explicitly reported in Kambhampati and Kattuman (2003), the actual data file is thankfully received from the first 
author. 
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2001, and 1980 respectively.22 For the USA, the HHI data of manufacturing sectors and the 
concentration ratios classifying service industries by the fraction of output accounted for by 
the largest 4, 8, 20, and 50 firms, are taken from the 2002 Economic Census organised by the 
U.S. Census Bureau (2007) using the North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS). Finally, the concentration ratios for UK industries in 2004 are excerpted from 
Appendix 1 in the Office for National Statistics (2006), of which estimates are derived by 
calculating for the percentage of gross value added contributed by the top 5 and top 15 
leading businesses in each industry. 
As noted earlier, instead of the HHI, some authorities routinely publish the concentration 
ratios sec( )regCR j  signifying the sum of market shares of the largest j firms operating in industry 
sec of region reg. Assuming that the first j firms record approximately equal market shares, 
the market share of each of these largest j firms is derived as sec, sec( )reg regi jS CR j jd  , provided 
that sec, sec,( 1)
reg reg
i iS S t  always holds. Therefore, the HHIs are accordingly approximated as: 
   
 
 
 
 
 
2 2 2 2
sec sec sec sec sec sec
sec
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where there are assumed to be 1,000 firms competing in each sector, and {j, k, l,…,z} is the 
set of numbers of the largest firms, of which the concentration ratios are randomly reported.  
As for the four aggregate regions consisting of numerous countries, i.e. North ASEAN 
(NASN), South ASEAN (SASN), Rest of Europe (XEUR), and Rest of World (ROW), it is 
impractical to compile the market concentration data for each and every production sector. On 
the premise that these regions are not as central to this study as Thailand and her FTA 
counterparts, the study approximates that regions in the same range of wealth level (as 
                                                     
22
 To be precise, data of market concentration in individual countries are extracted from Table 5.2 in OECD Economic Surveys: 
Korea (2004a); Table 2.2 in OECD Economic Surveys: Canada (2004b); and Table 41 in OECD Economic Surveys: Mexico 
(1991/92). 
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Table 3-3: The degree of sectoral market competition by region 
Sector 
Region 
AGR NRS OIL PAGR OFD MNF TEX WAP CRP I_S NFM MVH ELE OME OMF MSR TRD TRP CFI OBS OSG DWE 
Thailand PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC 
Australia PC MC MC MC MC MC PC PC MC MC PC PC MC MC PC MC PC MC CO PC PC PC 
New Zealand PC CO CO CO PC MC PC PC MC MC MC MC MC PC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
India PC CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO 
Japan PC PC PC MC PC MC MC PC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC PC MC MC MC MC PC 
China PC PC MC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC MC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC 
North ASEAN PC MC MC CO CO MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
South ASEAN PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC 
Korea PC MC MC MC PC MC PC PC MC MC MC MC MC PC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
USA PC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC CO MC MC PC MC PC PC PC PC PC PC 
Canada PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC 
Mexico PC MC MC CO CO MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
United Kingdom PC MC MC MC MC MC MC PC MC MC PC MC MC MC MC MC PC MC MC PC PC PC 
Rest of Europe PC MC MC MC MC MC MC PC MC MC PC MC MC MC MC MC PC MC MC PC PC PC 
Rest of World PC PC MC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC 
Source: Compiled by author from various sources (see Subsection 3.3.2.2). Note: PC stands for perfectly competitive sectors (HHI < 100); MC accounts for monopolistic competitive sectors (100  HHI < 
1,000); and CO represents Cournot Oligopolistic sectors (HHI  1,000). India as the only country in the low income group has the most imperfectly competitive market among all regions. Thus, it might be the 
case that countries with lowest income level have loose antitrust regulation. Thailand and China belong to the lower middle income group and coincidentally have similar market structures which are almost all 
perfectly competitive, while most markets in upper middle and high income countries are under monopolistic competition.
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illustrated in Chart 3-2) tend to have a certain proximity in antitrust standard and competition 
policy. Therefore, the sectoral market structures of North ASEAN are assumed to replicate 
those of Mexico, as both are categorised as upper middle income regions. On the other hand, 
the geographic, political, and economic structures of South ASEAN as a lower middle income 
region are in keeping with those of Thailand; while the Rest of Europe shares the same HHI 
data with the UK; and the market concentration index for Rest of World is the simple average 
of the HHI data from other lower middle income countries (Thailand and China). Table 3-3 
reports the designated commodity market structure given the above criteria. 
Lastly, the hypothetical number of firms is calibrated in line with the ATHENA model,23 in 
that the inverse of the HHI gives the number of hypothetical, equal-sized firms in each sector. 
Such this feature is already described in the general model structure section, in that Cournot 
oligopolistic sectors are populated with homogeneous firms; and that, although 
monopolistically competitive firms produce heterogeneous products, they have identical 
production functions. 
3.3.3 Factors: Specification of Labour Market Structure 
There are five primary factors – namely capital “K”, skilled labour “SkLab”, unskilled labour 
“UnSkLab”, land “H”, and natural resources “NatRes.” The model specifies that capital, 
skilled and unskilled labour are mobile domestically but not internationally, whilst land and 
natural resources are completely immobile (sector-specific). As described in Section 3.2.5, the 
current model allows the flexibility of real wage and unemployment, or the lack of it, to be 
varied by region. This is based on the argument that the sensitivity of the labour market and 
unemployment to a policy change may vary with the degree of wage rigidity; for example, the 
effects on the real economy may be more pronounced when wages do not adjust fully to an 
                                                     
23
 See Section 3.3 in de Brujin (2006). 
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external shock. For that reason, the chapter accounts for the following characteristics of the 
skilled and unskilled labour markets in the different aggregate regions (see Table 3-4). 
Table 3-4: Specifications of skilled and unskilled labour market closure rules 
Labour market  
(by income group)  
The flexible wage 
approach 
The rigid wage 
approach 
The wage curve 
approach 
High income USA 
New Zealand 
Australia 
Canada 
UK 
Rest of Europe Japan 
Korea 
 
Upper middle 
income 
North ASEAN  Mexico 
Lower 
middle 
income 
 
 
 Thailand 
South ASEAN 
 China 
Rest of World 
Skilled 
labour 
Low income   India 
High income USA 
New Zealand 
 Australia 
 Canada 
Rest of Europe 
UK 
Japan 
Korea 
 
Upper middle 
income  
North ASEAN  Mexico 
Lower 
middle 
income  
 
 
 Thailand 
South ASEAN 
 China 
Rest of World 
Unskilled 
labour 
Low income   India 
      Source: Compiled by author.  
In general, this chapter assumes that the real wage is inversely related to the unemployment 
rate, so that both variables are endogenous in the majority of regions. However, it is 
commonly observed that in some upper-middle and high income regions the government may 
actively pursue policies that encourage either a flexible wage, which entails a relatively low 
and stable level of unemployment, or a rigid wage that inevitably brings about relatively high 
and fluctuating unemployment. In this model, the former types of region consist of the USA, 
New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and North ASEAN, whereas the Rest of Europe follows to 
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the rigid wage approach. To reflect the economic reality of the UK, on the other hand, the 
labour market is divided by skill level, so that skilled labour has a flexible wage similar to the 
majority of the non-European rich countries, while unskilled labour receives high 
unemployment benefits, similar to the Rest of Europe, such that wages become rigid and the 
unemployment rate remains relatively high.24  
3.3.4 The Simplified Social Accounting Matrix 
A complete CGE model has a consistent accounting framework in the sense that every receipt 
must be offset by a corresponding expenditure: thus all transactions in a region can be 
expressed as elements of a SAM. The SAM framework of this model is consistent with the 
one adopted in Chapter 2 and importantly the international System of National Accounts 
(SNA) 1993 standard on the presentation of national income accounts set by United Nations 
Statistical Office (Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts, 1993). For 
simplicity, regional value flows derived from the GTAP database are represented in a 
simplified SAM format, with commodities’ and activities’ input-output demands explicitly 
identified. While the simplified regional SAM sheds light on the macroeconomic 
characteristics of production and trade, monetary flows between the household, the 
government, and the bank are not explicitly shown in the following SAMs, but will be 
handled later in Subsection 3.3.5.  
 
                                                     
24
 Another alternative is to use the rigid wage approach to model the unskilled labour market closure in lower-middle and low 
income countries. However, the legislative minimum wage applied to unskilled labour in these countries is basically in nominal 
terms, while prices and wages in the CGE model are in real terms. In addition, the non-negligible existence of the informal 
economic activity may effectively nullify the argument that unskilled labour wage in these countries is rigid and well-regulated 
by the government. 
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Table 3-5: Thailand’s simplified SAM 
ABSORPTION MATRIX  FINAL DEMANDS MATRIX 
Commodities Activities  
A M S A M S
Sub-total Household Investment Government Export 
margins Exports
Total 
A      0.5493 9.3655 0.5825 10.4972 2.1759 0.0598 0.0000   12.7329 
M      2.4120 69.8117 19.7628 91.9865 29.2611 12.0461 0.0000   133.2937 Commodities
S      1.4975 20.6003 21.3691 43.4669 31.1305 11.0403 11.5939   97.2316 
A 11.0153       11.0153     2.6291 13.6444 
M   73.5131     73.5131     67.2127 140.7259 Activities
S     89.2730    89.2730    4.0880 10.4249 103.7860 
Sub-total 11.0153 73.5131 89.2730 4.4588 99.7775 41.7143 319.7520 62.5675 23.1462 11.5939 4.0880 80.2668 501.4144 
Factors      9.0640 34.1510 54.6334 97.8484        
Indirect taxes 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0522 0.1215 6.7975 7.4382 14.3051    
Import tariffs 0.2053 5.4262 0.0000    5.6315    
Import margins 0.0924 2.2102     2.3027    
Imports 1.4199 52.1440 8.0107    61.5747    
Total 12.7329 133.2936 97.2315 13.6444 140.7259 103.7860 501.4143        
Source: Compiled from the GTAP 6.0 database. Note: A = Agriculture; M = Manufacturing; S = Services; values are in billion US$; and the SAM format is based on Drud et al. (1986). 
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Table 3-6: Australia’s simplified SAM 
ABSORPTION MATRIX  FINAL DEMANDS MATRIX 
Commodities Activities  
A M S A M S
Sub-total Household Investment Government Export 
margins Exports
Total 
A      1.9816 7.9612 1.3495 11.2923 3.8328 0.5655 0.0490   15.7395 
M      3.1072 70.9855 53.7127 127.8054 55.8906 23.7860 2.3912   209.8733 Commodities
S      4.8715 39.9112 134.6904 179.4731 155.1423 50.5186 61.7987   446.9327 
A 15.1209       15.1209     7.6564 22.7773 
M   135.8025     135.8025     51.2224 187.0249 Activities
S     432.7829    432.7829    5.2055 14.1543 452.1427 
Sub-total 15.1209 135.8025 432.7829 9.9603 118.8579 189.7526 902.2770 214.8657 74.8700 64.2389 5.2055 73.0331 1,334.4903 
Factors      13.1217 63.1034 237.2774 313.5025        
Indirect taxes 0.0106 11.6482 1.1194 -0.3047 5.0636 25.1127 42.6498    
Import tariffs 0.0022 3.1461 0.0000    3.1483    
Import margins 0.0496 2.4824     2.5320    
Imports 0.5563 56.7940 13.0304    70.3807    
Total 15.7395 209.8733 446.9327 22.7773 187.0249 452.1427 1,334.4903        
Source: Compiled from the GTAP 6.0 database. Note: A = Agriculture; M = Manufacturing; S = Services; values are in billion US$; and the SAM format is based on Drud et al. (1986). 
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Table 3-7: New Zealand’s simplified SAM 
ABSORPTION MATRIX  FINAL DEMANDS MATRIX 
Commodities Activities 
A M S A M S
Sub-total Household Investment Government Export 
margins Exports
Total 
Commodities A      0.6508 4.0797 0.3407 5.0712 0.3943 0.0121 0.0043   5.4818 
M      1.0268 11.7091 8.5564 21.2924 8.0176 4.2856 0.0986   33.6942 
S      2.0520 7.0231 20.5523 29.6274 20.1973 5.5454 8.3147   63.6848 
A 5.1711       5.1711     1.6918 6.8629 
Activities
M   19.9139     19.9139     13.2279 33.1417 
S     58.4516    58.4516    1.1644 3.3951 63.0111 
Sub-total 5.1711 19.9139 58.4516 3.7296 22.8119 29.4493 139.5275 28.6092 9.8431 8.4176 1.1644 18.3148 205.8766 
Factors      3.1397 10.0642 31.9383 45.1422        
Indirect taxes 0.0388 1.1817 2.0300 -0.0064 0.2656 1.6235 5.1333    
Import tariffs 0.0003 0.2733 0.0000    0.2736    
Import margins 0.0247 0.5844     0.6091    
Imports 0.2468 11.7410 3.2031    15.1910    
Total 5.4818 33.6942 63.6848 6.8629 33.1418 63.0111 205.8766        
Source: Compiled from the GTAP 6.0 database. Note: A = Agriculture; M = Manufacturing; S = Services; values are in billion US$; and the SAM format is based on Drud et al. (1986). 
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Table 3-8: India’s simplified SAM 
ABSORPTION MATRIX  FINAL DEMANDS MATRIX 
Commodities Activities 
A M S A M S
Sub-total Household Investment Government Export 
margins Exports
Total 
A      18.6106 24.8517 6.8093 50.2716 86.0322 0.7223 0.8681   137.8943 
M      6.5378 129.6816 59.1249 195.3442 101.2848 48.5366 7.7735   352.9391 Commodities
S      15.4821 69.2433 79.6502 164.3755 122.1551 56.8877 52.1444   395.5627 
A 134.9327       134.9327     3.1417 138.0744 
M   285.9093     285.9093     45.5578 331.4671 Activities
S     383.7599    383.7599    2.8081 12.4259 398.9939 
Sub-total 134.9327 285.9093 383.7599 40.6305 223.7765 145.5844 1,214.5933 309.4721 106.1466 60.7860 2.8081 61.1254 1,754.9316 
Factors      101.9598 97.8715 241.1720 441.0033        
Indirect taxes 0.0000 5.9090 0.0000 -4.5159 9.8191 12.2376 23.4498    
Import tariffs 0.6021 12.9885 0.0000    13.5906    
Import margins 0.1800 2.4632     2.6431    
Imports 2.1796 45.6690 11.8028    59.6514    
Total 137.8943 352.9390 395.5627 138.0744 331.4672 398.9940 1,754.9316        
Source: Compiled from the GTAP 6.0 database. Note: A = Agriculture; M = Manufacturing; S = Services; values are in billion US$; and the SAM format is based on Drud et al. (1986). 
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Table 3-9: Japan’s simplified SAM 
ABSORPTION MATRIX  FINAL DEMANDS MATRIX 
Commodities Activities 
A M S A M S
Sub-total Household Investment Government Export 
margins Exports
Total 
A      8.1456 47.1799 5.7484 61.0738 27.4775 1.6828 0.2253   90.4594 
M      13.4615 1,026.8522 519.4034 1,559.7172 607.5348 301.6870 7.9582   2,476.8973 Commodities
S      11.6729 522.5113 1,144.3355 1,678.5197 1,699.1787 725.6513 709.8462   4,813.1959 
A 71.9969       71.9969     1.2809 73.2778 
M   2,087.2483     2,087.2483     411.9499 2,499.1982 Activities
S     4,694.0173    4,694.0173    14.0331 39.7915 4,747.8419 
Sub-total 71.9969 2,087.2483 4,694.0173 33.2800 1,596.5434 1,669.4873 10,152.5734 2,334.1910 1,029.0211 718.0297 14.0331 453.0222 14,700.8705 
Factors      39.9828 673.3529 2,511.2107 3,224.5464        
Indirect taxes 1.3231 61.5511 34.2901 0.0149 229.3020 567.1439 893.6252    
Import tariffs 3.7243 13.3379 0.0000    17.0622    
Import margins 1.4071 16.7277     18.1348    
Imports 12.0080 298.0321 84.8884    394.9284    
Total 90.4594 2,476.8972 4,813.1958 73.2778 2,499.1983 4,747.8419 14,700.8705        
Source: Compiled from the GTAP 6.0 database. Note: A = Agriculture; M = Manufacturing; S = Services; values are in billion US$; and the SAM format is based on Drud et al. (1986). 
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Table 3-10: China’s simplified SAM 
ABSORPTION MATRIX  FINAL DEMANDS MATRIX 
Commodities Activities 
A M S A M S
Sub-total Household Investment Government Export 
margins Exports
Total 
A      47.1588 108.1838 9.0997 164.4424 121.1458 6.7940 0.0048   292.3871 
M      54.6323 1,048.2496 394.3752 1,497.2571 294.7535 139.0984 0.3675   1,931.4766 Commodities
S      18.3501 229.7797 352.0109 600.1407 186.1046 310.0806 165.5206   1,261.8464 
A 277.3103       277.3103     6.7692 284.0795 
M   1,578.5627     1,578.5627     376.0446 1,954.6073 Activities
S     1,201.7297    1,201.7297    22.2669 98.9474 1,322.9439 
Sub-total 277.3103 1,578.5627 1,201.7297 120.1412 1,386.2132 755.4858 5,319.4429 602.0040 455.9730 165.8929 22.2669 481.7612 7,047.3408 
Factors      158.9552 461.9626 501.5940 1,122.5118        
Indirect taxes 0.0000 0.0181 -0.0738 4.9831 106.4315 65.8641 177.2231    
Import tariffs 4.2592 28.2660 0.0000    32.5252    
Import margins 0.7779 13.4477     14.2256    
Imports 10.0397 311.1820 60.1906    381.4123    
Total 292.3871 1,931.4765 1,261.8464 284.0795 1,954.6073 1,322.9440 7,047.3408        
Source: Compiled from the GTAP 6.0 database. Note: A = Agriculture; M = Manufacturing; S = Services; values are in billion US$; and the SAM format is based on Drud et al. (1986). 
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Table 3-11: North ASEAN’s simplified SAM 
ABSORPTION MATRIX  FINAL DEMANDS MATRIX 
Commodities Activities  
A M S A M S
Sub-total Household Investment Government Export 
margins Exports
Total 
A      0.6364 2.7004 0.6953 4.0321 2.4133 0.0214 0.0000   6.4668 
M      0.8884 152.1018 34.6905 187.6807 25.2363 25.1495 0.0001   238.0665 Commodities
S      0.4537 31.9438 62.0776 94.4751 40.7019 16.7794 17.7153   169.6717 
A 2.5117       2.5117     1.7082 4.2198 
M   63.8648     63.8648     191.9378 255.8026 Activities
S     136.9609    136.9609    7.0486 43.1703 187.1798 
Sub-total 2.5117 63.8648 136.9609 1.9784 186.7460 97.4634 489.5252 68.3515 41.9503 17.7153 7.0486 236.8162 861.4071 
Factors      2.2092 68.7348 86.7154 157.6594        
Indirect taxes 0.0847 1.3881 4.6541 0.0322 0.3218 3.0009 9.4817    
Import tariffs 0.5036 3.0871 0.0000    3.5908    
Import margins 0.3706 5.8731     6.2437    
Imports 2.9963 163.8532 28.0567    194.9062    
Total 6.4668 238.0664 169.6717 4.2198 255.8026 187.1798 861.4070        
Source: Compiled from the GTAP 6.0 database. Note: A = Agriculture; M = Manufacturing; S = Services; values are in billion US$; and the SAM format is based on Drud et al. (1986). 
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Table 3-12: South ASEAN’s simplified SAM 
ABSORPTION MATRIX  FINAL DEMANDS MATRIX 
Commodities Activities  
A M S A M S
Sub-total Household Investment Government Export 
margins Exports
Total 
A      5.7276 27.5787 1.5422 34.8485 15.7814 0.5160 0.0000   51.1459 
M      5.9982 127.8606 54.2337 188.0925 95.6632 21.0616 0.0001   304.8174 Commodities
S      3.6056 46.0396 52.7599 102.4051 105.7719 47.5429 30.7061   286.4260 
A 47.1822       47.1822     4.7862 51.9685 
M   206.9174     206.9174     116.3077 323.2250 Activities
S     260.9105    260.9105    7.6353 9.7589 278.3046 
Sub-total 47.1822 206.9174 260.9105 15.3314 201.4789 108.5358 840.3561 217.2166 69.1205 30.7062 7.6353 130.8528 1,295.8874 
Factors      35.1085 104.2441 154.3435 293.6961        
Indirect taxes 0.0020 0.1234 0.1862 1.5285 17.5021 15.4253 34.7676    
Import tariffs 0.1487 5.8808 0.0000    6.0295    
Import margins 0.2842 4.3646     4.6488    
Imports 3.5288 87.5311 25.3293    116.3893    
Total 51.1459 304.8173 286.4260 51.9685 323.2251 278.3046 1,295.8874        
Source: Compiled from the GTAP 6.0 database. Note: A = Agriculture; M = Manufacturing; S = Services; values are in billion US$; and the SAM format is based on Drud et al. (1986). 
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Table 3-13: Korea’s simplified SAM 
ABSORPTION MATRIX  FINAL DEMANDS MATRIX 
Commodities Activities  
A M S A M S
Sub-total Household Investment Government Export 
margins Exports
Total 
A      2.7652 21.5851 1.9069 26.2572 11.5064 0.2199 0.0216   38.0051 
M      6.0561 256.9611 69.7173 332.7344 72.8203 42.1585 0.0673   447.7805 Commodities
S      2.6594 69.3370 130.1111 202.1075 161.9001 64.6724 42.1792   470.8591 
A 26.6576       26.6576     0.5765 27.2342 
M   307.7323     307.7323     158.8405 466.5728 Activities
S     443.5643    443.5643    6.3589 17.7616 467.6847 
Sub-total 26.6576 307.7323 443.5643 11.4806 347.8832 201.7353 1,339.0534 246.2267 107.0508 42.2681 6.3589 177.1786 1,918.1364 
Factors      16.4281 106.8095 249.8108 373.0484        
Indirect taxes 0.0040 2.3083 0.0004 -0.6746 11.8802 16.1387 29.6570    
Import tariffs 6.7411 7.0579 0.0000    13.7990    
Import margins 0.3230 6.5188     6.8418    
Imports 4.2792 124.1632 27.2944    155.7368    
Total 38.0050 447.7805 470.8591 27.2342 466.5729 467.6847 1,918.1364        
Source: Compiled from the GTAP 6.0 database. Note: A = Agriculture; M = Manufacturing; S = Services; values are in billion US$; and the SAM format is based on Drud et al. (1986). 
 
 3-45
Table 3-14: USA’s simplified SAM 
ABSORPTION MATRIX  FINAL DEMANDS MATRIX 
Commodities Activities  
A M S A M S
Sub-total Household Investment Government Export 
margins Exports
Total 
A      17.3956 111.7377 14.5707 143.7040 42.7386 1.0428 1.7408   189.2262 
M      50.0087 1,992.3215 1,145.0102 3,187.3404 1,470.4305 796.4590 228.7712   5,683.0010 Commodities
S      51.0923 1,056.7641 3,481.3381 4,589.1945 5,443.0977 1,193.1341 1,298.1353   12,523.5617 
A 170.0151       170.0151     29.9829 199.9979 
M   4,526.9972     4,526.9972     638.5869 5,165.5841 Activities
S     12,347.4362    12,347.4362    21.4359 220.2423 12,589.1144 
Sub-total 170.0151 4,526.9972 12,347.4362 118.4967 3,160.8233 4,640.9189 24,964.6874 6,956.2668 1,990.6359 1,528.6473 21.4359 888.8120 36,350.4853 
Factors      107.3144 1,811.9047 7,176.4027 9,095.6217        
Indirect taxes 0.0000 30.3353 0.0000 -25.8131 192.8561 771.7928 969.1712    
Import tariffs 0.2179 19.9013 0.0000    20.1192    
Import margins 1.9524 38.1623     40.1146    
Imports 17.0409 1,067.6049 176.1254    1,260.7712    
Total 189.2262 5,683.0010 12,523.5616 199.9979 5,165.5841 12,589.1144 36,350.4853        
Source: Compiled from the GTAP 6.0 database. Note: A = Agriculture; M = Manufacturing; S = Services; values are in billion US$; and the SAM format is based on Drud et al. (1986). 
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Table 3-15: Canada’s simplified SAM 
ABSORPTION MATRIX  FINAL DEMANDS MATRIX 
Commodities Activities  
A M S A M S
Sub-total Household Investment Government Export 
margins Exports
Total 
A      3.6145 12.5221 0.9723 17.1089 3.2181 0.0007 0.0070   20.3346 
M      6.0030 229.6872 76.1753 311.8655 122.8857 44.3375 1.4762   480.5650 Commodities
S      4.1273 76.0503 163.8235 244.0011 279.6425 96.2108 134.4639   754.3183 
A 15.2549       15.2549     8.8414 24.0963 
M   258.3061     258.3061     224.2617 482.5679 Activities
S     698.5502    698.5502    7.2296 34.1633 739.9431 
Sub-total 15.2549 258.3061 698.5502 13.7448 318.2596 240.9711 1,545.0867 405.7463 140.5490 135.9471 7.2296 267.2664 2,501.8252 
Factors      11.7616 140.6892 413.0185 565.4693        
Indirect taxes 0.2641 14.1005 22.6553 -1.4100 23.6190 85.9535 145.1824    
Import tariffs 0.0627 2.9196 0.0000    2.9823    
Import margins 0.4594 5.5726     6.0320    
Imports 4.2935 199.6662 33.1128    237.0725    
Total 20.3346 480.5650 754.3183 24.0963 482.5679 739.9431 2,501.8252        
Source: Compiled from the GTAP 6.0 database. Note: A = Agriculture; M = Manufacturing; S = Services; values are in billion US$; and the SAM format is based on Drud et al. (1986). 
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Table 3-16: Mexico’s simplified SAM 
ABSORPTION MATRIX  FINAL DEMANDS MATRIX 
Commodities Activities  
A M S A M S
Sub-total Household Investment Government Export 
margins Exports
Total 
A      5.1031 20.9524 0.4949 26.5504 9.3335 0.3976 0.1534   36.4349 
M      3.6568 194.8044 67.2359 265.6971 174.6976 46.2394 7.1464   493.7804 Commodities
S      1.5167 71.2555 74.9951 147.7673 227.6976 75.1157 60.5932   511.1739 
A 30.5781       30.5781     4.0101 34.5882 
M   357.8459     357.8459     150.1118 507.9577 Activities
S     495.2136    495.2136    3.6998 11.4494 510.3627 
Sub-total 30.5781 357.8459 495.2136 10.2767 287.0123 142.7258 1,323.6524 411.7287 121.7527 67.8930 3.6998 165.5714 2,094.2979 
Factors      26.5909 200.7921 311.3053 538.6883        
Indirect taxes 0.0000 0.7913 0.3589 -2.2793 20.1533 56.3316 75.3559    
Import tariffs 0.5688 6.1908 0.0000    6.7596    
Import margins 0.2172 3.5035     3.7207    
Imports 5.0708 125.4489 15.6014    146.1211    
Total 36.4349 493.7804 511.1739 34.5882 507.9578 510.3628 2,094.2979        
Source: Compiled from the GTAP 6.0 database. Note: A = Agriculture; M = Manufacturing; S = Services; values are in billion US$; and the SAM format is based on Drud et al. (1986). 
 
 3-48
Table 3-17: UK’s simplified SAM 
ABSORPTION MATRIX  FINAL DEMANDS MATRIX 
Commodities Activities  
A M S A M S
Sub-total Household Investment Government Export 
margins Exports
Total 
A      1.7604 16.4802 1.6204 19.8611 8.3706 0.0225 0.1177   28.3719 
M      6.1006 320.7467 164.0008 490.8481 249.7072 98.3830 48.7264   887.6647 Commodities
S      4.0403 161.6719 572.9232 738.6354 700.7653 140.5281 229.5895   1,809.5182 
A 19.1379       19.1379     1.9045 21.0424 
M   568.4251     568.4251     243.0939 811.5190 Activities
S     1,726.9150    1,726.9150    6.0721 88.0640 1,821.0511 
Sub-total 19.1379 568.4251 1,726.9150 11.9014 498.8988 738.5443 3,563.8226 958.8431 238.9336 278.4336 6.0721 333.0625 5,379.1674 
Factors      12.6172 262.9714 900.2070 1,175.7955        
Indirect taxes 0.0000 14.8907 2.7152 -3.4761 49.6489 182.2998 246.0785    
Import tariffs 0.3803 4.3409 0.0000    4.7213    
Import margins 0.8577 8.6323     9.4900    
Imports 7.9960 291.3756 79.8880    379.2595    
Total 28.3719 887.6647 1,809.5182 21.0424 811.5191 1,821.0512 5,379.1674        
Source: Compiled from the GTAP 6.0 database. Note: A = Agriculture; M = Manufacturing; S = Services; values are in billion US$; and the SAM format is based on Drud et al. (1986). 
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Table 3-18: Rest of Europe’s simplified SAM 
ABSORPTION MATRIX  FINAL DEMANDS MATRIX 
Commodities Activities  
A M S A M S
Sub-total Household Investment Government Export 
margins Exports
Total 
A      100.9391 205.6574 44.2532 350.8496 115.3619 3.1981 0.4664   469.8761 
M      99.8024 2,622.7617 1,144.6370 3,867.2011 1,592.2100 644.5879 9.5897   6,113.5887 Commodities
S      66.1218 1,238.8128 2,498.8660 3,803.8007 2,753.1608 913.9426 1,550.1317   9,021.0358 
A 389.3266       389.3266     48.0514 437.3780 
M   3,757.7179     3,757.7179     2,136.7357 5,894.4535 Activities
S     8,300.1429    8,300.1429    80.4586 513.5513 8,894.1527 
Sub-total 389.3266 3,757.7179 8,300.1429 266.8633 4,067.2319 3,687.7562 20,469.0388 4,460.7327 1,561.7286 1,560.1878 80.4586 2,698.3383 30,830.4848 
Factors      177.1528 1,411.9438 4,187.8148 5,776.9114        
Indirect taxes 6.1778 233.1552 185.0211 -6.6381 415.2778 1,018.5818 1,851.5755    
Import tariffs 3.7500 33.2206 0.0445    37.0151    
Import margins 5.9260 74.7694     80.6954    
Imports 64.6956 2,014.7256 535.8273    2,615.2486    
Total 469.8761 6,113.5887 9,021.0358 437.3780 5,894.4535 8,894.1527 30,830.4848        
Source: Compiled from the GTAP 6.0 database. Note: A = Agriculture; M = Manufacturing; S = Services; values are in billion US$; and the SAM format is based on Drud et al. (1986). 
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Table 3-19: Rest of World’s simplified SAM 
ABSORPTION MATRIX  FINAL DEMANDS MATRIX 
Commodities Activities  
A M S A M S
Sub-total Household Investment Government Export 
margins Exports
Total 
A      43.5704 151.2976 12.3584 207.2263 172.7327 6.8531 1.4208   388.2329 
M      53.4575 894.5714 404.1353 1,352.1642 777.6874 245.4122 8.6269   2,383.8908 Commodities
S      40.7907 396.6426 593.7241 1,031.1574 1,103.6686 358.6211 500.7978   2,994.2449 
A 349.0496       349.0496     44.7834 393.8330 
M   1,557.4976     1,557.4976     669.4821 2,226.9797 Activities
S     2,820.5338    2,820.5338    44.9371 130.5415 2,996.0124 
Sub-total 349.0496 1,557.4976 2,820.5338 137.8186 1,442.5115 1,010.2178 7,317.6289 2,054.0887 610.8864 510.8455 44.9371 844.8070 11,383.1936 
Factors      240.8442 697.8114 1,759.2420 2,697.8976        
Indirect taxes 1.9298 87.4227 28.2254 15.1702 86.6568 226.5526 445.9575    
Import tariffs 3.0304 60.8814 0.0053    63.9170    
Import margins 2.7606 33.4467     36.2073    
Imports 31.4625 644.6424 145.4803    821.5853    
Total 388.2329 2,383.8908 2,994.2449 393.8330 2,226.9797 2,996.0124 11,383.1936        
Source: Compiled from the GTAP 6.0 database. Note: A = Agriculture; M = Manufacturing; S = Services; values are in billion US$; and the SAM format is based on Drud et al. (1986). 
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3.3.5 Disaggregation of the GTAP ‘Regional’ Household and Monetary Flows 
Since the monetary flows among the household, government, and investment bank, as 
illustrated in Figure 3-1, are not reported in the simplified version of the SAMs above, this 
subsection explains the disaggregation of the ‘regional’ household in the GTAP 6.0 database, 
and more specifically the data sources and the calibration of the monetary sector in each 
region.  
Although in this study, most elements in regional SAMs can be directly calibrated from the 
GTAP 6.0 database, the monetary flows among the government, the household and the bank 
require more disaggregation since GTAP only provides the data of the ‘regional’ household. 
In other words, domestic savings are not disaggregated into household and government 
savings, and government transfers to the household are not explicitly reported. Therefore, this 
model uses the residual approach to calibrate for the above benchmark variables. Referring to 
the regional SAM in Table 2-1 of Chapter 2, as we know the sum of tax receipts by the 
government from GTAP (row 11), which is equal to the sum of government consumption, 
transfers to the household and government savings (column 11); the transfers to the household 
in SAM(10,11) 25  can be residually derived once the data of government savings in 
SAM(18,11) are obtained from external sources. Accordingly, as now we know the sum of 
income receipts by the household (row 10), which is identical to the sum of household 
consumption, income tax payments and savings (column 10); household saving in 
SAM(18,10) can also be residually derived.    
Since the SAM format is in compliance with the SNA 1993 standard, the government saving 
data titled, “Government Finance Deficit or Surplus, National Currency (IMF Estimates),” are 
derived from the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD, 2007) online resource and 
subsequently converted to the assumed ‘world currency’ (US$) using the exchange rates in 
                                                     
25
 As with Chapter 2, SAM(10,11) refers to the element in the 10th row and the 11th column of the SAM. 
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matching years. Table 3-20 thus reports benchmark regional savings consisting of household, 
government, and foreign savings by region. 
Table 3-20: Regional savings decomposed by source (in billion US$) 
Region Government 
savings 
Household 
savings 
Foreign 
savings 
Regional 
Savings 
Thailand 0.48 43.14 -20.48 23.15 
Australia -4.48 84.68 -5.33 74.87 
New Zealand -0.17 13.70 -3.68 9.84 
India -21.58 129.37 -1.64 106.15 
Japan -65.86 1,148.88 -53.99 1,029.02 
China -34.91 599.27 -108.39 455.97 
North ASEAN -2.75 87.41 -42.72 41.95 
South ASEAN -148.37 234.94 -17.45 69.12 
Korea -6.32 134.33 -20.96 107.05 
USA -318.05 1,918.05 390.64 1,990.64 
Canada 9.20 162.74 -31.39 140.55 
Mexico -5.74 146.93 -19.43 121.75 
United Kingdom 0.47 188.84 49.62 238.93 
Rest of Europe -123.64 1,768.22 -82.85 1,561.73 
Rest of World -203.85 846.69 -31.95 610.89 
Source: Government savings from UNSD database; foreign savings from GTAP 6.0 database; and 
household savings calculated by author as the residuals of household incomes and expenditures. 
3.4 Thailand’s Bilateral Free Trading Arrangements 
FTA initiatives have been prevalent through the Asia-Pacific region from the beginning of the 
21st century. Economic ‘powerhouses’ such as China, India, Japan, Korea, Australia, and New 
Zealand are actively involved in bilateral FTA negotiations with other countries in the region. 
Among ASEAN nations, Thailand positions herself at the negotiating frontier with the 
intention to push forward the competitive liberalisation agenda, in the hope that this positive 
atmosphere will help facilitate the multilateral trade negotiation process (Fiscal Policy 
Research Institute, 2005). At the same time, since Thailand is a small open economy with 
great dependence on export revenues, the government seems to have felt an urge to acquire 
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preferential market access to major export destinations, for fear of being left behind the 
current wave of (mostly bilateral) economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region.  
Among Thailand’s concluded bilateral FTAs, those with Australia and New Zealand have 
been fully in effect since 2005, while the FTA with Japan was signed later in 2007. The 
‘early-harvest’ tariff-reducing packages with China and India came into force in 2003 and 
2004, respectively.26 In addition, Thailand is part of the collective ASEAN FTA’s ongoing 
negotiations with the above five countries.27 As such, Thailand’s FTA commitments with 
these counterparts are individually summarised below, especially with respect to the de facto 
deals on tariff elimination and service liberalisation. 
3.4.1 Thailand-Australia 
The Thailand-Australia Closer Economic Relations FTA (TAFTA) came into force in January 
2005. While the tariff-cutting package is reasonably comprehensive; the commitments on 
services and investment barely go beyond the existing GATS commitments. It is also 
noteworthy that, in comparison to Thailand, the Australian service markets have been 
relatively open since before the signing of TAFTA.  
According to the Department of Trade Negotiations (Ministry of Commerce, Thailand), under 
TAFTA, Australia eliminated tariffs on 5,083 tariff line items, which account for 83.08% of 
bilateral imports from Thailand in 2003 (US$1,934 million), on the 1st of January 2005. 
Furthermore, 786 items or 16.05% of Australian imports from Thailand are to be removed by 
2010; and 239 sensitive tariff line items (textiles and wearing apparels) or 0.87% of current 
                                                     
26
 The ‘early-harvest’ package is the tariff-reducing programme preliminarily enforced before the actual signing of a preferential 
trading agreement. Typically, products included in the early-harvest scheme are less ‘controversial’ for all negotiating members. 
27
 Negotiations on the above-mentioned plurilateral economic integration are currently ongoing under the AFTA-CER framework 
for ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand; and then separately between ASEAN and Japan, China, and India. Due to political tension, 
it is less likely that ASEAN can possibly form a single economic grouping that involves Japan and China, leave alone ASEAN+3 
that includes South Korea in the negotiating circle. 
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trade will be phased out by 2015. Also, special safeguards on processed tuna and pineapple 
products are abandoned by 2008.  
In terms of the liberalisation of service sectors, on the 1st of January 2005, Australia granted a 
preferential 100% access for Thai investors to launch businesses in her service markets, 
except that newspapers, media sectors, broadcasting services, banking, international airlines 
and airports are subject to prior approval under the Australian government’s foreign 
investment policy. 
On the other hand, Thailand has agreed to eliminate her tariffs against Australian imports 
under a relatively longer time span. While tariffs on 2,724 items, which account for 78.54% 
of bilateral imports from Australia in 2003 (US$1,239 million), were removed in 2005 as the 
agreement came into force, another 2,411 items or 17.27% of Australian imports are 
scheduled to be eliminated by 2010. All remaining tariffs, including tariff-rate quotas, will 
decline to zero in 2015 or 2020, with the exception of skim milk powder and liquid milk and 
cream, for which the tariff-rate quotas will be eliminated in 2025.28 For agricultural products 
subject to tariff rate quotas prior to 1 January 2005, Thailand has either eliminated the tariff 
and quota restrictions or will expand access for Australia over a transition period varying 
according to the product, before final elimination of the tariff-rate quota. Similarly, special 
safeguards on 23 tariff items such as pork, beef, dairy products, orange, grape and processed 
potatoes will be abandoned in 2015 or 2020. 
As for the services commitments, Thailand has partially relaxed the limit of 49.9% foreign 
ownership. Hence, Australian investors are permitted to have full ownership in distribution, 
construction, and management consulting services; and majority ownership – up to 60% – in 
                                                     
28
 A tariff-rate quota is an ad valorem, two-tier tariff. A lower ‘in-quota’ tariff is applied to the first certain units of imports and a 
higher ‘over-quota’ tariff is applied to the rest. In spite of the name, the tariff-rate quota is not considered a quantitative 
restriction because it does not limit import quantities. 
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mining operations, major restaurants or hotels, tertiary education institutions in science and 
technology outside the capital, and maritime cargo services. 
3.4.2 Thailand-New Zealand 
Following TAFTA, the Thailand-New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement 
(TNZCEPA) entered into force in July 2005. The commitments are very similar to those 
under TAFTA, especially in terms of trade in goods. Negotiations on trade liberalisation in 
services, however, are scheduled to commence in 2008. New Zealand eliminated tariffs on 
5,878 product lines, which account for roughly 85% of her import values from Thailand, on 
the 1st of July 2005; the rest are scheduled to become tariff-free in 2010, except for those in 
textiles, wearing apparels, and leather products, which must be phased out by 2015. Although 
trade liberalisation in services remains to be negotiated, in 2005 New Zealand agreed to 
extend conditional access to temporary employment for Thai chefs and traditional massage 
therapists. 
As with the TAFTA commitments, Thailand is granted a more relaxed tariff-reduction 
schedule than is New Zealand. As TNZCEPA took effect in 2005, Thailand removed tariff 
barriers from 49% of bilateral imports from New Zealand, including important product lines 
for New Zealand, such as lamb’s wool, products made of plastic, wood, and paper, seafood, 
sugar, and other processed food products. The other 10% of imports from New Zealand are 
scheduled to be liberalised by 2010, with exceptions for ‘sensitive’ tariff items for Thailand, 
e.g. milk and cream, beef, pork, onions, onion seeds, and so forth, which will be gradually 
eliminated until completely liberalised in 2015-2025. In addition, Thailand agreed to remove 
quotas from 18 sensitive agricultural product items, while granting progressive preferential 
quotas to New Zealand’s imports of milk and cream products (HS 040110, 040120, 040130) 
until 2025; and to concentrated and sweetened milk and cream products (HS 040210), 
potatoes (HS 070110, 070190), onions (HS 070310, 071220), and onion seeds (HS 120991ex) 
until 2020, when all quotas are completely removed. However, quota impositions on strongly 
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sensitive items like skimmed milk remain after the signing of TNZCEPA. Similarly, special 
safeguards on 41 tariff items such as pork, beef, dairy products, honey, orange, grape and 
processed potatoes will not be abandoned until 2015 or 2020. 
3.4.3 Thailand-Japan 
To an extent, the Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) – commenced in 
October 2007 after being postponed during Thailand’s political turning point – resembles 
those already signed between Japan and Singapore (JSEPA). In comparison with TAFTA and 
TNZCEPA, the coverage is less comprehensive. This is understandable in that the strong 
economic ties between Thailand and Japan might have caused fears that the negative list 
approach would harmfully affect domestic production sectors in each country. Products 
removed from the Japanese tariff-reduction package include rice, raw tapioca flour, products 
with high flour and sugar content, government-distributing rice products, raw sugar, canned 
pineapple, and milk products. Despite incompleteness in commitments on trade in goods, it is 
fair to say that liberalisation of services is advanced compared to the packages Japan has 
agreed with her other bilateral FTA counterparts. 
Japan has agreed to abolish tariffs on 1,400 out of 2,300 agricultural and fishery products 
from Thailand. It immediately eliminated tariffs on prawns29, tropical fruits (including durian, 
papaya, mango, mangosteen, and coconut), fruit wine, textiles, wearing apparels, chemical 
products, and jewellery. While petroleum and plastic products are to be fully liberalised in 
2012, tariffs on some fishery products (excluding prawns), cat and dog food, food seasonings, 
wood products, footwear, and leather products will be either instantly abolished or 
progressively phased out until completely removed by 2017. Fruits and vegetables (excluding 
tropical fruits) are regarded as sensitive items, and thus their tariffs will be eliminated over a 
                                                     
29
 This commitment has significant economic meanings to Thai exporters, as prawns account for 14% of Japanese imports of 
fishery products from Thailand. 
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longer time period (due for completion in 2022). On the other hand, there are some tariff 
items being partially liberalised by this agreement: by 2012, tariffs on chicken and vegetable 
oil are reduced by 50% or less. Also, tariffs on modified tapioca flour, banana, and fresh 
pineapple are removed but then replaced with tariff-free quota; while molasses, pork and 
processed ham are to be offered tariff quotas at special tariff rates.30  
In terms of service liberalisation, Japan has allowed Thai companies to enter 65 service sub-
sectors, and has improved GATS commitments preferentially for Thailand in 70 sub-sectors, 
including advertising, hotel, restaurant, health, spa, tourism, exhibition, education, printing, 
security, translation, business and profession, legal services, distribution, maintenance and 
repairs, entertainment, etc. 
Thailand granted immediate elimination of tariffs on temperate fruits (e.g. apple, pear, peach, 
prune, berry fruits, lemon, and papaya), herring, and cod; carrot, strawberries, watermelon, 
and other melons are to be liberalised in 2009. Fish (excluding herring and cod) are to be 
liberalised by 2012, whereas tariffs on auto parts for Original Equipment Manufacturing 
(OEM) will be maintained until elimination in 2012 or 2014 for some sensitive engine items. 
In spite of being strongly opposed by domestic producers,  tariffs and tariff quotas on steel 
products imported from Japan are promised to be eventually eliminated by 2017. As for 
partial liberalisation, Japanese exports of automobiles with engines exceeding 3,000 cc will 
receive annual tariff-reduction instalments until the tariff rates reach 60% in 2010. 
With respect to service liberalisation, Thailand offered the possibility of full ownership to 
Japanese businessmen only in general management consulting services. Additionally, a range 
of 49-75% ownership is granted to Japanese companies in 13 subsectors, i.e. marketing, 
human resource management, production management, project management (excluding 
                                                     
30
 The terms ‘tariff quota’ and ‘tariff-rate quota’ are interchangeably employed in the literature; however, by definition, tariff 
quota additionally includes specific tariff (the type of tariff levied at a specific rate per physical unit). 
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construction), logistics, maintenance and repairs, distribution, 5-star hotels, large-scale 
restaurant, advertising, marinas, computer and related services, and high-level education. 
3.4.4 Thailand-China and ASEAN-China 
After preliminarily agreeing upon the elimination of import tariffs on 116 items of fruits and 
vegetables (HS 07-08) by 2003,31 Thailand and China subsequently extended the Thailand-
China FTA to further include ASEAN as a whole. The ASEAN-China FTA is comprehensive 
and reciprocal in terms of commitments on goods, services, and investment.  
The Early-Harvest Package (EHP) of ASEAN-China FTA covers the elimination of tariffs on 
agricultural items (HS 01-08) and charcoal by 2006 for China and ASEAN-6,32 while in 
general, CLMV 33 countries are given five more years for adjustment purposes. The EHP 
excludes outside-quota tariffs on milk, onion, garlic, potato, coconut, and dried longan which 
remain subject to WTO commitments. Subsequently, two ‘tracks’ are applied to the tariff-
elimination scheme: Normal and Sensitive (inclusive of highly-sensitive items) Tracks. On 
the Normal Track, most of the remaining items, including industrial products, will be tariff-
free by 2010 for China and ASEAN-6. On the other hand, products on the Sensitive Track 
(asymmetric across member countries) should not exceed 400 tariff lines (HS 6-digit) and 
must account for less than 10% of total imports. Most of their tariff rates will be reduced to 
less than 20% by 2012 and further down to 0-5% by 2015. Among the sensitive products, 
tariff rates of those listed as highly sensitive (fewer than 100 items) will be reduced to less 
than 50% within 2015.  
                                                     
31
 The agreement excludes the outside-quota tariffs on onion, garlic, potato, coconut, and dried longan, which are invariably in 
compliance with the WTO commitments. 
32
 ASEAN-6 is composed of the six original members of ASEAN, i.e., Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, The Philippines, 
Indonesia, and Brunei. 
33
 CLMV refers to the set of countries those joined the group after the ASEAN-6 countries, i.e., Cambodia, the Lao PDR, 
Myanmar, and Vietnam. 
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Generally speaking, member countries listed some lines of automobiles and parts, rice, sugar 
and vegetable oil on their highly sensitive lists. Specifically, China reserved 261 items on the 
sensitive list, which (apart from the above highly-sensitive product lines) includes wheat, 
seeds, flour, coffee, pepper, tobacco, plastic products, wool, iron and steel, wood products, 
paper and pulp, and automobiles and parts. Similarly, Thailand specified 342 items on the 
sensitive list, e.g. tea, coffee, pepper, tobacco, milk, crude oil, certain farm commodities such 
as garlic, onions, potatoes, and tomatoes, juice, mineral water, electrical appliances, footwear, 
ceramic products, glass products, iron and steel, and certain types of toys. 
In respect of trade in services, negotiations are delayed, since China proposed the positive-list 
approach, but ASEAN prefers the negative approach for investment. Nevertheless, the signing 
of a further agreement on service liberalisation at the 10th ASEAN-China Summit in Cebu, the 
Philippines on the 14th of January 2007 guaranteed that China will allow regional integration 
in computer services, property management, road transport, and so forth; while Thailand has 
promised to open her markets in business, education, tourism, and sea transport services. 
3.4.5 Thailand-India and ASEAN-India 
Contrary to the pattern of trade negotiation between Thailand and China in Subsection 3.4.4, 
the Thailand-India and ASEAN-India FTAs are negotiated simultaneously. Although the 
bilateral FTA has been negotiated at a faster pace, India’s reluctance to grant further tariff 
concessions on many agricultural products has delayed the procedure as a whole. As such, not 
surprisingly, negotiations on services, investment, and movement of natural persons with 
India remain to be initiated. 
With respect to the Thailand-India FTA, the Early Harvest Scheme (EHS) required that tariffs 
on 82 product lines including fruits, wheat, canned seafood, plastic products, jewellery, 
machinery parts, furniture, automobile parts, and some electrical appliances were to be 
annually decreased by 50, 75 and 100% of the base-year (2004) tariff rates, so that they would 
be fully liberalised by September 2006. Four fifths of total items are on the Normal Track, 
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where tariffs are eliminated over two instalments. As for the Sensitive Track involving some 
agricultural products, textiles, and automobiles and parts, their tariffs are scheduled to be 
reduced to 5% in 2015 and to 0-5% within 2018. Although, it is noteworthy that India has 
included rubber and related products in the Exclusion List, while Thailand has done the same 
with beef and textiles. 
3.5 FTA Simulations  
There is a public concern in Thailand over the outcomes of the concluded Thai FTAs – whose 
commitments on trade in goods, services, investment, and movement of natural persons were 
summarised in the previous section. Commonly regarded as a second-best policy for 
improving regional and global welfare, economists and policy makers alike anticipate inferior 
gains from narrower economic integration. Moreover, when all the FTA deals Thailand has 
separately agreed upon eventually enter into force, the ‘messiness’ arising from asymmetry in 
the agreements on rules of origin and customs procedures, among others, may incur non-
negligible economic costs to the Thai economy. Therefore, this section scrutinises the 
expected outcomes of forming the ‘actual’ FTAs (TAFTA, TNZCEPA, JTEPA, ASEAN-
China and Thailand-India) in comparison to the ‘counterfactual’ ones where larger free trade 
zones with complete sectoral coverage are formed. Finally, the ‘counterfactual’ simulation 
results for Thailand’s unilateral trade liberalisation; and those of global trade liberalisation are 
briefly compared with the above outcomes. 
Trade liberalisation in agricultural and manufacturing sectors is simulated by removing tariffs 
in accordance with the actual commitments. While all of these sectors will be liberalised 
under both TAFTA and TNZCEPA, there are exclusion lists for highly sensitive products in 
the JTEPA, ASEAN-China and Thailand-India agreements. Tariffs on these products are to 
be either partially removed or kept at the benchmark Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) rates. 
However, since the HS 6-digit product lines are aggregated into 22 sectors, individually 
removing tariffs from product lines within each sector is not possible. For that reason, all 
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production sectors under negotiations are completely, albeit preferentially, liberalised 
regardless of the de facto exclusion lists. Moreover, since the GTAP tariff data package is 
provided as inclusive of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs), the study does not explicitly impose 
NTBs (nor remove them in joining an FTA) due to the double-accounting issue. As NTBs are 
more distortionary than ad valorem tariffs, it would be of great interest to model NTBs for the 
future study once the two separate trade barrier accounts are properly developed. On the other 
hand, since there are no import tariffs on services, the intrinsic barriers to entering or exiting 
Cournot oligopolistic sectors are removed as the FTAs are launched. Therefore, where 
applicable, oligopolistic service sectors are liberalised by fixing sectoral profits while 
endogenising the number of firms. 
To illustrate, the GAMS code for the global trade liberalisation simulation reads: 
* Eliminate tariffs in all tradable sectors: 
  tm.FX(reg,regg,secT)             = 0*tm0(reg,regg,secT)    ; 
* Fix the profit variable then free the number of firms in Cournot   
* service sectors: 
  PROFIT.FX(reg,serv)$co(reg,serv) = PROFIT0(reg,serv)       ; 
  NOF.LO(reg,serv)$co(reg,serv)    = 0                       ; 
  NOF.UP(reg,serv)$co(reg,serv)    = +INF                    ; 
  NOF.L(reg,serv)$co(reg,serv)     = NOF0(reg,serv)          ; 
  NOF.LO(reg,serv)$co(reg,serv)    = 0.000001*NOF0(reg,serv) ; 
Simulation results are then reported in the following three subsections. 
3.5.1 Thai FTAs with Australia and New Zealand 
TAFTA and TNZCEPA are analysed together in Subsection 3.5.1 since not only the details of 
the two trade agreements but also the production patterns of Australia and New Zealand are 
broadly similar.  
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Anticipating that bilateral economic groupings will ultimately lead to broader integration, 
Thailand’s alliance with the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade 
Agreement (ANZCERTA), henceforth ‘THAILAND+2;’ and ASEAN’s partnership with 
ANZCERTA, hereafter ‘ASEAN+2,’ are also simulated and compared with the outcomes of 
the actual TAFTA and TNZCEPA agreements.  
Table 3-21: Regional welfare gains after Thailand’s FTA formation with Australia and 
New Zealand (EV in million US$ and as percentage of the 2001 regional income) 
TAFTA TNZCEPA THAILAND+2 ASEAN+2 
Region EV 
(million 
US$) 
EV (% 
of 2001 
income) 
EV 
(million 
US$) 
EV (% 
of 2001 
income) 
EV 
(million 
US$) 
EV (% 
of 2001 
income) 
EV 
(million 
US$) 
EV (% 
of 2001 
income) 
      FTA member candidates 
THA 6.81 0.01% 8.31 0.01% 14.64 0.02% 111.54 0.12% 
AUS 97.38 0.03% -1.72 -0.00% 118.03 0.03% 224.71 0.06% 
NZL -2.73 -0.01% 8.31 0.02% 98.57 0.21% 101.67 0.22% 
NASN -0.35 -0.00% 1.31 0.00% -3.57 -0.00% 1,411.30 1.10% 
SASN -3.48 -0.00% -1.59 -0.00% -12.32 -0.00% 1,321.62 0.42% 
      Non-members 
IND  -2.83 -0.00% -0.57 -0.00% -5.02 -0.00% -99.13 -0.02% 
JPN -30.43 -0.00% -3.01 -0.00% -54.25 -0.00% -524.10 -0.01% 
CHN -11.76 -0.00% -1.44 -0.00% -37.55 -0.00% -335.94 -0.03% 
KOR -5.45 -0.00% -3.46 -0.00% -16.43 -0.00% -176.42 -0.05% 
USA  -11.25 -0.00% -1.10 -0.00% -25.95 -0.00% -233.50 -0.00% 
CAN -0.39 -0.00% -1.57 -0.00% -6.42 -0.00% 1.77 0.00% 
MEX 0.10 0.00% -1.82 -0.00% -6.74 -0.00% -1.73 -0.00% 
UK  -8.27 -0.00% -5.68 -0.00% -28.00 -0.00% -94.61 -0.01% 
XEUR -53.94 -0.00% -25.13 -0.00% -135.78 -0.00% -1,856.00 -0.02% 
ROW -13.94 -0.00% -9.07 -0.00% -40.22 -0.00% -97.02 -0.00% 
World -40.54 -0.00% -38.23 -0.00% -141.00 -0.00% -245.83 -0.00% 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: Numbers in bold letters indicate welfare changes in member countries of each FTA 
grouping.  
Table 3-21 shows the regional welfare effects – measured in terms of the EV – from Thailand 
forming FTAs with Australia (TAFTA); New Zealand (TNZCEPA); ANZCERTA 
(THAILAND+2); and also when ASEAN forms an FTA with ANZCERTA (ASEAN+2). It 
appears that TAFTA and TNZCEPA do not result in any significant impact on global income 
as the variation is close to zero in all scenarios; nevertheless, trade diversion dominates the 
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overall welfare outcome as the estimates of world EV losses from TAFTA and TNZCEPA are 
40.54 and 38.23 million US dollars, respectively. 
There is no doubt that larger economic groupings yield higher regional welfare gains to 
Thailand (THA). However, under TAFTA, Thailand gains 18% less than under TNZCEPA, 
perhaps because Australia (AUS) has an absolute advantage over Thailand due to her 
distinctly larger production scale in many tradable sectors. For the same reason, Australia 
gains more from TAFTA than does New Zealand from TNZCEPA, since Australia’s lower 
unit costs facilitate more exports to Thailand after the trade arrangement. As a consequence, 
Australia may be expected to enjoy higher welfare gains than Thailand and New Zealand, 
even under THAILAND+2 and ASEAN+2. 
In general, the levels of positive welfare changes (measured by EVs) are determined by the 
comparative advantages as well as the initial patterns of trade and tariffs prior to the 
formation of FTAs. In theory, sectors with comparative advantages would gain more from 
greater export opportunities that drives up export prices and thus improving the terms of 
trade, at the same time as inducing more efficient resource re-allocation across production 
sectors. Also, as examined earlier in the sensitivity analysis section in Chapter 2, the higher 
the protection levels prior to trade liberalisation, the greater the expected gains from it. Thus, 
sectors initially more protected by import duties tend to gain more in respect of the 
consumption effect as import prices in domestic markets are reduced, and hence higher utility 
levels. In addition to these gains from trade, the model also identifies the pro-competitive 
effect arising from trade liberalisation in sectors with imperfect competition and economies of 
scale (Francois and Roland-Holst, 1997). Due to this specification, more specialisation in 
certain goods after tariffs are eliminated reduces average costs and thus enhancing industrial 
performances. Consumers then enjoy cheaper products with greater quantity and variety 
(since imports are differentiated from domestically-produced commodities). In sum, the 
changes in summary statistics (EVs) are mainly caused by the changes in producer and 
consumer prices among sectors, and hence the changes in the structures of production and 
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consumption incentives. As such, sector-specific adjustments to each FTA scenario will be 
further explored in Subsections 3.5.1.1 to 3.5.1.3. 
Most countries not involved in any of the groupings are worse off, although the degree of 
trade diversion depends on the strength of the ex-ante economic ties with FTA members. In 
this respect, Japan (JPN), China (CHN), The United States (USA), and Europe (UK and 
XEUR) may expect comparatively negative effects as they have established good trade 
relationship with some member countries.  
Conversely, several non-member regions gain marginally from the groupings, for instance, 
Mexico (MEX) from TAFTA and Canada (CAN) from ASEAN+2. Not only do these 
countries not trade much with Australia, New Zealand and ASEAN, they also have strong 
trade ties with the United States. Therefore, as the United States is negatively affected by 
TAFTA and ASEAN+2, the U.S. trade with Australia, New Zealand and ASEAN is naturally 
re-channelled towards Mexico and Canada, which should come as no surprise as the three 
countries are members of the long-established NAFTA trading bloc.   
Chart 3-3 reports on the percentage changes in nominal GDP, where North and South 
ASEAN (NASN and SASN) are jointly referred to as ‘Rest of ASEAN,’ whilst all other 
regions not included in any of the above FTA negotiations are aggregated into one region 
identified as ‘Others.’ Once again, the economic expansion in non-member regions is barely 
altered, whereas member economies grow to a greater extent as the group is enlarged. In 
particular, the difference in New Zealand’s GDP expansion rates under TNZCEPA and 
THAILAND+2 is noteworthy, since it manages to evade the strong trade diversion effect 
once its major trading partner, Australia, is included in the trade-liberalising regime. 
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Chart 3-3: Percentage changes in nominal GDP after Thailand’s FTA formation with 
Australia and New Zealand 
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Table 3-22: Welfare changes for trade indicators in Thailand after the FTA formation 
with Australia and New Zealand 
Welfare changes TAFTA TNZCEPA THAILAND+2 ASEAN+2 
Change in million US$        
Gross imports from FTA partners 361.20 134.37 478.53  3,952.34 
Gross imports from non-partners -72.75 -53.65 -111.93  -1,073.78 
% change     
Bilateral imports from FTA partners 19.72% 48.99% 23.09% 23.20% 
Bilateral imports from non-partners -0.10% -0.07% -0.15% -1.78% 
Bilateral exports to FTA partners 12.70% 5.93% 11.66% 13.68% 
Bilateral exports to non-partners 0.07% 0.08% 0.16% 0.35% 
Source: Simulated by author.  
Table 3-22 also highlights the variation in trade indicators for Thailand. Under all FTA 
scenarios trade creation dominates trade diversion in that fewer imports from non-members 
are offset by those from FTA counterparts, not only because Thai imports from non-members 
are replaced by those produced within the FTA zones, but also because preferential trade 
liberalisation has created trade among member countries that would not have taken place, 
were it not for the reduced trade barriers. Since trade creation under TAFTA is considerably 
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stronger than that under TNZCEPA, Australia benefits more from the FTA with Thailand 
than does New Zealand in absolute terms. However, the proportional variation in Thai 
imports from New Zealand under TNZCEPA exceeds that from Australia under TAFTA 
because Thai trade with New Zealand is relatively low before the FTA signing. Consequently, 
TNZCEPA is estimated to increase New Zealand’s exports to Thailand by 48.99%. 
Table 3-23: Percentage changes in labour welfare of member countries after 
Thailand’s FTA formation with Australia and New Zealand 
  Real wage of 
unskilled labour 
Real wage of 
skilled labour 
Ratio of unskilled 
to skilled labour 
income 
THA 0.05% -0.11% 0.34% TAFTA 
AUS 0.06% 0.03% 0.03% 
THA 0.02% -0.04% 0.11% TNZCEPA 
NZL 0.04% -0.01% 0.04% 
THA 0.07% -0.14% 0.45% 
AUS 0.09% 0.03% 0.06% 
THAILAND+2 
NZL 0.34% 0.27% 0.07% 
THA 0.40% -1.36% 3.92% 
AUS 0.21% 0.08% 0.13% 
NZL 0.37% 0.29% 0.08% 
NASN 1.39% 0.47% 0.92% 
ASEAN+2 
SASN 0.39% -0.23% 1.31% 
Source: Simulated by author.  
Table 3-23 summarises the variation in the welfare of labour in member countries under the 
four regimes, the change in real wage implicitly reflecting the deviation of labour demand 
from the ex-ante level. Since Thailand (THA) and South ASEAN (SASN) are relatively 
abundant in unskilled-labour, the real wage of skilled labour unambiguously drops while that 
of the unskilled is increased once the two countries form partnerships with higher income and 
more skilled-labour abundant regions like Australia (AUS), New Zealand (NZL) and North 
ASEAN (NASN). On the other hand, the real wages of both types of labour in AUS, NZL and 
NASN increase since the unskilled labour in these regions is, in absolute terms, more 
productive than that in THA and SASN. Thus, their exports of products intensive in unskilled-
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labour by and large increase after the implementation of the agreements, and accordingly, the 
ratio of unskilled to skilled labour income improves in all scenarios. As a consequence of the 
assumption that the labour markets in Thailand and South ASEAN are subject to the wage-
curve relationship between the real wage and the unemployment rate, while Australia, New 
Zealand, and North ASEAN have flexible real wages and rigid unemployment; on average, 
real wages in the former group adjust by a smaller degree than in the latter group.  
3.5.1.1 TAFTA 
Next, the regional and sectoral welfare changes due to the formation of an FTA between 
Thailand and Australia (TAFTA) are discussed in greater detail.  
Table 3-24: Percentage changes for various regional indicators under TAFTA 
Region Real GDP 
Private 
demand 
Investment 
demand 
Public 
demand 
Regional 
import 
Regional 
export 
Terms 
of trade 
      FTA members 
THA 0.08% 0.11% 0.16% -0.96% 0.30% 0.31% 0.13% 
AUS 0.02% 0.06% 0.07% -0.08% 0.22% 0.14% 0.11% 
 
     Non-members 
NZL -0.00% -0.00% -0.01% -0.00% -0.03% -0.01% -0.00% 
Others -0.00% -0.00% -0.00% -0.00% -0.00% -0.00% -0.00% 
Source: Simulated by author.  
The estimated real GDP expansion rates reported in Table 3-24 suggest that Thailand and 
Australia gain slightly while non-members are mostly unaffected by TAFTA. Other changes 
in real variables, including final demands and trade flows, also indicate that TAFTA boosts 
regional production and trade, which consequently improves the terms of trade in member 
countries. Thailand’s real GDP expansion is estimated to be higher than Australia’s, a 
consequence of Thailand having higher trade barriers before the signing, and of her economy 
being rather small compared to her partner. Hence, the tariff revenue loss in Thailand reduces 
public demand by 0.96%, much higher than the 0.08% decrease than that for Australia. 
Although the change is small in absolute terms, New Zealand is more negatively affected by 
TAFTA than region ‘Others,’ due to her reliance on the Australian economy.  
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The sectoral adjustments under TAFTA are reported in Table 3-25 for Thailand, and in Table 
3-26 for Australia.  
Table 3-25: Percentage changes for various sectoral indicators in Thailand under 
TAFTA 
Sector Output 
Unskilled 
labour 
demand 
Skilled 
labour 
demand 
Capital 
demand Export Import 
 AGR  -0.04% -0.08% -0.04% -0.12% 0.17% 2.10% 
 NRS  0.01% 0.04% 0.07% 0.01% -0.13% 0.34% 
 OIL  0.01% 0.03% 0.07% 0.00% 1.42% 0.07% 
 PAGR  0.09% 0.22% 0.40% 0.04% 0.24% 2.68% 
 OFD  0.16% 0.29% 0.48% 0.11% 0.36% 0.96% 
 MNF  0.06% 0.20% 0.41% 0.00% 0.12% 0.28% 
 TEX  0.36% 0.49% 0.69% 0.29% 0.54% 0.14% 
 WAP  0.24% 0.35% 0.55% 0.14% 0.41% 0.41% 
 CRP  0.36% 0.49% 0.70% 0.29% 0.48% 0.18% 
 I_S  0.31% 0.44% 0.64% 0.23% 0.53% 0.43% 
 NFM  0.12% 0.25% 0.45% 0.04% 0.16% 0.13% 
 MVH  0.02% 0.15% 0.36% -0.05% 0.44% 0.83% 
 ELE  -0.12% 0.04% 0.24% -0.17% -0.11% 0.00% 
 OME  1.51% 1.65% 1.85% 1.44% 1.60% 0.50% 
 OMF  0.11% 0.24% 0.44% 0.03% 0.17% 0.25% 
 MSR  0.06% 0.21% 0.43% -0.01% -0.07% 0.15% 
 TRD  0.03% 0.25% 0.53% -0.02% -0.15% 0.20% 
 TRP  -0.05% 0.13% 0.40% -0.14% -0.17% 0.08% 
 CFI  -0.01% 0.10% 0.30% -0.11% -0.06% 0.04% 
 OBS  -0.12% -0.01% 0.19% -0.21% -0.13% -0.02% 
 OSG  -0.87% -0.96% -0.75% -1.16% -0.54% -0.63% 
 DWE  -0.13% 0.04% n/a* -0.16% n/a** n/a** 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: * Sector DWE does not demand for skilled labour in the benchmark year, thus the 
CES production function for this sector treat this factor demand as non-existing ; **Output from Sector DWE is non-
traded. 
Table 3-25 shows that Thailand gains in most manufacturing sectors. Particularly, we observe 
outstanding output and trade expansion in processed agricultural products (PAGR and OFD), 
textiles and wearing apparel (TEX and WAP), chemical, rubber and plastic products (CRP), 
metal products (I_S and NFM), machinery and equipments (OME), and other manufacturing 
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products (OMF). On the other hand, Table 3-26 reports that Australia’s agricultural products 
(AGR), motor vehicles and parts (MVH), electronic equipments (ELE) and, as with Thailand, 
sectors PAGR, OFD, CRP, I_S, and OMF, also benefit from TAFTA. The expansion of these 
five sectors is due to the Armington assumption that distinguishes products by country of 
origin. In particular, Thailand enjoys a strong expansion in sector OME, and does Australia in 
sector OFD. Lastly, TAFTA induces contraction in dwellings (DWE), the only non-traded 
sector, as resources are bid away by producers in tradable sectors. 
Table 3-26: Percentage changes for various sectoral indicators in Australia under 
TAFTA 
Sector Output 
Unskilled 
labour 
demand 
Skilled 
labour 
demand 
Capital 
demand Export Import 
 AGR  0.15% 0.19% 0.19% 0.19% 0.28% 0.31% 
 NRS  -0.04% -0.05% -0.04% -0.05% -0.09% 0.19% 
 OIL  -0.04% -0.05% -0.05% -0.05% -0.06% 0.06% 
 PAGR  0.13% 0.11% 0.13% 0.11% 0.25% 0.21% 
 OFD  0.59% 0.56% 0.58% 0.56% 2.23% 0.44% 
 MNF  0.00% -0.03% -0.00% -0.03% 0.15% 0.23% 
 TEX  -0.35% -0.35% -0.31% -0.35% -0.22% 0.50% 
 WAP  -0.13% -0.14% -0.10% -0.14% 0.10% 0.61% 
 CRP  0.10% 0.06% 0.08% 0.06% 0.48% 0.20% 
 I_S  0.14% 0.11% 0.13% 0.11% 0.68% 0.33% 
 NFM  -0.05% -0.05% -0.01% -0.05% -0.05% 0.18% 
 MVH  0.47% 0.46% 0.50% 0.46% 1.17% 0.17% 
 ELE  0.33% 0.28% 0.31% 0.28% 0.62% 0.08% 
 OME  -0.10% -0.14% -0.12% -0.14% 0.15% 0.36% 
 OMF  0.09% 0.08% 0.12% 0.08% 0.43% 0.30% 
 MSR  0.02% -0.00% 0.03% 0.00% -0.10% 0.12% 
 TRD  0.01% -0.00% 0.05% 0.00% -0.12% 0.13% 
 TRP  -0.03% -0.05% -0.01% -0.05% -0.34% 0.13% 
 CFI  -0.02% -0.03% 0.00% -0.03% -0.39% 0.13% 
 OBS  -0.00% -0.02% 0.02% -0.01% -0.13% 0.13% 
 OSG  -0.07% -0.09% -0.05% -0.09% -0.17% 0.08% 
 DWE  -0.02% -0.03% n/a* -0.02% n/a** n/a** 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: * Sector DWE does not demand for skilled labour in the benchmark year, thus the CES 
production function for this sector treat this factor demand as non-existing ; **Output from Sector DWE is non-traded. 
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Finally, Chart 3-4 plots the percentage change in the number of firms against output per firm 
in Australian imperfectly competitive sectors under TAFTA.34  
Chart 3-4: Percentage changes in the number of firms and output per firm of 
imperfectly competitive sectors in Australia under TAFTA 
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Domestic sectors such as forestry, fishery, coal, gas, and mineral (NRS), oil (OIL) and 
communication, financial and insurance services (CFI), which contract under TAFTA (see 
Table 3-26), appear in the South-West quadrant where both the number of firms and the 
output per firm decrease. The output drop in this cluster of producers is attributable to the ex-
ante ‘inefficacy’ arising from imperfect competition, since they were relatively highly 
protected before TAFTA. Whilst it comes as no surprise that firm population falls due to 
greater competition from abroad, the degree of inefficacy in these particular sectors is strong 
enough to reduce output, both at the firm and sectoral levels. On the other hand, a fraction of 
firms operating in sectors comparatively uncompetitive at the international level – namely 
transport (TRP), electricity, gas, water, and construction (MSR), some manufacturing 
products (MNF) and machinery and equipments (OME) – then leave the market while 
                                                     
34
 The results for Thailand are not reported here, because the estimated HHIs define that all Thai production sectors are under 
perfect competition. 
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surviving firms shift production into higher gear to benefit from the scale economies. The last 
group comprise sectors endowed with international competitiveness – specifically, processed 
agricultural products (PAGR and OFD), ferrous metals (I_S), chemical, rubber, plastic 
products (CRP) and electronic equipments (ELE). These sectors are estimated to grow both in 
terms of outputs per firm and number of firms. 
3.5.1.2 TNZCEPA 
The FTA between Thailand and New Zealand (TNZCEPA) is analysed as follows. In Table 3-
27, we observe that Thailand and New Zealand can only gain marginally from this 
preferential arrangement.  
Table 3-27: Percentage changes for various regional indicators under TNZCEPA 
Region Real 
GDP 
Private 
demand 
Invest-
ment 
demand 
Public 
demand 
Regional 
import 
Regional 
export 
Terms 
of trade 
      FTA members 
THA 0.02% 0.04% 0.02% -0.32% 0.09% 0.10% 0.04% 
NZL 0.02% 0.02% 0.04% -0.05% 0.23% 0.11% 0.01% 
      Non-members 
Others 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Source: Simulated by author.  
In both countries, real GDP grows merely by 0.02%, whilst private and investment demands 
increase by less than 0.04%. Thailand’s public sector demand contracts to a greater extent as 
her ex-ante trade barriers are substantial especially in agricultural sectors. Trade between the 
two countries expands by less than one quarter of one per cent, while the terms of trade 
improve by only 0.04% and 0.01% in Thailand and New Zealand, respectively. 
Table 3-28 and Table 3-29 report on sectoral adjustments in Thailand and New Zealand. 
Overall, TNZCEPA facilitates expansion in Thailand’s production and exportation of 
processed food products (OFD), textiles (TEX), chemical, rubber, plastic products (CRP), 
metal products (I_S and NFM), and machinery and equipments (OME); while New Zealand 
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benefits from expansion particularly in agricultural produces (AGR), processed agricultural 
products (PAGR and OFD), and wearing apparels (WAP).  
Table 3-28: Percentage changes for various sectoral indicators in Thailand under 
TNZCEPA 
Sector Output 
Unskilled 
labour 
demand 
Skilled 
labour 
demand 
Capital 
demand Export Import 
 AGR  -0.01% -0.01% 0.00% -0.02% 0.11% 0.01% 
 NRS  0.02% 0.04% 0.05% 0.03% 0.02% 0.08% 
 OIL  0.02% 0.05% 0.06% 0.03% -0.00% 0.03% 
 PAGR  -0.18% -0.14% -0.08% -0.20% 0.00% 5.49% 
 OFD  0.11% 0.15% 0.21% 0.09% 0.23% 0.54% 
 MNF  0.03% 0.08% 0.15% 0.01% 0.06% 0.02% 
 TEX  0.10% 0.14% 0.21% 0.07% 0.13% -0.02% 
 WAP  0.05% 0.08% 0.15% 0.02% 0.10% 0.57% 
 CRP  0.17% 0.21% 0.28% 0.15% 0.19% 0.01% 
 I_S  0.11% 0.15% 0.22% 0.08% 0.12% 0.05% 
 NFM  0.09% 0.13% 0.19% 0.06% 0.08% 0.06% 
 MVH  0.04% 0.09% 0.15% 0.02% 0.15% -0.03% 
 ELE  0.05% 0.10% 0.17% 0.03% 0.05% 0.03% 
 OME  0.15% 0.20% 0.26% 0.13% 0.16% 0.04% 
 OMF  0.07% 0.11% 0.17% 0.04% 0.09% -0.04% 
 MSR  0.02% 0.07% 0.14% -0.00% 0.03% -0.01% 
 TRD  0.02% 0.09% 0.18% 0.00% 0.03% -0.01% 
 TRP  0.02% 0.08% 0.16% -0.02% 0.08% -0.03% 
 CFI  0.02% 0.05% 0.12% -0.01% 0.09% -0.07% 
 OBS  0.00% 0.04% 0.10% -0.03% 0.06% -0.07% 
 OSG  -0.29% -0.31% -0.25% -0.38% -0.11% -0.28% 
 DWE  -0.04% 0.02% n/a* -0.05% n/a** n/a** 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: * Sector DWE does not demand for skilled labour in the benchmark year, thus the CES 
production function for this sector treat this factor demand as non-existing ; **Output from Sector DWE is non-traded. 
The results resemble those under TAFTA, since New Zealand’s economic structure and factor 
endowment are broadly analogous to Australia. Nonetheless, some Thai sectors adjust to 
TAFTA and TNZCEPA in a dissimilar manner. For instance, sector PAGR in Thailand 
contracts by 0.18% under TNZCEPA, whereas a 0.09% expansion in sectoral output was 
observed under TAFTA. This sheds light on the concern over the spaghetti bowl effect of 
multiple bilateral FTAs entering into force at different points in time, making it hard for 
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domestic producers to decide whether to expand production after the signing of TAFTA, 
given the anticipation over TNZCEPA or other FTAs that may entail contraction later on. 
Table 3-29: Percentage changes for various sectoral indicators in New Zealand 
under TNZCEPA 
Sector Output 
Unskilled 
labour 
demand 
Skilled 
labour 
demand 
Capital 
demand Export Import 
 AGR  0.17% 0.19% 0.20% 0.20% -0.01% 0.52% 
 NRS  -0.06% -0.08% -0.07% -0.08% -1.44% 0.49% 
 OIL  -0.08% -0.13% -0.12% -0.13% 0.21% -0.13% 
 PAGR  0.26% 0.21% 0.25% 0.23% 0.41% 0.34% 
 OFD  2.88% 2.86% 2.91% 2.88% 3.85% -0.01% 
 MNF  -0.14% -0.16% -0.12% -0.14% -0.19% 0.22% 
 TEX  -0.26% -0.27% -0.21% -0.25% -0.31% 0.25% 
 WAP  0.18% 0.17% 0.22% 0.19% 0.60% 0.41% 
 CRP  -0.15% -0.16% -0.13% -0.15% -0.23% 0.32% 
 I_S  -0.38% -0.38% -0.35% -0.37% -0.45% 0.20% 
 NFM  -0.66% -0.67% -0.65% -0.66% -0.74% 0.26% 
 MVH  -0.16% -0.20% -0.19% -0.19% -0.22% 0.25% 
 ELE  -0.21% -0.23% -0.19% -0.21% -0.20% 0.22% 
 OME  -0.43% -0.45% -0.39% -0.42% -0.45% 0.23% 
 OMF  -0.23% -0.25% -0.22% -0.24% -0.36% 0.32% 
 MSR  -0.03% -0.05% -0.01% -0.03% -0.22% 0.18% 
 TRD  0.01% -0.01% 0.04% 0.01% -0.18% 0.20% 
 TRP  -0.12% -0.13% -0.09% -0.12% -0.55% 0.18% 
 CFI  -0.02% -0.04% 0.00% -0.02% -0.21% 0.20% 
 OBS  -0.01% -0.03% 0.01% -0.01% -0.20% 0.20% 
 OSG  -0.04% -0.07% -0.02% -0.05% -0.22% 0.16% 
 DWE  -0.00% -0.02% n/a* -0.00% n/a** n/a** 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: * Sector DWE does not demand for skilled labour in the benchmark year, thus the CES 
production function for this sector treat this factor demand as non-existing ; **Output from Sector DWE is non-traded. 
On the other hand, the majority of the service sectors in Thailand gain slightly from 
TNZCEPA. Thus, the preferential tariff elimination in agricultural and manufacturing sectors 
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has positive spill-over effects on service sectors, in the sense that the expansion in these 
sectors triggers further demands for domestic services.35  
Chart 3-5: Percentage changes in the number of firms and output per firm of 
imperfectly competitive sectors in New Zealand under TNZCEPA 
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Chart 3-5 reports changes in the scale of production of firms under imperfect competition in 
New Zealand. Processed agricultural products (PAGR), as well as commodities that 
intensively use natural resources as primary factors (NRS and OIL), are manufactured under 
oligopoly in New Zealand (see Table 3-3). Therefore, firm populations are invariable, whilst 
outputs per firm adjust with respect to their comparative advantages over Thai imports. 
Precisely, since total outputs of sectors NRS and OIL drop after TNZCEPA (see Table 3-29), 
outputs per firm also fall respectively by 0.06% and 0.08%; whereas firms in sector PAGR 
expand by 0.26% on average, in line with the sectoral output increase reported in Table 3-29. 
Since the rest of New Zealand’s imperfectly competitive sectors operate under monopolistic 
competition and almost everyone of them is worse off after TNZCEPA, they are mostly 
                                                     
35
 Since all service firms in Thailand operate under perfect competition, the simulation of TNZCEPA does not actually include 
service liberalisation, i.e. the removal of oligopolistic firms’ entry and exit barriers. Hence, service expansion in Thailand after 
TNZCEPA is chiefly attributable to the spill-over expansion effects from good sectors 
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plotted in the lower quadrants of the chart, where the less competitive firms exit the market 
and the ones that survive either expand and grow more productive under the increased 
pressure of international competition (e.g. sectors MVH, MNF, OMF, TRP, etc.), or decrease 
their output levels due to severe competition from abroad (e.g. sectors I_S and NFM). 
3.5.1.3 THAILAND+2 FTA 
The THAILAND+2 FTA scenario supposes that TAFTA, TNZCEPA, and ANZCERTA enter 
into force at the same time. Table 3-30 indicates that Thailand and New Zealand experience 
higher increases in real GDP, private and investment demands than Australia, probably 
because the better access to Australian markets granted to Thailand and New Zealand is more 
beneficial than that conceded to Australia in return. On the whole, the grouping’s impact on 
the world economy is marginal. This implies that even though THAILAND+2 is more 
beneficial to member regions than the TAFTA or TNZCEPA, the policy influence on each 
region is nonetheless minimal because of the lack of trade established between Thailand and 
the other two countries prior to the FTA signings. 
Table 3-30: Percentage changes for various regional indicators under THAILAND+2 
Region Real 
GDP 
Private 
demand 
Investment 
demand 
Public 
demand 
Regional 
import 
Regional 
export 
Terms of 
trade 
Real 
exchange 
rate 
       FTA members 
THA 0.10% 0.15% 0.18% -1.27% 0.39% 0.40% 0.17% 0.08% 
AUS 0.03% 0.10% 0.11% -0.22% 0.35% 0.33% 0.28% 0.01% 
NZL 0.09% 0.15% 0.39% -0.10% 0.91% 0.26% 0.01% -0.63% 
       Non-members 
Others 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Source: Simulated by author.  
Table 3-31 compares variations in sectoral production and trade across member regions. 
Thailand most benefits from the expansion in machinery and equipment (OME), and 
secondarily from expansion in chemical, rubber, plastic products (CRP), textiles (TEX), 
ferrous metals (I_S), and wearing apparels (WAP). Thus, generally speaking, the direction of 
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Thailand’s sectoral adjustments to THAILAND+2 is in keeping with the previous simulation 
results under TAFTA and TNZCEPA scenarios but with an enhanced degree of positive 
change.  
Table 3-31: Percentage changes for various sectoral indicators in member countries 
under THAILAND+2 
Output Export Import 
Sector 
THA AUS NZL THA AUS NZL THA AUS NZL 
 AGR  -0.05% 0.17% -0.63% 0.28% 0.35% -1.02% 2.12% 0.10% 0.58% 
 NRS  0.03% 0.03% -0.62% -0.10% -0.02% -3.82% 0.41% 0.11% 0.94% 
 OIL  0.02% -0.05% 0.51% 1.39% 0.09% 17.81% 0.10% 0.24% 1.88% 
 PAGR  -0.06% 0.13% -0.66% 0.27% 0.44% -1.09% 7.79% 3.75% 2.26% 
 OFD  0.25% 0.61% 2.60% 0.57% 2.32% 3.58% 1.49% 0.76% 0.28% 
 MNF  0.09% 0.02% 0.31% 0.18% 0.35% 1.17% 0.30% 0.42% 0.85% 
 TEX  0.44% -0.75% 8.96% 0.64% -0.12% 16.90% 0.11% 1.11% 1.75% 
 WAP  0.27% -0.45% 14.34% 0.49% 0.63% 30.36% 0.97% 2.04% -0.84% 
 CRP  0.52% 0.13% 0.86% 0.65% 0.70% 1.72% 0.19% 0.32% 0.66% 
 I_S  0.40% 0.20% 0.77% 0.63% 0.86% 2.08% 0.48% 0.68% 0.69% 
 NFM  0.20% 0.25% -1.08% 0.25% 0.28% -1.32% 0.19% 0.19% 1.62% 
 MVH  0.07% 0.66% 0.77% 0.59% 1.56% 2.61% 0.81% 0.12% 1.03% 
 ELE  -0.06% 0.73% -0.88% -0.06% 1.18% -1.37% 0.03% -0.00% 1.13% 
 OME  1.63% 0.04% 2.98% 1.73% 0.45% 4.16% 0.54% 0.41% 0.69% 
 OMF  0.18% 0.19% 0.19% 0.26% 0.69% 0.48% 0.21% 0.32% 1.06% 
 MSR  0.08% 0.04% 0.11% -0.04% 0.01% -0.82% 0.14% 0.05% 0.97% 
 TRD  0.04% 0.03% 0.10% -0.12% -0.02% -0.86% 0.19% 0.06% 1.05% 
 TRP  -0.03% 0.01% -0.69% -0.08% -0.08% -2.72% 0.05% 0.04% 0.81% 
 CFI  0.00% -0.01% -0.22% 0.03% -0.15% -1.23% -0.03% 0.05% 1.06% 
 OBS  -0.12% 0.01% -0.12% -0.08% -0.04% -1.11% -0.09% 0.06% 1.02% 
 OSG  -1.14% -0.16% -0.13% -0.65% -0.15% -1.17% -0.89% -0.07% 1.02% 
 DWE  -0.17% -0.05% -0.09% n/a** n/a** n/a** n/a** n/a** n/a** 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: **Output from Sector DWE is non-traded. 
For Australia, the sources of output expansion are from processed agricultural and food 
products (PAGR and OFD), metal products (I_S and NFM), motor vehicles and parts (MVH), 
and electronic equipment (ELE), again similar to the results under TAFTA. In comparison to 
the other member countries, Australian exports of agricultural produces (AGR), processed 
agricultural products (PAGR), non-ferrous metals (NFM), and other manufactures (OMF), 
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expand substantially after THAILAND+2, which reflects the comparative advantage of 
Australia in these commodities.  
Since New Zealand has strong economic ties with Australia, the simulation results for this 
country differ slightly from those under TNZCEPA. Although wearing apparel (WAP) and 
some food products (OFD) are still dominant sources of gains, once Australia is taken into 
consideration, agricultural produces (AGR) and most processed agricultural products (PAGR) 
are subject to contraction both in terms of production and exportation. Yet again, the non-
traded sector, dwellings (DWE), is faced with contraction since productive resources are 
reduced as the tradable sectors are liberalised. 
The proportional changes plotted in Chart 3-6 for Australia’s imperfectly competitive sectors 
resemble those in Chart 3-4 for the TAFTA analysis, except that there forestry, fishery, coal, 
gas, minerals (NRS) was positioned in the South-West quadrant.  
Chart 3-6: Percentage changes in the number of firms and output per firm of 
imperfectly competitive sectors in Australia under THAILAND+2 
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Under THAILAND+2, output per firm in this sector grows unambiguously while the variation 
in the number of firms is similar to that under TAFTA. As New Zealand gains access to the 
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grouping, the order of comparative advantages in sector NRS among the three countries 
results in sectoral expansion in Australia, due to the fact that Australia has a clear 
comparative advantage in this sector over New Zealand.  
Finally, Chart 3-7 shows the percentage changes in production scale of New Zealand’s 
imperfectly competitive sectors under THAILAND+2. The outcomes differ from those 
reported in Chart 3-5 (TNZCEPA), in which most sectors are located around the origin. In 
Chart 3-7, we observe more positive results on the whole as the plots are shifted toward the 
right hand side of the diagram. Especially, compared to the case where Australia is not 
involved in the agreement, sectoral and individual firm’s outputs of oil (OIL), ferrous metals 
(I_S), chemical, rubber, plastic products (CRP) and motor vehicles and parts (MVH) have 
increased markedly, despite the number of firms in the latter three being expanded at the same 
time. This reflects the comparative advantage of New Zealand over Australia in these sectors. 
Conversely, in sector PAGR the involvement of Australia has a strong negative impact, with a 
notable contraction in output per firm (Chart 3-6) and by sector (Table 3-31). 
Chart 3-7: Percentage changes in the number of firms and output per firm of 
imperfectly competitive sectors in New Zealand under THAILAND+2 
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3.5.2 Thai FTAs with Japan, China and India 
For the next step, JTEPA, ASEAN-China and Thailand-India FTAs are analysed together in 
this subsection. Although we do not observe apparent proximity in the economic structures of 
Japan, China and India, Thai FTAs with these three nations are analogous in terms of the 
negotiating approaches that result in a limited coverage of commitments. Moreover, as they 
are all major economic figures in Asia, a comparative study of the economic effects of Thai 
FTAs with these nations is of an interest to policy makers. To take things further, the obtained 
results are contrasted with those simulated under ‘ASEAN+3,’ where ASEAN as a whole 
forms an ‘ideal’ FTA with Japan, China, and India. 
Table 3-32: Regional welfare gains after Thailand’s FTA formation with Japan, China 
and India (EV in million US$ and as percentage of 2001 regional income) 
JTEPA ASEAN+CHINA THAILAND+INDIA ASEAN+3 
Region EV 
(million 
US$) 
EV (% 
of 2001 
income) 
EV 
(million 
US$) 
EV (% 
of 2001 
income) 
EV 
(million 
US$) 
EV (% 
of 2001 
income) 
EV 
(million 
US$) 
EV (% 
of 2001 
income) 
      FTA member candidates 
THA 1,685.49  1.73%  393.76  0.40%  311.70  0.32%  2,144.50  2.20% 
IND -21.40  -0.00%  -160.04  -0.03%  -142.32  -0.03%  58.04  0.01% 
JPN 3,795.80  0.09%  -1,252.06  -0.03%  -21.59  -0.00%  19,727.70  0.48% 
CHN -361.95  -0.03%  2,526.81  0.21%  -12.62  -0.00%  3,694.99  0.30% 
NASN -172.59  -0.13%  2,265.59  1.77%  -5.18  -0.00%  2,298.79  1.80% 
SASN -148.54  -0.05%  1,556.67  0.49%  -15.43  -0.00%  1,673.98  0.53% 
       Non-members 
AUS -70.61  -0.02%  -54.23  -0.02%  -4.81  -0.00%  -110.37  -0.03%  
NZL 1.46  0.00%  -3.78  -0.01%  -1.06  -0.00%  0.29  0.00%  
KOR -106.10  -0.03%  -561.00  -0.14%  -10.19  -0.00%  -1,577.55  -0.40%  
USA -350.14  -0.00%  -440.72  -0.00%  -34.44  -0.00%  -921.23  -0.01%  
CAN -6.73  -0.00%  13.59  0.00%  -1.41  -0.00%  71.29  0.01%  
MEX -0.39  -0.00%  2.51  0.00%  2.15  0.00%  -19.25  -0.00%  
UK -83.45  -0.01%  -134.33  -0.01%  -16.15  -0.00%  -336.22  -0.02%  
XEUR -714.69  -0.01%  -3,570.05  -0.05%  -154.20  -0.00%  -5,678.18  -0.07%  
ROW -277.04  -0.01%  -381.54  -0.01%  -81.57  -0.00%  -949.09  -0.03%  
World 3,169.11  0.01%  201.18  0.00%  -187.12  -0.00%  20,077.68  0.06%  
 Source: Simulated by author. Note: Numbers in bold letters indicate welfare changes in member countries of each FTA 
grouping.  
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Table 3-32 reports the EV results from the four FTA scenarios. It is noteworthy that Thailand 
(THA) derives a welfare gain from the bilateral FTA with Japan (JPN) that is more than four 
times higher than under the assumed ASEAN+CHINA regime. Even under the ‘ideal’ 
ASEAN+3, Thailand’s gains are some 30% higher than under JTEPA. This result reflects the 
fact that Japan has been Thailand’s largest trading partner in Asia and the Pacific region. 
Japan, on the other hand, gains 3,795.80 million US dollars from the agreement, some 0.09% 
of the regional income in 2001. Overall, JTEPA increases the world income by 3,169.11 
million US dollars or 0.01%, which is much larger than the results from TAFTA or 
TNZCEPA (see Table 3-21). 
The results indicate that member countries enjoy substantial gains under ASEAN+CHINA, 
especially China (CHN), whose income is augmented by 2,526.81 million US dollars. 
However, the trade diversion effects on non-members such as Europe (UK and XEUR), Korea 
(KOR) and the United States (USA) are significant enough to counterbalance the positive 
impacts on member regions, resulting in a minor improvement in world welfare. 
Not surprisingly, Thailand would obtain minor gains from the bilateral FTA with India (IND); 
whereas for India and the world the agreement would be slightly welfare-worsening. The 
primary reason for the deterioration in regional welfare is that Indian industries have been 
highly protected at the border. Although THAILAND + INDIA results in benefits for India 
through improved resource re-allocation, the tariff revenue loss reduces the government 
income to the extent that that it more than offsets the real gains and so decreases welfare. 
Were ASEAN (THA, NASN, and SASN) to be successful in forming a single FTA with Japan, 
China and India (ASEAN+3), all members would be unequivocally better off; while non-
members such as Korea, the United States and Rest of Europe would find the outcome 
unfavourable. In contrast, the negative impacts on Australia (AUS) and New Zealand (NZL) 
would be relatively small compared to other non-members, because the trade relationships 
between ASEAN+3 members and these two nations are not extensive. Moreover, under some 
FTA scenarios, non-members such as New Zealand, Canada (CAN) and Mexico (MEX) may 
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even marginally gain as trade with their major trading partners like Australia and the United 
States – also not included in the groupings – is increased after the FTA is formed. This aspect 
of the analysis highlights the usefulness of the general equilibrium approach in that this type 
of secondary trade diversion effect on non-member economies might otherwise have been 
overlooked. 
Chart 3-8: Percentage changes in nominal GDP after Thailand’s FTA formation with 
Japan, China and India 
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       Source: Simulated by author.  
Chart 3-8 plots the increase in nominal GDP under the four FTA scenarios, where North and 
South ASEAN (NASN and SASN) are again aggregated as ‘Rest of ASEAN,’ and all other 
non-members are together labelled as ‘Others.’ The overall results are consistent with those in 
Table 3-32, except that the gross nominal output change in India after THAILAND+INDIA is 
positive but close to zero (0.02%). This again underlines the argument made above that the 
loss in tariff revenues is the main source of overall negative EV for India. 
Table 3-33 reports the nominal and real changes in trade indicators for the member regions. In 
all cases, trade creation dominates trade diversion, and the gains grow in absolute terms as the 
groupings are enlarged to ASEAN+3.  
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Under JTEPA, bilateral trade between Thailand and Japan is boosted by approximately 25% 
of the base volume. Given that Thailand’s ex-ante imports from Japan do not significantly 
differ from Japan’s imports from Thailand (according to the GTAP 6.0 database), the scope 
for the elimination of trade barriers in the two countries should be essentially the same, 
despite the fact that Japanese trade barriers on major Thai agricultural exports are not 
removed under JTEPA. In contrast, under ASEAN+CHINA, both Thailand and South 
ASEAN experience greater trade impacts than China and North ASEAN, which may be 
expected since the former two’s initial border protection is more substantial, especially given 
the fact that Singapore – as part of North ASEAN – imposes virtually zero tariffs on many 
product lines. 
Table 3-33: Welfare changes for trade indicators in member countries after Thailand’s 
FTA formation with Japan, China and India 
Change in million US$  % change in real volumes 
FTA Region 
Gross 
imports 
from 
FTA 
partners 
Gross 
imports 
from 
non-
partners 
 
 
 
 
Imports 
from 
FTA 
partners 
Imports 
from 
non-
partners 
Exports 
to FTA 
partners 
Exports 
to non-
partners 
THA 4,207.15 -796.87  25.35% -1.37%  25.70%  -3.72% JTEPA 
JPN 5,781.69 -998.55  25.70% -0.25%  25.35%  0.13% 
THA 5,141.62 -692.20  24.93% -1.37%  19.90%  -1.65% 
CHN 15,035.67 -4,123.88  10.87% -1.34%  7.48%  0.31% 
NASN 5,169.59 3,178.88  5.45% 1.75%  13.45%  -2.89% 
ASEAN 
+CHINA 
SASN 8,357.78 -1,662.37  22.39% -1.70%  15.61%  0.59% 
THA 846.45 -283.98  92.57% -0.35%  78.64%  -0.10% THAILAND
+INDIA 
IND 654.24 -104.09  78.64% -0.13%  92.57%  -0.46% 
THA 8,967.24 -819.42  23.09% -2.40%  18.15%  -4.53% 
IND 15,017.72 -3,860.72  78.10% -7.01%  47.23%  14.71% 
JPN 19,372.86 4,792.81  10.31% 0.96%  17.19%  -2.11% 
CHN 32,880.71 -7,498.71  14.44% -3.08%  10.04%  0.84% 
NASN 8,362.55 3,330.80  5.66% 2.20%  13.52%  -4.98% 
ASEAN+3 
SASN 10,362.20 -1,271.98  15.65% -1.88%  11.63%  -0.41% 
Source: Simulated by author.  
By the same token, trade between Thailand and India is almost doubled under 
THAILAND+INDIA, reflecting their relatively minor trade relationship and their substantial 
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trade barriers before the arrangement. This point is also observed under ASEAN+3, as the 
percentage expansion in India’s intra-group trade is notably higher than that perceived in 
other member countries. 
Table 3-34: Percentage changes for labour welfare indicators in member countries after 
Thailand’s FTA formation with Japan, China and India 
  Unemploy-
ment rate of 
unskilled 
labour 
Unemploy-
ment rate of 
skilled 
labour 
Real wage of 
unskilled 
labour 
Real wage of 
skilled 
labour 
Ratio of 
unskilled to 
skilled 
labour 
income 
THA -7.84% 7.61% 0.82% -0.73% 3.32% 
JTEPA 
JPN -0.74% -0.79% 0.07% 0.08% -0.01% 
THA -5.92% 17.35% 0.61% -1.59% 4.93% 
CHN -2.97% -0.58% 0.30% 0.06% 0.51% 
NASN n/a* n/a* 2.24% 0.87% 1.36% 
ASEAN 
+CHINA 
SASN -5.35% 4.34% 0.55% -0.42% 2.07% 
THA -2.10% 0.41% 0.21% -0.04% 0.53% THAILAND
+INDIA IND -0.08% 0.42% 0.01% -0.04% 0.11% 
THA -13.52% 25.88% 1.46% -2.28% 8.50% 
IND -5.30% 4.56% 0.55% -0.45% 2.11% 
JPN -3.33% -3.39% 0.34% 0.35% -0.01% 
CHN -6.09% 0.37% 0.63% -0.04% 1.39% 
NASN n/a* n/a* 2.20% 0.06% 2.14% 
ASEAN+3 
SASN -5.74% 9.31% 0.59% -0.89% 3.21% 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: *North ASEANs skilled and unskilled labour markets have fully flexible wages and rigid 
unemployment rates. 
Finally, Table 3-34 summarises the labour welfare effects in the member regions. Since real 
wages in the unskilled and skilled labour markets of Thailand (THA), India (IND), Japan 
(JPN), China (CHN), and South ASEAN (SASN) are negatively associated with 
unemployment rates, their percentage changes are always of opposite sign. On the other hand, 
real wages in North ASEAN (NASN) are fully flexible at the same time as unemployment 
rates are exogenised, thus the real wage adjustment is more pronounced for the type of labour 
used intensively to produce commodities in which NASN has a comparative advantage, given 
that unemployment is voluntary, it does not decline with the increased labour demand. For 
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that reason, North ASEAN’s rate of return to unskilled labour is enhanced under both 
ASEAN+CHINA and ASEAN+3. 
Thailand experiences an improvement in the real wage of unskilled labour under all scenarios. 
The ex-post unskilled wage is at its highest under ASEAN+3, reflecting the strong demand 
for unskilled-labour intensive products from elsewhere. Since the unskilled wage variation is 
also considerably high under JTEPA, it is apparent that such demands mainly come from 
Japan, a relatively skilled-labour abundant economy. In contrast, skilled labour in Thailand is 
worse off under all types of FTA; hence Thailand’s unskilled labour income unequivocally 
improves more relative to that of skilled labour. 
Unskilled labour in regions such as India, China and South ASEAN benefit more from the 
regional groupings than does skilled labour; Japan being the only country whose skilled 
labour gains more from FTA formation than the unskilled, and Japan’s ratio of unskilled to 
skilled labour income uniquely deteriorates (see Table 3-34). 
3.5.2.1 JTEPA 
Table 3-35 summarises the results for the partnership between Thailand and Japan (JTEPA).  
Table 3-35: Percentage changes for various regional indicators under JTEPA 
Region Real GDP 
Private 
demand 
Investment 
demand
Public 
demand 
Regional 
import 
Regional 
export 
Terms of 
trade 
     FTA members 
THA 0.42% 2.40% 5.34% -6.26% 3.84% 1.37% 1.64% 
JPN 0.11% 0.14% 0.14% -0.04% 0.68% 0.84% 0.38% 
     Non-members 
AUS -0.02% -0.03% 0.00% -0.01% -0.05% -0.05% 0.00% 
NZL -0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% -0.06% -0.05% 0.00% 
CHN -0.01% -0.02% -0.01% -0.06% -0.06% -0.02% 0.01% 
NASN -0.06% -0.08% -0.19% -0.09% -0.12% -0.06% 0.02% 
SASN -0.02% -0.02% -0.05% -0.11% -0.12% -0.07% 0.01% 
KOR -0.02% -0.02% -0.02% -0.05% -0.03% -0.02% 0.00% 
Others 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% -0.02% -0.01% 0.00% 
     Source: Simulated by author.  
 3-85
Overall, JTEPA increases the real GDP of the Thai and Japanese economies by 0.42% and 
0.11%, respectively. The percentage changes in all other macroeconomic variables similarly 
suggest that Thailand, as a smaller economy, obtains stronger positive impacts than Japan, 
given the same magnitude of change in bilateral imports (see Table 3-33). Under JTEPA, 
regional trade is facilitated and the terms of trade with respect to all other economies are 
improved for both member countries. Private and investment demands are then enhanced as 
national incomes increase. However, the reduction in public demand is unavoidable under all 
FTA scenarios due to the fall in tariff revenue. Lastly, among those outside the grouping, the 
real GDP of Korea is that most negatively affected by JTEPA. 
Table 3-36: Percentage changes for sectoral indicators in Thailand under JTEPA 
Sector Output 
Unskilled 
labour 
demand 
Skilled 
labour 
demand 
Capital 
demand Export Import 
 AGR  3.08% 6.78% 7.18% 6.64% -12.04% 28.72% 
 NRS  -0.45% -0.57% -0.26% -0.68% -0.82% 1.25% 
 OIL  -0.75% -1.47% -1.17% -1.58% 0.08% -1.38% 
 PAGR  29.58% 30.08% 32.36% 29.27% 85.17% 0.95% 
 OFD  -1.13% -0.71% 1.02% -1.33% -0.78% 4.76% 
 MNF  -1.34% -0.89% 1.06% -1.59% -1.53% 7.31% 
 TEX  -5.33% -4.97% -3.10% -5.64% -6.49% 6.34% 
 WAP  -0.86% -0.54% 1.43% -1.23% -2.09% 7.88% 
 CRP  -11.30% -10.96% -9.20% -11.58% -11.40% 2.88% 
 I_S  -5.45% -5.08% -3.21% -5.75% -2.46% 1.70% 
 NFM  -2.10% -1.74% 0.20% -2.43% -1.86% -1.17% 
 MVH  -2.80% -2.42% -0.49% -3.10% -0.87% 29.12% 
 ELE  -1.86% -1.39% 0.56% -2.08% -1.79% 0.23% 
 OME  1.83% 2.24% 4.26% 1.53% 2.19% 4.26% 
 OMF  -1.55% -1.16% 0.79% -1.85% -2.14% 3.81% 
 MSR  1.26% 1.72% 3.89% 0.95% -0.28% 2.03% 
 TRD  0.11% 0.85% 3.51% -0.09% -2.02% 2.37% 
 TRP  0.29% 0.81% 3.47% -0.13% -1.46% 1.47% 
 CFI  -0.05% 0.15% 2.13% -0.55% -1.52% 1.62% 
 OBS  -1.01% -0.83% 1.13% -1.52% -2.17% 1.28% 
 OSG  -5.57% -6.50% -4.66% -7.15% -4.52% -3.03% 
 DWE  0.54% 1.13% n/a* 0.43% n/a** n/a** 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: * Sector DWE does not demand for skilled labour in the benchmark year, thus the CES 
production function for this sector treat this factor demand as non-existing ; **Output from Sector DWE is non-traded. 
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Table 3-36 shows Thailand’s sectoral adjustments to JTEPA, while Table 3-37 reports on the 
corresponding results for Japan. In Thailand, processed agricultural products (PAGR) benefit 
the most from the bilateral partnership as its output and exports outstandingly grow by 
29.58% and 85.17%, respectively. There is also a 3.08% expansion in the output of 
agricultural products (AGR). 
Table 3-37: Percentage changes for various sectoral indicators in Japan under JTEPA 
Sector Output 
Unskilled 
labour 
demand 
Skilled 
labour 
demand 
Capital 
demand Export Import 
 AGR  -0.35% -0.42% -0.43% -0.44% 0.80% -0.77% 
 NRS  0.03% 0.05% 0.05% 0.04% 0.10% 0.25% 
 OIL  -0.02% -0.03% -0.03% -0.04% -0.12% 0.14% 
 PAGR  -1.34% -1.45% -1.46% -1.50% 0.58% 19.55% 
 OFD  0.12% 0.15% 0.14% 0.08% 4.92% 0.64% 
 MNF  0.14% 0.13% 0.13% 0.08% 0.89% 0.05% 
 TEX  0.50% 0.45% 0.45% 0.40% 1.18% -0.03% 
 WAP  0.11% 0.14% 0.13% 0.06% 1.18% 0.21% 
 CRP  0.34% 0.31% 0.31% 0.26% 1.02% -0.27% 
 I_S  0.45% 0.38% 0.38% 0.34% 1.29% 0.00% 
 NFM  0.43% 0.40% 0.40% 0.36% 0.92% 0.10% 
 MVH  1.10% 0.90% 0.90% 0.84% 1.81% -0.15% 
 ELE  0.21% 0.19% 0.19% 0.15% 0.25% 0.05% 
 OME  0.54% 0.51% 0.51% 0.46% 0.80% 0.02% 
 OMF  0.13% 0.11% 0.11% 0.06% 0.41% 0.04% 
 MSR  0.06% 0.07% 0.07% 0.01% -0.02% 0.10% 
 TRD  0.05% 0.08% 0.07% -0.03% -0.02% 0.09% 
 TRP  0.03% 0.05% 0.04% -0.03% -0.23% 0.11% 
 CFI  0.02% 0.05% 0.04% -0.02% -0.09% 0.12% 
 OBS  0.07% 0.09% 0.08% 0.02% -0.03% 0.12% 
 OSG  0.01% 0.01% 0.01% -0.05% -0.08% 0.07% 
 DWE  -0.08% 0.00% n/a* -0.08% n/a** n/a** 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: * Sector DWE does not demand for skilled labour in the benchmark year, thus the CES 
production function for this sector treat this factor demand as non-existing ; **Output from Sector DWE is non-traded. 
Japanese production and exports, on the other hand, increase in most manufacturing sectors, 
especially in motor vehicles and parts (MVH), by 1.10% and 1.81%, respectively. Similarly, 
textiles (TEX), chemical, rubber, plastic products (CRP), metal products (I_S and NFM), and 
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machinery and equipments (OME) also clearly gain from JTEPA as their exports to Thailand 
are increased. 
Chart 3-9: Percentage changes in the number of firms and output per firm of 
imperfectly competitive sectors in Japan under JTEPA 
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Chart 3-9 plots the changes in production of imperfectly competitive sectors in Japan. Since 
all of them are assumed to be operating under monopolistic competition (see Table 3-3), the 
number of firms population is endogenous. In most of these sectors the numbers of firms and 
outputs per firm are simultaneously increased, the changes in sectoral demands being reported 
in Table 3-37. Not surprisingly, sector MVH experiences the largest increases in these two 
indicators, reflecting its strong output expansion. On the other hand, since sector PAGR in 
Japan is at a comparative disadvantage relative to Thai exports, less efficient producers adjust 
to the new trade regime by merging with others or exiting the market, while the surviving 
ones to increase their outputs and so enjoy increasing returns to scale. 
 3-88
3.5.2.2 ASEAN+CHINA 
This subsection reports the welfare results of the formation of an FTA between China and 
ASEAN. Firstly, Table 3-38 shows that the positive impacts on real GDP and final demands 
are strongest in North ASEAN, while Thailand and South ASEAN enjoy a relatively high 
increase in regional trade in comparison to other members. Given that North ASEAN’s GDP 
is almost half of South ASEAN’s, the consumer effect in North ASEAN is probably strong 
enough to magnify the effect of the relatively small trade change into a large impact on real 
GDP. Thailand and South ASEAN, on the other hand, experience sizeable trade expansions 
because they had imposed comparatively high trade barriers before the union. For that reason, 
their considerable tax revenue losses cause major reductions in public demand, in comparison 
to the welfare gains from the increased private and investment demands.  
Table 3-38: Percentage changes for various regional indicators under 
ASEAN+CHINA 
Region Real 
GDP 
Private 
demand 
Invest-
ment 
demand 
Public 
demand 
Regional 
import 
Regional 
export 
Terms 
of trade 
Real 
exchange 
rate 
       FTA members 
THA 0.82% 1.79% 4.06% -12.35% 5.15% 3.77% 1.62% -1.44% 
CHN 0.26% 0.50% 0.65% -2.13% 1.90% 1.68% 0.88% -0.08% 
NASN 1.76% 2.05% 5.47% -6.23% 3.12% 2.28% 0.24% -1.93% 
SASN 0.66% 0.75% 2.31% -5.89% 4.43% 3.95% 1.81% 0.24% 
       Non-members 
AUS -0.01% -0.03% -0.02% 0.01% -0.03% -0.04% -0.04% -0.23% 
NZL -0.04% -0.02% -0.04% 0.00% -0.36% -0.24% -0.01% 0.00% 
IND -0.02% -0.02% -0.02% -0.08% -0.16% -0.09% -0.01% -0.24% 
JPN -0.02% -0.02% -0.02% -0.07% -0.15% -0.05% 0.00% -0.17% 
KOR -0.08% -0.10% -0.12% -0.38% -0.23% -0.11% -0.01% -0.10% 
Others -0.02% -0.01% -0.02% -0.05% -0.05% -0.06% -0.02% -0.25% 
  Source: Simulated by author.  
The general FTA impact on China is moderate since China is a large economy and her trade 
barriers are low thanks to the international competitiveness that has turned China into one of 
the major exporting countries nowadays. In fact, as China becomes a major economy in Asia 
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in terms of both the size and the expansion of its market, the ASEAN countries are keen to 
strengthen their economic ties with China, notwithstanding that the patterns of their factor 
endowments and comparative advantages are not particularly disparate. This point is clearly 
illustrated in Table 3-39 to Table 3-41, where the outputs of sectors such as wearing apparels 
(WAP), metal products (I_S and NFM), motor vehicles and parts (MVH), machinery and 
equipments (OME), and electricity, gas, water, and construction services (MSR) are 
commonly increased in all member regions.  
Table 3-39: Percentage changes for various sectoral indicators in Thailand under 
ASEAN+CHINA 
Sector Output 
Unskilled 
labour 
demand 
Skilled 
labour 
demand 
Capital 
demand Export Import 
 AGR  1.31% 2.81% 3.36% 2.43% 11.53% 11.39% 
 NRS  -0.31% -0.22% 0.23% -0.53% 0.26% 5.17% 
 OIL  -0.58% -1.01% -0.57% -1.32% -1.00% 0.68% 
 PAGR  -2.43% -1.27% 1.20% -2.99% -1.72% 43.31% 
 OFD  -3.49% -2.26% 0.19% -3.96% -2.55% 10.05% 
 MNF  0.59% 1.98% 4.86% -0.01% 2.01% 6.60% 
 TEX  -1.08% 0.10% 2.93% -1.85% 1.34% 12.28% 
 WAP  0.17% 1.22% 4.08% -0.75% -0.81% 35.71% 
 CRP  18.10% 19.57% 22.94% 17.23% 24.94% 4.70% 
 I_S  2.69% 3.94% 6.87% 1.91% 5.71% 2.84% 
 NFM  2.91% 4.14% 7.08% 2.11% 3.33% 0.92% 
 MVH  2.12% 3.39% 6.31% 1.37% 6.11% 7.02% 
 ELE  4.24% 5.76% 8.75% 3.70% 4.62% 4.82% 
 OME  4.17% 5.51% 8.49% 3.45% 4.87% 5.25% 
 OMF  -3.71% -2.53% 0.23% -4.43% -4.45% 5.45% 
 MSR  1.57% 3.03% 6.18% 0.86% -1.31% 3.59% 
 TRD  0.41% 2.60% 6.48% -0.06% -3.03% 3.93% 
 TRP  -0.97% 0.67% 4.48% -1.94% -5.02% 2.44% 
 CFI  -0.43% 0.52% 3.35% -1.45% -2.77% 2.45% 
 OBS  -2.23% -1.33% 1.46% -3.25% -3.42% 0.72% 
 OSG  -11.14% -12.29% -9.82% -14.00% -8.63% -6.72% 
 DWE  -0.78% 0.87% n/a* -1.09% n/a** n/a** 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: * Sector DWE does not demand for skilled labour in the benchmark year, thus the CES 
production function for this sector treat this factor demand as non-existing ; **Output from Sector DWE is non-traded. 
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Table 3-40: Percentage changes for various sectoral indicators in North and South ASEAN (excluding Thailand) under ASEAN+CHINA 
NASN SASN 
Sector  Output Unskilled 
labour 
demand 
Skilled 
labour 
demand 
Capital 
demand 
Export Import Output Unskilled 
labour 
demand 
Skilled 
labour 
demand 
Capital 
demand 
Export Import 
 AGR  -0.26% -0.53% -0.21% -0.57% -0.43% 20.35% 0.06% 0.14% 0.37% -0.11% 5.11% 1.62% 
 NRS  -0.54% -0.79% -0.56% -0.81% -3.88% 8.88% 0.12% 0.32% 0.52% 0.11% -0.20% 5.58% 
 OIL  -0.82% -1.30% -1.09% -1.33% -1.83% 3.12% -0.27% -0.22% -0.03% -0.43% -0.06% -0.04% 
 PAGR  33.63% 30.10% 31.93% 29.87% 51.35% 20.03% -2.05% -1.19% -0.11% -2.35% 6.92% 57.02% 
 OFD  7.88% 6.32% 7.65% 6.16% 9.67% 6.01% 1.55% 2.35% 3.48% 1.16% 5.15% 3.41% 
 MNF  2.01% 0.50% 1.23% 0.41% 2.56% 4.13% -0.34% 0.48% 1.72% -0.84% 1.91% 8.08% 
 TEX  25.73% 20.99% 21.61% 20.91% 28.22% 6.55% 2.62% 3.51% 4.79% 2.14% 5.69% 5.08% 
 WAP  11.46% 8.34% 9.25% 8.22% 12.01% 5.18% 2.82% 3.53% 4.81% 2.17% 3.50% 10.07% 
 CRP  10.96% 9.27% 10.34% 9.14% 12.92% 2.94% 5.28% 6.12% 7.43% 4.72% 12.82% 2.02% 
 I_S  6.70% 3.98% 4.37% 3.92% 7.43% 5.86% 2.05% 3.02% 4.29% 1.67% 4.70% 2.00% 
 NFM  3.00% 0.94% 1.32% 0.89% 3.09% 3.90% 2.60% 3.46% 4.74% 2.10% 2.64% 3.54% 
 MVH  4.27% 2.77% 3.79% 2.65% 8.55% 2.82% 2.13% 2.93% 4.20% 1.58% 19.21% 3.19% 
 ELE  -2.45% -4.05% -3.42% -4.13% -2.43% 0.17% 4.57% 5.55% 6.86% 4.16% 4.65% 2.72% 
 OME  18.18% 15.29% 16.07% 15.19% 19.51% 4.34% 7.45% 8.23% 9.57% 6.81% 9.21% 3.17% 
 OMF  2.58% 0.69% 1.40% 0.60% 2.97% 4.00% 0.20% 1.05% 2.30% -0.28% 1.24% 5.37% 
 MSR  2.49% 1.68% 2.88% 1.54% -0.63% 4.26% 1.50% 2.31% 3.67% 0.85% 1.26% 0.85% 
 TRD  -0.08% -0.52% 1.12% -0.71% -3.53% 4.94% 0.53% 1.85% 3.53% 0.07% -0.19% 0.87% 
 TRP  -2.30% -2.83% -1.34% -3.01% -8.91% 3.09% 0.53% 1.73% 3.40% -0.06% 0.46% 0.28% 
 CFI  -0.04% -0.45% 0.71% -0.59% -3.79% 4.65% -0.17% 0.48% 1.72% -0.84% -0.10% -0.14% 
 OBS  -5.75% -6.10% -4.97% -6.23% -7.35% 2.69% -0.00% 0.75% 1.99% -0.58% -0.01% -0.21% 
 OSG  -3.23% -4.11% -2.93% -4.25% -4.82% 0.49% -4.53% -5.03% -3.85% -6.28% -2.60% -3.64% 
 DWE  -1.10% -1.01% n/a* -1.18% n/a** n/a** -1.14% -0.05% n/a* -1.36% n/a** n/a** 
Note: * Sector DWE does not demand for skilled labour in the benchmark year, thus the CES production function for this sector treat this factor demand as non-existing ; **Output from Sector DWE is non-traded.
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Table 3-41: Percentage changes for various sectoral indicators in China under 
ASEAN+CHINA 
Sector Output 
Unskilled 
labour 
demand 
Skilled 
labour 
demand 
Capital 
demand Export Import 
 AGR  0.12% 0.19% 0.25% 0.11% 1.22% 1.70% 
 NRS  0.16% 0.24% 0.29% 0.18% 0.52% 0.55% 
 OIL  0.24% 0.26% 0.29% 0.20% -0.36% 1.01% 
 PAGR  0.29% 0.51% 0.79% 0.14% 9.78% 8.88% 
 OFD  0.17% 0.35% 0.62% -0.03% 1.07% 1.48% 
 MNF  0.47% 0.63% 0.94% 0.21% 1.72% 1.27% 
 TEX  1.03% 1.22% 1.53% 0.80% 3.46% 2.53% 
 WAP  1.36% 1.48% 1.80% 1.06% 2.39% 9.16% 
 CRP  -0.99% -0.80% -0.50% -1.22% 0.52% 4.68% 
 I_S  0.48% 0.61% 0.92% 0.19% 1.68% 0.46% 
 NFM  0.50% 0.65% 0.96% 0.23% 1.37% 0.68% 
 MVH  0.55% 0.25% 0.35% 0.12% 2.49% 0.27% 
 ELE  2.81% 3.02% 3.33% 2.59% 3.68% 1.79% 
 OME  0.41% 0.59% 0.90% 0.17% 1.42% 1.98% 
 OMF  0.50% 0.77% 1.08% 0.35% 0.73% 1.10% 
 MSR  0.36% 0.50% 0.83% 0.04% 0.41% 0.16% 
 TRD  0.22% 0.42% 0.83% -0.14% 0.30% 0.06% 
 TRP  0.12% 0.37% 0.78% -0.19% -0.08% 0.08% 
 CFI  0.09% 0.26% 0.56% -0.16% 0.12% -0.02% 
 OBS  -0.07% 0.11% 0.42% -0.31% 0.07% -0.32% 
 OSG  -1.71% -1.80% -1.50% -2.21% -1.09% -1.32% 
 DWE  -0.13% 0.23% n/a* -0.19% n/a** n/a** 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: * Sector DWE does not demand for skilled labour in the benchmark year, thus the CES 
production function for this sector treat this factor demand as non-existing ; **Output from Sector DWE is non-traded. 
In addition, there is some similarity in the pattern of comparative advantage after the 
formation of ASEAN+CHINA, with Thailand becoming more specialised in chemical, 
rubber, and plastic products (CRP); North ASEAN in processed agricultural and food 
products (PAGR and OFD), textiles (TEX), and sector CRP; South ASEAN in sectors OME, 
CRP and electronic equipments (ELE); and China in sectors TEX and ELE. Such similar shifts 
in production patterns in member regions are attributable to the Armington function that 
differentiates products by origin and thus allowing intra-industry trade among regions; in 
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addition to the fact that some production sectors are under imperfect competition. As a 
consequence, the real gains from ASEAN+CHINA are non-zero in spite of the above-
mentioned proximity. 
Lastly, Chart 3-10 shows the adjustments of imperfectly competitive firms in North 
ASEAN.36 Sectors plotted in the first quadrant are better off since they are able to compete at 
the international level; while those in the fourth quadrant are faced with contraction as their 
resources are bid away to produce more of the former group of products. Sectors PAGR and 
OFD, on the other hand, are located on the X axis since they are under Cournot oligopoly. 
The escalation in their outputs per firm is more pronounced than it would have been under 
monopolistic competition, as firm mobility is prohibited and the incumbent firms are able to 
reap more profits from their increased production activities.  
Chart 3-10: Percentage changes in the number of firms and output per firm of 
imperfectly competitive sectors in North ASEAN under ASEAN+CHINA  
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36
 The results are only reported for North ASEAN, because sectors in Thailand and South ASEAN are all under perfect 
competition; also, in China, only sectors OIL and MVH are under monopolistic competition. 
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3.5.2.3 THAILAND+INDIA 
Table 3-42 shows that the bilateral FTA between Thailand and India has weak impacts on 
regional and global welfare. The positive changes in the main regional indicators, including 
the terms of trade in Thailand and India, is predominantly less than 1%; at the same time non-
members are broadly unaffected by this FTA. As with the outcomes reported in Table 3-33, 
India’s regional export increases by a greater proportion than Thailand’s, and thus we see 
greater improvement in her terms of trade. Nonetheless, as India is a much larger economy 
than Thailand, the percentage changes in its real GDP and final demands are comparatively 
small. 
Table 3-42: Percentage changes for various regional indicators under 
THAILAND+INDIA 
         Source: Simulated by author.  
Table 3-43 reports the sectoral results for Thailand and India. In Thailand, most 
manufacturing sectors find the agreement beneficial. While sectors CRP, I_S, MVH, and 
OME expand their exports moderately (by 0.92% to 2.40%), sector NFM (non-ferrous metals) 
benefits substantially from THAILAND+INDIA as its output and exports are increased by 
10.41% and 10.86%, respectively. India, on the other hand, gains predominantly from the 
respective 4.07% and 16.84% increases in output and exports of commodity OFD (food 
products).  
Region Real 
GDP 
Private 
demand 
Invest-
ment 
demand 
Public 
demand 
Regional 
import 
Regional 
export 
Terms 
of trade 
 
     FTA members 
THA 0.15% 0.43% 0.65% -1.27% 0.81% 0.52% 0.20% 
IND 0.03% 0.01% 0.11% -0.31% 0.59% 0.82% 0.42% 
 
     Non-members 
Others 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
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Table 3-43: Percentage changes for various sectoral indicators in member countries 
under THAILAND+INDIA 
  Thailand           India 
Sector 
Output Export Import Output Export Import 
 AGR  0.16% 0.32% 0.76% 0.03% -0.15% 1.04% 
 NRS  -0.08% 0.14% 2.79% 0.03% 0.90% 0.36% 
 OIL  -0.09% -0.15% 0.08% -0.05% -0.37% 0.06% 
 PAGR  0.17% 0.52% 1.28% 0.05% 0.16% 1.19% 
 OFD  -0.32% 1.13% 8.77% 4.07% 16.84% 1.59% 
 MNF  0.07% 0.20% 0.92% 0.03% 0.49% 0.59% 
 TEX  0.15% 0.89% 1.35% -0.11% -0.14% 3.14% 
 WAP  -0.12% -0.05% 21.15% 0.10% 0.15% 3.24% 
 CRP  1.17% 1.71% 0.60% -0.03% 1.14% 0.97% 
 I_S  0.63% 1.97% 0.72% 0.15% 2.67% 0.76% 
 NFM  10.41% 10.86% 0.75% -0.15% 1.72% 0.33% 
 MVH  0.89% 2.40% 0.44% 0.02% 1.69% 3.74% 
 ELE  0.01% 0.02% 0.24% -0.18% 0.67% 1.32% 
 OME  0.87% 0.92% 0.66% 0.01% 0.60% 0.72% 
 OMF  0.25% 0.38% 0.55% -0.32% -0.40% 0.32% 
 MSR  0.33% -0.01% 0.47% -0.01% -0.46% 0.13% 
 TRD  0.04% -0.42% 0.51% 0.04% -0.49% 0.19% 
 TRP  -0.17% -0.61% 0.29% 0.05% -0.35% 0.16% 
 CFI  0.04% -0.14% 0.21% -0.03% -0.46% 0.14% 
 OBS  -0.21% -0.36% 0.12% -0.20% -0.44% 0.12% 
 OSG  -1.14% -0.86% -0.68% -0.24% -0.38% -0.03% 
 DWE  -0.12% n/a** n/a** -0.03% n/a** n/a** 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: **Output from Sector DWE is non-traded. 
Chart 3-11 shows the output adjustments by individual firms in India. Except for the perfectly 
competitive agricultural sector (AGR), all Indian sectors are highly protected under the 
assumed Cournot oligopoly and its firm immobility constraint. As such, the firm-level results 
in this chart once again reflect the sectoral output changes in India previously reported in 
Table 3-43, such as the distinctive magnitude of gain sector OFD enjoys under 
THAILAND+INDIA. 
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Chart 3-11: Percentage changes in the number of firms and output per firm of 
imperfectly competitive sectors in India under THAILAND+INDIA  
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3.5.3 Broader Economic Integration 
To shed more light on the prospects of Thailand’s economic integration options, Subsection 
3.5.3 simulates the formation of an FTA between ASEAN and Australia, New Zealand, 
Japan, China, and India (ASEAN+5); Thailand’s unilateral trade liberalisation; and global 
trade liberalisation. As such, the real output expansion rates observed in these scenarios are 
contrasted with those from the previous scenarios. Specifically, Chart 3-12 to Chart 3-20 
illustrates how each region is affected by the scope of the various structures of economic 
liberalisation. 
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Chart 3-12: Real GDP expansion under various FTA scenarios: THAILAND 
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Chart 3-13: Real GDP expansion under various FTA scenarios: AUSTRALIA 
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Chart 3-14: Real GDP expansion under various FTA scenarios: NEW ZEALAND 
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Chart 3-15: Real GDP expansion under various FTA scenarios: INDIA 
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Chart 3-16: Real GDP expansion under various FTA scenarios: JAPAN 
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Chart 3-17: Real GDP expansion under various FTA scenarios: CHINA 
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Chart 3-18: Real GDP expansion under various FTA scenarios: NORTH ASEAN 
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Chart 3-19: Real GDP expansion under various FTA scenarios: SOUTH ASEAN 
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Chart 3-20: Real GDP expansion under various FTA scenarios: WORLD 
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It is apparent that, the expansion in real GDP is highest under global trade liberalisation. 
Regions generally attain more economic benefits from joining a larger free trade zone; 
whereas the regions left outside suffer to a greater extent not only as the trade zone expands, 
but also when their major trading counterparts join the grouping. Moreover, the magnitude of 
FTA benefits tends to vary with the ex-ante level of bilateral trade among members and also 
with the size of the initial trade barriers. Combined together, these welfare determinants result 
in Thailand gaining most from global free trade, with unilateral trade liberalisation coming 
next. Although Thailand clearly reaps more benefits from FTAs that involve ASEAN; among 
the four FTAs Thailand has bilaterally launched with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and 
India, the economic partnership with Japan yields the highest output expansion in the Thai 
economy, approximately 21 times higher than the lowest expansion, observed in the FTA 
between Thailand and New Zealand (TNZCEPA).  
In comparison to other regions, Australia and New Zealand gain the least from global free 
trade and ASEAN+5, which underlines the fact that the two countries already have relatively 
low trade barriers. In contrast, India gains only marginally from THAILAND+INDIA, while 
her 3.03% real GDP expansion is the highest among all regions under global trade 
liberalisation, and is substantial under ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+5. This highlights both the 
weak economic linkages between Thailand and India and the prohibitive barriers to trade in 
India, where most sectors are modelled as Cournot oligopolies. Furthermore, as shown in 
Chart 3-16 and Chart 3-17, the real output expansion in Japan is higher than in China as the 
two together switch from the ASEAN+3 to ASEAN+5 regime. Hence, Japan should establish 
stronger trade ties with Australia and New Zealand than China. In addition, China gains 
almost three times more under global trade liberalisation than ASEAN+5, which can be 
ascribed to the a number of China’s major trading partners remaining outside the ASEAN+5 
grouping. 
Chart 3-18 shows that, leaving aside the results that North ASEAN substantially gains from 
the ASEAN-plus FTAs and global trade liberalisation, the region is hardly affected by most of 
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the Thai bilateral FTAs, except for the 0.06% decline after JTEPA, and the 0.24% rise when 
Thailand unilaterally liberalises trade in goods and services. Therefore, it is safe to say that 
the North ASEAN economy depends considerably on trade with Japan and Thailand. As a 
matter of fact, trade with ASEAN accounts for roughly 20% of total Thai trade (see Table 3-
1), and most of that is due to Thailand’s trade with North ASEAN. In contrast, Chart 3-19 
shows that South ASEAN makes only moderate gains from ASEAN FTAs and global free 
trade, largely because South ASEAN is less dependent on trade than the North, as indicated 
by the ratio of trade to GDP (GTAP 6.0 database). As for the pattern of trade, it may be 
observed from Chart 3-19 that ASEAN+CHINA, ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+5 result in almost 
identical output expansion for South ASEAN, thus exemplifying the relative importance of 
South ASEAN’s trade with China. 
Finally, Chart 3-20 illustrates the effects on the world as a whole. Not surprisingly, the world 
economy expands by 0.96%, significantly more than the 0.12% expansion in real GDP under 
ASEAN+5, the second largest economic integration scenario. ASEAN+3 comes third, as the 
world real GDP grows by 0.10%, while the rest of scenarios centred around Thailand and 
ASEAN result in positive but less than 0.02% world output expansion rates.  
3.6 Sensitivity Tests 
A limited number of sensitivity tests are reported in this section to shed light on the degree to 
which the above FTA simulation results are responsive to specific parameters and model 
structures. Below, the EV results of ASEAN+5 under various specifications are measured in 
million US dollar and as a percentage of the ex-ante income. 
3.6.1 Elasticity of Substitution between Final Demands (ıD) 
The household, the government, and the bank are assumed to share the same elasticity of 
substitution between final consumption of goods and services (ıD). The sensitivity of the 
ASEAN+5 welfare results to this elasticity is reported in Table 3-44. 
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It is clear from Table 3-44 that the elasticity of substitution between consumption of final 
goods for the household, the government, and the bank can alter the results by a large margin. 
Overall, greater substitutability between consumption goods improves welfare in most 
regions. For instance, the world EV is almost doubled and those of India and the United 
States even turn positive if the elasticity is tripled. The higher the elasticity, the more 
individuals may adjust their consumption behaviours to certain changes in regional trade 
policy. Yet, this cross-sectoral elasticity is not likely to be as high as in the counterfactual 
cases given that the Armington trade elasticities that represent the substitutability between 
domestically-produced and overseas products is estimated to be merely around 2 on average 
(GTAP 6.0 database). 
Table 3-44: The sensitivity of EV results under ASEAN+5 to the elasticity of substitution 
between final demands of the household, the government, and the bank (benchmark 
value: ıDreg = 1.43) 
Benchmark values Double benchmark values Triple benchmark values 
Region EV   
(million US$) 
EV (% 
of 2001 
income) 
EV   
(million US$) 
EV (% 
of 2001 
income) 
EV   
(million US$) 
EV (% 
of 2001 
income) 
THA 1,809.03  1.86%  1,864.07  1.92%  1,974.82  2.03%  
IND 3,686.81  1.04%  4,561.90  1.29%  5,563.19  1.57%  
JPN 139.23  0.30%  144.05  0.31%  158.03  0.34%  
CHN -194.22  -0.04%  3,486.55  0.73%  2,316.95  0.49%  
NASN 25,486.44  0.62%  32,918.76  0.81%  42,477.69  1.04%  
SASN 4,182.72  0.34%  5,615.56  0.46%  6,950.54  0.57%  
AUS 2,325.61  1.82%  2,091.09  1.63%  1,772.31  1.38%  
NZL 1,598.73  0.50%  1,781.85  0.56%  2,039.64  0.64%  
KOR -1,831.36  -0.46%  -1,656.67  -0.42%  -1,552.22  -0.39%  
USA -1,263.11  -0.01%  -831.75  -0.01%  96.03  0.00%  
CAN 13.62  0.00%  50.95  0.01%  120.74  0.02%  
MEX -60.20  -0.01%  -79.68  -0.01%  -82.11  -0.01%  
UK -560.91  -0.04%  -566.17  -0.04%  -486.43  -0.03%  
XEUR -7,392.31  -0.10%  -8,280.77  -0.11%  -8,843.64  -0.12%  
ROW -1,352.45  -0.04%  -839.20  -0.03%  -20.38  -0.00%  
World 26,587.60  0.09%  40,260.56  0.13%  52,485.16  0.17%  
Source: Simulated by author.  
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3.6.2 Elasticity of Transformation between Products Supplied to Different 
Market Destinations (ıT and ıBE) 
Table 3-45 reports on the sensitivity of the EV results to the elasticities of transformation 
between products supplied to domestic and overseas markets (ıT), and further between those 
exported to different market destinations (ıBE). In this table, both transformation elasticities 
are doubled and tripled as ASEAN, Australia, New Zealand, India, China, and Japan come 
together to form the ASEAN+5 FTA. 
Table 3-45: The sensitivity of EV results under ASEAN+5 to the transformation 
elasticity between products supplied to different market destinations (benchmark 
values: ıT = -2; ıBE = -2) 
Benchmark values Double benchmark values Triple benchmark values 
Region EV   
(million US$) 
EV (%  
of 2001 
income) 
EV   
(million US$) 
EV (% 
of 2001 
income) 
EV   
(million US$) 
EV (% 
of 2001 
income) 
THA 1,809.03  1.86%  2,364.71  2.43%  2,648.86  2.72%  
IND 3,686.81  1.04%  3,827.07  1.08%  3,849.43  1.09%  
JPN 139.23  0.30%  170.01  0.36%  179.61  0.38%  
CHN -194.22  -0.04%  -268.10  -0.06%  -364.10  -0.08%  
NASN 25,486.44  0.62%  30,478.39  0.75%  33,153.13  0.81%  
SASN 4,182.72  0.34%  3,705.20  0.30%  3,364.26  0.27%  
AUS 2,325.61  1.82%  3,248.77  2.54%  3,671.97  2.87%  
NZL 1,598.73  0.50%  1,526.40  0.48% 1,480.47  0.47%  
KOR -1,831.36  -0.46%  -2,258.31  -0.57%  -2,436.31  -0.62%  
USA -1,263.11  -0.01%  -1,891.59  -0.02%  -2,166.14  -0.02%  
CAN 13.62  0.00%  10.68  0.00%  15.74  0.00%  
MEX -60.20  -0.01%  -49.52  -0.01%  -44.46  -0.01%  
UK -560.91  -0.04%  -817.39  -0.06%  -938.05  -0.06%  
XEUR -7,392.31  -0.10%  -10,047.91  -0.13%  -11,356.83  -0.15%  
ROW -1,352.45  -0.04%  -1,874.56  -0.06%  -2,051.60  -0.06%  
World 26,587.60  0.09%  28,123.84  0.09%  29,005.98  0.09%  
Source: Simulated by author.  
Overall, as the elasticities become higher, the regional welfare effects are more substantial, 
with both positive and negative EVs becoming higher in absolute terms. Therefore, regions 
that benefit from integration basically gain more with higher elasticities because they are 
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more able to switch exports towards the market destinations with relatively lower trade 
barriers. At the same time, regions that already experience welfare losses under ASEAN+5 
will be even worse off as trade is shifted away from their markets. Although the extent to 
which these transformation elasticities change the EV results is not as extreme as in the case 
of the elasticity of substitution between final demands reported in Subsection 3.6.1, it is clear 
that these elasticities have a marked impact on the outcomes of the FTA impacts on regional 
economies.  
3.6.3 Asymmetry of Firm Population in Each Sector across Regions 
In this model, the exogenously-estimated HHI determines whether a sector in each region is 
modelled as perfectly competitive, monopolistically competitive or a Cournot oligopoly. As 
such, the number of firms is defined as the inverse of the above index, allowing the degree of 
market imperfection to vary by sector and region. Hence, it would be of interest to examine 
the sensitivity of ASEAN+5 results to the symmetry of the firm population or the lack of it. In 
Table 3-46, the welfare variation given the asymmetric number of firms by sector and region 
is compared with the symmetric case in which all sectors are deliberately and evenly 
populated by 27 firms, this being the simple average of the number of firms in all imperfectly 
competitive sectors in the world economy. 
As Table 3-46 shows, the EV results are reasonably robust to changes in the initial firm 
population. However, regions endowed with many imperfectly competitive sectors, especially 
the Cournot oligopolistic ones, are comparatively more affected. Specifically, in India the 
regional welfare change becomes positive as the majority of Indian industries are modelled as 
Cournot oligopolies (see Table 3-3). Thus, the initial number of firms is one of the main 
determinants of the magnitude of adjustment in Cournot oligopolistic sectors. However, the 
overall effect of the symmetry in firm population is fairly negligible in this model. 
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Table 3-46: The sensitivity of EV results under ASEAN+5 to the symmetry of firm 
population in each sector across regions (benchmark: asymmetric number (#) of firms) 
Benchmark: asymmetric # of firms Symmetric # of firms = 27 
Region EV (million US$) EV (%  of 
2001 
income) 
EV (million US$) EV (% of 
2001 
income) 
THA 1,809.03  1.86%  1,807.18  1.86%  
IND 3,686.81  1.04%  3,762.76  1.06%  
JPN 139.23  0.30%  128.96  0.28%  
CHN -194.22  -0.04%  974.06  0.20%  
NASN 25,486.44  0.62%  25,516.46  0.63%  
SASN 4,182.72  0.34%  4,176.78  0.34%  
AUS 2,325.61  1.82%  2,072.39  1.62%  
NZL 1,598.73  0.50%  1,586.77  0.50%  
KOR -1,831.36  -0.46%  -1,819.51  -0.46%  
USA -1,263.11  -0.01%  -1,230.48  -0.01%  
CAN 13.62  0.00%  12.81  0.00%  
MEX -60.20  -0.01%  -53.47  -0.01%  
UK -560.91  -0.04%  -576.49  -0.04%  
XEUR -7,392.31  -0.10%  -7,605.06  -0.10%  
ROW -1,352.45  -0.04%  -1,446.38  -0.05%  
World 26,587.60  0.09%  27,306.78  0.09%  
Source: Simulated by author.  
3.6.4 Specification of Commodity Market Structure 
The sensitivity of the ASEAN+5 simulation results to commodity market structures is 
examined in this subsection. It aims to certify that the detailed market structure determination 
which allows the degree of market imperfection to differ across sectors and regions is vital 
when estimating the real impacts of Thai FTAs on regional and world economies. 
Accordingly, the benchmark EV results are compared with those when all sectors are under 1) 
perfect competition; 2) monopolistic competition; and 3) Cournot oligopoly. Note that as a 
perfectly competitive sector is changed to an imperfectly competitive one, the number of 
firms calibrated as the inverse of the HHI is relatively large. Also, in the monopolistic 
competitive case, the elasticity of substitution between product varieties within each sector is 
always specified as 4.  
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The EV results in Table 3-47 are highly responsive to the specification of commodity market 
structures. The world reaps the highest benefits under monopolistic competition, firstly 
because of the economies of scale, and secondly since firms are allowed to enter and exit the 
market freely under monopolistic competition, as opposed to the prohibitive firm mobility 
assumption under Cournot oligopoly.  
Table 3-47: The sensitivity of EV results under ASEAN+5 to the specification of 
commodity market structure (benchmark: asymmetric market structure) 
Benchmark: 
asymmetric market 
structure 
Perfect competition Monopolistic 
competition 
Cournot oligopoly 
Region 
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THA 1,809.03  1.86%  1,475.95  1.52%  2,153.01  2.21%  3,489.39  3.59%  
IND 3,686.81  1.04%  3,101.03  0.88%  3,346.11  0.95%  3,194.24  0.90%  
JPN 139.23  0.30%  213.05  0.45%  254.14  0.54%  214.68  0.46%  
CHN -194.22  -0.04%  -48.77  -0.01%  1,363.89  0.29%  383.33  0.08%  
NASN 25,486.44  0.62%  19,157.57  0.47%  24,874.52  0.61%  34,722.18  0.85%  
SASN 4,182.72  0.34%  3,791.64  0.31%  11,838.65  0.97%  2,218.66  0.18%  
AUS 2,325.61  1.82%  2,313.08  1.81%  4,287.37  3.35%  3,407.42  2.66%  
NZL 1,598.73  0.50%  1,049.41  0.33%  2,236.29  0.71%  1,214.21  0.38%  
KOR -1,831.36  -0.46%  -1,561.18  -0.39%  -1,958.14  -0.50%  -2,356.36  -0.60%  
USA -1,263.11  -0.01%  -1,073.39  -0.01%  -1,072.61  -0.01%  -1,958.94  -0.02%  
CAN 13.62  0.00%  20.41  0.00%  -1.02  -0.00%  25.09  0.00%  
MEX -60.20  -0.01%  -38.65  -0.01% -51.92  -0.01%  17.56  0.00%  
UK -560.91  -0.04%  -523.49  -0.04%  -679.33  -0.05%  -899.40  -0.06%  
XEUR -7,392.31  -0.10%  -4,623.15  -0.06%  -8,153.55  -0.11%  -7,468.78  -0.10%  
ROW -1,352.45  -0.04%  -1,794.85  -0.06%  -2,037.75  -0.06%  -2,799.47  -0.09%  
World 26,587.60  0.09%  21,458.66  0.07%  36,399.66  0.12%  33,403.81  0.11%  
Source: Simulated by author.  
Sectoral adjustment across regions results in complex aggregate welfare effects. To illustrate, 
although Thai production sectors are already perfectly competitive in the benchmark case, as 
other regions are uniformly specified as perfectly competitive, the Thai EV gain is reduced by 
18.41%. Similarly, although most of the Indian industries are modelled as Cournot oligopolies 
in the benchmark scenario, as the whole world also shifts into Cournot oligopoly, the Indian 
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EV is augmented from -194.22 million US dollars to 383.33 million US dollars. In addition, 
substantial changes in the aggregate welfare levels of regions endowed with various types of 
market structures are commonly observed. Hence, the sensitivity results emphasise the 
importance of modelling commodity market structures to differ across regions and sectors. 
3.6.5 Labour Market Closure Rules: Endogeneity of Real Wage and 
Unemployment 
Another feature of the current CGE model is the detailed specification of a labour market 
paradigm, i.e. the endogeneity of the real wage and the unemployment rate. Table 3-48 
contrasts the benchmark EV results with the cases when, for all labour markets, the real wage 
is fully flexible while unemployment is rigid (the flexible wage approach); where the real 
wage is rigid while unemployment is endogenous (the rigid wage approach); and where both 
the real wage and unemployment are flexible and associated with each other (the wage curve 
approach). 
It may be observed from Table 3-48 that the specification of the real wage and unemployment 
influences regional EV outcomes to a considerable extent. In general, under an endogenous 
real wage with rigid unemployment, the real effects are reduced due to the full wage 
flexibility preventing unemployed labour from providing more or less services to production 
sectors, and thus the regional EVs are the smallest among the three settings. In marked 
contrast, when the real wage is rigid while unemployment is endogenous, the real effects are 
accentuated, and thus the EV results are most strongly pronounced. Not surprisingly, under 
the wage curve approach, where both variables are endogenous, labour markets yield 
outcomes in between the welfare results for each region and for the world as a whole.  
In contrast to the results reported in Subsection 3.6.4, the modification of the labour market 
structure in other countries does not have significant spill-over effects on a region’s EV. For 
instance, although the association of real wage and unemployment in Thailand, India, Japan 
and China is initially specified as subject to the wage curve relationship; once labour markets 
 3-107
in all other regions are modelled similarly we find that the EVs of the four countries are 
altered by only a small margin. In other words, the effects are more or less region-specific: 
because labour is not mobile across border, other regions will only be indirectly affected 
through trade flow adjustments.  
Table 3-48: The sensitivity of EV results under ASEAN+5 to the specification of labour 
market closure rules (benchmark: asymmetric labour market structure) 
Benchmark: 
asymmetric labour 
market structure 
The flexible wage 
approach 
The rigid wage 
approach 
The wage curve 
approach 
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THA 1,809.03  1.86%  1,678.59  1.73%  2,170.00  2.23%  1,819.72  1.87%  
IND 3,686.81  1.04%  3,661.67  1.03%  11,231.46  3.17%  5,516.83  1.56%  
JPN 139.23  0.30%  137.30  0.29%  497.61  1.06%  240.62  0.51%  
CHN -194.22  -0.04%  -995.96  -0.21%  674.13  0.14%  -194.78  -0.04%  
NASN 25,486.44  0.62%  12,448.67  0.31%  77,729.95  1.90%  25,526.54  0.63%  
SASN 4,182.72  0.34%  491.95  0.04%  11,586.69  0.95%  4,234.80  0.35%  
AUS 2,325.61  1.82%  2,296.94  1.79%  5,599.32  4.37%  3,357.14  2.62%  
NZL 1,598.73  0.50%  1,283.69  0.40%  2,320.03  0.73%  1,628.44  0.51%  
KOR -1,831.36  -0.46%  -1,267.20  -0.32%  -3,011.99  -0.76%  -1,826.22  -0.46%  
USA -1,263.11  -0.01%  -1,340.24  -0.01%  -3,362.91  -0.03%  -1,941.69  -0.02%  
CAN 13.62  0.00%  1.98  0.00%  -8.31  -0.00%  -2.49  -0.00%  
MEX -60.20  -0.01%  -45.12  -0.01%  -91.13  -0.02%  -57.11  -0.01%  
UK -560.91  -0.04%  -191.17  -0.01%  -925.52  -0.06%  -361.14  -0.02%  
XEUR -7,392.31  -0.10%  -1,935.47  -0.03%  -7,110.83  -0.09%  -3,463.70  -0.05%  
ROW -1,352.45  -0.04%  -812.81  -0.03%  -1,753.65  -0.06%  -1,216.34  -0.04%  
World 26,587.60  0.09%  15,412.81  0.05%  95,544.86  0.31%  33,260.62  0.11%  
Source: Simulated by author.  
3.6.6 Government Closure Rules: Endogeneity of Government Transfers 
Finally, in reference to Equation (2-10), the sensitivity of the government closure rule is 
examined by fixing total government transfers (TRNFreg) while endogenising lump-sum 
transfers to the household (TROreg). Implicitly, in this alternative setting, the government 
always allocates the same amount of government budget to total transfers and savings, thus 
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the government consumption budget varies directly with total tax revenues. Since total 
transfers comprise unemployment benefits and other lump-sum transfers, once they are fixed, 
lump-sum transfers are then inversely determined by the level of unemployment in each 
region. Table 3-49 shows the aggregate EV results of this optional government closure rule in 
comparison with the benchmark setting. 
Table 3-49: The sensitivity of EV results under ASEAN+5 to the government closure 
rule (benchmark: flexible total government transfers) 
Benchmark: flexible total 
government transfers 
Fixed total government transfers 
Region EV (million US$) EV (%  of 
2001 
income) 
EV (million US$) EV (% of 
2001 
income) 
THA 1,809.03  1.86%  1,805.03  1.85%  
IND 3,686.81  1.04%  3,690.02  1.04%  
JPN 139.23  0.30%  138.93  0.30%  
CHN -194.22  -0.04%  -208.02  -0.04%  
NASN 25,486.44  0.62%  24,915.06  0.61%  
SASN 4,182.72  0.34%  3,864.67  0.32%  
AUS 2,325.61  1.82%  2,329.92  1.82%  
NZL 1,598.73  0.50%  1,575.13  0.50%  
KOR -1,831.36  -0.46%  -1,786.63  -0.45%  
USA -1,263.11  -0.01%  -1,248.84  -0.01%  
CAN 13.62  0.00%  16.13  0.00%  
MEX -60.20  -0.01%  -60.38  -0.01%  
UK -560.91  -0.04%  -576.99  -0.04%  
XEUR -7,392.31  -0.10%  -7,063.24  -0.09%  
ROW -1,352.45  -0.04%  -1,291.42  -0.04%  
World 26,587.60  0.09% 26,099.37  0.08%  
Source: Simulated by author.  
Table 3-49 shows that the results are robust to the change in the government closure rule. 
Generally speaking, the original closure rule is more sensible, as the government is more 
likely to keep the lump-sum transfers stable instead of raising them whenever the 
unemployment benefits drop in the face of a random positive economic shock, so as to keep 
total transfers flat. 
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3.7 Summary 
The static multi-region and multi-sector CGE model used in this chapter is carefully 
structured with respect to the specification of factor and sectoral market structures. The 
flexibility of real wage and unemployment varies by region and by labour type, and the 
degree of market imperfection in each sector is determined by the corresponding exogenously 
estimated HHI.  
By and large, TAFTA, TNZCEPA, JTEPA, ASEAN+CHINA and THAILAND+INDIA tend 
to have minor effects on the global economy, while moderately improving the welfare of 
member regions. FTAs universally improve their terms of trade, and trade creation commonly 
dominates trade diversion, with the exception that the EV of India under THAILAND+INDIA 
is slightly negative, probably because of the trade-diversion effect, as India’s bilateral imports 
from Thailand are not obtained at lowest cost.  
A broader economic integration definitely yields higher welfare gains to member countries, 
and the benefits are markedly enhanced if their major trading partners join the grouping. On 
the other hand, the magnitude of the negative impacts on countries excluded from a particular 
regional grouping depends upon their economic ties with member countries. More to the 
point, some non-members are even better off when their major trading counterparts are 
similarly left outside the trading bloc. For that reason, although by a small margin, Mexico 
resultantly benefits from TAFTA, ASEAN+CHINA and THAILAND+INDIA, and Canada 
enjoys the positive spill-over effect from ASEAN+CHINA. 
At the sectoral level, FTAs usually entail contraction in dwellings (DWE), the only non-traded 
sector, since production resources are transferred to the export sectors (the reallocation effect) 
and commodity demands are shifted towards importing goods as they become more cheaply 
available after the union (the consumer effect). Among the sectors modelled as imperfectly 
competitive, Cournot oligopolistic firms experience stronger impacts than the 
monopolistically competitive firms, which is consistent with the simulation results reported in 
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Chapter 2. Furthermore, among sectors under monopolistic competition, sectors with a 
comparative advantage have incumbent firms enlarging their production scales whilst more 
firms enter the sector. Conversely, sectors that are not strongly competitive adjust to the new 
trade regime by reducing the numbers of firms at the same time as raising firms’ outputs in 
order to make use of the increasing returns to scale. Lastly, relatively inefficient sectors 
reduce both output per firm and the number of firms. 
Taken as a whole, among all the concluded Thai FTAs under consideration, with respect to 
the standard EV measure, Thailand benefits the most from JTEPA, ASEAN+CHINA, 
THAILAND+INDIA, TAFTA and TNZCEPA, respectively. As Australia’s economy is much 
larger and more competitive than Thailand, the country enjoys greater trade creation under 
TAFTA, the simulation results showing that Australia’s bilateral exports to Thailand expand 
to a greater extent in absolute terms than her parallel imports from the latter country. 
Therefore, Australia’s EV is distinctly higher than Thailand’s. At the sectoral level, Thailand 
experiences the strongest expansion in the production of machinery and equipments (OME), 
while Australia has an expansion in food products (OFD).  
On the other hand, under TNZCEPA, New Zealand and Thailand enjoy almost the same 
minor levels of EVs and real output changes. In Thailand, production expansion is highest in 
chemical, rubber and plastic products (CRP), while New Zealand particularly benefits from 
exporting commodity OFD. Overall, the ex-post production pattern is analogous to TAFTA, 
reflecting to the proximity in economic structures of Australia and New Zealand.  
Under JTEPA, Thailand’s largest increase is in the production of processed agricultural 
products (PAGR), while Japan benefits from the expansion of most manufacturing sectors, 
especially motor vehicles and parts (MVH). Notwithstanding that the absolute values of 
Japanese imports increase by a larger degree than its exports, its EV is significantly larger 
than Thailand’s due to the strong consumer effect that boosts the utility of the representative 
household and also enables the bank to invest at cheaper costs.  
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Subsequently, under ASEAN+CHINA, despite somewhat similar shifts in the production and 
trade patterns of member regions, Thailand has the greatest comparative advantage in sector 
CRP, North ASEAN in sector PAGR, South ASEAN in sector OME, and China in electronic 
equipments (ELE). Among the four members, China and North ASEAN reap considerably 
high EVs, while South ASEAN and Thailand are reasonably better off with the FTA. Lastly, 
Thailand gains more than India under THAILAND+INDIA both in absolute and proportional 
terms, with a substantial expansion of exports of non-ferrous metals (NFM). India, on the 
other hand, focuses on the expansion of sector OFD. 
The sensitivity analysis results are consistent with those reported in Chapter 2, in that 
elasticity parameters considerably alter the policy implications. While different cross-sector 
substitution elasticities across final demands (ıD) consistently yield positive changes to all 
regions, changes in the transformation elasticities (ıT and ıBE) exaggerate regional welfare 
outcomes in that FTA members make further gains while non-members experience additional 
losses from the integration. The sensitivity tests also show that he simulation results are 
robust to the benchmark firm population, and also to the government closure rule on the 
endogeneity of household benefits. Notwithstanding, particular attention needs to be paid to 
the specification of commodity market structures (the degree of market competitiveness) and 
labour market paradigm (the flexibility of real wage and unemployment), given that the 
welfare results vary with these settings in a significant way. 
 
CHAPTER 4 
REVENUE-NEUTRAL FTA FORMATION IN THE PRESENCE 
OF AN INFORMAL SECTOR: THE CASE OF INDIA  
4.1 Introduction 
The macroeconomic results from Chapter 3 indicate that, among the FTA members, Indias 
EV has a propensity to be negative after the country forms an FTA with other countries.1 This 
outcome contrasts with the positive change in the real GDP of India in all cases. The 
counterfactual data suggest that the fall in welfare reflects a substantial decline in tax revenue 
as tariffs on imports from the other FTA members go to zero.2 This implies the economic 
dependency of low-income countries such as India3 on the customs tariff as the main source 
of government tax revenue, the vulnerability of domestic sectors to overseas competition. 
According to the WTOs Trade Policy Review of India (2002), customs duties accounted for 
31.9% of the Indian gross tax revenue for the fiscal year 1992/93, but then declined following 
her large-scale economic reforms in the early 1990s.4 The GTAP 6.0 database reports that the 
contribution of tariffs to total tax revenue is approximately 27.5%. Thus, although free trade 
is theoretically optimal for a small open economy with no world market power, it may not be 
a practically attainable goal for India. 
                                                     
1 See Table 3-32 in Chapter 3. 
2 In actuality, under the CGE approach, the net welfare loss of joining an FTA is normally not merely a consequence of lower 
tariff revenues but is more associated with the dominance of the trade diversion effect that adversely impacts the welfare 
outcomes for India. Since aiming at forming the necessarily welfare-improving CU with endogenous common external tariffs 
(examined earlier in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2) that completely eliminate trade diversion is probably unattainable given the current 
situation of international politics, it is assumed throughout this chapter that India would probably not liberalise trade in the way 
that ensures the absence of trade diversion, but should instead be tempted to refinance the government revenue by raising other 
types of domestic taxes to maintain total revenues. 
3 India is categorised as a low-income country, according to Chart 3-2 in Chapter 3. 
4 See Table III.13 in WTO (2002). 
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The sources of tariff revenues can be read from the global trade pattern in Chart 4-1.5 Taken 
as a whole, the immediate effect of ASEAN+3 (defined in Chapter 3 as an FTA between 
ASEAN, Japan, China, and India) may reduce Indias tariff revenue by more than a fifth, 
since ASEAN, Japan and China taken together are relatively important sources of imports for 
India. 
Chart 4-1: Trade flows between India, Rest of ASEAN+3, and Rest of World (2001) 
India
US$49.9bn  
US$14.1bn  
US$10.7bn 
US$45.4bn 
US$917.0bn 
 
 
Rest of World 
ASEAN 
Japan 
China 
US$692.8bn 
 
Source: Compiled from the GTAP 6.0 database. 
Chart 4-2 shows the composition of Indian imports by origin. According to the GTAP 6.0 
database, in 2001 India mainly imported from Europe (31.28%); and also had an important 
trade relationship with the ASEAN nations (13.80%). These statistics highlight the fact that 
the Indian government has given priority to the initiative of the ASEAN-India FTA, while at 
the same time pursuing trade negotiations with China and Japan. However, it is noteworthy 
                                                     
5 Trade flow values are compiled from the GTAP 6.0 databases bilateral exports net of trade taxes, subsidies, and international 
transport margins: VXMD(secT,reg,regg). 
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that India has recently become diplomatically closer to China, possibly reflecting the fact that 
her trade with China has been growing continually since 2000.6
Chart 4-2: Composition of Indian imports by origin (2001) 
ASEAN, 13.80%
Japan, 4.24%
China, 5.64%
USA, 9.73%
Europe, 31.28%
Korea, 2.58%
Australia&New 
Zealand, 2.58%
Rest of World, 
30.16%
 
Source: Compiled from the GTAP 6.0 database. 
Given the above pattern of Indian trade and the importance of tariffs in total tax revenue, 
there are potential fiscal issues should India join a single preferential trading group with 
ASEAN, Japan and China. In reality, there are two main fiscal constraints for India. First and 
foremost, raising tariffs on imports from non-members to compensate for the tariff revenue 
loss from regional integration may be implemented only with difficulty, since India has 
agreed to the WTO commitment not to increase tariffs above the designated bound rates.7 
Although there remains a de facto gap between the bound and applied rates, India has been 
firm in her stance of pursuing trade reform and pushing ahead with further tariff reductions in 
                                                     
6 See Table AI.4 and Table AI.5 in WTO (2007). 
7 It is not uncommon for WTO members to have actual tariff rates that are lower than the bound rates. For example, there may 
be a bound rate on imports of a particular good of 25%, while the de facto rate is 15%. This would mean that the de facto rate 
could be increased to 24.99% without violating the bound rate. 
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accordance with her Uruguay Round commitments, which were completed in 2005. 8  In 
addition, the government has been reducing the applied MFN tariffs on non-agricultural 
products to meet its goal of reaching ASEAN tariff levels on these products by 2009. As a 
result, Indian tariff revenue has continued to decrease gradually while remaining an important 
source of tax revenue (WTO, 2002 and 2007).  
According to WTO (2007), the second constraint for the government arises from the strong 
domestic needs for further public spending on infrastructure and social services as well as the 
pervasiveness of production and export incentives in the forms of both subsidies and tax 
holidays. Despite the ongoing pursuit of the 2003 Fiscal Responsibility and Budget 
Management (FRBM) Act, implemented for the purpose of reducing and eventually 
eliminating the revenue deficit through various kinds of domestic reforms by March 2009, the 
number of industries reserved to the public sector remains unchanged, and stated-owned 
enterprises still require a substantial amount of government resources. In addition, the 
decision in July 2006 to pause privatisation has hinted at future government support for these 
enterprises. Moreover, India continues to provide export assistance to producers in the form 
of export insurance and financing schemes through the Export-Import Bank of India, while 
the government has made little progress on cutting back price controls and subsidies to 
education, health care, and research and development. The government shows great 
reluctance to trim its existing public expenditures, in spite of the uncertainty about the 
effectiveness of these policies. This tendency is clearly demonstrated in Table I.1 of WTO 
(2007), which shows that the current expenditure of the central government as a percentage of 
GDP has been comparatively stable over the period of 2000 (13.2%) to 2007 (12.4%). 
For these reasons, one natural and practical resolution of the afore-mentioned government 
budget issue is the manipulation of other domestic tax rates to counteract the reduction in 
                                                     
8 As of May 2007, the simple averages of the bound and applied import tariffs on all goods are 50.2% and 14.5%, respectively. 
See <http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfiles/IN_e.htm>. 
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tariff revenues after preferential trade reforms. Accordingly, in this chapter, Indias domestic 
taxes on consumption, output, primary factor, and household income are consecutively 
manipulated in order to maintain real government revenue in the event of the formation of 
ASEAN+3.9 In particular, this chapter examines whether and, if so, to what extent, this sort of 
active government budget constraint can improve regional welfare and private, public, and 
investment welfare levels, compared to the base case scenario, henceforth referred to as the 
passive policy, that passes on the effects of government revenue losses to household 
transfers and public final demands.  
An alternative strategy would be for the government to seek to maintain regional welfare, or 
more specifically, the welfare of the poor household, rather than its real tax revenue. 
However, since the EV is a function of the changes in the disposable incomes of government, 
bank, and households; and since bank and households in member regions tend to gain as 
domestic prices decline and their economies grow in real terms, it is likely that the reduction 
in government revenue is the source of the negative EV in India. For that reason, the 
rebalancing of tax revenue through the manipulation of domestic taxes can be justified, since 
this will improve, instead of merely maintain, the EV level, if and only if the increase in 
domestic tax rates does not simultaneously hamper the real side of the economy to a degree 
that reduces the welfare of non-governmental economic agents. This chapter thus reports on 
the responsiveness of the welfare of each economic agent, and also the aggregate welfare by 
region, to the variation in the afore-mentioned domestic taxes. 
The literature on optimal taxation theory was initiated by Ramsey (1927), who argued that 
optimal tax rates should not distort the composition of domestic consumption, and thus should 
be inversely proportional to the price elasticity of demand, in other words they ought to be set 
at differentiated rates. The approach is advocated by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and 
                                                     
9 The real government revenue is defined in terms of the Laspeyres consumer price index, previously introduced in Equation (2-
11) of Chapter 2. 
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extended to the case of import tariffs by Panagariya (1994). However, the underlying 
assumption of this theory is that goods are not substitutes but complements, and thus 
consumers will not shy away from purchasing goods with higher tax rates. Questioning the 
policy implications based on this assumption, Bertrand and Vanek (1971); Hatta (1977); 
Mitra (1994) and Chambers (1994) demonstrated that, if substitutability among goods 
prevails, the uniform attenuation of price distortions and piecemeal reforms that diminish the 
distortion by lowering the highest tax rate to the level of the next highest are guaranteed to be 
welfare-improving as they induce efficient resource re-allocation. Additionally, tax 
uniformity enhances the administrative simplicity and transparency that lead to an increase in 
government revenue and a prevention of tax evasion (Subramanian, 1994). Nonetheless, since 
exhaustive information on demand and cross-price elasticities is unavailable, the practical 
superiority of the uniform tax reform over the differential one remains an open question, since 
it may be difficult to identify with certainty the good(s) with the highest tax rate(s). Moreover 
as Dahl et al. (1994) pointed out, under the CGE framework a uniform tax may not be 
welfare-increasing in the presence of the existing distortionary taxation. Notwithstanding, 
policy recommendations by the World Bank are consistently directed towards tax uniformity 
reflecting the fact that the approach is advocated by policy economists on the whole 
(Rajaram, 1994).  
Over the same period, a number of theorists endeavoured to determine the conditions that 
make a country better off as tariffs and other types of tax instruments are concurrently 
reformed. For instance, Diewert et al. (1989) specified a number of sufficient conditions for 
tariff reforms in a small open, multi-household economy to be welfare-improving. In this 
framework, commodity taxes are adopted as the instrument for income redistribution, instead 
of the traditional lump-sum transfers. Accordingly, Diewert et al. showed that proportional 
tariff reductions and reductions of extreme tariff rates will invariably improve productivity 
and Pareto efficiency at the same time. Abe (1995) provided a comprehensive treatment of 
multiple tax reforms by deriving the target rates for tariff and commodity tax reforms that 
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improve welfare for a small open economy with an endogenous public good. Michael et al. 
(1993) showed that there exists an integrated reform of import tariff and consumption tax that 
improves welfare while maintaining the government revenue constraint. Their results 
suggested that a greater uniformity of taxes will increase welfare subject to certain conditions; 
for example, raising the lowest consumption tax rate to the level of the second lowest, at the 
same time as lowering the highest tariff rate to the level of the second highest to keep constant 
the government revenue, will enhance welfare. 
Given the theoretical predictions by the afore-mentioned authors, many attempts have been 
made to obtain empirical welfare implications of the simultaneous trade and domestic tax 
reforms. Devarajan et al. (1999) used the CGE approach to highlight the importance of 
Armington and transformation elasticities as key determinants of welfare results, and then 
argued that the econometric estimates of these trade elasticities in 60 countries indicate the 
improbability of trade reform being self-financing. For that reason, the government may have 
an incentive to compensate for such tariff revenue losses by means of domestic tax reforms. 
However, Anderson (1999), using the CGE technique to compute the Marginal Cost of Funds 
(MCF) for the Korean economy in 1963, showed that the type of revenue-neutral tax reform 
that simultaneously manipulates trade and consumption taxes is not necessarily welfare-
enhancing. Later, Erbil (2001) extended the evaluation of revenue-neutral trade reform by 
generating the MCF values for import tariffs and indirect taxes in 15 countries. The results are 
mainly consistent with Anderson (1999) in the sense that, for 11 out of 15 countries, tariffs 
are less costly than indirect taxes, and thus trade reform is comparatively costly in most 
countries, although a minority of countries examined demonstrated the opposite outcome. 
Subsequently, Harrison et al. (2003) derived a generic result that the requirement for tax 
replacement consequently reduces the likelihood that a particular preferential trading 
arrangement will yield positive outcomes, as it typically imposes cross-sector distortions on 
the economy. More specifically, Feraboli (2007) used a dynamic CGE model to show that the 
arbitrary reforms of income or Value Added Tax (VAT) to counter-balance the Jordanian 
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government revenue loss in the face of its Association Agreement (AA) with the European 
Union (EU) would offset to some extent the positive outcomes, particularly in terms of 
private and investment demands. 
Thus far, the previous theoretical analyses tell us that the welfare effects of revenue-neutral 
regional arrangements can be positive under certain circumstances, while the empirical 
studies commonly suggest that the results are more likely to be negative. Given the above 
results, Emran et al. (2005) introduced an informal sector into the standard model. As this 
sector is generally large in low- and middle-income countries, once it is incorporated, 
revenue-neutral trade reforms tend to reduce welfare, since the higher VAT biases production 
and distribution activities away from the taxable formal sector(s). Therefore, it would be of 
interest to evaluate the variability of FTA welfare results with counteracting domestic tax 
policies for a developing country in the presence of an informal sector, since the approach is 
relatively new, and we can foresee a non-negligible economic interaction between the formal 
and informal sectors during the adjustment process to the new general equilibrium. 
Accordingly, Chapter 4 is organised as follows. Firstly, Section 4.2 uses theoretical general 
equilibrium analysis to predict the likely outcomes as domestic taxes are imposed to offset the 
government revenue loss in the face of a trading bloc formation. Section 4.3 explains the 
general model structure along with a number of modifications that distinguish the current 
CGE model from the one previously utilised in Chapter 3. Section 4.4 simulates the welfare 
effects of active domestic tax policies as India joins ASEAN+3. Section 4.5 explains how the 
informal economy is defined, measured, and incorporated into the current CGE framework. 
The variability in the welfare results is then examined in aggregate terms and also in terms of 
the consumption distribution of households. Finally, Section 4.6 summarises the findings of 
this chapter. 
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4.2 Theoretical General Equilibrium Analysis of Domestic Tax 
Policy Reforms 
This section uses a simple two good general equilibrium model to provide some insight into 
the impacts of domestic tax reforms on consumer welfare. Relatively speaking, India may be 
regarded as a small country, since according to the GTAP 6.0 database, her GDP accounts for 
merely 1.53% of world GDP, whereas Japan and the United States respectively contribute 
13.36% and 32.23%.10 However, under the CGE framework, domestic policy variation in 
India may affect the world market for at least some sectors. For that reason, in Subsections 
4.2.1-4.2.3 we firstly develop an analytical framework for the introduction of domestic taxes 
in a small country, where border prices are not affected by a change in domestic tax policy. 
Subsequently, we shall discuss policy consequences in Subsection 4.2.4 where the country is 
regarded as a large economy and cross-country price effects are taken into consideration. In 
particular, the policy impacts on a small open economy are confirmed by simulating the 
domestic taxes at issue using the GAMS software in a single-region model with two identical 
goods that use labour and capital as primary factors, under the assumptions that the 
government imposes no tax distortion at the initial state, that factors are fully employed, and 
that world prices are fixed as a tax policy implemented by a small country would not have any 
effect on the international market. The theoretical predictions are discussed below. 
4.2.1 An Income Tax  
For a small open economy, the introduction of a tax on the income of the representative 
household does not have any effect on border prices, and hence does not affect domestic 
producer prices. Thus it does not matter for this analysis which of X and Y is exported and 
                                                     
10 In the GTAP 6.0 database, the nominal GDP of India is calculated as the sum of national expenditures,   . 
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which is imported. In Figure 4-1, the pre-tax equilibrium has the household consuming 
quantities X0 and Y0 of the two goods subject to the budget constraint BB0, giving it utility U0.  
Good Y
E 
 
Figure 4-1: The household welfare change as an income tax is introduced 
Since introducing an income tax on the household would not change the relative consumer 
prices of the two goods, and there are by assumption homothetic preferences, the new 
equilibrium must lie on the ray from the origin that passes through the initial equilibrium 
point. The new consumption mix is given by X1 and Y1, with utility falling to U1 under the 
new budget constraint B1. The extent to which consumer utility drops depends on the amount 
of tax revenue returned to the household by the government. If there are no transaction costs 
and the government does not spend on public good consumption but instead transfers the 
entire amount of income tax revenue back to the household in the form of government 
benefits, the level of household utility will be shifted back to the initial level (that is to say, U1 
= U0). 
4.2.2 A Consumption Tax  
As with the income tax, if India is, by assumption, a small open economy then the imposition 
of a consumption tax on a good should not have any influence on the border and hence 
B1 B0 
Y1 
Y0 
U0 
U1 
Good X
0 
X0 X1 
 
4-10 
domestic producer price of that good. Thus, once again the PPF need not be considered in this 
analysis.  
As in Figure 4-1, introducing taxes on goods X and Y at the same ad valorem rate would not 
change the relative consumer prices of the two goods. Therefore, we obtain the same result as 
under the income tax, with the new equilibrium located on the ray from the origin that passes 
through the initial equilibrium point. If there are no transaction costs and the government 
returns the entire amount of the consumption tax revenue to the household then household 
consumption is unchanged. Note that in this case, household money income must increase, 
since the household still owns all the factors of production, with all factors being fully 
employed, and with factor prices determined by the exogenous world prices, and the 
household is also the recipient of the tax revenue. However, household real income must be 
unchanged, since its money income and both consumer prices have increased by the same 
proportion.11  
Suppose now that the government imposes a consumption tax only on good X. In Figure 4-2, 
since the consumer price of good Y is unchanged (as there is no consumption tax on good Y), 
the new household budget line B2 must pass through the same point on the Y axis as before. 
However, if all the money income were spent on good X then the demanded quantity would 
be smaller. The new household budget line B2 is tangential to indifference curve U2. As the ad 
valorem rate at which consumption tax is imposed on good X is higher than the rate 
commonly applied to the two goods, the biased imposition of consumption tax thus brings 
about more distortion to the economy, and it is likely that U2 will turn out to be lower than U1. 
 
                                                     
11 See Appendix A4-1 for the algebraic explanation of the adjustment of household income in money and real terms, given that 
both the household and the government have the Cobb-Douglas preferences. 
 
4-11 
Good Y
 
Figure 4-2: Changes in the household consumption mix when a consumption tax on 
good X is introduced 
The tax on X reduces the households purchasing power, i.e. its real income, and the change 
in relative prices leads to the household substituting good Y for good X at the margin in its 
consumption expenditure. In absolute terms, however, the direction and scale of change in 
good Y consumption depend on the elasticity of substitution. 
 
Figure 4-3: Changes in the household consumption mix when a consumption tax on 
good X is introduced to the household with high elasticity of substitution 
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When a consumption tax is imposed on good X, the effect on consumption of good Y may be 
decomposed into the income effect and the substitution effect. It is possible that the 
substitution effect will dominate the income effect, so that consumption of Y increases, as in 
Figure 4-3 above (where Y2 > Y0). 
The demand equations for a CES utility function are 
1
1 1(1 )
X
X X Y
PC
X
P P P
V V
V V V
D
D D

 
§ · ¨ ¸¨ ¸ © ¹V
 
1
1 1
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Y X Y
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Y
P P P
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D
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 
§ · ¨ ¸¨ ¸ © ¹V
. 
So we want to find the derivative of Y with respect to PX. Rewrite the Y equation as 
  11 1(1 ) (1 )Y X YY C P P PV V V V V VD D D        . 
Hence, we derive 
    ^ `21 1(1 ) (1 ) 1Y X Y X
X
Y
C P P P P
P
V V V V V V V VD D D V D   w       w . 
This is positive if V  > 1. That is, if the elasticity of substitution, V , is sufficiently high (i.e. a 
relatively flat indifference curve) then an increase in the price of X leads to an increase in 
the consumption of Y (Figure 4-3).12 In other words, as the effect of the tax is decomposed 
into the income effect and the substitution effect, the more readily the household substitutes 
one good for the other, the more likely it is that the substitution effect (the switching at the 
margin from consuming X to consuming Y) will dominate the income effect. Therefore, if the 
utility function is Leontief (V  = 0), then the substitution effect would not exist, and thus the 
consumption of Y would fall as a result. The equation above also shows that when the utility 
                                                     
12 As the household and government utility functions in this model are uniformly expressed in the CES form with the elasticity of 
substitution higher than one, an increase in the consumption of untaxed goods is particularly relevant. 
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function is Cobb-Douglas (V  = 1), we must have no change in the quantity of good Y that is 
purchased, since with the Cobb-Douglas preferences the expenditure on each good is a 
constant share of household money income. Since primary factors are fully employed, money 
income would remain at the initial level while real income drops as the imposition of a 
consumption tax increases the consumer price of X, and therefore households demand for Y 
would not change given the assumed the Cobb-Douglas utility function.  
Although the direction of change in the aggregate consumption of the two goods should not 
be altered by the handling of the tax revenue, in comparison with the government making a 
lump-sum transfer to the household, the government spending on public consumption should 
result in higher domestic demands in aggregate terms because the government faces no tax 
prejudice against X, whereas the household does. Specifically, if the government is to spend 
the sales tax revenue on the consumption of X and Y, then under the Cobb-Douglas 
preferences, the collective private and public consumption of X will descend, whilst Y will be 
more demanded domestically. To demonstrate this algebraically, suppose that the government 
applies an ad valorem sales tax of Xt  on good X . Now the household maximises its utility 
subject to the budget constraint 
 1 .t X X t YX p t Y p      Z  
The Lagrangean function is 
  1 1t t t X X t YX Y X p t Y p ZD D O*            
where O  is the Lagrange multiplier.  
The first-order conditions are 
 1 1 1 0t t X X
t
X Y p t
X
D DD O w*         w  
 1 0t t Y
t
X Y p
Y
D DD Ow*        w  
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1 0t X X t YX p t Y p Z .O
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From which we obtain 
 
 1
, .
1
t t
X X Y
ZZ
X Y
p t p
DD       
The government income from the tax on good X  is  
  .1 Xt X X X
t Z
R X p t
t
D        
The government does not pay the tax on good X . So its utility maximising problem is  
YGXGGGG pYpXRYXU     subject to ,Max 1 DD  
and the solution to that is, as before, 
 1
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Substituting for R  gives 
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The total consumption of X  is now 
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so that total consumption of X  falls (since 1D  ). 
The total consumption of Y  is now 
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and consumption of Y  increases (since  
 
 
1 1
1 1
1 1
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X X
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DD     !  ). 
However, the unambiguous increase in total consumption of Y  may not necessarily hold if 
the utility function is CES rather than Cobb-Douglas. 
It is noteworthy that if the consumption preferences of the government and the household are 
identical then the aggregate consumption of each good is the same whether the government 
transfers the tax revenue back to the household or spends some or all of it on own 
consumption. If, however, the government and the household have different preferences then 
the introduction of a consumption tax would alter the consumption pattern in aggregate terms 
(Figure 4-4). 
 
Figure 4-4: The government taxes good X and has different preferences from the 
household 
ș0 
0
HU
1
GY
1
GX GO
0
HY  
0
HX
1
HXHO
 
1
GU  
1E
1
HU
ș1 
1
HY  
 
4-16 
At the initial state, the government is yet to receive tax revenue, thus the household is the only 
consumer in this economy. Hence, at the utility level U , the household purchases 0H
0
HX  and 
 at the relative price of 0
HY
0 0
0 X Y ( i.e. P P )
(U  and U
1
1
H
similar welfare impacts when both are introduced at appropriate rates to generate the same 
                                                     
ș . As good X is taxed, its consumer price is 
increased. For simplicity we assume that the government pays the same price as the 
household, but of course the money is reclaimed by the government as revenue, which is then 
spent on purchasing the two goods. If both share the same preferences, then the new 
consumption mix will be situated on the diagonal line OHOG, and the household consumption 
mix of the two goods would not be altered by the level of sales tax. If the government has 
different preferences to those of the household, the new equilibrium will not be on the 
diagonal. For Instance, if the governments preference is for a higher ratio of the X to Y than 
the household, as shown in Figure 4-4, the equilibrium will lie above the diagonal, for 
example at point E1. The household and government indifference curves  are 
tangential since they pay the same prices for X and Y, and the new relative price of X, i.e. ș , 
is higher than before. The household is therefore worse off because its welfare has fallen from 
 to U . 
1 1
H G )
0
HU
4.2.3 Production and Factor Taxes  
The imposition of production and factor taxes are analysed jointly here, since both raise the 
average costs of production. Because a production tax decreases the prices of both primary 
factors and intermediate inputs13 as the demands for their services decline while a factor tax 
solely decreases primary factor prices, a tax on both factor and intermediate inputs at the 
equivalent ad valorem rate should have the same effect as a production tax, provided that the 
supply elasticities of primary factors are identical. Therefore, the two taxes would yield 
13 However, note that the prices of intermediate inputs will not be affected by the introduction of a production tax if the inputs are 
imported by a small open economy. 
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level of government revenue, that is to say, the production tax would be imposed at a lower 
rate, owing to a broader tax base.  
Since a factor or production tax on X and Y at the same ad valorem rate would not alter the 
e consumption tax, the new 
4.2.4 The Large Country Case 
The analysis of a large country implementing a domestic tax reform to meet the government 
relative producer prices of the two goods and the relative prices of capital and labour, and 
since border prices are not affected by the introduction of production or factor taxes in a small 
open economy; with linearly homogenous technologies and perfectly competitive factor 
markets (i.e. factors are fully employed due to flexible wages), the PPF would not be shifted, 
and the economy must remain at the original production point. However, producers net 
revenues must be reduced, and so factor prices must fall. Factors will continue to be fully 
employed at these lower levels of payments, but if the government retains the tax revenue, 
then the household income must be lower, and so its consumption of both goods must fall. 
However, if the government returns the tax revenue to the household, then its money income 
will be restored, and so will the initial consumption quantities.  
If the government imposes a production tax only on X, as with th
equilibrium should lead to more distortion, and thus lower consumer utility further than the 
case in which common tax rates are levied on both goods (Figure 4-2). If a factor tax is 
imposed only on capital, then capital-intensive sectors would suffer from price discrimination, 
causing further distortionary production resource reallocation than the uniform factor tax 
policy, especially when the substitution elasticities of primary factors are relatively low. 
revenue constraint is largely complicated by the uncertainty arising from the terms of trade 
effects as border prices are endogenous and thus responsive to a government policy change. 
In other words, we expect price interaction between the large country and the rest of the 
world. Hence, we shall not produce the same type of diagram for the large open economy; 
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however, the results should be reminiscent of the small country case, in that the application of 
a domestic tax with no sectoral bias would yield better welfare outcomes.  
To be precise, consumption taxes commonly imposed at the same ad valorem rate on both 
goods should have similar welfare effects to an income tax on the representative household. 
Assuming that India is a large open economy, the proportional decrease in domestic demand 
leads to lower world prices of both goods X and Y, thus, although the tax hike does not 
strongly affect the terms of trade, it exacerbates the welfare of foreign exporters while 
improving that of overseas consumers. As the rest of the world is also large, and is a net 
importer of good X from and a net exporter of good Y to India, the corresponding adjustments 
in production and consumption by the rest of the world imply a higher world price for good X 
and a lower one for good Y. As a result, the terms of trade of India could be improved in the 
new equilibrium. Coupled with the higher factor prices and government transfers to the 
household, the welfare outcomes of the income and universal consumption tax reforms can be 
slightly positive for the large open economy.  
Similarly, production and factor taxes imposed at the single common rate on both production 
sectors could be collectively explained. The proportional decrease in domestic supply 
heightens the world prices of both goods and the rest of the world may responsively increase 
its output and thus export of good Y to India, and reduce its import of good X from India. 
Consequently, the terms of trade of India could change adversely in the new equilibrium. 
Although the household still receives government transfers as in the case of income or 
consumption tax reform, the lower factor prices (due to lower factor demands) and the worsen 
terms of trade tend to yield more negative outcomes in comparison with the previous case of 
taxation on the demand side. 
Given the above economic mechanism, if a tax is imposed on only one good, then it is likely 
that the terms of trade will become more distorted, and the tax reform will cause 
disproportional adjustments across sectors. Thus, as in the analysis in Subsections 4.2.1-4.2.3, 
the introduction to the economy of taxes without sectoral bias tends to yield more desirable 
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impacts on the representative household.  However, due to the complexity in price interaction 
across regions, coupled with the uncertainty in the direction of change in trade volume in 
response to a shift in the offer curve of another country, which in turn depends on the 
curvature of the countrys own offer curve, it is worth emphasising that the introduction of 
domestic taxation has exceptionally ambiguous implications on the large economy.  
4.3 The Model and Benchmark Data Calibration 
Section 4.3 explains new features incorporated in the computable general equilibrium model 
previously constructed in Chapter 3. The modified model which is described in full details in 
Appendix A4-2 will then be used for the fiscal analysis in Section 4.4, in which only formal 
economic activities are taken into account. To elaborate, the representative regional 
household is divided into rich and poor households, such that the income distribution effects 
of the revenue-neutralising FTA can be derived; and data calibration for production sectors is 
revised in such a way that benchmark production taxes can be directly calibrated from the 
GTAP 6.0 database, instead of being calculated as the residuals of total production costs as 
before. Since this chapter is centred on the manipulation of domestic taxes, the importance of 
calibrating benchmark tax rates directly from the GTAP 6.0 database must be emphasised. 
Finally, the detailed derivation of tax data from the GTAP 6.0 database will be clarified. 
4.3.1 Household Disaggregation 
In this CGE model, the set of households comprises rich and poor households: 
hh = {RH, PH}.14
                                                     
14 As summarised by Savard (2003), a large number of CGE literature on the income distribution and poverty analysis grow 
advanced in terms of the household disaggregation technique. While many modellers have disaggregated the representative 
household by wealth and location, this chapter simply distinguishes the two households with respect to their functions in 
production activities, since it focuses on public decision-making issues rather than the detailed household adjustments to multiple 
policy shocks. 
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The model assumes that the two households are identical in their CES preferences and 
consumption patterns at the benchmark year. The two households receive incomes from 
different sources. First of all, the rich household earns income from the provision of skilled 
labour, capital, land, and natural resource services to production sectors. In addition, firms 
profits and unemployment benefits for skilled labour also accrue to this household. When the 
skilled and unskilled labour are respectively denoted by UnSkLab and SkLab, total 
income of the rich household in region reg reads:15
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sec sec
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 (4-1) 
On the other hand, the poor households income is earned from the provision of unskilled 
labour services to producers, unemployment benefits for unskilled labour, and also lump-sum 
income transfers by the government: 
" ", " ",
" " sec
sec
" ", " ", " ",
.
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reg reg
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 (4-2) 
As described in Chapter 2, unemployment benefits in Equations (4-1) and (4-2) are derived as 
unemployed labour wages multiplied by the fixed replacement rates (
f ,lab reg
                                                     
tr ). In addition, 
lump-sum income transfers which are fixed in real terms are allocated only to the poor 
household. 
ep
Subsequently, some part of the incomes of the two households is paid to the government as 
direct tax, with the rest being either saved or allocated to consumption budgets: 
15 In Equation (4-1), $(not SameAs(fac,"UnSkLab") tells GAMS not to include unskilled labour in the calculation, and $  
means only sectors under imperfect competition will transfer profits to the rich household. 
sec
regic
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,reg reg reg reg reghh hh hh hh hhINC TRY SHH PCBUD CBUD     (4-3) 
where household saving is a fixed proportion of total income net of income tax: 
( )reg reg reg reghh hh hh hhSHH mps INC TRY   ,   (4-4) 
and private final demands are derived from the CES utility function: 
 ,sec ,sec sec sec .1
regD
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 (4-5) 
Finally, total expenditure on the final consumption good by the households is equal to their 
respective total consumption budgets: 
 sec sec ,sec
sec
1reg reg reg reg reghh hh hhPCBUD CBUD tc PA C    ¦ .
reg
 (4-6) 
Given the above structure of household expenditure, households income outflows are 
calibrated as follows. First, the benchmark data for income taxes paid by the rich and by the 
poor can be extracted directly from the GTAP 6.0 database.16 Denote by hhgini  the share of 
income of each household in total household income within region reg, evaluated in the 
benchmark year (denoted by 0), exclusive of income tax: 
 
reg reg
reg hh hh
hh reg reg
hh hh
hh
INC0 TRY0
gini
INC0 TRY0
 ¦ . (4-7) 
The sum of these parameters in each region should equal unity. Accordingly, the benchmark 
consumption-related data for individual households are calibrated as fixed shares of the 
corresponding data of the representative household in the GTAP 6.0 database. To be precise, 
for instance, the benchmark final demand by household is calculated as:  
                                                     
16 The direct derivation of income tax by household from the GTAP 6.0 database is possible, because the study takes skilled 
labour, capital, land, and natural resource as indicating the high-income (rich) household, and unskilled labour as indicating the 
low-income (poor) household. 
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sec sec,sec ,reg reghh hh reg regC0 gini vdpm vipm    
where the two vectors on the right hand side are defined in the GTAP 6.0 database as: 
:secregvdpm        Private households domestic purchases at market prices; and 
:secregvipm         Private households imports at market prices. 
Thus, the benchmark household consumption budget is calculated as: 
 ,sec ,sec sec
sec
(reg reg reg reghh hh hhCBUD0 C0 gini TRC0  ¦ ) .
reg
 (4-8) 
Then finally, the household saving data ( ) are derived as total household incomes net 
of income taxes and consumption budgets. Given the definition of the 
reg
hhSHH
hhgini  multiplier, the 
proportions of incomes of rich and poor households are reported in Table 4-1: 
Table 4-1: The proportion of rich and poor household incomes in total household 
incomes 
Region Rich household Poor household 
Thailand 0.72 0.28 
Australia 0.60 0.40 
New Zealand 0.59 0.41 
India 0.65 0.35 
Japan 0.56 0.44 
China 0.55 0.45 
North ASEAN 0.63 0.37 
South ASEAN 0.48 0.53 
Korea 0.60 0.40 
USA 0.59 0.42 
Canada 0.54 0.46 
Mexico 0.72 0.28 
UK 0.59 0.41 
Rest of Europe 0.60 0.40 
Rest of World 0.59 0.41 
World 0.59 0.41 
Source: Compiled by author from the GTAP 6.0 database. 
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From Table 4-1, the proportion of national income accruing to the rich household is observed 
to be higher than that of the poor in most regions; income disparity being especially obvious 
in developing countries such as Thailand, India, and Mexico. 
4.3.2 Production Sectors 
Production sectors are re-calibrated for the fiscal policy analysis in this chapter. The zero-
profit condition for production activities requires that the value of total output equates the 
sum of factor costs, intermediate input costs, factor usage taxes, production taxes, and sectoral 
profits: 
  ,, ,sec sec sec sec sec ,sec sec,
secsec
sec sec sec sec sec
$ ( )
1
$ ( )
$ .
fac reg
reg reg fac reg fac reg reg reg
c cfac reg
fac c
reg reg reg reg reg
PFM facM fac
PZ QZ tf F IO PA
PFS facS fac
tz PZ QZ PROFIT ic
§ ·§ · § ·      ¨ ¸¨ ¸ ¨ ¸¨ ¸¨ ¸ © ¹© ¹© ¹
   
¦ ¦
 (4-9) 
In this chapter, the calibration of the right hand side of the equation is altered so that instead 
of allocating zero values to sectoral profits and calibrating production taxes as residuals of 
total production costs, production tax revenues from each sector are derived directly from the 
GTAP 6.0 database, and accordingly profit variables are calibrated to the difference between 
total output values and total costs. 
4.3.3 Calibration of Tax Revenues 
This subsection explains how the various types of tax revenues are obtained from the GTAP 
6.0 database. Region reg collects tariff revenues from bilateral imports from region regg, the 
revenues being the difference between the values of bilateral imports at world and domestic 
market prices: 
, sec sec
sec , , .
reg regg T T
T regg reg regTRBM 0 vims viws  g reg   
Consequently, total tariff revenues in region reg are calibrated as: 
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,sec
sec
( )
.reg reg reggT
T regg
reg
TRM 0 TRBM 0
z
 ¦ ¦   
Income taxes are calibrated by household, with the rich household deriving income from the 
provision of skilled labour, capital, land, and natural resource to production sectors, while the 
poor is endowed only with unskilled labour. If vfmfac,sec,reg stands for the purchases of factor 
fac by sector sec in region reg at market prices, and evoafac,reg represents the endowment of 
factor fac in region reg at agents prices, income tax revenues are calibrated as:17
  > @,sec, ," "
sec
$ not ( ," ")reg fac reg fac regRH
fac
TRY0 vfm evoa SameAs fac UnSkLab
§ · ¨ ¸© ¹¦¦  
 " ",sec, " "," "
sec
.reg UnSkLab reg UnSkLab regPHTRY0 vfm evoa ¦  
Factor usage tax revenues are the difference between the purchase values of factor fac by 
sector sec in region reg at agents and market prices: 
, ,sec ,sec
sec ;
fac reg fac fac
reg regTRF0 evfa vfm   
Since consumption tax revenues are collected only from consumers, their benchmark values 
are calculated as the difference between private households consumption valued at agents 
and market prices: 
   sec sec sec secsec ,reg reg reg reg regTRC0 vdpa vipa vdpm vipm     
where the first two terms on the right hand side denote private households purchases of 
domestic and imported goods at agents prices, respectively and the second pair are the 
corresponding purchases at market prices. Finally, production tax revenues are calibrated to 
                                                     
17 It is noteworthy that strictly these are not strictly direct taxes on household incomes but are nevertheless adopted as a proxy for 
the revenue-rebalancing income tax policy simulations. Therefore, there are potential limitations on the implications of the 
counterfactual results. 
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the difference between total outputs of sector sec in region reg valued at market and producer 
prices: 
sec sec
sec .
reg
reg regTRZ0 vom voa   
The values of total outputs evaluated at the two prices are derived as: 
sec sec sec sec, sec, sec
( )
$ (sec);  andpro regreg reg reg reg regg reg
pro regg
reg
vom vdpm vdgm vdfm vxmd vst trsp
z
    ¦ ¦  
 ,
sec
sec,secsec,secsec,sec ¦¦  
c
c
reg
c
reg
fac
fac
regreg vifavdfaevfavoa  
where: 
sec
regvdgm  = Domestic purchases of commodity sec by the government at market prices in 
region reg;  
sec, pro
regvdfm  = Domestic purchases of intermediate input sec by production sector pro (i.e., 
sector sec inclusive of the investment sector CGDS) at market prices in 
region reg; 
sec,reg
reggvxmd  = Bilateral exports of commodity sec from region reg to region regg at market 
prices; 
sec
regvst  = Exports of international transport service sec by region reg; 
sec ,secc
regvdfa  = Domestic purchases of intermediate input secc by production sector sec in 
region reg; 
sec ,secc
regvifa  = Imports of intermediate input secc by production sector sec in region reg. 
4.4 Active Domestic Tax Policies: Simulation Designs and Welfare 
Results 
This section discusses the simulation of a domestic tax policy introduced in order to 
counteract the decline in Indias tax revenue following the formation of ASEAN+3 (between 
ASEAN, Japan, China, and India). Imports from ASEAN, Japan and China together account 
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for approximately 23.7% of Indias total imports (Section 4.1), and India has initiated 
preferential trade negotiations with this group of nations. ASEAN+3 is chosen for the analysis 
of Indian tax policy since the magnitude of the welfare change is much stronger, and so is the 
incentive for the Indian government to pursue a domestic tax reform in compensation for the 
tax revenue loss, than are the results from the THAILAND+INDIA grouping that has already 
entered into force.  
Specifically, taxes on income, factor usage, consumption and production are increased in 
sequence, and the ensuing changes in 1) government tax revenue, 2) the utility levels of the 
government, the bank, and the rich and the poor households,18 and 3) regional disposable 
income evaluated at the ex-ante price, 19  are plotted with respect to the counterfactual 
domestic tax rate. Subsequently, the tax rates at which total government revenue is 
maintained, as well as other aspects of welfare changes, are compared across tax reform 
scenarios. 
4.4.1 Simulations of Active Income Tax Policies 
In the first simulation, as ASEAN+3 is formed, the Indian government seeks to maintain its 
revenue by increasing the income taxes imposed on both households in the same proportion 
(hereafter, the uniform income tax reform). An alternative, reflecting a possible concern 
over the effect on the poor households welfare in the first simulation, is a discriminatory tax 
reform, under which a higher income tax rate is imposed only on the rich household 
                                                     
reg regreg reg reg D D
hh hh hhUHH HH C
U UJ ¦
18 The CES utility levels of households are defined as:  
1/
,sec ,sec
sec
{ ( ) } ,
 
which are essentially the real household budget constraints. Similarly, the CES utility levels of the government and the bank 
which represent their real budget constraints are, respectively, 
and ,})({ /1
sec
secsec
regreg DDregregreg CGGVUGV UUJ¦   .})({ /1
sec
secsec
regreg DDregregreg IIUI UUJ¦   
19 Given the definition of the Equivalent Variation (EV) in Chapter 2, this regional welfare change is actually measured by 
multiplying the ratio of the EV (EVreg) to the benchmark regional disposable income (Y0reg) by 100: 
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(henceforth, the selective income tax reform). The welfare results from the two scenarios are 
reported separately in Chart 4-3 and Chart 4-4, and then compared in Table 4-2. 
Chart 4-3: Increasing Indian income tax rates on all households by the same proportion 
(the uniform income tax reform) under ASEAN+3 
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Chart 4-4: Increasing Indian income tax rates on the rich household (the selective 
income tax reform) under ASEAN+3 
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Chart 4-3 and Chart 4-4 indicate that as the household income tax is increased,  tax revenue 
and government welfare are consistently improved in comparison with the results of the 
standalone ASEAN+3 formation, i.e. ASEAN+3 without any kind of counteracting 
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domestic tax reform. Although such improvements are commonly observed under all types of 
tax reforms, tax revenue is increased at a faster rate than government welfare, as would be 
expected since the revenue is more directly affected by tax policy changes.  
While bank welfare declines consistently under both types of income tax reform, the welfare 
of the rich and poor households adjust in a dissimilar manner. To elaborate, although both 
households are worse off under the uniform income tax reform; under the selective income 
tax reform, the rich household is further worse off while the poor makes a marginal gain. 
Therefore, at the aggregate level, albeit marginally, regional disposable income  which 
encompasses the utility levels of the government, the bank, and the two households  is 
initially improved but then worsens as the tax is further increased. Specifically, while the 
standalone ASEAN+3 formation decreases Indias disposable income by 0.03%, after the 
introduction of an income tax reform it increases monotonically, and eventually reaches a rate 
(of 0.02%) at which the government revenue is rebalanced (Table 4-2). 
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Table 4-2: Percentage changes in welfare variables given the uniform and selective 
income tax reforms for government revenue neutralisation under ASEAN+3 
Welfare variables 
ASEAN+3 
without 
counteracting 
tax reform 
ASEAN+3 
with uniform 
income tax 
reform 
ASEAN+3 
with selective  
income tax 
reform 
Income tax rates 0% *29.77% **46.02% 
Tariff revenues -35.05% -35.19% -35.19% 
Income tax revenues 0.83% 30.81% 30.81% 
Factor usage tax revenues 1.13% 1.21% 1.21% 
Consumption tax revenues 0.76% -0.19% -0.19% 
Production tax revenues 2.98% 2.62% 2.62% 
Real wage of unskilled labour 0.56% 0.67% 0.67% 
Real wage of skilled labour -0.48% 0.70% 0.70% 
Unemployment of unskilled labour -5.41% -6.49% -6.49% 
Unemployment of skilled labour 4.98% -6.70% -6.70% 
Regional unemployment -2.93% -6.54% -6.54% 
Government utility -6.80% 0.56% 0.56% 
Bank utility 1.19% 0.00% 0.00% 
Rich household utility 0.88% -0.21% -0.74% 
Poor household utility 0.91% 0.13% 1.10% 
Regional disposable income (base year price) -0.03% 0.02% 0.02% 
Real GDP 1.12% 1.01% 1.01% 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: * refers to the percentage changes in income tax rates applied to both rich and poor 
households; while ** only shows the rate applied to the rich household, keeping the other  at its initial rate of 3%.  
Table 4-2 shows percentage changes in key welfare variables, first under the standalone 
ASEAN+3, and then with the income tax reforms. The results suggest that, in order to 
maintain revenue at the ex-ante level, India can choose either to increase the income tax on 
the rich household by 46.02% or to tax both households by 29.77% to obtain approximately 
identical outcomes on most welfare variables except for household utility. This substantiates 
the fact that the two income tax reforms are almost indistinguishable in aggregate terms, 
given that this model assumes that the two households are identical in their CES utility 
functions and consumption patterns at the benchmark year, and thus the selective reform that 
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targets only the rich does not impose any greater distortion on sectoral commodity prices than 
the uniform reform.20   
In principle, the augmented income tax reduces the portion of income that households allocate 
to final consumption and investment via the bank. Thus, the welfare levels of the bank and the 
households are reduced, while total tax revenue and government welfare are increased. This 
crowding-out effect results in lower aggregate outputs, reflected in real GDP increasing by 
1.01%, as opposed to the 1.12% increase without the reform. In contrast, the impact on 
regional disposable income becomes positive as the index now increases by 0.02% owing to 
higher factor prices driven by higher demands from the public sector.  
The demand for skilled labour is increased to a greater extent than for the unskilled, as 
indicated by the observed increase in the augmented real wage and the reduced 
unemployment in the skilled labour market as the tax reform takes effect. This reflects the 
patterns of factor intensity in India. As illustrated in Table 4-3, two thirds of Indias public 
demands are allocated to the purchase of commodity OSG (i.e. public administration, defence, 
education, and health) which is skilled-labour intensive. Since the second most demanded 
service (MSR) only accounts for approximately 7% of total public demand, the factor 
intensity of sector OSG is the principal determinant of welfare variation in factor markets. As 
a result, skilled labour benefits the most, while unskilled labour comes in second, a 
consequence of it being used less intensively in the production of commodity OSG. In 
aggregate terms, the revenue-neutralising income tax reform eventually improves regional 
disposable income, and at the same time real wages are boosted and total unemployment is 
reduced. The results indicate that the economic impacts of the revenue-neutralising domestic 
                                                     
20 For that reason, if the two households have different CES preferences and consumption patterns, then selectively imposing an 
income tax on one of the two households would yield different welfare results from the unbiased reform. In order to incorporate 
this feature into the analysis, however, the detailed data of household consumption and the substitution elasticity of final 
consumption by household must be obtained. 
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tax reform on each factor owners welfare can significantly vary with the country-specific 
pattern of public sector demand. 
Table 4-3: The ranking of Indian public demands (million US$), along with the 
corresponding factor intensities 
Rankings Public 
Demands  
Land Unskilled 
labour 
Skilled 
labour 
Capital Natural 
resource 
Total 
1 OSG 40,251 0% 32% 51% 17% 0% 100% 
2 MSR 4,225 0% 48% 11% 40% 0% 100% 
3 CFI 4,200 0% 20% 15% 65% 0% 100% 
4 OMF 2,938 0% 43% 5% 52% 0% 100% 
5 CRP 2,197 0% 18% 4% 78% 0% 100% 
6 Others 6,975 15% 35% 4% 44% 1% 100% 
Source: Compiled from the GTAP 6.0 database. 
4.4.2 Simulations of Active Factor Usage Tax Policies 
In these simulations taxes on production factors are increased in order to counteract the 
undesirable FTA effects on government revenue. First of all, Indias factor taxes are 
collectively increased to those rates at which revenue is maintained at the initial level 
(henceforth, the uniform factor tax reform). Then, taxes on factors owned by the rich 
(capital, skilled labour, land, and natural resources) and the poor (unskilled labour) are 
individually increased, hereafter referred to respectively as the selective rich-factor tax 
reform and the selective poor-factor tax reform,. In contrast to the proportional reforms in 
Subsection 4.4.1, factor tax reforms are simulated in absolute terms since Indias factor tax 
rates are initially trivial and mostly evenly imposed on sectors and factors. The implications 
of the two approaches are not substantially dissimilar, but the transparency of the outcome is 
greatly improved as the label of the horizontal axis in the following charts can be presented in 
a more concise manner. The welfare results for each scenario are reported in Chart 4-5a, 
Chart 4-5b, Chart 4-6 and Chart 4-7, then altogether in Table 4-4. 
 
4-32 
Chart 4-5a: Increasing all Indian factor usage tax rates to a targeted rate (the uniform 
factor tax reform) under ASEAN+3 
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Chart 4-5b: Percentage changes in sector OSG's output and real GDP given the uniform 
factor tax reform under ASEAN+3 
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Chart 4-6: Increasing Indian tax rates on the usage of factors owned by the rich 
household to a targeted rate (the selective rich-factor tax reform) under ASEAN+3 
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Chart 4-7: Increasing Indian tax rates on the usage of factors owned by the poor 
household to a targeted rate (the selective poor-factor tax reform) under ASEAN+3 
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tax reforms. Firstly, although government welfare is increased with factor tax imposition, the 
rate of improvement is not as strong, the change in government welfare being negative 
especially at the point where tax revenue is rebalanced. As such, the government does not find 
There are a number of welfare results that are distinctively different from those in the income 
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factor tax reforms as worth implementing as income tax reforms in Subsection 4.4.1. In 
aggregate terms, regional disposable income and real GDP are likewise deteriorated under all 
factor tax scenarios.  
Table 4-4: Percentage changes in welfare variables given the uniform and selective 
factor usage tax reforms for government revenue neutralisation under ASEAN+3 
Welfare variables ASEAN+3 
without 
ASEAN+3 
with 
ASEAN+3 
with 
ASEAN+3 
with 
counteracting 
tax reform 
uniform 
factor tax 
reform 
selective 
rich-factor 
selective 
poor-factor 
tax reform  tax reform 
+Factor usage tax rates §0% *1.08% **1.60% ***3.16% 
Tariff revenues -35.05% -35.34% -35.24% -35.54% 
Income tax revenues 0.83% -0.30% -0.20% -0.53% 
Factor usage tax revenues 1.13% 1,805.81% 1,781.72% 1,858.47% 
Consumption tax revenues 0.76% -0.33% -0.22% -0.56% 
Production tax revenues 2.98% 2.37% 2.55% 2.00% 
Real wage of unskilled labour 0.56% 0.14% 0.64% -0.81% 
Real wage of skilled labour -0.48% -0.01% -0.11% 0.18% 
Real rent of capital 1.61% 0.12% -0.25% 0.80% 
Unemployment of unskilled labour -5.41% -1.40% -6.17% 8.45% 
Unemployment -1.76% of skilled labour 4.98% 0.11% 1.15% 
Regional unemployment -2.93% -1.04% -4.43% 6.02% 
Government utility -6.80% -0.59% -0.03% -1.75% 
Bank utility 1.19% -0.24% -0.06% -0.63% 
Rich household utility 0.88% -0.51% -0.76% -0.06% 
Poor household utility 0.91% 0.29% 1.05% -1.18% 
Regional disposable income (base year price) -0.03% -0.28% -0.09% -0.66% 
Real GDP 1.12% 0.70% 0.90% 0.26% 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: + report on the targeted rates o xes, no entage c er to 
applied to all factors; ** to factors owned by the rich, and *** to those owned by the poor, while keeping the others at their initial 
Secondly, in contrast to the unusual results of the income tax reforms due to the identical 
f factor ta t the perc hanges.* ref the rates 
rates.  
consumption preferences of the two households, the welfare outcomes in Table 4-4 suggest 
that the uniform and selective factor tax reforms do not yield identical results in aggregate 
terms, as factor intensities differ across production sectors. One would expect the selective 
factor tax reforms to yield uneven effects on individual sectors, in the sense that sectors 
intensively employing those factors that are subject to extra taxation will be particularly 
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worse off, and thus the economic outcome should be more distortionary than in the uniform 
tax reform scenario. However, the fact that the selective rich-factor tax reform turns out to be 
the most favourable option of the three  which is inconsistent with the theoretical prediction 
in Section 4.2  accentuates the complexity of predicting the actual outcomes of a particular 
set of tax reforms, especially in consideration of the terms-of-trade effect across countries. 
In Table 4-4, in order to keep government revenue at the pre-FTA level, the government is 
assumed to raise factor tax rates to 1.08% under the uniform reform; 1.60% under the 
selective rich-factor reform; and 3.16% when only the unskilled labour tax is adjusted under 
the selective poor-factor reform. The difference in these figures represents the gap in the 
scope of tax bases among individual reforms.  
Under the uniform factor tax reform, production costs are evenly increased in most sectors, 
                                                     
and real GDP is clearly reduced as a consequence. At the same time, government welfare is 
improved with the rise in tax revenue, although not by as much as under the income tax 
reforms. This reflects the stronger disincentive to the production sectors, which in turn 
exacerbates Indias terms of trade, as previously described in Subsection 4.2.4. To illustrate, 
Chart 4-5b shows that commodity OSG  that most demanded by the public sector (Table 4-3) 
 benefits significantly from the reform in terms of the change in output, while the rest of the 
economy contracts.21 As OSG is intensive in skilled labour, the real wage of skilled labour is 
improved in comparison with the standalone ASEAN+3, whereas the real wages of other 
factors deteriorate. In particular, capital demand is strongly reduced; it accounts for only 17% 
of sector OSGs factor demand, whilst representing 44% of the value of the aggregate factor 
endowment in India (GTAP 6.0 database). Hence, even though the welfare levels of both 
households are more affected than under the standalone ASEAN+3, the rich are worse off to 
a greater extent, due to the substantial decline in the return to capital. The aggregate welfare 
21 For brevity, it is not explicitly shown in Chart 4-5b that the changes in all other Indian sectoral outputs are negative and real 
GDP expansion is continually hampered as factor taxes are increased. 
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losses entailed by the uniform factor tax reform are again present, as all other types of tax 
revenues deteriorate (namely, consumption, production, household income, and import taxes). 
Thus, on the whole, the regional disposable income declines as the factor tax reform takes 
effect, and it is safe to say that the overall impact of the factor tax reform is more negative 
than under the income tax reforms. 
The selective factor tax reforms generally yield similar results to the uniform reform. 
4.4.3 Simulation of the Active Consumption Tax Policy 
at neutralises government 
However, in comparison with the uniform reform, the real wages of factors owned by the rich 
further fall substantially, while that of the unskilled labour owned by the poor is increased 
under the rich-factor tax reform. In contrast, the poor-factor tax reform positively affects 
skilled labour and capital real prices, while exacerbating the price of the unskilled labour, 
again in comparison with the uniform reform. Nevertheless, the rich-factor tax reform turns 
out to be the most efficient choice, given Indias production and trade patterns and the low 
substitution elasticity among factors. 
Next, Indian consumption taxes are uniformly raised to that rate th
revenue after ASEAN+3 (henceforth, the uniform consumption tax reform). As was argued 
in Subsection 4.4.2, the uniform rate approach is preferable because Indias benchmark 
consumption taxes in the GTAP 6.0 database are comparatively low and are imposed at 
similar rates across sectors. Thus, proportional and absolute reforms will yield similar welfare 
implications. Chart 4-8a and Chart 4-8b illustrate the different aspects of welfare changes in 
India under ASEAN+3 with the active consumption tax policy, and Table 4-5 contrasts the 
results with those from the standalone ASEAN+3 simulations. 
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Chart 4-8a: Increasing all Indian consumption tax rates to a targeted rate (the uniform 
consumption tax reform) under ASEAN+3  
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Chart 4-8b: Percentage changes in key real variables given the uniform consumption tax 
reform under ASEAN+3 
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In general, the direction of changes in the welfare variables in Chart 4-8a parallel those of the 
income and factor tax reforms previously simulated, except that the rich household welfare 
declines strongly as the consumption tax is increased. Since the uniform consumption tax 
reform lowers final demands in all sectors without prejudice, the demands for primary factors 
would also be unbiasedly affected, as all production sectors suffer the same problem of fallen 
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final demands. However, a disparity occurs since the government predominantly spends any 
additional tax revenue on specific products, such as commodity OSG (Table 4-3). Since 
capital is not used intensively in the production of these public goods, capitals real rental rate 
in Chart 4-8b clearly declines relative to other factors. As capital accounts for 44% of Indias 
total factor endowment and 67% of the rich household endowment (GTAP 6.0 database), the 
sharp decline in capital price is the major source of welfare loss for the rich household. In 
addition, although initially increased as intensively used in the OSG production, once 
consumption tax becomes too heavy, skilled labour price also eventually falls. Thus, the rich 
households welfare is unequivocally reduced under the consumption tax reform. 
Combined together, the falls in private and investment welfare levels effectively cancel out 
the rise in public welfare, and consequently reduce the improvement in regional disposable 
income as the consumption tax is raised (Chart 4-8a). As a result, total unemployment is an 
increasing function of the tax rate, while real GDP is a decreasing function (Chart 4-8b). This 
result is consistent with the previous findings by Anderson (1999) and Erbil (2001) that a 
revenue-neutral tax reform that simultaneously manipulates trade and consumption taxes is 
not necessarily welfare-enhancing. This point is further elaborated in Table 4-5. 
In Table 4-5, the revenue-neutralising outcomes are compared to the case of ASEAN+3 
without the counteracting domestic tax hike. Clearly, most variables are worsened except for 
the welfare of the government. In particular, there is a strong negative impact on the welfare 
of the private sector in contrast to the effects of the uniform imposition of income and factor 
taxes. As a whole, the welfare of India falls almost as much as under the uniform factor tax 
hike. However, the positive change in real GDP is as high as under the income tax reform 
since the supply side is less affected by the policy shock. 
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Table 4-5: Percentage changes in welfare variables given the uniform consumption tax 
reform for government revenue neutralisation under ASEAN+3 
Welfare variables ASEAN+3 without 
counteracting tax 
reform 
ASEAN+3 with 
uniform 
consumption tax 
reform 
+Consumption tax rates §0% 3.67% 
Tariff revenues -35.05% -34.83% 
Income tax revenues 0.83% -2.21% 
Factor usage tax revenues 1.13% -2.31% 
Consumption tax revenues 0.76% 81.07% 
Production tax revenues 2.98% 1.64% 
Real wage of unskilled labour 0.56% -0.53% 
Real wage of skilled labour -0.48% -0.64% 
Real rent of capital 1.61% -2.28% 
Unemployment of unskilled labour -5.41% 5.49% 
Unemployment of skilled labour 4.98% 6.63% 
Regional unemployment -2.93% 5.76% 
Government utility -6.80% 0.36% 
Bank utility 1.19% -0.48% 
Rich household utility 0.88% -2.21% 
Poor household utility 0.91% -0.05% 
Regional disposable income (base year price) -0.03% -0.23% 
Real GDP 1.12% 1.03% 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: + report on the targeted rates of consumption taxes, not the percentage changes. 
4.4.4 Simulations of Active Production Tax Policies 
Finally, the welfare implications of production tax policies that neutralise government 
revenue in the face of ASEAN+3 are reported below. In contrast to the ex-ante consumption 
and factor tax rates, which are uniformly low for all sectors, Table 4-6 shows that Indias 
production tax rates differ across sectors, and are mainly imposed on heavy manufacturing 
industries.  
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Table 4-6: Indian production tax rates by sector, as percentage of output values in the 
benchmark year (2001) 
 
Source: Compiled from the GTAP 6.0 database. 
Production sectors 
Initial production 
tax rates (% of  
output values) 
AGR  0.00% 
NRS 0.93% 
OIL 1.21% 
PAGR  0.00% 
OFD 1.42% 
MNF 2.09% 
TEX 2.04% 
WAP 2.67% 
CRP 2.50% 
I_S 2.86% 
NFM 4.68% 
MVH 4.01% 
ELE 4.14% 
OME 4.28% 
OMF 3.99% 
MSR 2.61% 
TRD 1.51% 
TRP 4.22% 
CFI 0.85% 
OBS 2.11% 
OSG 0.41% 
DWE  0.00% 
Simple average 2.21% 
Therefore, the welfare implication of the uniform proportional production tax reform, where 
all tax rates are increased by the same proportion, should differ from the uniform level 
production tax reform, where all are adjusted towards a targeted rate. Additionally, the 
selective gradual production tax reform, where the government continuously raises the 
lowest production tax rates to the second lowest levels until the tax revenue is neutralised, is 
also simulated as an alternative reform that gradually converges taxes towards uniformity. 
This third reform is specifically drawn from Michael et al. (1993), in that raising the lowest 
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consumption tax rate to compensate for the government revenue loss after lowering the 
highest tariff rate will improve welfare under certain sufficient conditions. Instead of the 
consumption taxes, this study examines the implications of production tax reforms, as 
production tax rates are more diversified across sectors (Table 4-6). Accordingly, the welfare 
changes under the three production tax reforms are separately plotted in Chart 4-9, Chart 4-10 
and Chart 4-11, and then summarised in Table 4-7 as regards macroeconomic variables, and 
in Table 4-8 with respect to output and mark-up by sector. 
Chart 4-9: Increasing Indian production tax rates on all production sectors by the same 
proportion (the uniform ‘proportional’ production tax reform) under ASEAN+3 
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Chart 4-10: Increasing Indian production tax rates on all production sectors to a 
targeted rate (the uniform ‘level’ production tax reform) under ASEAN+3 
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Chart 4-11: To continuously increase the lowest Indian production tax rates to the 
second lowest levels (the selective ‘gradual’ production tax reform) under ASEAN+3 
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The general direction of changes in welfare variables is similar across all reform scenarios, in 
that tax revenue and government welfare are augmented as the production taxes are increased, 
while regional income and the welfare of the regional bank and the two households decline. 
Output falls instantaneously as the production tax is increased, leading to reductions in real 
GDP, as well as in factor price, and eventually household income. At the same time, since the 
increased tax revenue is spent on public consumption, factors intensively used in producing 
public goods are better off. Hence, as with the cases in Subsections 4.4.1-4.4.3, to some 
extent, the increased public demand lessens the negative effects from the additional 
production tax. However, taken as a whole, the welfare effects are rather negative, since 
regional income continually falls, of which tendency is akin to factor tax reforms that directly 
affect the supply side of the economy.  
However, Chart 4-9 to Chart 4-11 also indicate that the impact on each economic agent 
differs across reform types. As mentioned, the proportional reform raises production taxes 
on all sectors by the same proportion, hence imposing a greater amount of taxes on sectors 
that are already heavily taxed. From Table 4-6, it is apparent that the heavy manufacturing 
sectors are worse off under this reform relative to other sectors. Given the investment and 
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private demand structures in India (see Appendix A4-3), we know that the investment and 
production tax patterns considerably overlap. As a result, the proportional reform has a more 
negative impact on investment more than on household consumption. This essentially 
explains why the percentage fall in bank welfare is always larger (Chart 4-9).  
Subsequently, the uniform level reform integrates the existing production taxes into a 
common rate, hence raising taxes on sectors relatively untaxed, and reducing them on the 
heavily taxed. In this sense, the level reform is the opposite of the proportional reform. As 
Chart 4-10 shows, the bank gains the most under this reform, especially at the point where 
government revenue is neutralised, because production taxes are raised on sectors with low 
investment and reduced on those with high investment. At the same time, the changes in 
welfare of the two households are inferior to that of the bank for the most part, since the 
uniform level reform essentially imposes higher taxes on sectors with comparatively high 
outputs (Table 4-7 and A4-1), which directly lowers factor prices, and eventually household 
incomes. As a result, the percentage change in regional disposable income is always below 
that under the proportional reform in Chart 4-9. On the other hand, the results under the 
selective gradual reform (Chart 4-11) are in between those of the previous two, since the 
reform consecutively increases the lowest tax rate up to the second lowest level, thus 
resembling the level reform except that sectors with heavy production taxes do not benefit 
from tax reduction. Thus, this is consistent with the results from the theoretical analysis in 
Section 4.2, i.e. that applying the same ad valorem tax rate on all production sectors should 
cause the least distortion to the economy. 
Table 4-7 compares welfare changes across the selected types of reform. In order to neutralise 
total tax revenue, the government may choose to raise production taxes equiproportionally on 
every sector by 28.15%; or to simultaneously converge tax rates to 2.46% of output values, 
which is above the initial average rate of 2.21% (Table 4-6); or to exclusively shift the rates 
which are initially below 1.76% up to the 1.76% level. 
 
4-44 
Table 4-7: Percentage changes in welfare variables given the uniform and selective 
production tax reforms for government revenue neutralisation under ASEAN+3  
Welfare variables ASEAN+3 
without tax 
reform 
ASEAN+3 
with uniform 
proportional 
production 
tax reform 
ASEAN+3 
with 
uniform 
level    
production 
tax reform 
ASEAN+3 
with 
selective 
gradual 
production 
tax reform 
+Production tax rates n/a *28.15% **2.46% ***1.76% 
Tariff revenues -35.05% -34.88% -37.47% -36.19% 
Income tax revenues 0.83% 0.08% -2.99% -1.63% 
Factor usage tax revenues 1.13% 0.36% -3.14% -1.56% 
Consumption tax revenues 0.76% -0.48% -2.07% -1.06% 
Production tax revenues 2.98% 30.87% 36.59% 33.86% 
Real wage of unskilled labour 0.56% 0.20% -0.88% -0.34% 
Real wage of skilled labour -0.48% 0.20% -1.20% -0.52% 
Real rent of capital 1.61% 0.31% -2.87% -1.42% 
Unemployment of unskilled labour -5.41% -1.96% 9.27% 3.43% 
Unemployment of skilled labour 4.98% -1.98% 12.84% 5.40% 
Regional unemployment -2.93% -1.96% 10.12% 3.90% 
Government utility -6.80% -0.42% -1.41% -0.87% 
Bank utility 1.19% -1.34% 0.42% -0.21% 
Rich household utility 0.88% 0.01% -3.34% -2.00% 
Poor household utility 0.91% 0.35% -0.83% -0.27% 
Regional disposable income (base year price) -0.03% -0.28% -1.67% -1.05% 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: + report on both the proportional changes and targeted rates. * refers to the percentage 
change in production tax rates applied to all Indian sectors; ** shows their uniform targeted rate; while *** reports on the 
targeted rate that is second lowest among sectors, to which the lowest tax rate is to be raised.  
As a production tax directly increases production costs, the three reforms yield worse welfare 
outcomes than under the standalone ASEAN+3. However, among the three approaches, the 
proportional reform is the least welfare-decreasing. Although the bank is particularly worse 
off under the proportional reform, the rest of the economy gains the most under this reform, 
largely since it reduces unemployment by 1.96%, whereas level and gradual reforms increase 
unemployment by 10.12% and 3.90%, respectively. Hence, regional disposable income is 
least reduced under the proportional reform. This result thus supports the prediction that 
applying the same proportional change on all production tax rates is generally more efficient 
than raising the rates in some sectors while lowering them in the others, or specifically raising 
production taxes against sectors those are lightly taxed in the benchmark year. 
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Table 4-8: Percentage changes in sectoral variables after the production tax reforms for 
government revenue neutralisation under ASEAN+3 
No counteracting 
tax reform 
Proportional 
uniform production 
tax reform 
Level uniform 
production tax 
reform 
Gradual selective 
production tax 
reform 
Sectors 
Sectoral 
outputs 
Mark-
up rates 
(only 
Cournot 
sectors) 
Sectoral 
outputs 
Mark-
up rates 
(only 
Cournot 
sectors) 
Sectoral 
outputs 
Mark-
up rates 
(only 
Cournot 
sectors) 
Sectoral 
outputs 
Mark-
up rates 
(only 
Cournot 
sectors) 
AGR -0.02%  n/a* -0.06% n/a* -1.06% n/a* -0.71%  n/a* 
NRS 0.85%  -9.75%  1.15% -14.56% -0.19% -6.73%  0.46%  -9.85% 
OIL 0.20%  -0.37%  0.23% -0.01% -0.45% -0.44%  0.15%  -0.35% 
PAGR -5.31%  -11.50%  -5.34% -11.98% -10.44% -10.79%  -8.89%  -11.15% 
OFD 9.30%  -5.92%  9.24% -6.74% 5.79% -4.89%  8.08%  -5.78% 
MNF 2.29%  -3.86%  0.31% -4.21% 2.01% -3.06%  2.13%  -4.09% 
TEX 6.81%  -6.00%  5.36% -6.80% 3.19% -3.83%  6.44%  -6.05% 
WAP 13.93%  -1.47%  12.19% -1.63% 8.83% -1.06%  13.00%  -1.44% 
CRP 3.11%  -6.44%  1.73% -6.39% 3.58% -6.01%  3.86%  -6.69% 
I_S 3.79%  -2.54%  0.05 % -2.68% 7.13% -2.33%  3.73%  -2.70% 
NFM 6.04%  -4.28%  -1.49% -4.58% 19.03% -4.76%  6.41%  -4.33% 
MVH 1.69%  -4.19%  -2.36% -3.77% 4.81% -5.47%  0.88%  -4.42% 
ELE 6.85%  -8.60%  -0.81% -7.61% 18.53% -12.03%  7.03%  -9.21% 
OME 4.09%  -7.76%  -1.35% -6.70% 12.33% -11.45%  3.92%  -8.32% 
OMF 9.45%  -3.89%  5.01% -3.09% 19.54% -5.12%  10.65%  -3.62% 
MSR 0.34%  -0.02%  -1.27% -0.25% -0.47% 0.86%  -0.46%  0.48% 
TRD 0.98%  -0.48%  -0.05% -0.67% 0.17% -0.75%  0.74%  -0.72% 
TRP 1.75%  -1.06%  -0.69% -1.18% 3.39% -0.14%  1.46%  -0.71% 
CFI 0.75%  -0.32%  -0.09% -0.36% 1.11% -1.51%  0.74%  -0.98% 
OBS 8.69%  -5.81%  6.90% -6.06% 5.50% -3.47%  8.49%  -5.64% 
OSG -5.00%  2.73%  0.03% -0.30% -3.47% 0.77%  -2.05%  0.32% 
DWE -7.53%  6.57%  -3.12% 2.27% -35.25% 29.02%  -24.61%  17.84% 
Source: Simulated by author. Note: * sector AGR is operated under perfect competition, thus no variation in the mark-up rate 
reported. 
Finally, Table 4-8 reports the sectoral impacts of individual production tax reforms. Since 
sector AGR is perfectly competitive, while the rest are modelled as Cournot oligopolies, 
sectors with higher outputs and lower mark-up rates gain in efficiency through becoming 
more competitive; while those with lower output and higher mark-up rate become more 
oligopolistic. The most highly protected sector  PAGR  is the only one that is obviously 
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inefficient in the world market since its output and mark-up rate decline markedly after the 
reforms.  
Under the standalone ASEAN+3, most (few) sectors become more (less) competitive. Then, 
as production tax reforms are introduced, the scale of tax variation generally determines the 
magnitude of the impacts on sectoral output. Since we observe from Table 4-7 that the 
government only needs to increase production tax revenue by 30.87% to maintain its total 
revenue at the pre-FTA level, the proportional reform leads to the least output deviation in 
comparison to the other two reforms. Specifically, the output change ranges widely, between -
5.34% (PAGR) and 12.19% (WAP), under the proportional reform. However, under the level 
reform, heavy manufacturing sectors (especially, sectors NFM and OMF) expand by more 
than 19% as the high tax rates are  uniformly diminished to the level of 2.46%, while the 
dwelling sector (DWE) contracts significantly by 35.25%. Also, for the gradual reform, as a 
subset of sectors is faced with higher taxes, sector DWE perceives the drop in output by 
24.61%, while sector WAP grows by 13%. Hence, by and large, Table 4-8 confirms that the 
proportional reform causes the smallest adjustments at the sectoral level. 
4.4.5 Comparative Studies 
Thus far, Subsections 4.4.1-4.4.4 have identified the welfare implications of individual 
revenue-neutralising reforms. This subsection compares the macroeconomic results across 
reform scenarios. In terms of real GDP, Chart 4-12 shows that the economic expansion of 
India under ASEAN+3 deteriorates as domestic taxes are introduced in order to rebalance the 
government revenue, and we find that all types of taxation have negative impacts on 
economic activities. Among the four types of domestic taxes, the imposition of consumption 
or income taxes  which directly affect the demand side of the economy  is less distortionary 
than the introduction of factor or production taxes that directly affect domestic production. 
This observation is consistent with the theoretical prediction in Subsection 4.2.4, in that 
taxing demand yields more desirable terms-of-trade effects for the Indian economy.  
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Chart 4-12: Real GDP expansion after the ASEAN+3 FTA with revenue-rebalancing tax 
reforms  
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Of the two types of taxes levied on the supply side, production taxes hamper Indias 
economic expansion to a greater extent. It was noted in Subsection 4.2.3 that, in theory, 
production taxes should be less distortionary than factor taxes, since they increase the 
marginal cost of production as a whole, whereas factor taxes specifically increase the unit cost 
of primary factors, but not intermediate inputs. However, if the production tax structure in the 
benchmark year has already been sectorally biased in comparison with the factor tax 
structure, as with the case of India in the GTAP 6.0 database, factor taxes may turn out to be a 
more favourable policy option.  
Chart 4-13 plots the percentage change in regional disposable income against unemployment, 
where the former variable comprises the aggregated welfare of the households, the 
government and the bank. Previously in this section, we observed that increasing 
consumption and income taxes initially enhances regional disposable income, but then 
worsens it as taxation becomes higher, and the crowding-out effect becomes dominant as the 
public sector expands. In contrast, factor and production taxes solely aggravate regional 
disposable income at all rates. As a result, at the point where government revenue is precisely 
rebalanced in Chart 4-13, the income tax turns out to be the only policy option that can 
improve regional income, whereas the consumption tax does not yield a significantly better 
impact on regional income than factor and production taxes.  
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Chart 4-13: Percentage changes in regional disposable income and unemployment level 
after the ASEAN+3 FTA with revenue-rebalancing tax reforms  
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As for the unemployment level, once again, it is apparent that only the income tax option can 
reduce labour unemployment to a greater extent than the standalone ASEAN+3. Hence, we 
may conclude that the income tax appears to be an appropriate choice if India is to keep 
government revenue balanced in the face of the ASEAN+3 formation. 
4.5 The Informal Economy and Revenue-Rebalancing Tax Policies 
Given the results in Section 4.4, Section 4.5 now assumes that the informal economy exists 
when India implements revenue-neutralising tax reforms, once again under ASEAN+3. 
Despite an increasing number of studies aimed at understanding the nature and scale of the 
informal economy, and constructing theoretical frameworks to explain the economic linkages 
between formal and informal economies; the whole issue remains opaque due to problems 
regarding the definition and measurement of the informal sector. However, such unrecorded 
economic activity ought not to be overlooked in the context of the revenue-neutralising tax 
policy analysis, since their inclusion could alter the expected welfare outcomes, as we would 
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suspect that the enforcement of a domestic tax policy encourages some economic agents to 
shift into informal production.  
The informal economy is defined in Subsection 4.5.1. Then the conventional methods usually 
adopted to measure the informal economys size are overviewed, and their intrinsic problems 
identified. Thirdly, various ways to incorporate the informal sector into CGE models are 
assessed, along with a CGE model design proposed to address the revenue-neutralising 
problem. Finally, a number of policy simulations on the Indian economy are conducted. 
4.5.1 Defining the Informal Economy 
The definition of the informal economy is far from standardised. Researchers use this 
ambiguous term in diverse contexts, depending upon their policy interests. Bearing in mind 
that the informal and formal parts of the economy are so inter-connected that they should not 
be regarded as two discrete activities, the International Labour Organisation (ILO, 1993) 
proposed the most widely-used, yet somewhat broad definition of the informal economy, that 
it consists of units engaged in the production of goods and services with the primary 
objective of generating employment and income to the persons concerned. Accordingly, the 
System of National Accounts (SNA) conforms to this guideline by defining informal sectors 
in terms of the characteristics of the production units (the enterprise approach), rather than 
the persons involved (the labour approach).22  According to this definition, the informal 
economy may be regarded as those production units owned by households, which is 
particularly useful when analysing poverty issues. However, it was also acknowledged by 
ILO (1993) that the above definition does not capture all the dimensions of an informal 
economy.  
                                                     
22 Refer to Chapter IV, Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts (1993). 
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Broader definitions were proposed by Schneider (1986), Hartzenburg and Leimann (1992), 
and Smith (1994), where the informal economy is equated with the unrecorded sector. 
However, since this definition is also somewhat imprecise in that it does not rule out illegal 
activities, we may find it less useful in terms of policy formulation.23   
For that reason, researchers sub-categorise the informal economy in order to cope with a 
variety of policy questions. In the broadest sense, Dixon (1999) defines the informal economy 
as comprising three socio-economic types of activities: 
x Non-market economic activities (subsistence home production or voluntary 
community work); 
x Semi-legal market activities (those kept hidden in order to evade taxes, commit 
benefit frauds, or avoid labour legislations); 
x Illegal market activities (production and distribution of prohibited substances). 
Dixons framework is broadly analogous to that of Bagachwa and Naho (1995), in which the 
above three sub-divisions are respectively labelled as informal, parallel, and black 
markets, though the distinction drawn between the first two groups is somewhat blurred as it 
is based on the scale of production, rather than the type of transaction (market/non-market).  
Next, a number of definitions are introduced to illustrate the extent to which the interpretation 
of the informal economy is diversified. Vosloo (1994) sub-categorised the informal economy 
both with respect to its legality (or acceptability from the social perspective) and by its 
position in the value chain (producer/distributor/service provider), which was useful in his 
analysis of the economy of South Africa. Schneider and Enste (2000) classified the informal 
economy by both the legality of activity and the nature of transactions (monetary/barter). In 
an alternative approach, Thomas (1992) proposed a continuum, with economic activities 
                                                     
23 Informal activities which are illegal by nature are considered irrelevant to the tax reform analysis at issue, because the shift of 
production and consumption between formal and informal sectors is permanently barred as these activities cannot be legalised 
and thus formally taxed. Hence, the inclusion of these activities would yield insignificant implications on the Indian economy. 
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falling outside the formal economy being classified as the household, informal, irregular, and 
criminal sectors, based on the type of transaction (market/non-market), the legality of the 
output itself, and the production/distribution channel.  
This approach is in line with ILO (2002), where the informal economy is defined by its 
capability to meet certain basic employment conditions, thus implicitly indicating the co-
existence of informal and formal economies along a continuum of decency at work.24 This 
view is extrapolated in ILO (2002) to construct an expanded conceptual framework for the 
informal economy, taking into account the employment status of workers (the labour 
approach), to complement the type of economic unit classification (the enterprise 
approach) frequently adopted in previous studies. In this context, production and employment 
tend to fall on a scale of formality (see Table 4-9). 
Table 4-9: A conceptual framework: the informal economy 
Jobs classified by employment status 
Own-account 
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Source: Derived and adapted from ILO (2002). Note: Dark grey unit cells represent jobs that do not exist in the type of 
production unit in question; unit cells with x-marks symbolise jobs that exist by definition, though irrelevant to the main focus of 
the study; and white unit cells denote jobs in different segments of the informal economy.  
                                                     
24  The seven essential securities often denied to workers in informal activities are: 1) labour market security: adequate 
employment opportunities through high levels of employment ensured by macroeconomic policies; 2) employment security: 
protection against arbitrary dismissal, regulation of hiring and firing, employment stability; 3) job security: the opportunity to 
develop a sense of occupation; 4) work security: protection against accidents and illness at work; 5) skills reproduction security: 
widespread opportunities to gain and retain skills, through innovation and training; 6) income security: provision of adequate 
incomes; and 7) representation security: protection of collective voice in the labour market. 
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Cells 1 and 2 refer to own-account workers (cell 1) and employers (cell 2) who have their 
own informal enterprises. The informal nature of their jobs follows directly from the 
characteristics of the enterprise they own. Cell 3 represents producers of goods for own final 
use by their household (for instance, subsistence farming). Cells 4 and 5 consist of 
contributing family workers with no contract of employment and no legal or social protection 
arising from the job, in formal enterprises (cell 4) or informal enterprises (cell 5). Cells 6, 7 
and 8 then denote employees who have informal jobs, whether employed by formal 
enterprises (cell 6) or informal enterprises (cell 7) or as paid domestic workers by households 
(cell 8). Lastly, cell 9 shows members of informal producers cooperatives. 
The definition of the informal sector used in this chapter is a combination of the various 
approaches already explained above. For the purpose of the revenue-neutralising domestic tax 
policy analysis, the informal part of the economy  that is to be featured in the CGE 
framework  should exclude non-market and non-monetary transactions as well as the 
production and distribution of illegal outputs. It should comprise economic activities that are 
essentially legal in nature but kept hidden for the purpose of tax evasion and so forth. Hence, 
our definition encompasses the semi-legal activities in cells 1, 2, and 4 to 8 of Table 4-9. 
4.5.2 Measuring the Size of the Informal Economy 
The quantification of the informal economy has been conducted with varying degrees of non-
compliance. Hence we always observe discrepancies in the collected data. This section 
overviews the three mainstream measurement methods: the direct, indirect, and model 
approaches, and then identifies their known issues. 
4.5.2.1 The Direct Approach 
The direct approach estimates the size of the informal economy through surveys, using both 
voluntary replies and tax audits. The monetary extent of undeclared work is clarified under 
this approach. The advantage of this method lies in its microeconomic nature, allowing us to 
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obtain a good insight into the detailed structure and geography of the informal economy. On 
the other hand, its downside lies in the operating costs and the deficient coverage of the direct 
survey on the national scale, as well as in the reliance on the willingness to reveal true 
information to interviewers, in the face of the potentially severe data bias since survey studies 
frequently have a high rate of non-respondence. Despite its advantages in many circumstances 
(in particular, the provision of information in great detail), the direct approach does not fit 
very well with the main purpose of this CGE study; and this, together with the inherent 
disadvantages that undermine the credibility of survey results; the direct approach is unlikely 
to be a suitable choice. 
4.5.2.2 The Indirect Approach 
The indirect approach is generally based on the assumption that, although individuals are 
inclined to conceal informal income, the data can be implicitly captured on the 
macroeconomic scale. As described in Annex A of the Office for National Statistics (ONS, 
2005), the advantage of the indirect approach over the direct lies in its cost-efficiency, as the 
implementation of direct surveys is not required. Although widely used, the indirect approach 
has limited usefulness, as it relies heavily on rudimentary assumptions, and yields little 
information about informal activity in each sector as required for the multi-sector analysis.  
This subsection considers the three main indirect methods as follows. Firstly, the indirect non-
monetary measurement of the informal economy uses real indicators, such as the estimates of 
the aggregate size of small enterprises and of the labour force engaged in self-employment 
and second-job holding, to estimate the discrepancy between the official and actual data 
observed in each category. However, this method fails to provide solid evidence that there is 
actual informal work in these parts of the economy. In particular, the labour force estimation 
is not very satisfactory, since it does not account for unorganised types of informal job and 
overlooks the important fact that a person can take part in both formal and informal activities 
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over the same time period. The fallibility of these methods is non-trivial as they often yield 
contradictory results (Appendix A, ONS, 2005).  
Under the indirect monetary approach, the volume of high-denomination banknote 
circulation; the product of money velocity and cash-deposit disparity; and the sum of 
monetary transactions inclusive of cheque payments, are also adopted as proxies for the size 
of the informal sector. However, as with the non-monetary methods discussed previously, 
there is no concrete theoretical justification for these proxies. To begin with, the first 
approach is problematic as informal work is not necessarily associated with high-
denomination notes. On the contrary, small banknotes might be expected be prevalent in 
informal transactions, since the informal economy is usually associated with small-scale 
enterprises, given that its existence is attributable to the sizeable extra marginal costs of 
producing in the formal sector, specifically as taxation and labour legislation are reinforced. 
Thus, the first approach will not be appropriate unless we define the informal economy as 
inclusive of illegal activities, which is incompatible with the main focus of this study. The 
second approach is criticised because the velocity of money in the formal and informal 
spheres is assumed to be identical, which is unrealistic, but nevertheless unavoidable, since it 
is virtually impossible to measure the velocity of money in the informal sector. Besides, it 
overlooks the fact that from 1/4 to 1/3 of the unreported income in the United States was paid 
via cheque rather than cash (Feige, 1990). The third approach relaxes the cash-only 
assumption, and yields higher estimates of the size of the unrecorded sector, but the other 
known issues associated with the indirect method remain unresolved. 
In the third indirect approach, the discrepancy between expenditure and income, either by 
household or country, is adopted as the proxy for the size of the informal economy. Since this 
method is based on household and consumer surveys, it has an advantage over other indirect 
methods, the data being fairly reliable. However, it has the same drawbacks as the direct 
method. All in all, the income-expenditure discrepancy method is not likely to be a promising 
approach to measure the informal economy. 
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4.5.2.3 The Model Approach 
The direct and indirect approaches discussed above are designed to estimate the size of the 
informal economy by taking a snapshot of the informal economic structure while paying 
little attention to explaining the causes of the emergence and development of the informal 
economy over time. Schneider (2002) proposed a factor-analytic behavioural model  namely 
the Dynamic Multiple-Indicators Multiple-Causes (DYMIMIC) model  in which the 
structural equations explaining causal relationships between the unobserved variable (the size 
of the informal economy) and certain observed causal and indicator variables are specified 
explicitly. In brief, the interaction over time between the causal variables Zit (i = 1, 2, ..., k), 
the size of the shadow economy Xt, and the indicator variables Yjt (j = 1, 2, ..., p) is shown in 
Figure 4-5. 
Causes
 
Indicators
 
 Xt-1 
 
Figure 4-5: The structure of the DYMIMIC model (Schneider, 2002) 
In the DYMIMIC model, Schneider identifies the causal variables (Zit) as: 1) those 
contributing to higher marginal costs of entry to the formal sector, for instance, an increase in 
the tax burden, lack of social security provision, or government regulation; 2) the lack of 
effective detection and punishment for illegal informal economic activities; and last but not 
least, 3) the declining sense of tax morality. The indicator variables (Yjt) are those 
adjustments observed in labour, product, and money markets. Specifically, as the informal 
economy grows, we would expect to witness: 1) an increase in monetary transactions; 2) a 
rising proportion of the labour force participating in the informal economy; and 3) a decline in 
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primary factor demands in the formal economy. Although this model approach is probably the 
most comprehensive, its dynamic nature requires a vast amount of data, some of which might 
not be presently available in India.  
4.5.3 The Informal Economy in the CGE Framework 
Since analysing a fiscal policy with no regard to the existence of the informal economy can be 
misleading, recent CGE papers on the income distribution effects of various government 
policies have paid more attention to the informal element. After reviewing prior approaches 
that feature the informal economy in the CGE framework, the model design for the study of 
the revenue-neutralising tax reform will be discussed below. 
4.5.3.1 Literature Review 
Although economists are fully aware of the existence of the informal economy and its non-
negligible influence on the outcome of a fiscal policy; CGE modellers only started to tackle 
this problem in the late 1990s. The underlying complications in the incorporation of the 
informal economy to the CGE analysis arise from the ambiguities in its definition and 
measurement, along with the practical issues of the scale of work to be undertaken in 
compiling data. Thus far, CGE models with informal sectors are constrained to be country-
specific; and are predominantly designed for the purpose of analysing a fiscal policys impact 
on the income distribution, rather than for the study of the simultaneous implementation of 
multiple tax reforms for the purpose of revenue neutralisation.  
For instance, Decaluwé et al. (1999), among others, incorporated the informal economy for 
the study of income distribution and poverty in Africa. However, since they defined the 
informal economy as production units owned by households, the distinction between non-
marketed subsistence production, untaxable black market production, and taxable formal 
market production was blurred; so that informality was not directly associated with 
untaxability. Similarly, Colatei and Round (2001) simulated the revenue-neutral income 
 
4-57 
redistributive reforms operated in Ghana during the 1980s and 1990s. Since the study 
disaggregates household with respect to socio-economic and geographic criteria, informal 
producers are implicitly modelled as unincorporated self-employed enterprises, and individual 
households are involved in both formal and informal production activities. Blake, McKay, 
and Morrissey (2001) explored the impact of agricultural trade liberalisation on the Ugandan 
economy in the presence of the informal economy. In this model, the informal households are 
endowed with informal non-waged labour, while formal households are endowed with both 
formal and informal factors of production. Once again, production sectors are not identified 
by their degree of formality since they hire both kinds of factors and pay production taxes; 
and informal households are not untaxable since they also pay income taxes. Carneiro (2003); 
Sinha (2003); Dorward et al. (2004); Gibson (2005); and Kiringai, Wanjala, and Mathenge 
(2006) also took similar approaches to the afore-mentioned studies in addressing poverty 
issues for Brazil, India, Malawi, Paraguay, and Kenya, respectively. While this approach is 
suitable for poverty analysis, it is arguable that a more explicit treatment of the interaction 
between formal and informal sectors is required for the study of revenue-neutralising reform. 
The MIMIC model on the Dutch economy features many realistic specifications in the labour 
market (Graafland and Mooij, 1998). 25  The informal activity encompasses household 
production and labour supply to the black market, and thus each household allocates time 
between leisure, work in the formal market, and work in the informal economy. The CES 
utility structure of each household assumes that labour-intensive services from the formal 
market (Cf) and from the black market (Cb) is first combined into aggregate consumption of 
marketable labour-intensive services (Cl) with a substitution elasticity of 2. This aggregate is 
then combined with other consumption (Ck) to yield total consumption (C) with an elasticity 
of 1.1. Thus, Cb is a much closer substitute for Cf than Ck. Except in the black market, the 
                                                     
25 MIMIC stands for the MIcro-Macro model to analyse the Institutional Context, and is an applied general equilibrium model 
developed by CPB, The Hague. 
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housekeeping activities are modelled as a constant fraction of the time spent on leisure. 
Housekeeping activities yield household production that is a perfect substitute for the 
consumption of marketable labour-intensive services (Cl). In this context, an increase in 
leisure raises household production, thereby crowding out the consumption of Cl. At the same 
time, increasing taxes augments the consumption of Cb while lowering the overall 
consumption of marketable services (Cl), thus encouraging more housekeeping activities and 
leisure. With some differences in the demand structure, MIMICs modelling approach is 
comparable to that adopted by Piggot and Whalley (2001) for the analysis of the VAT base 
broadening in Canada; and Patrón (2005) on education and endogenous skill formation in 
Uruguay, even though self-supply and housekeeping activities are not accounted for in the 
latter. Essentially, the virtue of MIMIC lies in the explicit association of informality with 
untaxability, which is of practical benefit in the context of tax policy studies. Nevertheless, 
since MIMIC is a single-region model which only incorporates VAT and income taxes while 
ignoring trade and production taxes, the model must be adapted for the study of simultaneous 
manipulation of multiple tax policies. 
4.5.3.2 Model Design 
The newly incorporated system of informal production and distribution activities fully 
described in Appendix A4-4 is similar to those used by Graafland and Mooij (1998), Piggot 
and Whalley (2001), and Patrón (2005). However, since the model is tailored to the efficacy 
analysis of domestic tax policies that exactly offset government revenue losses from 
preferential tariff removal, the untaxable production sectors are defined as informal and 
explicitly distinguished from those that are taxable. Both the rich and the poor households are 
endowed with formal and informal factors, which are supplied respectively to the formal and 
informal sectors. Due to their small-scale production and tax-evading nature, commodities 
produced in the informal sector are not internationally traded. They are demanded by informal 
domestic producers as informal intermediate inputs; consumed by rich and poor households 
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as informal final goods; and purchased by the bank as informal investment goods. However 
the government does not consume products from the informal sector. Thus the CES demand 
structure utilised thus far now applies only to the government, whereas the bank and 
households are represented by the newly-defined nested CES demand function illustrated in 
Figure 4-6.26  
 
Figure 4-6: Final demand trees for the two households and the bank in the presence of 
informal commodities 
At the top level, k types of commodities are aggregated with the common elasticity of 
substitution among final products denoted by ıDregI. 27  Hence the aggregate household 
demand is modelled as: 
,
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in which the price index of the aggregate demand for commodity sec by household hh in 
region regI is the newly introduced variable sec
regIPCA , the household budget constraint 
reads: 
.
26 The earlier version of the CES demand structure is explained in Subsection 3.2.2 of Chapter 3. 
27 regI signifies the set of regions where black markets exist (regI  reg). In the context of Chapter 4, it only encompasses 
India: regI = {IND}. 
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, , ,
sec sec
sec
.regI hh regI hh regI hh regI hhPCBUD CBUD PCA C  ¦ ,  (4-11) 
At the lower level, each commodity {1, 2, , k} is a CES aggregate of formal and informal 
products with the substitution elasticity of ıFMregI. Accordingly, the new set named fm, 
consisting of formal ("FML") and informal ("IFML") commodities, is assigned to relevant 
parameters and variables: 
fm = {FML, IFML}. 
Thus, the lower level of the household demand function is expressed as: 
,
, , ,sec
sec, sec, sec
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 (4-12) 
where parameters and variables with the informal dimension are identified by the letters 
FM. The households demand for each commodity (
,
sec,
regI hh
fmCFM
sec,
regI
) is purchased at the 
corresponding sectoral market price of fmPAFM sec
regI
,
sec,
regI hh
,28 with a consumption tax ( tc ) applied 
to formally produced commodities.29 Lastly, the new parameter fmM
,
sec,
regI
HFJ  represents the 
consumption share of a formal or informal commodity ( hhfmCFM ) in its aggregate demand 
( ). Paralleling Equation (4-11), the lower-level household budget constraint is 
specified as: 
,
sec
regI hhC
                                                     
, , ,
sec sec sec sec, sec,[1 $( " ")] .
regI hh regI hh regI regI regI hh
fm fm
fm
PCA C tc fm FML PAFM CFMª º     ¬ ¼¦  (4-13) 
Similarly, the aggregate investment demand by the bank is specified as: 
28 For reference, the formal dimension of this new variable (
sec," "
regI
FMLPAFM ) is equivalent to  in the previous chapters 
where the shadow economy did not exist. 
sec
regIPA
29 Accordingly, the term $(fm="FML") means that consumption tax is to be added to Equation (4-12) only when goods are 
purchased from the formal sector (FML). 
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where the price index of the aggregate investment demand for commodity sec in region regI 
is now denoted by . Thus, the corresponding banks budget constraint reads: secPIA
regI
sec sec
sec
.regI regI regI regIPS S PIA I  ¦  (4-15) 
Paralleling Equations (4-12) and (4-13), the investment demand and budget constraint at the 
lower level are derived respectively as: 
sec
sec, sec, sec
sec,
;  and
regIFM
regI
regI regI regI
fm fm regI
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V
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 (4-16) 
sec sec sec, sec, ,
regI regI regI regI
fm
fm
PIA I PAFM IFM  ¦ fm
regI
 (4-17) 
where the investment demand for commodity sec by the formal and informal sectors in region 
regI ( sec, fmIFM ) and the corresponding share parameter ( sec,
regI
fmIFMJ ) are newly introduced. 
Since the government is not involved in informal economic activities, there is no informal 
production and distribution of public services (OSG). By the same token, the government 
does not consume informal products. Hence, the equation that balances the sum of private, 
investment, public, and intermediate demands with aggregate demand in the formal and 
informal markets ( sec,
regI
fmQAFM ) reads:
30
,
sec, sec, sec sec,sec , sec,
sec
$( " ") ,regI hh regI regI regI regIfm fm c fm
hh c
CFM IFM CG fm FML IOFM QAFM     ¦ ¦ fm
                                                     
 (4-18) 
30 Once again, the formal dimension of this new variable ( sec," "
regI
FMLQAFM ) is equivalent to the Armington demand  in the 
previous version where the shadow economy did not exist. 
sec
regIQA
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where  stands for the Leontief intermediate input demand for commodity sec by 
formal or informal production sector secc in region regI, parallel with  from Chapter 
2; while public consumption ( ) is only of goods sold in the formal market.
sec,sec ,
regI
c fmIOFM
sec,seccIO
regI
regI
regI regI regI regI
secCG
31  
As the outputs of the informal part of the economy are only produced and consumed 
domestically, they are non-traded. Thus, we specify that: 
sec," " sec," " sec," " sec," ",IFML IFML IFML IFMLQZFM QDSFM QDDFM QAFM    (4-19) 
where sec,
regI
fmQZFM  represents sector secs formal and informal outputs in region regI; while 
sec,
regI
fmQDSFM  and sec,
regI
fmQDDFM  respectively denote domestically-produced goods supplied 
and demanded within the same region.32 Likewise, their prices are identical: 
sec," " sec," " sec," ",
regI regI regI
IFML IFML IFMLPZFM PDFM PAFM   (4-20) 
where sec,
regI
fmPZFM  is the output price dual to sec,
regI
fmQZFM ; and sec,
regI
fmPDFM  is the common 
price of domestically-produced goods ( sec,
regI
fmQDSFM  and sec,
regI
fmQDDFM ).
33   
On the other hand, the original property is maintained in the formal part of the economy, thus 
supply and demand remain based on the CET and Armington functions. As a consequence the 
modified CET zero-profit condition for sector sec in region regI reads: 
                                                     
31 Recalling Equation (2-97) in Chapter 2, the left hand side of Equation (4-18) will be multiplied by the scaling vector if sector 
sec is under monopolistic competition. However, the vector is not included here, first of all for the sake of simplicity, and 
secondly because none of the sectors in India is under monopolistic competition (Table 3-3, Chapter 3). 
32 Again, sec," " sec," " sec," ", ,
regI regI regI
FML FML FMLQZFM QDSFM QDDFM  newly introduced here respectively possess the same property as 
 in the previous version, where the black market was not taken into consideration. sec sec sec, ,
regI regI regIQZ QDS QDD
33 The same logic is applied to their parallel prices, such that 
sec," " sec," " and 
regI regI
FML FMLPZFM PDFM  respectively possess the same 
property as sec sec and 
regI regIPZ PD  in the previous version. 
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Implicitly, the exportation of tradable commodities (secT) and international transport services 
(trsp, as described in Subsection 3.2.3, Chapter 3) is not allowed in the informal sector. The 
market for domestic consumers clears ( sec, sec,
regI regI
fm fmSFM QDDFM QD ), as in Equation (4-21), 
the Armington zero-profit condition for sector sec in region regI requiring that aggregate 
demand is equal to the demands for domestic and import goods, although the latter applies 
solely to the distribution in the formal sector: 
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 (4-22) 
Production in the shadow economy is assumed to be carried out on a small scale, thus 
implying perfect competition. Therefore, the zero-profit condition for production activities 
may be written as: 
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where 
,
sec,
fac regI
fmFFM  represents the factor demands by the formal and informal sectors (as 
subscripted by fm), parallel with 
,
sec
fac regIF  which applies solely to the demands by the formal 
sector.  
It should be noted that there are some limitations in the specification of labour. By definition, 
the informal sectors use only self-employed and waged labour. This rules out non-marketed 
labour services such as subsistence home production and voluntary community work, and 
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illegal market activities such as the production of prohibited substances. Hence, labour 
involved in these activities is implicitly regarded as unemployed. However, since we are 
focusing on the economic implication of revenue-neutralising domestic tax policies, this 
specification should be satisfactory, since these activities are non-taxable by their nature. A 
further limitation lies in the movement of labour between the formal and informal sectors, 
which basically depends upon the change in the proportion of formal to informal demands. 
Thus, the seasonal movement of unskilled labour into formal manufacturing sectors during 
the dry season while otherwise working in informal agricultural sectors is not modelled. 
Lastly, the complex nature of labour supply, in that a person can simultaneously work full 
time in the formal sector while holding an informal part-time job, is not precisely accounted 
for. Nevertheless, since we do not define the unit of labour input as a person but rather as the 
value added to the final output, this issue is automatically taken care of in the CGE 
framework. 
As for each households income, the model specifies that informal income is received from 
informally providing labour services to informal production sectors. Then, denoted by 
, the household income inclusive of that from informal sources, the households 
income-balance condition is modified to: 
,regI hh
,
,
INCFI
, , , , .regI hh regI hh regI hh regI hh regI hhINCFI TRY SHH PCBUD CBUD      (4-24) 
Income tax is exclusively imposed on formal income ( ), 
,regI hhINC
, , .regI hh regI hh regI hhTRY ty INC   (4-25) 
4.5.4 Tax Policy Simulation in the Presence of the Informal Sector 
Compiling data on the informal economy is difficult since, as noted earlier, all the 
measurement methods contain inaccuracies. In the CGE context, the data on the informal 
sector should ideally be comprehensive and on a national scale, with sectoral details which 
are compatible with our model design. In practice, Subsection 4.5.4.1 re-calibrates the CGE 
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model using the informal data estimated by Unni (2001), and Subsection 4.5.4.2 then 
simulates the revenue-neutralising reform taking into account the informal economy. 
4.5.4.1 Model Calibration 
Despite the serious constraints on data availability, a number of SAMs have been constructed 
for India (Sarkar and Subbarao, 1981; Sarkar and Panda, 1986; Janvry and Subbarao, 1986; 
Subbarao, 1993; Storm, 1997; Sinha et al., 2003; and Pradhan et al., 2006). As these Indian 
SAMs are constructed and updated regularly by the same set of researchers for the analysis of 
policy impacts on income distribution across households, household income is classified in 
great detail, although not explicitly with regard to taxability. Hence, this model adopts the 
informal data estimates from Unni (2001) and specifies that the share of the informal sector in 
GDP is proxied by the share of the unorganised sector in Net Domestic Product (NDP) from 
the National Accounts Statistics. Although the definition of the unorganised sector is based on 
the legal status of the enterprise rather than on its taxability, it is assumed that the two criteria 
are reasonably correlated.  
It should be noted that this method of estimating and including informal activities in 
addition to the SAM data provided by GTAP conflicts with the definition of the standard 
SNA production boundary that informal activities are already included in the economic 
system (Dimaranan, 2006). Although this approach entails structural biases in the simulation 
results, the method is chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, the common occurrence of 
underestimation of the informal sector in official statistics is widely recognised (Charmes, 
1998; Kulshreshtha, 2004). Secondly, the comparability of the present model results with the 
former ones where only formal activities are accounted for, will be lost if the benchmark 
formal sector is re-calibrated to become smaller, because then domestic taxes are imposed on 
a smaller base and thus all benchmark tax rates will become higher, implying a completely 
different tax structure. Finally, since neither calibration approaches (i.e., adding informal 
activities on top of the GTAP statistics or extracting them from the dataset) could yield a 
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strictly accurate reflection of the Indian economy, and since the study originally aims at 
offering an insight into how the incorporation of the informal economy can alter the former 
policy implications, the adopted method should be qualified to suit the primary purpose of the 
current research. 
Once the production sectors from Table 7 of Unni (2001) are mapped with those in the 
current model, the ratio of informal to formal GDP by sector ( ) is calculated. 
Subsequently, the informal intermediate, private, and investment demands for each 
commodity are similarly calibrated in compliance with the respective formal demands 
originally taken from the GTAP 6.0 database. Thus we derive: 
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The benchmark informal demand for commodity sec can now be derived as: 
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Since informal commodities are not internationally tradable, this aggregate demand should be 
equal to the corresponding domestic output ( sec," "
regI
IFMLQZFM 0 ), which in turn determines the 
total informal labour demand as the residual of informal intermediate demands: 
sec sec," " sec ,sec," "
sec
.regI regI regIIFML c IFML
c
FI0 QZFM 0 IOFM 0 ¦  
The ratios of unskilled to skilled labour demanded by informal producers are calibrated to be 
consistent with those previously observed in the corresponding formal sectors: 
,
sec," ",
sec," " sec,
sec," "
.
fLab regI
FMLfLab regI regI
IFML fLab regI
FML
fLab
FFM 0
FFM 0 FI0
FFM 0
 ¦  
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Since household income, now derived as , takes into account the additional 
labour supply to the informal market, household saving is re-calibrated as the residual of 
income and expenditure: 
,0regI hhINCFI
, , , ,regI hh regI hh regI hh regI hhSHH0 INCFI0 TRY0 CBUD0   ,
,
                                                     
  
Where the household consumption budget is also re-calculated as inclusive of informal 
consumption: 
, ,
sec, sec sec," "
sec
.regI hh regI hh regI regI hhfm FML
fm
CBUD0 CFM 0 tc0 CFM 0
§ ·  ¨ ¸© ¹¦ ¦  
Finally, the elasticity of substitution between formal and informal goods (ıFM) for the bank 
and households is universally set to 2, as in Graafland and Mooij (1998). 
4.5.4.2 Simulation Results 
To help our understanding of the effects of introducing the informal economy into the model, 
we simulate the uniform level tax reforms intended to compensate for the Indian 
government revenue loss after ASEAN+3 is formed, both with and without tax evasion.34 
Since the calibration in Subsection 4.5.4.1 assumes that the GTAP 6.0 database overlooks the 
existence of the informal sector, the benchmark Indian GDP is more than doubled when the 
informal economy is incorporated.35 Since the initial economic sizes with and without the 
informal sector are not the same, the comparison of welfare impacts in proportional terms is 
not suitable for this particular type of analysis. Consequently, in Table 4-10, welfare changes 
are reported in the world currency (US$), whilst price changes are shown in proportional 
terms since their benchmark values are uniformly unity. 
34 For simplicity, the ASEAN+3 FTA simulation in the presence of the informal economy is defined as tariff cuts in agricultural 
and manufacturing sectors among member nations, while service liberalisation in terms of competition advocacy is abbreviated. 
35 Precisely, Table 7 in Unni (2001) suggests that the informal sector contributes approximately 60.5% to GDP. 
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It is also noteworthy that the simulated tax rates required to keep government revenue 
balanced barely differ across tax types. For instance, under consumption tax reforms, tax rates 
(
" "
sec
IND
                                                     
tc ) are raised to 0.035 without, and 0.033 with the informal sector.36 Hence, we can rest 
assured that the model imposes nearly the same degree of tax policy change on the economy 
with and without the informal market, and the results in Table 4-10 are hence mostly caused 
by the adjustment between formal and informal sectors. 
4.5.4.2.1 Overall Results 
The results are summarised in Table 4-10 in terms of both relative and absolute changes. The 
absolute changes in three categories of real variables, i.e. final demands, labour demands and 
total output (also referred to as the real GDP), are reported in commensurate units which are 
defined as the values divided by the corresponding prices in each row of a regional SAM (see 
Table 2-1 in Chapter 2 for the basic SAM structure). As a consequence, while we may 
compare the counterfactual changes in the real variables of the same kind, it is not meaningful 
to compare the absolute changes in, for instance, final and factor demands. Although the 
percentage changes in real variables are more commonly reported in the CGE literature, the 
absolute measure is utilised here because the study is focused on the comparability of these 
variable changes with and without the informal sector. More specifically, reporting the results 
in percentage terms might be misleading, given the fact that the benchmark volumes of the 
real variables at the regional level become larger when including the informal activities on top 
of the initial data from GTAP.  
As a whole, the introduction of the informal economy alters welfare outcomes in a non-
negligible way. Welfare is reduced given income and factor tax reforms and improved given 
36 Similarly, the respective revenue-neutralising targeted tax rates before and after the incorporation of the non-taxable black 
market are 0.040 and 0.041 for income tax (
" ",IND hhty ); 0.0106 and 0.0105 for factor tax ( ," "sec
fac INDtf ); and 0.024 and 0.023 for 
production tax ( " "
sec
INDtz ). 
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consumption and production tax reforms. As a consequence, we observe a smaller gap 
between the outcomes of the best and the worst tax policies.  
In general, the beneficial tariff-cutting effect that shifts production from the informal to 
formal sector, outweighs the unfavourable effect of increasing domestic taxes which 
consequently replaces production in the formal sector with that from the informal sector. The 
former effect is particularly enhanced under consumption and production tax reforms, as the 
formal sector grows markedly in real terms. Presumably, as the informal sector is brought into 
existence, consumers can adjust their final demands in accordance with the new tax regime in 
a more flexible manner, since households and the bank can now substitute between formal 
and informal consumption with the elasticity of ıFM regI, as specified in Equations (4-12) and 
(4-16). Consequently, the consumption tax reform yields the highest real gains, as the policy 
is most directly influenced by the afore-mentioned adjustment in final demand. In the same 
way, the production tax reform turns out to be the second best, while income and factor tax 
reforms are least welfare-enhancing. Accordingly, Indias revenue-neutralising domestic tax 
reforms, in the presence of the untaxable sector, are individually discussed as follows. 
4.5.4.2.1.1 ASEAN+3 with the Revenue-Neutralising Income Tax Increase (ty“IND”,hh) 
In the presence of the informal sector, tariff cuts stimulate expansion in the formal sector, 
which takes production resources from the informal sector. In particular, the partial trade 
liberalisation eliminates the economic distortion, thereby enabling India to gain from trade 
creation and the improvement in its terms of trade. At the same time, the higher domestic tax 
tends to lower these gains so causing an opposite shift in the direction of the informal 
economy. Although the former is stronger than the latter, since the revenue-neutralising 
income tax reform in the presence of the informal sector leads to positive outcomes as a 
whole, policy efficacy drops relative to the outcome when there is no informal economy. As 
the informal real GDP change is unequivocally negative, the reallocation of primary factors 
towards informal production sectors in consequence of the income tax reform is not as 
efficient as the shift in demand towards formal consumption caused by tariff removal.  
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," "
sec
fac IND
" "
tf ) 4.5.4.2.1.2 ASEAN+3 with the Revenue-Neutralising Factor Tax Increase (
Akin to the results under the income tax reform, real gains from tariff removal exceed the 
losses from factor tax increases, since macroeconomic variables such as employment and real 
GDP adjust positively to the new tax regime. However, factor taxes are evidently inferior to 
an income tax in terms of policy efficacy, as observed in Section 4.4, in that they hamper real 
production more directly. Nonetheless, in the presence of the untaxable black market, not 
only does that production expand more in the formal sector than the contraction in the 
informal one, but that contraction is also fairly minor, implying a smaller fall in production 
after the incorporation of the informal economy compared with that under the income tax 
reform. In principle the factor tax should result in greater efficiency in the presence of the 
informal economy, as it is more directly associated with the substitution between formal and 
informal consumption. On the other hand, since regional welfare in India declines slightly, the 
imposition of factor taxes does restrict domestic demand; however, preferential trade 
liberalisation nevertheless stimulates production, especially for the overseas markets within 
the regional grouping. 
4.5.4.2.1.3 ASEAN+3 with the Revenue-Neutralising Consumption Tax Increase ( secINDtc ) 
In contrast with the income and factor tax reforms, given ASEAN+3 with the consumption 
tax reform, Indias welfare is improved after the untaxable economy is incorporated into the 
model. Specifically, it is apparent from Table 4-10 that changes in real GDP, skilled and 
unskilled labour employment, real factor prices, and regional welfare are all positive. While 
ASEAN+3 leads to expansion in the formal sector akin to the previous two cases, an increase 
in the consumption tax turns out to be more beneficial with the informal sector included, 
because households have consumption alternatives those are not subject to taxation, and thus 
they can substitute between the two in response to the new tax regime. Consequently, 
although the consumption tax reform encourages the household to shift demand towards 
informal commodities, consumption by rich and poor households does not decline greatly 
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with the introduction of the informal sector, and macroeconomic variables are clearly 
improved on the whole. 
" "
sec
INDtz ) 4.5.4.2.1.4 ASEAN+3 with the Revenue-Neutralising Production Tax Increase (
As was the case without the untaxable sector, the production tax option yields the least 
favourable welfare changes among the four domestic taxes, particularly in terms of real 
wages, consumption demand, employment, and disposable income. However, the 
incorporation of the black market noticeably increases Indias welfare, with the real GDP 
increasing by 7.25 billion units, more than twice the output change in the absence of the 
informal economy. An increase in the production tax shifts production resources from the 
formal sector, and the ensuing reduction in formal supply further stimulates formal import 
demand, which has already been boosted by the partial tariff removal under ASEAN+3. With 
the regional bank able to substitute flexibly between formal and informal investment, formal 
investment from abroad is significantly increased. As a consequence, most variables respond 
positively to the new tax regime once the informal sector is taken into consideration. 
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Table 4-10: ASEAN+3 with revenue-neutralising uniform tax raises 
  
ASEAN+3 with 
revenue-neutralising 
uniform income tax 
raise ( " ",IND hhty ) 
ASEAN+3 with 
revenue-neutralising 
uniform factor tax 
raise ( ," " ) secfac INDtf
ASEAN+3 with 
revenue-neutralising 
uniform consumption 
tax raise ( " "secINDtc ) 
ASEAN+3 with revenue-
neutralising uniform 
production tax raise 
( " "secINDtz ) 
  
Without 
informal 
sector 
With 
informal 
sector 
Without 
informal 
sector 
With 
informal 
sector 
Without 
informal 
sector 
With 
informal 
sector 
Without 
informal 
sector 
With 
informal 
sector 
%  change 
Real wage of unskilled labour 0.86% 0.17% 0.17% 0.02% -0.46% -0.23% -0.90% -0.39% 
Real wage of skilled labour 0.85% 0.23% 0.11% 0.02% -0.26% -0.17% -0.93% -0.49% 
Real rent of capital 2.46% 2.30% 0.89% 0.94% 0.09% 1.16% -1.04% 0.54% 
Absolute change (billion units) 
Rich household consumption 0.80 1.13 -0.32 -0.74 -2.81 -2.85 -3.99 -4.28  
   Formal rich household consumption 0.80 1.92 -0.32 0.12 -2.81 -1.98 -3.99 -4.03  
   Informal rich household consumption 0 -0.79 0 -0.86 0 -0.87 0 -0.25  
Poor household consumption 0.51 0.13 0.37 0.18 -0.71 -0.72 -1.36 -1.12  
   Formal poor household consumption 0.51 0.88 0.37 0.26 -0.71 -0.79 -1.36 -1.78  
   Informal poor household consumption 0 -0.75 0 -0.09 0 0.07 0 0.66  
Government consumption 0.25 -0.10 -0.41 -0.51 -0.07 -0.18 -1.15 -1.05 
Bank consumption 0.08 -0.65 -0.28 0.19 -0.30 0.53 0.83 2.46  
   Formal bank consumption 0.08 0.05 -0.28 -0.14 -0.30 0.45 0.83 3.34  
   Informal bank consumption 0 -0.70 0 0.33 0 0.08 0 -0.87  
            Source: Simulated by author
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Table 4-10 (Continued): ASEAN+3 with revenue-neutralising uniform tax raises 
  
ASEAN+3 with 
revenue-neutralising 
uniform income tax 
raise ( " ",IND hhty ) 
ASEAN+3 with 
revenue-neutralising 
uniform factor tax 
raise ( ," " ) secfac INDtf
ASEAN+3 with 
revenue-neutralising 
uniform consumption 
tax raise ( " "secINDtc ) 
ASEAN+3 with revenue-
neutralising uniform 
production tax raise 
( " "secINDtz ) 
  
Without 
informal 
sector 
With 
informal 
sector 
Without 
informal 
sector 
With 
informal 
sector 
Without 
informal 
sector 
With 
informal 
sector 
Without 
informal 
sector 
With 
informal 
sector 
Absolute change (billion units) 
Unskilled labour employment 1.39 0.28 0.28 0.03 -0.80 -0.39 -1.59 -0.67  
   Formal unskilled labour employment 1.39 2.13 0.28 0.57 -0.80 0.07 -1.59 -0.36  
   Informal unskilled labour employment 0 -1.85 0 -0.54 0 -0.46 0 -0.32  
Skilled labour employment 0.43 0.12 0.06 0.01 -0.14 -0.09 -0.52 -0.27  
   Formal skilled labour employment 0.43 0.51 0.06 0.08 -0.14 0.16 -0.52 -0.12  
   Informal skilled labour employment 0 -0.39 0 -0.07 0 -0.25 0 -0.15  
 
Real GDP 9.00 6.70 5.00 4.85 6.42 8.53 3.32 7.25  
   Formal real GDP 9.00 11.77 5.00 6.38 6.42 11.69 3.32 9.86  
   Informal real GDP 0 -5.07 0 -1.53 0 -3.17 0 -2.61  
Absolute change (billion US$) 
Regional welfare (disposable income) 2.28 0.82 -0.18 -0.51 -5.70 -4.38 -9.20 -7.27  
   Rich household utility 0.70 1.02 -0.43 -0.87 -2.02 -1.81 -4.14 -4.49  
   Poor household utility 0.45 0.06 0.32 0.11 -0.26 -0.15 -1.43 -1.23  
   Government utility 0.25 -0.10 -0.42 -0.51 -0.08 -0.18 -1.16 -1.07  
   Bank utility 0.07 -0.66 -0.29 0.19 -0.31 0.52 0.80 2.40  
            Source: Simulated by author.
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4.5.4.2.2 Household Consumption: The Cross-Sector Distribution Effect 
In addition to the aggregate outcomes reported in Subsection 4.5.4.2.1, the following charts 
give a further insight into the economic effects of the revenue-neutralising tax policies on the 
distribution of households consumption budget across commodity groups. As with Table 4-
10, all results are reported in absolute terms since the benchmark economic sizes with and 
without the informal sector are not identical. Also, for simplicity, commodities for which 
consumption levels adjust by less than 5 million units, both in formal and informal markets, 
are omitted from the charts.  
Chart 4-14a: Variation in the Indian rich household's consumption distribution under 
ASEAN+3 with the uniform income tax increase 
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Chart 4-14a indicates that the rich household in India demands more manufacturing products 
and less agricultural and service goods under ASEAN+3 with the income tax reform. This 
tendency is particularly strong in sector PAGR (i.e. processed agricultural products), in which 
the consumer effect of ASEAN+3 prevails, and domestic output is strongly replaced by 
cheaper imports from other ASEAN+3 member countries, namely ASEAN, Japan, and China. 
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This is further elaborated in Chart 4-14b, where the change in aggregate imports of 
commodity PAGR is comparatively high, while production in both the formal and the 
informal sectors markedly fall. Since unskilled labour, which accounts for 54.33% of the 
benchmark total factor input to sector PAGR, belongs to the poor household, that group may 
potentially disapprove the new tax regime. However, according to the GTAP 6.0 database, the 
amount of unskilled labour demanded by sector PAGR accounts for only 5.03% of the total 
unskilled labour endowment, and only 3.60% of the total factor endowment is allocated to 
this sector. Although the poor would find the policy less favourable than would the rich, since 
unskilled labour demand increases in aggregate terms (Table 4-10), the welfare of the poor 
household is not exacerbated by the reform, and the government should be able to put this 
into practice. 
Chart 4-14b: Absolute changes in Indian aggregate imports, formal and informal 
outputs under ASEAN+3 with the uniform income tax increase (in the presence of the 
shadow economy) 
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Chart 4-14a indicates that the direction of change in formal consumption with and without the 
black market is by and large the same. However, the consumption of informal manufacturing 
products tends to be replaced by the formal equivalent; while agricultural and service goods 
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adjust in the opposite direction. As noted earlier, such substitution should depend upon the 
positive impact of partial tariff removal under ASEAN+3 in relation to the negative effect of 
income tax increase on each sector. In consequence, the rich household shifts demands toward 
formal manufacturing goods because the consumer effect of ASEAN+3 is dominant in these 
sectors. On the other hand, agricultural and service goods benefit from ASEAN+3 to a lesser 
extent, as formal consumption falls both with and without the informal economy (Chart 4-
14a), and aggregate imports barely expand in the agricultural sector while declining 
moderately, if at all, in the service sector (Chart 4-14b). The consumption of the formal 
version of these commodities is replaced with products from the informal sector. 
Chart 4-15: Variation in the Indian poor household's consumption distribution under 
ASEAN+3 with the uniform income tax increase 
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The results for the poor household, which are broadly similar, are illustrated in Chart 4-15. 
The poor also consume more manufactured goods and less agricultural and service products 
after the policy change; and consumption of commodity PAGR noticeably increases. 
However, since the poor only receives incomes from unskilled labour services and 
government transfers, their consumption level should be distinctly lower than that of the rich 
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in general. Also, as aggregate production of PAGR  which is intensive in unskilled labour  
drops markedly after the shock (Chart 4-14b), the income of the poor household is not 
increased as much as that of the rich. Therefore, the magnitude of change in consumption 
demand, hence the scale of the Y axis in Chart 4-15 turns out to be roughly half of the change 
in Chart 4-14a.  
Finally, Chart 4-16 to Chart 4-21 show the impacts of ASEAN+3, coupled with the other 
three types of revenue-neutralising domestic tax reforms, on the cross-sector distribution of 
the rich and the poor households final demands. In general, it is apparent that the direction of 
change in each commoditys consumption level is fairly robust across types of domestic tax 
policies, while the magnitude of change basically depends on the channel through which each 
tax type affects household consumption. 
Chart 4-16: Variation in the Indian rich household's consumption distribution under 
ASEAN+3 with the uniform factor tax increase 
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Chart 4-17: Variation in the Indian poor household's consumption distribution under 
ASEAN+3 with the uniform factor tax increase
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Chart 4-18: Variation in the Indian rich household's consumption distribution under 
ASEAN+3 with the uniform consumption tax increase 
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Chart 4-19: Variation in the Indian poor household's consumption distribution under 
ASEAN+3 with the uniform consumption tax increase 
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Chart 4-20: Variation in the Indian rich household's consumption distribution under 
ASEAN+3 with the uniform production tax increase 
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Chart 4-21: Variation in the Indian poor household's consumption distribution under 
ASEAN+3 with the uniform production tax increase 
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4.6 Summary 
In this chapter, four types of reform to Indias domestic tax structure in order to neutralise 
government revenue under ASEAN+3 have been scrutinised. To recapitulate, the motivation 
of this study derives from the observation that the Indian government anticipates revenue 
losses after the preferential trade liberalisation, since import tariffs are one of the major 
sources of government revenue. If India abides by its WTO commitment not to increase 
tariffs against other countries outside the grouping, and demand for public spending is 
consistently high, it is plausible that the government will be induced to change its domestic 
taxes in order to rebalance its budget. Accordingly, Chapter 4 begins with the analysis of the 
welfare impacts of individual domestic taxes in a theoretical general equilibrium framework 
where each country produces only two goods. Firstly, assuming that India is a small country 
in the world market, the model predicts that there should be no difference in the welfare 
implications of the four domestic taxes, as long as they are levied on the whole economy 
without prejudice. However, India would find taxation of goods (i.e. production and 
consumption taxes) or primary factors (i.e. factor tax) less acceptable than the income tax 
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since both bias the pattern of demand of domestic economic agents. Hence, we may presume 
that the broader is the tax base, the less distortionary is the tax policy. 
However, if India becomes a large economy, any change in domestic demand and supply 
induced by a policy reform would lead to changes in world prices (the so-called terms-of-
trade effect) and some ambiguity in the net welfare impact of the four tax reforms may be 
anticipated. Since the rest of the world is also a large economy, the price interaction between 
the two large economies further complicates the net welfare outcome. However, consumer-
related taxes tend to yield better results than producer-related ones. 
Chapter 4 subsequently analyses the empirical results of the revenue-neutral ASEAN+3 
formation using the CGE approach. As a domestic tax is introduced, the increased public 
demand especially benefits skilled labour, which is most intensively used in the production of 
Indias public goods. An income tax appears to be the best revenue-neutralising policy for 
India, as measured by the effects on both real GDP and regional disposable income. Hence, 
consistent with the theoretical model, imposing a tax on household income seemingly distorts 
real demand to the least extent. More to the point, the model predicts that an income tax 
selectively levied on the rich household will yield the same welfare outcome in aggregate 
terms as an income tax neutrally imposed on the two household types. This is attributable to 
the fact that the initial income tax structure of India, according to the GTAP 6.0 database, is 
not biased across households. Thus, the selective income tax reform is the most appropriate 
policy alternative if the government is to ensure that the poor household benefits from the 
revenue-neutral ASEAN+3 without reducing the net welfare gain of the country.  
Secondly, consumption taxes turn out to be the second-best policy option; given that Indias 
real GDP increases by almost as much as under the income tax reform. However, 
consumption taxes are less beneficial in terms of regional disposable income, because they 
have a narrower tax base than an income tax in that they directly and solely reduce private 
consumption, whereas an income tax reduces expenditures and savings of households 
neutrally.  
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Thirdly, factor taxes appear to be the third-best policy tool, since while the regional 
disposable income falls by nearly as much as under the consumption tax reform, real GDP 
declines to a stronger extent. Thus, consistent with the prediction in Subsection 4.2.4, factor 
taxes are more welfare-decreasing since they have a direct negative impact on real 
production. However, it is noteworthy that levying taxes selectively on factors owned by the 
rich household is a superior option in aggregate terms, being slightly better than imposing 
taxes uniformly on all types of factors. This contradicts the prediction in Section 4.2 that an 
unbiased tax imposition should yield the most desirable welfare outcome. Indeed, the results 
reflect complications in pinpointing the likely outcomes of individual tax policies in the real 
world, where cross-sector price interactions may be expected to be complex and somewhat 
dependent on the economic structure in the initial year. 
Finally, production taxes are shown to be the worst choice for India, because the initial 
production tax structure is comparatively strongly biased across sectors (Table 4-6). Among 
the three types of production tax reforms, the one that augments tax rates on all sectors by the 
same proportion gives the best welfare outcome. Since this type of reform effectively 
increases taxes in a more balanced way, it is once again in keeping with the former prediction 
that the economy reaps the highest benefits from a uniform tax imposition. 
Once the study takes into consideration the existence of the informal economy, which is 
basically untaxable, the welfare results are greatly altered, since consumers are assumed to 
switch consumption between formal and informal goods. Accordingly, consumption and 
production taxes  which are more directly related with the elasticity of substitution between 
formal and informal commodity demands  lead to a greater increase in output; whereas 
income and factor taxes yield lower gains in the presence of the informal economy. However, 
since the extent of the demand shift between formal and informal consumption depends upon 
the elasticity of substitution, which is externally estimated, it remains an empirical issue 
whether the same relativity is likely to be replicated for other countries. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
The main conclusions of this thesis are structured as follows. Firstly, Section 5.1 commences 
with the overview of the results – in respect of the similarities and differences between the 
predicted and actual outcomes, along with some key policy implications – and then Section 
5.2 concludes with the outline of the limitations and areas for future research. 
5.1 Overview of the Results and Policy Implications 
This set of essays addresses a number of critical issues concerning the effects of preferential 
trading arrangements on economic welfare, by means of the static computable general 
equilibrium modelling approach. They explicitly call attention to various characteristics of 
individual markets that bring about idiosyncratic counterfactual adjustments across types of 
primary factors, production sectors, and economic regions after a proposed policy change.  
Given that CGE models are often criticised for the complexity of the equation system that 
leads to a lack of clarity of simulation outcomes (Panagariya and Duttagupta, 2001), the first 
essay initially focuses on the discrepancy in regional economic size, as to how it affects the 
simulation results of a customs union. It shows that, in a hypothetical framework with a 
highly controlled dataset, a small region has every incentive to gain preferential market access 
to a large economy. As observed from the results, the degrees by which trade creation 
dominates trade diversion, and the customs union improves the terms of trade with the rest of 
the world, are higher as the scope of the economic integration expands. This is consistent with 
Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2003), as their CGE model has shown that “the welfare gains 
from multilateral trade liberalisation are therefore considerably greater than the gains from 
preferential trading arrangements and more uniformly positive for all countries.” 
Furthermore, the small region perceives stronger union impacts on domestic production and 
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consumption in relation to the large one, which would appear to be reasonable, given that the 
small partner accounts for a very small share of the large region’s total trade.  
Additionally, suppose that regions outside the union concurrently form another grouping, 
thereby the world comprises two economic blocs, in each of which members trade freely 
among themselves while facing substantial inter-bloc trade barriers. Given this circumstance, 
the gains from the union is proportional to the collective size of other members, at the same 
time as being inversely proportional to the size of the other grouping. While general 
equilibrium models of Vanek (1965), Kemp (1969) and Lipsey (1970), and partial 
equilibrium models of Tovias (1978) and Schiff (1996) reckoned that small members would 
gain while large ones would lose from a customs union; this study suggests that under the 
CGE framework, goods supplied from (to) different origins (destinations) are treated as 
heterogeneous, and thus trade diversion becomes moderate (Konan and Maskus, 1997). As a 
result, small and large members may both gain from the union, although the introduction of 
the concurrent formation of another trading bloc by the rest of the world would strongly 
worsen the welfare of the large member. Therefore, this thesis offered a concise and 
comprehensive approach to the analysis of the differential country size effect on the welfare 
outcome of preferential trade integration, and is in line with other studies using the CGE 
technique, e.g. Kose and Riezman (2000) and Perroni and Whalley (2003).  
Although from the results, we can rest assured that it is unequivocally more beneficial for 
small countries to ally themselves with relatively large economies; political reality has it that 
the negotiation is prone to failure, by reason of the disparity in the bargaining power and area 
of interest, on top of the fact that large regions have no real economic motivation to form a 
union with small countries. Hence, small economies may be advised to negotiate 
progressively with regions of parallel sizes, while simultaneously lowering tariffs on imports 
from non-members. This ensures that the union does not trigger retaliation from the rest of the 
world and thus regional trade liberalisation can ultimately be expanded to the broadest extent. 
Particularly, as regards the design of a customs union that minimises trade diversion, the 
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results from the first essay advocate that the reduction of common external tariffs against the 
rest of the world should be more than sufficient to prevent non-members from adjusting their 
tariffs against the union or forming another trading bloc in response. In addition, the 
simulation results suggested that this tendency holds true across various types of market 
structures, among which the Cournot oligopolistic setting yields the highest welfare gains for 
union members and non-members alike.  
As the first essay shows, the scope of scale economies is a positive determinant of the 
magnitude of welfare change after a customs union. This point is consistent with Francois and 
Roland-Holst (1997) and de Brujin (2006), in that the effects of incorporating scale 
economies and imperfect competition – such as the decline of market power and the 
expansion of output in quantity and product variety – are substantial. According to Francois 
and Roland-Holst (1997), “it is clear that the constant returns, perfect competition paradigm 
suppresses a number of potentially powerful mechanisms linking trade policy with industry 
performance.” Hence, regions populated with relatively imperfectly competitive firms tend to 
reap greater benefits from trade liberalisation, and the gain is further advanced if the 
government decides concurrently to press forward the competition policy that enables firms to 
enter or exit the market without constraint. Moreover, we derive further policy implication 
from the first essay that, in order to enjoy the benefit of preferential trading arrangements to 
the fullest, the government is recommended to uphold the flexible exchange rate regime and 
not to compensate for the import tariff revenue loss by raising domestic taxes. Lastly, the 
sensitivity test confirms that the welfare gains from a regional grouping are proportionate to 
the extent of tariff removal. 
While the policy implication of the first essay is straightforward and generally in keeping 
with trade theory, the prime concern of this thesis regards the actual application of the CGE 
analytical framework to the issues of preferential trading arrangements in small developing 
countries such as Thailand. For that reason, the second essay reconciles the previous model in 
the first essay with the GTAP 6.0 database. It pays particular attention to the labour market 
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closure that differs across skill levels of labour and regions; and importantly, the discrepancy 
in the degree of market competition across production sectors and regions, in order to advance 
the reflection of economic reality. Thus far, there are numerous multi-region CGE models 
specifically developed for the ex-ante studies of the economic effects of trade liberalisation. 
Among which, the most widely recognised one is the standard GTAP model characterised by 
constant returns to scale and perfect competition (Hertel, 1998); whilst the General 
Equilibrium Model for Asia’s Trade (GEMAT) by Asian Development Bank (2006) and the 
MIRAGE model by The Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales 
(CEPII)1 have recently taken into account the complex features of product differentiation and 
imperfect competition. Although CGE modellers tend to make the strong assumption that 
commodity and labour market structures are homogeneous across regions, sectors and skill 
levels; this CGE model has contributed to the literature by assuming instead that markets can 
be ‘imperfect’ and ‘heterogeneous’ at the same time. 
Using the above-mentioned model, the second essay conducts the comparative analysis of the 
PTAs Thailand has in point of fact concluded with Japan (JTEPA), China (ASEAN+CHINA), 
India (THAILAND+INDIA), Australia (TAFTA) and New Zealand (TNZCEPA). Although 
most other studies have focused on ASEAN-based PTA scenarios2 – a sensible choice as 
Thailand’s PTAs were initiated mostly for political rather than economic reasons (Sally, 
2007) – it is imperative to comprehensively understand the welfare effects of the above five 
Thai PTAs, both at the sectoral and regional levels.   
Since official statistics have revealed that Thai industries are predominantly operated under 
perfect competition, in accordance with the simulation outcomes from the first essay, it is 
predicted that Thailand almost certainly expects less welfare gains from TAFTA, TNZCEPA, 
                                                     
1
 See Decreux and Valin (2007) for the description of the updated MIRAGE model. 
2
  For example, see Urata and Kiyota (2003); Mohanty, Pohit and Roy (2004); Gilbert, Scollay and Bora (2004); Cheong (2005); 
Bchir and Fouquin (2006); McDonald, Robinson and Thierfelder (2007) and Francois and Wignaraja (2008) for recent studies of 
ASEAN-based FTAs using the CGE approach. 
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JTEPA, ASEAN+CHINA, and THAILAND+INDIA, in comparison with other types of 
imperfectly competitive market structures, namely, Cournot oligopoly with firm mobility 
barriers, or monopolistic competition without them. Besides, in reality, most of the above 
Thai FTAs are negotiated among nations regarded as ‘small’ in relation to the rest of the 
world; and FTA commitments concluded – even on the bilateral basis – are normally not 
comprehensive as they involve extensive lists of sensitive and highly sensitive product lines 
not subject to tariff removal. Therefore, not surprisingly, the scale of welfare improvement 
perceived by FTA counterparts in the second essay turns out to be positive yet negligible in 
real terms, at the same time as non-members and the world as a whole are mostly unaffected 
by the proposed trade policy change. Hence, albeit the fact that Thailand has vigorously 
advocated each and every form of trade liberalisation and opted for the flexible exchange rate 
regime since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the simulation results from the second essay has 
implied that it is certainly necessary for Thailand to involve herself in FTA negotiations of a 
larger scale, if the country is to benefit from free trade in a substantial way. More to the point, 
trade creation is actually most enhanced and trade diversion is most diminished when 
Thailand allies herself with large economies with sizeable capacity to trade such as Japan and 
China under JTEPA and ASEAN+CHINA. This contrasts with the less expected benefits on 
the Thai economy under the bilateral FTA with India, TAFTA with Australia, and TNZCEPA 
with New Zealand.  
Another concern is raised over the direction of output adjustment in each production sector 
after manifold preferential trade policy shocks. To be precise, except for the non-traded sector 
that typically contracts after the shock, the change in production pattern of the tradable sector 
apparently differs across types of FTAs. For instance, the production of processed agricultural 
goods (PAGR) in Thailand expands by almost 30% under JTEPA, moderately rises under 
THAILAND+INDIA and TAFTA, but contracts under TNZCEPA and ASEAN+CHINA. 
This type of sectoral discrepancy unavoidably incurs adjustment costs to the economy, which 
may not be trivial in cumulative terms. Given the fact that the rules of origin have already 
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complicated the combined welfare effects of FTAs concurrently in force, confusion can be 
minimised if the Thai government discloses the roadmap of the country’s FTA negotiations to 
the public prior to the actual signings, and attempts to amalgamate the rules of origin across 
the existing FTAs. 
The third essay moves the discussion to the means of government revenue neutralisation in 
the event of the trading bloc formation. In this case, India is chosen as an instance of a region 
that is worse off in terms of EV after joining an FTA. Hence, it is in addressing the efficiency 
of domestic policy choices that this essay seeks to make a contribution. Nonetheless, on the 
whole, the policy implication is not straightforward, because the efficacy of each revenue-
rebalancing domestic tax policy is varied with the size of the informal economy, which is 
untaxable by definition. If tax evasion is prevalent in some sectors, introducing a domestic tax 
primarily on these sectors will entail policy inefficacy, compared with imposing a new tax on 
domestic sectors with more formal activities. In addition, the value of the elasticity of 
substitution between final demands for formal and informal goods plays a major role in the 
simulation results. High substitution elasticity implies more flexibility for consumers to shift 
to informal good consumption, and hence policy efficacy is ambiguous unless we obtain an 
accurate estimate of this elasticity. As such, it is difficult to identify exactly which tax policy 
is best for the maintenance of government revenue balance. However, the simulation results 
in the third essay are seemingly in keeping with those derived from the first essay, in that the 
ensuing expansion of the public sector normally hampers the positive changes in real GDP 
and EV after the launching of an FTA. For that reason, the government is advised not to 
manipulate the domestic tax policy unless the level of government spending is seriously in 
difficulty as a result of preferential tariff removal. 
5.2 Limitations and Extensions for Future Research 
Thus far, this thesis has examined numerous aspects of preferential trading arrangements and 
their effects on commodity and primary factor markets, rich and poor households, and overall 
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welfare of individual regions and the world as a whole. Whilst the CGE analysis is carefully 
conducted and the modelling approach is in tune with economic reality, the limitations of this 
research are chiefly attributable to the intrinsic characteristics of CGE models. Although it 
can be laborious trying to resolve some technical issues, it is reckoned that a number of model 
improvements with respect to the precision of the predictions of trade policy outcomes can 
certainly be achieved. 
The first set of limitations is concerned with the modelling of trade policy measures. As trade 
and protection data in this thesis are simply derived from the GTAP 6.0 database, the study 
has reconciled the CGE model with the GTAP specification in that Non-Tariff Barriers 
(NTBs) including quota restrictions are not explicitly modelled but instead transformed into 
tariff-equivalent protections, which in actuality partially account for customs tariffs on 
imports. As such, in order to examine the direct impact of quota removal on the economy, 
quota restrictions ought to be incorporated into the current CGE model in its original forms. 
This point is firmly justified since trade theory has resolutely vindicated the argument that 
quota restrictions yield different welfare effects on income distribution from import tariffs 
and tend to be more distortionary in general. Besides, this specific type of policy modelling 
should be applicable to a wide range of empirical FTA analyses, since FTA negotiations 
commonly include either the reduction or removal of quota restrictions. Although, it is 
noteworthy that the GTAP data on border protection will no longer be relevant as this feature 
is taken into account, and it requires a certain amount of effort on the redefinition and hence 
the recalibration of the benchmark border protection data in order that they become exclusive 
of quota restrictions.  
In addition to the above limitation in the incorporation of trade quota to the existing model, it 
is also the case that under the CGE framework, the quantification of various qualitative FTA 
commitments which are embraced by negotiating partners on a regular basis – for instance, 
the rules of origin and the reciprocal facilitation in government procurement, customs 
procedure, paperless trading, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and numerous kinds of 
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technical assistance – is extremely difficult, if not impossible. At the same time, trade 
economists recognise the long-term benefits of the afore-mentioned commitments, especially 
in terms of trade and real output expansion. For that reason, greater efforts on future research 
in this area are duly required for the advancement of the current understanding on the 
economic consequences of those FTA commitments which are normally unquantifiable. In 
particular, the FTA commitment on FDI facilitation should be regarded as one of the most 
prioritised research topics, as its economic benefits are likely to be fairly substantial in the 
long run. Accordingly, in order to address the FTA effect on FDI, there are a number of 
modifications to be made. First of all, multinational firms will be brought into existence, since 
capital is no longer identified as a region-specific production factor. As a result, the earlier 
assumption that foreign savings and international capital flows are exogenous should become 
invalidated. Hence, the explicit modelling of multinational firms and cross-country 
investment demands the restructuring of the monetary market which remains primitive in 
most CGE models. Importantly, firms should be allowed to allocate directly profits to 
overseas investment, instead of investing through the representative regional bank, which 
basically fixes the amount of foreign saving while concentrating on domestic investment. 
Concurrently, steps toward the dynamic CGE modelling will soon be imperative, due to the 
fact that capital accumulation greatly accounts for the long-term benefits of FDI promotion 
within a trading bloc. 
Another alternative for the current CGE model enhancement is to incorporate the 
heterogeneous firm assumption proposed by Melitz (2003) which essentially states that strong 
firms are comparatively capable of exportation while incompetent ones tend to supply mostly 
towards the domestic market. Intuitively, this feature may be explored through the re-
specification of the CES production function so that it additionally includes the efficiency 
parameter which is heterogeneous across individual firms. Since the modification obviously 
requires a colossal amount of data calibration at the firm level, it is doubtful whether the idea 
is practical. Nevertheless, on the modelling end, the problem is worth attention in 
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consideration of the fact that even the production functions of firms under monopolistic 
competition with heterogeneous products themselves are not truly heterogeneous, leaving 
alone those under perfect and Cournot oligopoly. Therefore, there is scope for improvement 
in the modelling of heterogeneous firms within individual sectors. 
Some other modelling issues for future research include the enrichment of the structure of the 
informal sector, which was strictly defined as the untaxable economy in the present version, 
in combination with the refinement of its relationship with the formal economy. Specifically, 
to improve the flexibility of the model in terms of its responsiveness to a policy change, the 
consumer demand function may be redefined in order that leisure is also included in the 
bundle of consumption options, or informal labour may be remodelled to explicitly account 
for the second-job holding. Alternatively, the modelling of the informal economy may be 
extended to the income distribution analysis which perhaps requires that the household is to 
be further disaggregated in accordance with profession, income and geography. Lastly, the 
inclusion and calibration of the informal sector in other developing countries which are 
expected to have a sizable degree of tax evasion similar to India may be implemented and 
compared with the previous simulation outcomes for the Indian economy.  
The second set of limitations is mainly associated with the data constraint. To a certain extent, 
most CGE models suffer from the accuracy issue concerning the estimation of parameters and 
variables in the benchmark year, which are collected from various external resources and may 
not be strictly consistent due to inconsistent data compilation methods. Besides, it remains 
doubtful whether we can take the data which are simply calibrated at a random point as if the 
economy must be in equilibrium. Thus, in future research we may endeavour to enhance data 
consistency by estimating initial values for a number of countries of interest using data from 
relatively updated and reliable sources.  
The remainder of the limitations are concerned with the sensitivity analysis of CGE models. 
Although the scale and complexity of the CGE modelling system require that the selection of 
functional forms and closure rules is transparent, simple and straightforward on the whole, 
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there is no proper facility to substantiate that they are appropriately chosen for specific types 
of economies. Coupled with the fact that the determinants of welfare gains from individual 
FTAs are vaguely articulated for the CGE framework, we may further supplement the 
findings in this thesis with some relevant results from econometric models specifically 
designed for the afore-mentioned purposes. However, this line of extension ought to be 
conducted after the FTAs under consideration have taken effect for a certain amount of time. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix to Chapter 2 
Appendix A2-1: Technical Specifications of the CGE Model Designed for 
Market Size Simulations 
Notations: 
x Regions (reg or regg) are endowed with sectors/goods (sec or secc), of which the subset 
secT is tradable and the subset secTN is non-tradable. Sectors demand primary factors 
(fac), of which the subset facM is mobile domestically but not internationally, and the 
subset facS is sector-specific. 
x Following the GAMS syntax, double quotation marks (" and ") are used to denote a 
particular element in one of the sets of factors (fac), sectors (sec) or regions (reg). Hence, 
“
" ",L regPFM ” represents the price of the mobile factor ‘labour’ in region reg. 
x In some equation blocks, particular parameters (variables) are appended with the dollar 
options ($), used in GAMS to identify conditions for these parameters (variables) to be 
incorporated into the model. If the conditions are not met, then the parameters (variables) 
will be set to zero. For example, “ , ,sec$ ( ) $ ( )fac reg fac regPFM facM fac PFS facS fac ” tells 
GAMS to use the former price if the factor is mobile, and the latter price otherwise. 
Furthermore, “$SameAs(fac,"L")” specifies that the preceding parameters (variables) are 
to be used only when the element of the factor set (fac) is ‘labour.’ 
x Benchmark values of variables are indicated by appending the number ‘0’. These 
variables are endogenous in general but their benchmark values may be used in defining 
other equations such as the wage curve and the consumer price index.  
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x For simplicity, all factor demands are referred to as ,secfac regF , with ‘fixed’ sector-specific 
factor demands identified by a ‘bar’ over the factor name (i.e. ,secfacS regF ). 
Parameters 
sec
regHHD  Households’ Cobb-Douglas commodity budget shares 
sec
regCGD  Government’s Cobb-Douglas commodity budget shares 
sec
regID  Bank’s Cobb-Douglas commodity budget shares 
sec,sec
reg
cio  Leontief intermediate demand coefficients 
sec
regFV  CES substitution elasticity of the value-added production function 
sec
regaF  CES efficiency parameters of the value-added production function 
,
sec
fac regFJ  CES share parameters of factors in the value-added production function 
sec
regAV  Substitution elasticity of the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regaA  Efficiency parameters of the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regAMJ  Share parameters of imports in the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regADJ  Share parameters of domestically-produced goods in the upper-level 
Armington function 
sec
regBMV  Substitution elasticity of the lower-level Armington function 
sec
regaBM  Efficiency parameters of the lower-level Armington function 
,
sec
reg reggBMJ  Share parameters of bilateral imports in the lower-level Armington function 
regZ  Wage curve elasticity 
regtrep  Replacement rates 
regmps  Households’ marginal propensity to save 
regty  Income tax rates 
sec
regtc  Commodity tax rates 
,
sec
fac regtf  Factor tax rates 
,
sec
reg reggtm  Import tariff rates 
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Exogenous variables 
,fac reg
FS  Factor endowments (by region) 
,
sec
facS reg
F  Sector-specific factor demands (by sector) 
reg
TRO  Government’s lump-sum transfers to the household 
reg
SG  Government savings 
reg
SF  Foreign savings 
Endogenous variables 
,fac regPFM  Mobile factor prices 
,
sec
fac regPFS  Sector-specific factor prices 
sec
regPA  Armington composite commodity prices  
sec
regPZ  Output prices 
sec
regPD  Prices of domestically-produced goods delivered to the home market 
sec
regPM  Import prices in home currency 
sec
regPE  Export prices in home currency 
,
sec
reg reggPBM  Prices of bilateral imports by region reg from region regg in home currency 
,
sec
reg reggPBE  Prices of bilateral exports from region reg to region regg in home currency 
,
sec
reg reggPWE  Prices of bilateral exports from region reg to region regg in world currency 
regEXC  Exchange rates 
,
sec
facM regF  Mobile factor demands 
sec
regQA  Armington composite commodity quantities 
sec
regQZ  Output quantities 
sec
regQDS  Quantities of domestically-produced goods supplied to the home market 
sec
regQDD  Quantities of domestically-produced goods demanded by the home market 
sec
regQM  Import volumes 
sec
regQE  Export volumes 
,
sec
reg reggQBM  Bilateral import volumes by region reg from region regg 
,
sec
reg reggQBE  Bilateral export volumes from region reg to region regg 
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regINC  Household income 
regTREV  Total tax revenue 
regS  Total savings 
regCBUD  Household consumption budget 
sec
regC  Households’ consumption demands 
sec
regCG  Government’s consumption demands 
sec
regI  Bank’s investment demands 
regSHH  Household savings 
regTRNF  Government’s total transfers to the household 
regUNEMP  Unemployed labour 
Numéraires 
reg
CPI  Laspeyre consumer price indices 
" 1"REG
EXC  Exchange rate of region REG1 
Equations 
Firms’ CES factor demands: 
   
   
sec
sec
,
sec
sec
, , ,
sec sec
,
sec
,
, ,
sec sec sec
,
sec
1 $ ( ) $ ( )
$ ( )
1
$ ( )
reg
reg
F
fac reg
reg
fac reg fac reg fac reg
fac reg
fac reg
F
reg fac reg fac reg
fac reg
FQZ
tf PFM facM fac PFS facS fac
F
PFM facM fac
aF F tf
PFS facS fac
V
V
J
J
§ ·¨ ¸ ¨ ¸  © ¹ 
§ ¨   
©
sec
sec sec
1 1
reg
reg reg
F
F F
fac
V
V V ­ ½ª º·° °« »¸® ¾¨ ¸« »° °¹¬ ¼¯ ¿
¦
 
Firms’ zero-profit conditions: 
   
 
, , , ,
sec sec sec sec sec
sec sec ,sec sec
sec
1 $ ( ) $ ( )reg reg fac reg fac reg fac reg fac reg
fac
reg reg reg
c c
c
PZ QZ tf PFM facM fac PFS facS fac F
PA io QZ
     
  
¦
¦
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Households’ Cobb-Douglas commodity demands: 
 sec sec sec sec1 reg reg reg reg regT T T Ttc PA C HH CBUDD      
Government’s Cobb-Douglas commodity demands: 
 sec sec sec
Government budget: reg
reg reg
reg reg reg reg reg
TN TN TN
CGBUD
PA CG CG TREV TRNF SG CPID     
	

 
Bank’s Cobb-Douglas commodity demands: 
sec sec sec
reg reg reg reg
T T TPA I I SD    
Homogeneous commodity supply to domestic and overseas markets: 
 sec sec sec sec sec sec $sec (sec)reg reg reg reg reg regPZ QZ PD QDS PE QE T      
, ,
sec sec sec sec
( )
reg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T
regg reg
PE QE PBE QBE
z
  ¦  
,
sec sec sec sec
reg reg reg reg regg
T T T TPZ PD PE PBE    
sec sec
reg reg
TN TNQDS QZ  
Upper-level Armington functions: 
Domestically-produced commodity demands: 
  secsec 1 sec secsec sec sec sec
sec
$sec (sec) $sec (sec)
reg
reg
A
reg regA
reg reg reg reg
reg
AD PAQDD aA QA T QA TN
PD
V
V Jª º§ ·« » ª º   ¨ ¸ ¬ ¼« »© ¹¬ ¼
  
Aggregate import demands:  
  secsec 1 sec secsec sec sec
sec
reg
T
reg
T
A
reg regA
reg reg regT T
T T Treg
T
AM PAQM aA QA
PM
V
V J § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
 
Balancing conditions for upper-level Armington demands:  
 sec sec sec sec sec sec $sec (sec)reg reg reg reg reg regPA QA PD QDD PM QM T      
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Lower-level Armington functions: 
Bilateral import demands: 
  secsec ,1, sec secsec sec sec,
sec
reg
T
reg
T
BM
reg regg regBM
reg regg reg regT T
T T Treg regg
T
BM PMQBM aBM QM
PBM
V
V J § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
 
Balancing conditions for bilateral import demands: 
, ,
sec sec sec sec
( )
reg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T
regg reg
PM QM PBM QBM
z
  ¦  
Market-clearing conditions: 
 Factor markets $facM(fac): 
,
,
sec
sec
$( " ")fac regfac reg regF FS UNEMP fac L   ¦  
 Armington commodity markets: 
sec sec sec,secc secc sec sec
sec
$sec (sec) $sec (sec)reg reg reg reg reg reg
c
C I io QZ T CG TN QA§ ·     ¨ ¸© ¹¦  
Domestically-produced commodity supply and demand: 
sec sec
reg regQDS QDD  
Bilateral trade: 
, ,
sec sec
reg regg regg reg
T TQBE QBM  
Balance of payments: 
   
, , , ,
sec sec sec sec
sec sec
reg reg
reg regg regg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T reg
T regg reg T regg reg
SF CPIQBM PWE QBE PWE
EXCz z
§ ·    ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹¦ ¦ ¦ ¦  
Wage curve: 
" ",
" ",
1 1
0 0
L reg reg
reg
L reg reg
PFM UNEMP
PFM UNEMP
Z ª º§ ·   « »¨ ¸© ¹¬ ¼
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Household income: 
 , , ,sec sec
sec
$ ( ) $ ( )reg fac reg fac reg fac reg reg
fac
INC PFM facM fac PFS facS fac F TRNF   ¦¦  
Household consumption budget: 
(1 )reg reg reg regCBUD ty INC SHH     
Household savings: 
(1 )reg reg reg regSHH mps ty INCª º   ¬ ¼  
Total savings: 
( )reg reg regreg regS SHH SG SF CPI     
Government tax revenue: 
, , ,
sec sec sec sec sec sec
sec
Income taxes: Commodity taxes: Import tariffs: reg reg reg
reg reg reg reg reg reg reg regg regg reg reg reg regg
T T T T T T
T
TRY TRC TRM
TREV ty INC tc PA C tm PWE EXC QBM        ¦	
 	
 	 

 
sec ( )
, , , ,
sec sec sec
sec
Factor taxes: 
$ ( ) $ ( )
reg
T regg reg
fac reg fac reg fac reg fac reg
fac
TRF
tf PFM facM fac PFS facS fac F
z
   
¦ ¦
¦¦

	

 
Government’s transfer to the household: 
" ",
reg regreg reg L reg regTRNF trep PFM UNEMP TRO CPI      
Laspeyre consumer price index: 
sec sec sec
sec
sec sec sec
sec
(1 ) 0
(1 ) 0 0
reg reg reg
reg
reg reg reg
tc PA C
CPI
tc PA C
  
   
¦
¦  
Bilateral export price: 
, ,
sec sec
reg regg reg regg reg
T TPBE PWE EXC   
Bilateral import price: 
, , ,
sec sec sec(1 )reg regg reg regg regg reg regT T TPBM tm PWE EXC     
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Appendix A2-2: If MC(X) < AC(X) then AC(X) is a Decreasing Function of X. 
Let the total cost function of X be C(X). 
Then the marginal cost function is     
dC X
MC X
d X
 ,  
and the average cost function is    C XAC X
X
 . 
The derivative of AC(X) with respect to X is: 
   
   
2
dC X
X C X
dXdAC X C Xd
dX dX X X
§ · ¨ ¸§ · © ¹  ¨ ¸© ¹
. 
This will be negative if     0dC XX C X
dX
§ ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
, that is if  
    0dC X C X
dX X
  . 
Therefore, AC(X) is a decreasing function of X if marginal cost is less than average cost, i.e. 
MC(X) < AC(X). 
Appendix A2-3: Technical Specifications of the CGE Model Designed for 
Market Structure Simulations 
Regions (reg or regg) are endowed with sectors/goods (sec or secc), of which the subset secT 
is tradable and the subset secTN is non-tradable (as in Appendix A2-1). In addition, pc stands 
for the perfectly competitive subset of sectors, and ic for the imperfectly competitive sector. 
As with Appendix A2-1, sectors demand primary factors (fac), of which facM is mobile 
domestically but not internationally, and facS is sector-specific.  
 (A) Cournot Oligopoly with Homogeneous Goods (Free Firm Mobility) 
This model is based upon the perfectly competitive model specified in Appendix A2-1, but 
has additional oligopolistic features, which are shown in bold type below. 
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Parameters 
sec
regHHD  Households’ Cobb-Douglas commodity budget shares 
sec
regCGD  Government’s Cobb-Douglas commodity budget shares 
sec
regID  Bank’s Cobb-Douglas commodity budget shares 
sec,sec
reg
cio  Leontief intermediate demand coefficients 
sec
regFV  CES substitution elasticity of the value-added production function 
sec
regaF  CES efficiency parameters of the value-added production function 
,
sec
fac regFJ  CES share parameters of factors in the value-added production function 
sec
regAV  Substitution elasticity of the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regaA  Efficiency parameters of the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regAMJ  Share parameters of imports in the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regADJ  Share parameters of domestically-produced goods in the upper-level 
Armington function 
sec
regBMV  Substitution elasticity of the lower-level Armington function 
sec
regaBM  Efficiency parameters of the lower-level Armington function 
,
sec
reg reggBMJ  Share parameters of bilateral imports in the lower-level Armington function 
regZ  Wage curve elasticity 
regtrep  Replacement rates 
regmps  Households’ marginal propensity to save 
regty  Income tax rates 
sec
regtc  Commodity tax rates 
,
sec
fac regtf  Factor tax rates 
,
sec
reg reggtm  Import tariff rates 
,
sec
fac regff  Fixed factor inputs demanded by each firm in Cournot sector sec 
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Exogenous variables 
,fac reg
FS  Factor endowments (by region) 
,
sec
facS reg
F  Sector-specific factor demands (by sector) 
reg
TRO  Government’s lump-sum transfers to the household 
reg
SG  Government savings 
reg
SF  Foreign savings 
Endogenous variables 
,fac regPFM  Mobile factor prices 
,
sec
fac regPFS  Sector-specific factor prices 
sec
regPA  Armington composite commodity prices  
sec
regPZ  Output prices 
sec
regPD  Prices of domestically-produced goods delivered to the home market 
sec
regPM  Import prices in home currency 
sec
regPE  Export prices in home currency 
,
sec
reg reggPBM  Prices of bilateral imports by region reg from region regg in home currency 
,
sec
reg reggPBE  Prices of bilateral exports from region reg to region regg in home currency 
,
sec
reg reggPWE  Prices of bilateral exports from region reg to region regg in world currency 
regEXC  Exchange rates 
,
sec
facM regF  Mobile factor demands 
sec
regQA  Armington composite commodity quantities 
sec
regQZ  Output quantities 
sec
regQDS  Quantities of domestically-produced goods supplied to the home market 
sec
regQDD  Quantities of domestically-produced goods demanded by the home market 
sec
regQM  Import volumes 
sec
regQE  Export volumes 
,
sec
reg reggQBM  Bilateral import volumes by region reg from region regg 
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,
sec
reg reggQBE  Bilateral export volumes from region reg to region regg 
regINC  Household income 
regTREV  Total tax revenue 
regS  Total savings 
regCBUD  Household consumption budget 
sec
regC  Households’ consumption demands 
sec
regCG  Government’s consumption demands 
sec
regI  Bank’s investment demands 
regSHH  Household savings 
regTRNF  Government’s total transfers to the household 
regUNEMP  Unemployed labour 
sec
regEDM  Price elasticity of demand for Cournot commodities 
sec
regNOF  Number of firms in Cournot sectors 
Numéraires 
reg
CPI  Laspeyre consumer price indices 
" 1"REG
EXC  Exchange rate of region REG1 
Equations 
Firms’ CES factor demands: 
   
   
sec
sec
,
sec
sec , , ,
sec sec
,
sec
,
, ,
sec sec sec
,
sec
1 $ ( ) $ ( )
$ ( )
1
$ ( )
reg
reg
F
fac reg
reg
fac reg fac reg fac reg
fac reg
fac reg
F
reg fac reg fac reg
fac reg
FQZ
tf PFM facM fac PFS facS fac
F
PFM facM fac
aF F tf
PFS facS fac
V
V
J
J
§ ·¨ ¸ ¨ ¸  © ¹ 
§¨
   
©
 
sec
sec sec
1 1
reg
reg reg
F
F F
fac
V
V V ­ ½ª º·° °« »¸® ¾¨ ¸« »° °¹¬ ¼¯ ¿

¦
$ (sec)fac,reg regsec sec+ ff NOF ic
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Firms’ zero-profit conditions: 
   
 
, , , ,
sec sec sec sec sec
sec sec ,sec sec
sec
1 $ ( ) $ ( )reg reg fac reg fac reg fac reg fac reg
fac
reg reg reg
c c
c
PZ QZ tf PFM facM fac PFS facS fac F
PA io QZ
     
  
¦
¦
 
Cournot firms’ price-markup conditions: 
,
,
,
sec sec,
sec, ,
$ ( )
1
$ ( )11
fac reg
fac reg
ic fac reg
icreg reg reg
ic icreg reg
facic ic fac reg fac reg reg
ic ic ic
reg
ic
PFM facM fac
tf
PFS facS fac
PZ PA io
EDM NOF
F ff NOF
QZ


u
 
Cournot price elasticity of demand: 
, ,
,
, ,
1
reg reg reg
reg regic ic ic
ic icreg reg reg
ic ic ic
regg reg regg reg
regg ic ic
ic regg regg
reg ic icic
regg reg
regg reggic
ic icreg
ic
regg reg regg reg
ic ic
QDD PD QDDA AQZ PA QA
PBM QBMBM
PM QMEDM
QBM BM AQZ
PBM QBM
V



 

( )
$ 0 0
1
$ 0 0
reg
ic
regg
reg
regg
icregg regg
ic ic
reg
regic
icreg
ic
QM
A
PA QA
CG QMQZ
V
z
z

¦  
Households’ Cobb-Douglas commodity demands: 
 sec sec sec sec1 reg reg reg reg regT T T Ttc PA C HH CBUDD      
Government’s Cobb-Douglas commodity demands: 
 sec sec sec
Government budget: reg
reg reg
reg reg reg reg reg
TN TN TN
CGBUD
PA CG CG TREV TRNF SG CPID     
	

 
Bank’s Cobb-Douglas commodity demands: 
sec sec sec
reg reg reg reg
T T TPA I I SD    
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Homogeneous commodity supply to domestic and overseas markets: 
 sec sec sec sec sec sec $sec (sec)reg reg reg reg reg regPZ QZ PD QDS PE QE T      
, ,
sec sec sec sec
( )
reg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T
regg reg
PE QE PBE QBE
z
  ¦  
,
sec sec sec sec
reg reg reg reg regg
T T T TPZ PD PE PBE    
sec sec
reg reg
TN TNQDS QZ  
Upper-level Armington functions: 
Domestically-produced commodity demands: 
  secsec 1 sec secsec sec sec sec
sec
$sec (sec) $sec (sec)
reg
reg
A
reg regA
reg reg reg reg
reg
AD PAQDD aA QA T QA TN
PD
V
V Jª º§ ·« » ª º   ¨ ¸ ¬ ¼« »© ¹¬ ¼
  
Aggregate import demands:  
  secsec 1 sec secsec sec sec
sec
reg
T
reg
T
A
reg regA
reg reg regT T
T T Treg
T
AM PAQM aA QA
PM
V
V J § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
 
Balancing conditions for upper-level Armington demands:  
 sec sec sec sec sec sec $sec (sec)reg reg reg reg reg regPA QA PD QDD PM QM T      
Lower-level Armington functions: 
Bilateral import demands: 
  secsec ,1, sec secsec sec sec,
sec
reg
T
reg
T
BM
reg regg regBM
reg regg reg regT T
T T Treg regg
T
BM PMQBM aBM QM
PBM
V
V J § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
 
Balancing conditions for bilateral import demands: 
, ,
sec sec sec sec
( )
reg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T
regg reg
PM QM PBM QBM
z
  ¦  
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Market-clearing conditions: 
 Factor markets $facM(fac): 
,
,
sec
sec
$( " ")fac regfac reg regF FS UNEMP fac L   ¦  
 Armington commodity markets: 
sec sec sec,secc secc sec sec
sec
$sec (sec) $sec (sec)reg reg reg reg reg reg
c
C I io QZ T CG TN QA§ ·     ¨ ¸© ¹¦  
Domestically-produced commodity supply and demand: 
sec sec
reg regQDS QDD  
Bilateral trade: 
, ,
sec sec
reg regg regg reg
T TQBE QBM  
Balance of payments: 
   
, , , ,
sec sec sec sec
sec sec
reg reg
reg regg regg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T reg
T regg reg T regg reg
SF CPIQBM PWE QBE PWE
EXCz z
§ ·    ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹¦ ¦ ¦ ¦  
Wage curve: 
" ",
" ",
1 1
0 0
L reg reg
reg
L reg reg
PFM UNEMP
PFM UNEMP
Z ª º§ ·   « »¨ ¸© ¹¬ ¼
 
Household income: 
 , , ,sec sec
sec
$ ( ) $ ( )reg fac reg fac reg fac reg reg
fac
INC PFM facM fac PFS facS fac F TRNF   ¦¦  
Household consumption budget: 
(1 )reg reg reg regCBUD ty INC SHH     
Household savings: 
(1 )reg reg reg regSHH mps ty INCª º   ¬ ¼  
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Total savings: 
( )reg reg regreg regS SHH SG SF CPI     
Government tax revenue: 
sec sec sec
sec
Income taxes: Commodity taxes: 
, , ,
sec sec sec
Import tariffs: 
reg reg
reg
reg reg reg reg reg reg
T T T
T
TRY TRC
reg regg regg reg reg reg regg
T T T
TRM
TREV ty INC tc PA C
tm PWE EXC QBM
    
   
¦	
 	

	 

 
sec ( )
, , , ,
sec sec sec
sec
Factor taxes: 
$ ( ) $ ( )
reg
T regg reg
fac reg fac reg fac reg fac reg
fac
TRF
tf PFM facM fac PFS facS fac F
z
   
¦ ¦
¦¦

	

 
Government’s transfer to the household: 
" ",
reg regreg reg L reg regTRNF trep PFM UNEMP TRO CPI      
Laspeyre consumer price index: 
sec sec sec
sec
sec sec sec
sec
(1 ) 0
(1 ) 0 0
reg reg reg
reg
reg reg reg
tc PA C
CPI
tc PA C
  
   
¦
¦  
Bilateral export price: 
, ,
sec sec
reg regg reg regg reg
T TPBE PWE EXC   
Bilateral import price: 
, , ,
sec sec sec(1 )reg regg reg regg regg reg regT T TPBM tm PWE EXC     
(B) Cournot Oligopoly with Homogeneous Goods (Barred Firm Mobility) 
The firm immobility constraint is applied by fixing the number of firms at the same time as 
endogenising the profit variable. Additional features to the former Cournot model, which 
assumed free entry and exit of firms, are indicated in bold. 
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Parameters 
sec
regHHD  Households’ Cobb-Douglas commodity budget shares 
sec
regCGD  Government’s Cobb-Douglas commodity budget shares 
sec
regID  Bank’s Cobb-Douglas commodity budget shares 
sec,sec
reg
cio  Leontief intermediate demand coefficients 
sec
regFV  CES substitution elasticity of the value-added production function 
sec
regaF  CES efficiency parameters of the value-added production function 
,
sec
fac regFJ  CES share parameters of factors in the value-added production function 
sec
regAV  Substitution elasticity of the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regaA  Efficiency parameters of the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regAMJ  Share parameters of imports in the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regADJ  Share parameters of domestically-produced goods in the upper-level 
Armington function 
sec
regBMV  Substitution elasticity of the lower-level Armington function 
sec
regaBM  Efficiency parameters of the lower-level Armington function 
,
sec
reg reggBMJ  Share parameters of bilateral imports in the lower-level Armington function 
regZ  Wage curve elasticity 
regtrep  Replacement rates 
regmps  Households’ marginal propensity to save 
regty  Income tax rates 
sec
regtc  Commodity tax rates 
,
sec
fac regtf  Factor tax rates 
,
sec
reg reggtm  Import tariff rates 
,
sec
fac regff  Fixed factor inputs demanded by each firm in Cournot sector sec 
Exogenous variables 
,fac reg
FS  Factor endowments (by region) 
,
sec
facS reg
F  Sector-specific factor demands (by sector) 
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reg
TRO  Government’s lump-sum transfers to the household 
reg
SG  Government savings 
reg
SF  Foreign savings 
sec
reg
NOF  Number of firms in Cournot sectors 
Endogenous variables 
,fac regPFM  Mobile factor prices 
,
sec
fac regPFS  Sector-specific factor prices 
sec
regPA  Armington composite commodity prices  
sec
regPZ  Output prices 
sec
regPD  Prices of domestically-produced goods delivered to the home market 
sec
regPM  Import prices in home currency 
sec
regPE  Export prices in home currency 
,
sec
reg reggPBM  Prices of bilateral imports by region reg from region regg in home currency 
,
sec
reg reggPBE  Prices of bilateral exports from region reg to region regg in home currency 
,
sec
reg reggPWE  Prices of bilateral exports from region reg to region regg in world currency 
regEXC  Exchange rates 
,
sec
facM regF  Mobile factor demands 
sec
regQA  Armington composite commodity quantities 
sec
regQZ  Output quantities 
sec
regQDS  Quantities of domestically-produced goods supplied to the home market 
sec
regQDD  Quantities of domestically-produced goods demanded by the home market 
sec
regQM  Import volumes 
sec
regQE  Export volumes 
,
sec
reg reggQBM  Bilateral import volumes by region reg from region regg 
,
sec
reg reggQBE  Bilateral export volumes from region reg to region regg 
regINC  Household income 
regTREV  Total tax revenue 
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regS  Total savings 
regCBUD  Household consumption budget 
sec
regC  Households’ consumption demands 
sec
regCG  Government’s consumption demands 
sec
regI  Bank’s investment demands 
regSHH  Household savings 
regTRNF  Government’s total transfers to the household 
regUNEMP  Unemployed labour 
sec
regEDM  Price elasticity of demand for Cournot commodities 
sec
regPROFIT  Sectoral profits under Cournot oligopoly 
Numéraires 
reg
CPI  Laspeyre consumer price indices 
" 1"REG
EXC  Exchange rate of region REG1 
Equations 
Firms’ CES factor demands: 
   
   
sec
sec
,
sec
sec , , ,
sec sec
,
sec
,
, ,
sec sec sec
,
sec
1 $ ( ) $ ( )
$ ( )
1
$ ( )
reg
reg
F
fac reg
reg
fac reg fac reg fac reg
fac reg
fac reg
F
reg fac reg fac reg
fac reg
FQZ
tf PFM facM fac PFS facS fac
F
PFM facM fac
aF F tf
PFS facS fac
V
V
J
J
§ ·¨ ¸ ¨ ¸  © ¹ 
§¨
   
©
 
sec
sec sec
1 1
,
sec $ (sec)
reg
reg reg
F
F F
fac
fac regff ic
V
V V ­ ½ª º·° °« »¸® ¾¨ ¸« »° °¹¬ ¼¯ ¿
 
¦
sec
reg
 NOF
 
Firms’ zero-profit conditions: 
   
 
, , , ,
sec sec sec sec sec
sec sec ,sec sec
sec
1 $ ( ) $ ( )reg reg fac reg fac reg fac reg fac reg
fac
reg reg reg
c c
c
PZ QZ tf PFM facM fac PFS facS fac F
PA io QZ
     
  
¦
¦ sec $ (sec)reg+ PROFIT ic
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Cournot firms’ price-markup conditions: 
 
 
,
,
,
sec sec,
sec, ,
$ ( )
1
$ ( )11
fac reg
fac reg
ic fac reg
ic
reg reg reg
ic ic
reg fac fac reg fac regic
ic ic
reg
ic
PFM facM fac
tf
PFS facS fac
PZ PA io
EDM F ff
QZ
­ ½§ ·° °¨ ¸ u¨ ¸° °§ · © ¹° °¨ ¸    ® ¾¨ ¸ ° °© ¹  ° °u° °¯ ¿
¦ ¦reg
regic
ic
NOF NOF
 
Cournot price elasticity of demand: 
 
 
, ,
,
, ,
1
reg reg reg
reg regic ic ic
ic icreg reg reg
ic ic ic
regg reg regg reg
regg ic ic
ic regg regg
reg ic icic
regg reg
regg reggic
ic icreg
ic
regg reg regg reg
ic ic
QDD PD QDDA AQZ PA QA
PBM QBMBM
PM QMEDM
QBM BM AQZ
PBM QBM
V V
V
V V
§ · ¨ ¸© ¹
  
 
  
 
 
( )
$ 0 0
1
$ 0 0
reg
ic
regg
reg
regg
icregg regg
ic ic
reg
regic
icreg
ic
QM
A
PA QA
CG QMQZ
V
z
­ ½° °° °° °° °§ ·¨ ¸° °° ° z¨ ¸® ¾¨ ¸° °¨ ¸° °¨ ¸° °¨ ¸° °¨ ¸ ° °¨ ¸° °© ¹¯ ¿
  
¦  
Households’ Cobb-Douglas commodity demands: 
 sec sec sec sec1 reg reg reg reg regT T T Ttc PA C HH CBUDD      
Government’s Cobb-Douglas commodity demands: 
 sec sec sec
Government budget: reg
reg reg
reg reg reg reg reg
TN TN TN
CGBUD
PA CG CG TREV TRNF SG CPID     
	

 
Bank’s Cobb-Douglas commodity demands: 
sec sec sec
reg reg reg reg
T T TPA I I SD    
Homogeneous commodity supplies to domestic and overseas markets: 
 sec sec sec sec sec sec $sec (sec)reg reg reg reg reg regPZ QZ PD QDS PE QE T      
, ,
sec sec sec sec
( )
reg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T
regg reg
PE QE PBE QBE
z
  ¦  
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,
sec sec sec sec
reg reg reg reg regg
T T T TPZ PD PE PBE    
sec sec
reg reg
TN TNQDS QZ  
Upper-level Armington functions: 
Domestically-produced commodity demands: 
  secsec 1 sec secsec sec sec sec
sec
$sec (sec) $sec (sec)
reg
reg
A
reg regA
reg reg reg reg
reg
AD PAQDD aA QA T QA TN
PD
V
V Jª º§ ·« » ª º   ¨ ¸ ¬ ¼« »© ¹¬ ¼
  
Aggregate import demands:  
  secsec 1 sec secsec sec sec
sec
reg
T
reg
T
A
reg regA
reg reg regT T
T T Treg
T
AM PAQM aA QA
PM
V
V J § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
 
Balancing conditions for upper-level Armington demands:  
 sec sec sec sec sec sec $sec (sec)reg reg reg reg reg regPA QA PD QDD PM QM T      
Lower-level Armington functions: 
Bilateral import demands: 
  secsec ,1, sec secsec sec sec,
sec
reg
T
reg
T
BM
reg regg regBM
reg regg reg regT T
T T Treg regg
T
BM PMQBM aBM QM
PBM
V
V J § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
 
Balancing conditions for bilateral import demands: 
, ,
sec sec sec sec
( )
reg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T
regg reg
PM QM PBM QBM
z
  ¦  
Market-clearing conditions: 
 Factor markets $facM(fac): 
,
,
sec
sec
$( " ")fac regfac reg regF FS UNEMP fac L   ¦  
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 Armington commodity markets: 
sec sec sec,secc secc sec sec
sec
$sec (sec) $sec (sec)reg reg reg reg reg reg
c
C I io QZ T CG TN QA§ ·     ¨ ¸© ¹¦  
Domestically-produced commodity supply and demand: 
sec sec
reg regQDS QDD  
Bilateral trade: 
, ,
sec sec
reg regg regg reg
T TQBE QBM  
Balance of payments: 
   
, , , ,
sec sec sec sec
sec sec
reg reg
reg regg regg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T reg
T regg reg T regg reg
SF CPIQBM PWE QBE PWE
EXCz z
§ ·    ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹¦ ¦ ¦ ¦  
Wage curve: 
" ",
" ",
1 1
0 0
L reg reg
reg
L reg reg
PFM UNEMP
PFM UNEMP
Z ª º§ ·   « »¨ ¸© ¹¬ ¼
 
Household income: 
,
,
sec
,sec
sec
$ ( )
$ ( )
fac reg
reg fac reg reg
fac regfac
PFM facM fac
INC F TRNF
PFS facS fac
§ ·¨ ¸  ¨ ¸© ¹
¦¦ ¦ sec
sec
$ (sec)reg+ PROFIT ic  
Household consumption budget: 
(1 )reg reg reg regCBUD ty INC SHH     
Household savings: 
(1 )reg reg reg regSHH mps ty INCª º   ¬ ¼  
Total savings: 
( )reg reg regreg regS SHH SG SF CPI     
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Government tax revenue: 
sec sec sec
sec
Income taxes: Commodity taxes: 
, , ,
sec sec sec
Import tariffs: 
reg reg
reg
reg reg reg reg reg reg
T T T
T
TRY TRC
reg regg regg reg reg reg regg
T T T
TRM
TREV ty INC tc PA C
tm PWE EXC QBM
    
   
¦	
 	

	 

 
sec ( )
, , , ,
sec sec sec
sec
Factor taxes: 
$ ( ) $ ( )
reg
T regg reg
fac reg fac reg fac reg fac reg
fac
TRF
tf PFM facM fac PFS facS fac F
z
   
¦ ¦
¦¦

	

 
Government’s transfer to the household: 
" ",
reg reg
reg reg L reg regTRNF trep PFM UNEMP TRO CPI      
Laspeyre consumer price index: 
sec sec sec
sec
sec sec sec
sec
(1 ) 0
(1 ) 0 0
reg reg reg
reg
reg reg reg
tc PA C
CPI
tc PA C
  
   
¦
¦  
Bilateral export price: 
, ,
sec sec
reg regg reg regg reg
T TPBE PWE EXC   
Bilateral import price: 
, , ,
sec sec sec(1 )reg regg reg regg regg reg regT T TPBM tm PWE EXC     
(C) Monopolistic Competition with Heterogeneous Goods (Free Firm Mobility) 
In Equation (2-98) of Chapter 2, the Armington group price index under monopolistic 
competition ( secregPA ) is the product of the price of the individual variety ( secregpa ) and the 
scaling vector (hereafter secregAUX ). However, since the GAMS syntax does not distinguish 
between capital and small letters, for simplicity, in the following model, sec sec
reg regAUX PA
 refers 
to the Armington group price index both under perfect competition and monopolistic 
competition. The scaling vector elements are set equal to one for perfect competition sectors, 
and as a function of the number of firms in monopolistic competition sectors. Modifications 
to the perfectly competitive model discussed in Appendix A2-1 are shown in bold letters. 
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Note that the application of the assumption of barred firm mobility to the monopolistically 
competitive case is not reported as the modifications are simply a repetition of the Cournot 
case in Subsection (B) of this appendix. 
Parameters 
sec
regHHD  Households’ Cobb-Douglas commodity budget shares 
sec
regCGD  Government’s Cobb-Douglas commodity budget shares 
sec
regID  Bank’s Cobb-Douglas commodity budget shares 
sec,sec
reg
cio  Leontief intermediate demand coefficients 
sec
regFV  CES substitution elasticity of the value-added production function 
sec
regaF  CES efficiency parameters of the value-added production function 
,
sec
fac regFJ  CES share parameters of factors in the value-added production function 
sec
regAV  Substitution elasticity of the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regaA  Efficiency parameters of the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regAMJ  Share parameters of imports in the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regADJ  Share parameters of domestically-produced goods in the upper-level 
Armington function 
sec
regBMV  Substitution elasticity of the lower-level Armington function 
sec
regaBM  Efficiency parameters of the lower-level Armington function 
,
sec
reg reggBMJ  Share parameters of bilateral imports in the lower-level Armington function 
regZ  Wage curve elasticity 
regtrep  Replacement rates 
regmps  Households’ marginal propensity to save 
regty  Income tax rates 
sec
regtc  Commodity tax rates 
,
sec
fac regtf  Factor tax rates 
,
sec
reg reggtm  Import tariff rates 
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,
sec
fac regff  Fixed factor inputs demanded by each firm in monopolistically 
competitive sector sec 
sec
regLVV  Substitution elasticity between product varieties in monopolistically 
competitive sector sec 
Exogenous variables 
,fac reg
FS  Factor endowments (by region) 
,
sec
facS reg
F  Sector-specific factor demands (by sector) 
reg
TRO  Government’s lump-sum transfers to the household 
reg
SG  Government savings 
reg
SF  Foreign savings 
Endogenous variables 
,fac regPFM  Mobile factor prices 
,
sec
fac regPFS  Sector-specific factor prices 
sec
regPA  Armington composite commodity prices 
sec
regPZ  Output prices 
sec
regPD  Prices of domestically-produced goods delivered to the home market 
sec
regPM  Import prices in home currency 
sec
regPE  Export prices in home currency 
,
sec
reg reggPBM  Prices of bilateral imports by region reg from region regg in home currency 
,
sec
reg reggPBE  Prices of bilateral exports from region reg to region regg in home currency 
,
sec
reg reggPWE  Prices of bilateral exports from region reg to region regg in world currency 
regEXC  Exchange rates 
,
sec
facM regF  Mobile factor demands 
sec
regQA  Armington composite commodity quantities 
sec
regQZ  Output quantities 
sec
regQDS  Quantities of domestically-produced goods supplied to the home market 
 A-25
sec
regQDD  Quantities of domestically-produced goods demanded by the home market 
sec
regQM  Import volumes 
sec
regQE  Export volumes 
,
sec
reg reggQBM  Bilateral import volumes by region reg from region regg 
,
sec
reg reggQBE  Bilateral export volumes from region reg to region regg 
regINC  Household income 
regTREV  Total tax revenue 
regS  Total savings 
regCBUD  Household consumption budget 
sec
regC  Households’ consumption demands 
sec
regCG  Government’s consumption demands 
sec
regI  Bank’s investment demands 
regSHH  Household savings 
regTRNF  Government’s total transfers to the household 
regUNEMP  Unemployed labour 
sec
regEDM  Price elasticity of demand under monopolistic competition 
sec
regNOF  Number of firms in sectors under monopolistic competition 
sec
regAUX  Scaling vectors 
Numéraires 
reg
CPI  Laspeyre consumer price indices 
" 1"REG
EXC  Exchange rate of region REG1 
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Equations 
Firms’ CES factor demands: 
   
   
sec
sec
,
sec
sec , , ,
sec sec
,
sec
,
, ,
sec sec sec
,
sec
1 $ ( ) $ ( )
$ ( )
1
$ ( )
reg
reg
F
fac reg
reg
fac reg fac reg fac reg
fac reg
fac reg
F
reg fac reg fac reg
fac reg
FQZ
tf PFM facM fac PFS facS fac
F
PFM facM fac
aF F tf
PFS facS fac
V
V
J
J
§ ·¨ ¸ ¨ ¸  © ¹ 
§¨
   
©
 
sec
sec sec
1 1
reg
reg reg
F
F F
fac
V
V V ­ ½ª º·° °« »¸® ¾¨ ¸« »° °¹¬ ¼¯ ¿

¦
$ (sec)fac,reg regsec sec+ ff NOF ic
 
Firms’ zero-profit conditions: 
   
 
, , , ,
sec sec sec sec sec
sec sec ,sec sec
sec
1 $ ( ) $ ( )reg reg fac reg fac reg fac reg fac reg
fac
reg reg reg
c c
c
PZ QZ tf PFM facM fac PFS facS fac F
PA io QZ
     
   
¦
¦ secregcAUX
 
Monopolistically competitive firms’ price-markup conditions: 
,
,
,
sec sec sec,
sec, ,
$ ( )
1
$ ( )11
fac reg
fac reg
ic fac reg
icreg reg reg reg
ic icreg
facic fac reg fac reg reg
ic ic ic
reg
ic
PFM facM fac
tf
PFS facS fac
PZ AUX PA io
EDM
F ff NOF
QZ

u
 
Monopolistically competitive price elasticity of demand: 
reg reg
ic icEDM LVV  
Scaling vectors for sectors both under perfect and monopolistic competition: 
sec
1
1
sec sec1$ (sec) $ (sec)
regLVreg regAUX pc NOF icV  
Household’s Cobb-Douglas commodity demands: 
 sec sec sec sec1 reg reg reg reg regT T T Ttc PA C HH CBUDD     secregTAUX  
 A-27
Government’s Cobb-Douglas commodity demands: 
 sec sec sec
Government budget: reg
reg reg
reg reg reg reg reg
TN TN TN
CGBUD
PA CG CG TREV TRNF SG CPID      sec 	

reg
TNAUX  
Bank’s Cobb-Douglas commodity demands: 
sec sec sec
reg reg reg reg
T T TPA I I SD   secregTAUX  
Homogeneous commodity supply to domestic and overseas markets: 
 sec sec sec sec sec sec $sec (sec)reg reg reg reg reg regPZ QZ PD QDS PE QE T      
, ,
sec sec sec sec
( )
reg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T
regg reg
PE QE PBE QBE
z
  ¦  
,
sec sec sec sec
reg reg reg reg regg
T T T TPZ PD PE PBE    
sec sec
reg reg
TN TNQDS QZ  
Upper-level Armington functions: 
Domestically-produced commodity demands: 
  secsec 1 sec secsec sec sec sec
sec
$sec (sec) $sec (sec)
reg
reg
A
reg regA
reg reg reg reg
reg
AD PAQDD aA QA T QA TN
PD
V
V Jª º§ ·« » ª º   ¨ ¸ ¬ ¼« »© ¹¬ ¼
  
Aggregate import demands:  
  secsec 1 sec secsec sec sec
sec
reg
T
reg
T
A
reg regA
reg reg regT T
T T Treg
T
AM PAQM aA QA
PM
V
V J § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
 
Balancing conditions for upper-level Armington demands:  
 sec sec sec sec sec sec $sec (sec)reg reg reg reg reg regPA QA PD QDD PM QM T      
Lower-level Armington functions: 
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Bilateral import demands: 
  secsec ,1, sec secsec sec sec,
sec
reg
T
reg
T
BM
reg regg regBM
reg regg reg regT T
T T Treg regg
T
BM PMQBM aBM QM
PBM
V
V J § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
 
Balancing conditions for bilateral import demands: 
, ,
sec sec sec sec
( )
reg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T
regg reg
PM QM PBM QBM
z
  ¦  
Market-clearing conditions: 
 Factor markets $facM(fac): 
,
,
sec
sec
$( " ")fac regfac reg regF FS UNEMP fac L   ¦  
Armington commodity markets: 
sec sec sec,secc secc sec sec
sec
$sec (sec) $sec (sec)reg reg reg reg reg reg
c
C I io QZ T CG TN QA­ ½§ ·      ® ¾¨ ¸© ¹¯ ¿¦secregAUX  
Domestically-produced commodity supply and demand: 
sec sec
reg regQDS QDD  
Bilateral trade: 
, ,
sec sec
reg regg regg reg
T TQBE QBM  
Balance of payments: 
   
, , , ,
sec sec sec sec
sec sec
reg reg
reg regg regg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T reg
T regg reg T regg reg
SF CPIQBM PWE QBE PWE
EXCz z
§ ·    ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹¦ ¦ ¦ ¦  
Wage curve: 
" ",
" ",
1 1
0 0
L reg reg
reg
L reg reg
PFM UNEMP
PFM UNEMP
Z ª º§ ·   « »¨ ¸© ¹¬ ¼
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Household income: 
 , , ,sec sec
sec
$ ( ) $ ( )reg fac reg fac reg fac reg reg
fac
INC PFM facM fac PFS facS fac F TRNF   ¦¦  
Household consumption budget: 
(1 )reg reg reg regCBUD ty INC SHH     
Household savings: 
(1 )reg reg reg regSHH mps ty INCª º   ¬ ¼  
Total savings: 
( )reg reg regreg regS SHH SG SF CPI     
Government tax revenue: 
sec sec sec
sec
Income taxes: Commodity taxes: 
, , ,
sec sec sec
Import tariffs: 
reg reg
r
reg reg reg reg reg reg
T T T
T
TRY TRC
reg regg regg reg reg reg regg
T T T
TRM
TREV ty INC tc PA C
tm PWE EXC QBM
     
   
¦ sec	
 	
regTAUX
 
sec ( )
, , , ,
sec sec sec
sec
Factor taxes: 
$ ( ) $ ( )
eg
reg
T regg reg
fac reg fac reg fac reg fac reg
fac
TRF
tf PFM facM fac PFS facS fac F
z
   
¦ ¦
¦¦
	

	

 
Government’s transfer to the household: 
" ",
reg reg
reg reg L reg regTRNF trep PFM UNEMP TRO CPI      
Laspeyre consumer price index: 
sec sec sec
sec
sec sec sec
sec
(1 ) 0
(1 ) 0 0
reg reg reg
reg
reg reg reg
tc PA C
CPI
tc PA C
   
    
¦
¦
sec
sec0
reg
reg
AUX
AUX
 
Bilateral export price: 
, ,
sec sec
reg regg reg regg reg
T TPBE PWE EXC   
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Bilateral import price: 
, , ,
sec sec sec(1 )reg regg reg regg regg reg regT T TPBM tm PWE EXC     
Appendix A2-4: Value Flows in the CGE Model Designed for Market Structure 
Simulations  
(A) Bilateral Trade Values of Goods (SEC1 and SEC2) in World Currency ($) 
Trade values REG1 REG2 REG3 REG4 Total 
REG1   20 20 20 60 
REG2 20  20 20 60 
REG3 20 20  20 60 
REG4 20 20 20  60 
Total 60 60 60 60  
Note: Imports are read on the rows whilst exports are read on the columns. 
(B) Bilateral Tariffs on Tradable Goods (SEC1 and SEC2) in World Currency ($) 
Bilateral Tariffs REG1 REG2 REG3 REG4 Total 
REG1  10 10 10 30 
REG2 10  10 10 30 
REG3 10 10  10 30 
REG4 10 10 10  30 
Note: Imports are read on the rows whilst exports are read on the columns. 
 
Appendix to Chapter 3 
Appendix A3-1: Technical Specifications of the CGE Model Designed for Thai 
FTA Simulations 
The nested CET functions; the CES demand functions for the household, the government and 
the bank; international transport margins and production taxes are added to the base model in 
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Chapter 2. As with Subsection (C) of Appendix A2-3, sec secreg regAUX PA  refers to the Armington 
group price index, where the scaling vector sec
regAUX
 is a function of the number of firms 
under monopolistic competition, and is equal to one under both perfect competition and 
Cournot oligopoly.  
Sets i 
reg, regg Regions  
sec, secc Production sectors 
secT (  sec) Tradable sectors 
secTN (  sec) Non-traded sectors 
trsp (  sec) Transport sectors 
fac Primary factors 
facM (  fac) Mobile factors 
facS (  fac) Sector-specific factors 
flab (  fac) Labour 
The model allows individual sectors in all regions to have independent market structures. 
Therefore, the sets identifying the degrees of market competition have both regional and 
sectoral dimensions, i.e.: 
sec
regpc  Perfect competition 
sec
regic  Imperfect competition 
 sec secreg regco ic  Cournot oligopoly 
 sec secreg regmc ic  Monopolistic competition 
                                                     
i
 As with the standard set theory, A B means that A is a subset of B. 
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Individual labour markets in all regions have independent closure rules which depend on the 
flexibility of wages and unemployment. Thus, the sets identifying the labour market closure 
rules have both regional and skill-level dimensions, i.e.: 
flab
regflx  The flexible wage approach 
flab
regrgd  The rigid wage approach 
flab
regwcrv  The wage curve approach 
Parameters 
regDV  CES substitution elasticity of final demand functions 
sec
regHHJ  CES share parameters of household consumption 
sec
regGVJ  CES share parameters of government consumption 
sec
regIJ  CES share parameters of bank investment 
sec,sec
reg
cio  Leontief intermediate demand coefficients 
sec
regFV  CES substitution elasticity of the value-added production function 
sec
regaF  CES efficiency parameters of the value-added production function 
,
sec
fac regFJ  CES share parameters of factors in the value-added production function 
sec
regAV  Substitution elasticity of the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regaA  Efficiency parameters of the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regAMJ  Share parameters of imports in the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regADJ  Share parameters of domestically-produced goods in the upper-level 
Armington function 
sec
regBMV  Substitution elasticity of the lower-level Armington function 
sec
regaBM  Efficiency parameters of the lower-level Armington function 
,
sec
reg reggBMJ  Share parameters of bilateral imports in the lower-level Armington 
function 
sec
regTV  Transformation elasticity of the upper-level CET function 
sec
regaT  Efficiency parameters of the upper-level CET function 
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sec
regTEJ  Share parameters of exports in the upper-level CET function 
sec
regTDJ  Share parameters of domestically-produced goods in the upper-level CET 
function 
sec
regBEV  Transformation elasticity of the lower-level CET function 
sec
regaBE  Efficiency parameters of the lower-level CET function 
,
sec
reg reggBEJ  Share parameters of bilateral exports in the lower-level CET function 
,fac regZ  Wage curve elasticity 
,fac regtrep  Replacement rates 
regmps  Households’ marginal propensity to save 
regty  Income tax rates 
sec
regtc  Commodity tax rates 
,
sec
fac regtf  Factor tax rates 
sec
regtz  Production tax rates 
,
sec
reg reggtm  Import tariff rates 
,
sec
fac regff  Fixed factor inputs demanded by each firm in imperfectly competitive 
sector sec 
sec
regLVV  Substitution elasticity between product varieties in monopolistically 
competitive sectors 
sec
regTRSPRD  Shares of international transport services provided by region reg 
,
sec,sec
reg regg
cG  International transport margin (sec) per unit of export goods secc from 
region reg to region regg  
Exogenous variables 
,fac reg
FS  Factor endowments (by region) 
,
sec
facS reg
F  Sector-specific factor demands (by sector) 
reg
TRO  Government’s lump-sum transfers to the household 
reg
SG  Government savings 
reg
SF  Foreign savings 
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sec sec$
reg
regNOF co  Number of firms in Cournot sectors 
sec sec$
reg
regPROFIT mc  Sectoral profits under monopolistic competition 
$flab flabreg regUNEMP flx  Unemployment under the flexible wage assumption 
Endogenous variables 
regPCBUD  Household consumption budget deflator 
regPCGBUD  Government consumption budget deflator 
regPS  Bank investment budget deflator 
,fac regPFM  Mobile factor prices 
,
sec
fac regPFS  Sector-specific factor prices 
sec
regPA  Armington composite commodity prices 
sec
regPZ  Output prices 
sec
regPD  Prices of domestically-produced goods delivered to the home market 
sec
regPM  Import prices in home currency 
sec
regPE  Export prices in home currency 
,
sec
reg reggPBM  Prices of bilateral imports by reg from regg (home currency) 
,
sec
reg reggPBE  Prices of bilateral exports from reg to regg (home currency) 
,
sec
reg reggPWM  Prices of bilateral imports by reg from regg (world currency) 
,
sec
reg reggPWE  Prices of bilateral exports from reg to regg (world currency) 
regEXC  Exchange rates 
,
sec
facM regF  Mobile factor demands 
sec
regQA  Armington composite commodity quantities 
sec
regQZ  Output quantities 
sec
regQDS  Quantities of domestically-produced goods supplied to home market 
sec
regQDD  Quantities of domestically-produced goods demanded by home market 
sec
regQM  Import volumes 
sec
regQE  Export volumes 
,
sec
reg reggQBM  Bilateral import volumes by region reg from region regg 
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,
sec
reg reggQBE  Bilateral export volumes from region reg to region regg 
regINC  Household income 
regTREV  Total tax revenue 
regS  Total savings 
regCBUD  Household consumption budget 
regCGBUD  Government consumption budget 
sec
regC  Households’ consumption demands 
sec
regCG  Government’s consumption demands 
sec
regI  Bank’s investment demands 
regSHH  Household savings 
regTRNF  Government’s total transfers to the household 
,fac regUNEMP  Unemployed labour 
sec
regEDM  Price elasticity of demand for imperfectly competitive commodities 
sec sec$reg regNOF mc  Number of firms in monopolistically competitive sectors 
sec sec$reg regPROFIT co  Sectoral profits under Cournot oligopoly 
sec
regAUX  Scaling vectors  
secPTRSPG  Prices of global transport services 
secTRSPG  Quantities of global transport services 
sec
regTRSPR  Quantities of international transport services provided by region reg 
Numéraires 
reg
CPI  Laspeyre consumer price indices 
" "THA
EXC  Exchange rate of Thailand 
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Equations 
Firms’ CES factor demands: 
   
   
sec
sec
,
sec
sec , , ,
sec sec
,
sec
,
, ,
sec sec sec
,
sec
1 $ ( ) $ ( )
$ ( )
1
$ ( )
reg
reg
F
fac reg
reg
fac reg fac reg fac reg
fac reg
fac reg
F
reg fac reg fac reg
fac reg
FQZ
tf PFM facM fac PFS facS fac
F
PFM facM fac
aF F tf
PFS facS fac
V
V
J
J
§ ·¨ ¸ ¨ ¸  © ¹ 
§¨
   
©
   
sec
sec sec
1 1
, ,
secsec sec sec sec sec$ $
reg
reg reg
F
F F
fac
regfac reg reg fac reg reg regff NOF co ff NOF mc
V
V V ­ ½ª º·° °« »¸® ¾¨ ¸« »° °¹¬ ¼¯ ¿
   
¦
 
 
Firms’ zero-profit conditions: 
   
 
,
, ,
sec sec sec sec sec
,
sec
sec sec sec ,sec sec
sec
secsec sec s
$ ( )
1 1
$ ( )
$ $
fac reg
reg reg reg fac reg fac reg
fac regfac
reg reg reg reg
c c c
c
reg
reg reg
PFM facM fac
tz PZ QZ tf F
PFS facS fac
AUX PA io QZ
PROFIT co PROFIT mc
§ ·¨ ¸      ¨ ¸© ¹
   
 
¦
¦
ec
reg
 
 
Imperfectly competitive firms’ mark-up pricing conditions sec$ regic : 
  ,,sec
,
secsec
secsec
sec
, ,
sec sec
sec
sec
$ ( )
11 $ ( )$
1
1 $
fac reg
fac reg
fac regreg
reg
reg
reg
fac reg fac re
reg
reg
PFM facM fac
tf
PFS facS facco
EDM NOF
PZ
F ff
mc
EDM
§ ·¨ ¸ u­ ½ª º§ · ¨ ¸° ° « »¨ ¸ © ¹¨ ¸° °« »© ¹° °« »   ® ¾« »° °§ · « »° °¨ ¸« »° °© ¹¬ ¼¯ ¿ u
sec sec
sec sec
sec
sec sec sec ,sec sec sec
sec
$
$
reg
reg
fac g
reg reg
reg
reg reg reg reg reg
c c c
c
NOF co
NOF mc
QZ
AUX PA io tz PZ
­ ½° °° °° °° °® ¾§ ·§ ·° °¨ ¸¨ ¸° °¨ ¸¨ ¸¨ ¸° °© ¹© ¹° °¯ ¿
    
¦
¦
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Imperfectly competitive price elasticity of demand sec$ regic : ii 
 
 
sec sec sec
sec sec
sec sec sec
sec sec sec
, ,
sec sec
sec
,
sec sec
sec
sec
sec
reg reg reg
reg reg reg
reg reg reg
regg regg regg
regg reg regg reg
reg
regg regg
regg reg
reg
QDD PD QDDA A DQZ PA QA
BM BM A
PBM QBMEDM
PM QMQBM
QZ A
V V V
V V V
V
§ · ¨ ¸© ¹
 
  

  
 
 
sec
( )
, ,
sec sec
sec sec
sec sec sec
sec sec,sec
$ sec (sec)  
1
reg
regg reggregg
reg
regg reg regg reg
regg regg
reg reg reg
reg reg
T co
D
PBM QBM
PA QA
C CG I
QZ io
Vz
­ ½° °° °° °° °§ ·¨ ¸° °¨ ¸° °° °¨ ¸® ¾¨ ¸° °¨ ¸° °¨ ¸° °¨ ¸° °¨ ¸° °¨  ¸° °¨ ¸° °© ¹¯ ¿
§    ©
¦

   sec sec sec$ sec (sec)  $reg reg regTN co LV mcV·¨ ¸ ¨ ¹¸ 
 
Scaling vectors: 
  sec11sec sec sec sec sec1$   $regLVreg reg reg reg regAUX pc co NOF mcV§ ·¨ ¸  ¨ ¸© ¹*  
Households’ CES private demands: 
sec sec
sec sec sec(1 )
regD
reg
reg reg reg
reg reg reg
PCBUDC CBUD HH
tc AUX PA
V
Jª º  « »  ¬ ¼
 
Households’ budget constraints: 
sec sec sec sec
sec
(1 )reg reg reg reg reg regPCBUD CBUD tc AUX PA C     ¦  
Government’s CES public demands: 
sec sec
sec sec
regD
reg
reg reg reg
reg reg
PCGBUDCG CGBUD GV
AUX PA
V
Jª º  « »¬ ¼
 
                                                     
ii
 Henceforth, for brevity, the symbol indicating the union of sets A and B: AB = {x | x is an element of A and B}, and that 
representing the intersection of sets A an B: A*B = {x | x is an element of A or B} are adopted to illustrate the asymmetric 
handlings of sectors, factors and regions in Chapter 3, and also later in Chapter 4. 
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Government’s budget constraints: 
sec sec sec
sec
reg reg reg reg regPCGBUD CGBUD AUX PA CG   ¦  
Bank’s CES investment demands: 
sec sec
sec sec
regD
reg
reg reg reg
reg reg
PSI S I
AUX PA
V
Jª º  « »¬ ¼
 
Bank’s budget constraints: 
sec sec sec
sec
reg reg reg reg regPS S AUX PA I   ¦  
Upper-level CET functions: 
Domestically-produced good supply (1) ^ `sec$ not sec (sec)  (   (sec))regT co trspª º¬ ¼ * : 
 
^ `
sec
sec 1 sec sec
sec sec sec
sec
sec
sec
$ sec (sec)  not (   (sec))
$sec (sec)
reg
reg
T
reg regT
reg reg reg
reg
reg
reg
TD PZQDS aT QZ
PD
T co trsp
QZ TN
V
V Jª º§ ·« »  ¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼
ª º¬ ¼
ª º ¬ ¼
 *  
Domestically-produced good supply (2) sec$ sec (sec)  (   (sec))regT co trspª º¬ ¼ * : 
sec sec
reg regPD PZ  
Aggregate export supply (1) ^ `sec$ sec (sec)  not (   (sec))regT co trspª º¬ ¼ * :  
  secsec 1 sec secsec sec sec
sec
reg
reg
T
reg regT
reg reg reg
reg
TE PZQE aT QZ
PE
V
V J § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
 
Aggregate export supply (2) sec$ sec (sec)  (   (sec))regT co trspª º¬ ¼ * : 
sec sec
reg regPE PZ  
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Balancing conditions for upper-level CET supplies:  
 
 
sec sec sec sec sec sec
sec sec
$sec (sec)
$ (sec)
reg reg reg reg reg reg
reg reg
PZ QZ PD QDS PE QE T
PE TRSPR trsp
    
 
 
Lower-level CET functions: 
Bilateral export supply (1) sec$(not )regTco :  
  secsec ,1, sec secsec sec sec,
sec
reg
T
reg
T
BE
reg regg regBE
reg regg reg regT T
T T Treg regg
T
BE PEQBE aBE QE
PBE
V
V J § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
 
Bilateral export supply (2) sec$ regTco : 
,
sec sec
reg regg reg
T TPBE PE  
Balancing conditions for bilateral export supply: 
, ,
sec sec sec sec
( )
reg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T
regg reg
PE QE PBE QBE
z
  ¦  
Upper-level Armington functions: 
Domestically-produced commodity demands: 
  secsec 1 sec secsec sec sec sec
sec
$sec (sec) $sec (sec)
reg
reg
A
reg regA
reg reg reg reg
reg
AD PAQDD aA QA T QA TN
PD
V
V Jª º§ ·« » ª º   ¨ ¸ ¬ ¼« »© ¹¬ ¼
  
Aggregate import demands:  
  secsec 1 sec secsec sec sec
sec
reg
T
reg
T
A
reg regA
reg reg regT T
T T Treg
T
AM PAQM aA QA
PM
V
V J § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
 
Balancing conditions for upper-level Armington demands:  
 sec sec sec sec sec sec $sec (sec)reg reg reg reg reg regPA QA PD QDD PM QM T      
Lower-level Armington functions: 
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Bilateral import demands: 
  secsec ,1, sec secsec sec sec,
sec
reg
T
reg
T
BM
reg regg regBM
reg regg reg regT T
T T Treg regg
T
BM PMQBM aBM QM
PBM
V
V J § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
 
Balancing conditions for bilateral import demands: 
, ,
sec sec sec sec
( )
reg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T
regg reg
PM QM PBM QBM
z
  ¦  
Market-clearing conditions: 
 Factor markets $facM(fac): 
,
, ,
sec
sec
$ ( )fac regfac reg fac regF FS UNEMP flab fac ¦  
 Armington commodity markets: 
sec sec sec sec sec,secc secc sec
sec
reg reg reg reg reg reg reg
c
AUX C CG I io QZ QA§ ·      ¨ ¸© ¹¦  
Domestically-produced commodity supply and demand: 
sec sec
reg regQDS QDD  
Bilateral trade: 
, ,
sec sec
reg regg regg reg
T TQBE QBM  
Balance of payments: 
   
, , , ,
sec sec sec sec
sec sec
reg regg reg regg reg regg reg regg
T T T T
T regg reg T regg reg
reg reg
reg
trsp trsp reg
trsp
QBM PWM QBE PWE
SF CPITRSPR PTRSPG
EXC
z z
§ ·  ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
  
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦
 
 A-41
Wage curve and rigid wage approaches ${not flabregflx }: 
,
, ,
, ,
1$ $
0 0
flab reg
flab reg flab reg
flab flab
reg regflab reg flab reg
PFM UNEMP
rgd wcrv
PFM UNEMP
Zª º§ ·« »  ¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼
 
Household income: 
,
sec sec
,
sec
,sec sec
secsec sec
$$ ( )
$ ( ) $
reg regfac reg
reg fac reg reg
regfac reg regfac
PROFIT coPFM facM fac
INC F TRNF
PFS facS fac PROFIT mc
§ ·§ · ¨ ¸¨ ¸   ¨ ¸¨ ¸ © ¹ © ¹
¦¦ ¦+  
Household consumption budget: 
(1 )reg reg reg reg regPCBUD CBUD ty INC SHH      
Household savings: 
(1 )reg reg reg regSHH mps ty INCª º   ¬ ¼  
Total savings: 
( )reg reg regreg reg regPS S SHH SG SF CPI      
Government tax revenue: 
sec sec sec sec
sec
Income taxes: Commodity taxes: 
sec sec sec
sec
Production taxes: 
,
sec
reg reg
reg
reg reg reg reg reg reg reg
TRY TRC
reg reg reg
TRZ
reg regg
T
TREV ty INC tc AUX PA C
tz PZ QZ
tm P
     
  
 
¦
¦
	
 	

	

 
, ,
sec sec
sec ( )
Import tariffs: 
, , , ,
sec sec sec
Factor taxes: 
$ ( ) $ ( )
reg
reg
reg regg reg reg regg
T T
T regg reg
TRM
fac reg fac reg fac reg fac reg
TRF
WM EXC QBM
tf PFM facM fac PFS facS fac F
z
 
   
¦ ¦ 	

	 
sec fac¦¦ 
 
Government consumption budget:  
reg reg
reg reg reg regPCGBUD CGBUD TREV TRNF SG CPI      
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Government’s transfer to the household: 
, , ,
reg reg
reg flab reg flab reg flab reg
fllab
TRNF trep PFM UNEMP TRO CPI    ¦  
Laspeyre consumer price index: 
sec sec sec sec
sec
sec sec sec sec
sec
(1 ) 0
(1 ) 0 0 0
reg reg reg reg
reg
reg reg reg reg
tc AUX PA C
CPI
tc AUX PA C
   
    
¦
¦  
Bilateral export price (home currency): 
, ,
sec sec
reg regg reg regg reg
T TPBE PWE EXC   
Bilateral import price (home currency): 
, , ,
sec sec sec(1 )reg regg reg regg reg regg regT T TPBM tm PWM EXC     
Bilateral import price (world currency): 
, , ,
sec sec ,sec
reg regg regg reg regg reg
T T trsp trsp T
trsp
PWM PWE PTRSPG G  ¦  
Shares of international transport services provided to the global transport sector: 
 reg reg regtrsp trsp trsp trsp trspPE TRSPR TRSPR PTRSPG TRSPGD     
Balancing conditions for the global transport sector: 
.¦ 
reg
reg
trsptrsp TRSPRTRSPG  
International transport margins as constant shares of bilateral export volumes: 
, ,
,sec sec
sec
( )
reg regg reg regg
trsp trsp T T
reg regg T
reg
TRSPG QBEG
z
 ¦ ¦ ¦  
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Appendix A3-2: Production Sectors in GTAP 6.0 Database 
Sector description Sector description
1 pdr paddy rice 30 lum wood products
2 wht wheat 31 ppp paper products, publishing
3 gro cereal grains, n.e.c. 32 p_c petroleum, coal products
4 v_f vegetables, fruit, nuts 33 crp chemical, rubber, plastic products
5 osd oil seeds 34 nmm mineral products, n.e.c.
6 c_b sugar cane, sugar beet 35 i_s ferrous metals
7 pfb plant-based fibres 36 nfm metals, n.e.c.
8 ocr crops n.e.c 37 fmp metal products
9 ctl bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses 38 mvh motor vehicles and parts
10 oap animal products, n.e.c. 39 otn transport equipment, n.e.c.
11 rmk raw milk 40 ele electronic equipment
12 wol wool, silk-worm cocoons 41 ome machinery and equipment
13 frs forestry 42 omf manufactures, n.e.c.
14 fsh fishing 43 ely electricity
15 coa coal 44 gdt gas manufacture, distribution
16 oil oil 45 wtr water
17 gas gas 46 cns construction
18 omn minerals n.e.c. 47 trd trade
19 cmt bovine meat products 48 otp transport, n.e.c.
20 omt meat products, n.e.c. 49 wtp water transport
21 vol vegetables oils and fats 50 atp air transport
22 mil dairy products 51 cmn communication
23 pcr processed rice 52 ofi finanical services, n.e.c.
24 sgr sugar cane, sugar beet 53 isr insurance
25 ofd food products, n.e.c. 54 obs business services, n.e.c.
26 b_t beverages and tobacco products 55 ros recreational and other services
27 tex textiles 56 osg public admin., defence, education, health
28 wap wearing apparel 57 dwe dwellings
29 lea leather products
Code Code
 
Note: “n.e.c.” stands for “not elsewhere classified” as defined by GTAP. 
Appendix to Chapter 4 
Appendix A4-1: Two-Good Small Open Economy with the Same Ad Valorem 
Sales Tax Imposed on Both Goods (with the Cobb-Douglas Preferences) 
Let the border prices be Xp  and Yp . 
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Assume a common ad valorem tax t  on goods X  and Y  so that the household faces prices 
 1Xp t  and  1Yp t , and consumes quantities tX  and tY . 
Let the utility function be Cobb-Douglas 
 
1
H t tU X Y
D D   
and let the initial household money income be Z . 
The household maximises its utility subject to the budget constraint 
    1 1t X t YX p t Y p t Z        . 
The Lagrangean function is 
     1 1 1t t t X t YX Y X p t Y p t ZD D O*             , 
where O  is the Lagrange multiplier.  
The first-order conditions are 
  1 1 1 0t t X
t
X Y p t
X
D DD O w*         w  
    1 1 0t t Y
t
X Y p t
Y
D DD Ow*          w  
    1 1 0.t X t YX p t Y p t ZO
w*           w  
From which we obtainiii 
  
 
 
1
, ,
1 1t tX Y
ZZX Y
p t p t
DD         
                                                     
iii
 Take the ratios of the left and right hand terms in the first two conditions to get Y as a function of X, and then substitute into the 
3rd equation to get X. 
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that is to say, with a given money income, the imposition of a common ad valorem 
consumption tax on the two goods ( 0t ! ) results in the household consuming less of both 
goods – its real income has fallen – and consumption of the two goods falls in the same 
proportion. Note that if 0t  , we have 
 0 0, 1 .X YX Z p Y Z pD D      
The government income from the taxes is 
t X t YR X p t Y p t       
In the simplest version of this analysis the government income ‘disappears’ – we don’t 
‘know’ what the government has done with it. However, for our purposes we need to make 
some assumption about what the government does with the revenue, and the most simple 
assumption is that it uses the revenue to purchase goods X  and Y . For simplicity we shall 
assume that the government has the same preferences (utility function) as the household. (If 
the government has different preferences then things will become more complicated.) 
So the government utility function is 
 
1
G G GU X Y
D D   
where GX  and GY  are the quantities purchased by the government. The government’s utility 
maximising problem is 
 
1max .G G G G X G YU X Y subject to R X p Y pD D       
The government’s Lagrangean function isiv 
                                                     
iv
 The government does not pay the tax. 
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1 .G G G G X G YX Y X p Y p RD D P*          
The first-order conditions are 
 
1 1 0G G G X
G
X Y p
X
D DD P w*       w  
  1 0G G G Y
G
X Y p
Y
D DD Pw*        w  
 0.G G X G YX p Y p RP
w*       w  
from which we obtain 
 
 1
, ,G G
X Y
RRX Y
p p
DD     
where R  is given by the revenue from the taxes on household consumption of the two goods, 
i.e. 
 .t X t YR X p t Y p t       
Substituting for tX  and tY  gives 
  
 
 
1
.
1 1 1X YX Y
ZZ tR p t p t Z
p t p t t
DD   § ·       ¨ ¸    © ¹  
We can now obtain GX  and GY  by substituting for R : 
 
 1
, .
1 1G GX Y
t tX Z Y Z
p t p t
DD § · § ·   ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸ © ¹ © ¹  
Thus the total consumption of X  is 
 
1
,
1 1t G X X X
tX X Z Z Z
p t p t p
D D D§ · § ·      ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸ © ¹ © ¹  
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which is of course the household consumption of X  when there is no tax on either good. An 
equivalent result holds for goodY . 
Suppose that the government decides to return the tax revenue to the household. The 
household now has a total money income given by its initial money income (nothing has 
happened that changes that money income) and the transfer from the government. So now its 
money income, M , is given by M Z R  . But we know that t X t YR X p t Y p t       
so that the optimisation problem for the household is to maximise 
 
1
H M MU X Y
D D   
subject to the constraint 
     1 1 .M X M Y M X M YX p t Y p t Z R Z X p t Y p t                 
But we can rewrite the above constraint as 
     1 1M X M Y t X t YX p t Y p t X p t Y p t Z               
which simplifies to 
.M X M YX p Y p Z     
That is, we have the same problem as in the case where the government does not impose a tax 
on either good. Thus,  0 0, 1M X M YX X Z p Y Y Z pD D       . 
Therefore, the money prices of both goods increase by a proportion t  but the money income 
of the household has also increased by a proportion t , so that the real income of the 
household is unchanged. This result would hold for any homothetic utility function, not just 
for the Cobb-Douglas function. It does rely on the assumption that the same ad valorem tax 
rate is applied to both goods. 
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Appendix A4-2: Technical Specifications of the CGE Model Designed for 
India’s Government Revenue Rebalancing Simulations 
Notations: 
x As in the Appendices for previous model versions, sec secreg regAUX PA  refers to the Armington 
group price index, where the scaling vector sec
regAUX
 is a function of the number of firms 
under monopolistic competition, and is equal to one under perfect competition and 
Cournot oligopoly. 
x The representative household is disaggregated into the rich and the poor households in 
order to clarify the disparity in the welfare impacts of domestic tax policies on households 
given different income sources.  
Sets  
One-Dimensional Sets: 
reg, regg Regions  
sec, secc Production sectors 
secT (  sec) Tradable sectors 
secTN (  sec) Non-traded sectors 
trsp (  sec) Transport sectors 
fac Primary factors 
facM (  fac) Mobile factors 
facS (  fac) Sector-specific factors 
flab (  fac) Labour 
hh Households 
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Two-Dimensional Sets: 
sec
regpc  Perfect competition 
sec
regic  Imperfect competition 
 sec secreg regco ic  Cournot oligopoly 
 sec secreg regmc ic  Monopolistic competition 
flab
regflx  The flexible wage approach 
flab
regrgd  The rigid wage approach 
flab
regwcrv  The wage curve approach 
Parameters 
regDV  CES substitution elasticity of final demand functions 
,sec
reg
hhHHJ  CES share parameters of household consumption 
sec
regGVJ  CES share parameters of government consumption 
sec
regIJ  CES share parameters of bank investment 
sec,sec
reg
cio  Leontief intermediate demand coefficients 
sec
regFV  CES substitution elasticity of the value-added production function 
sec
regaF  CES efficiency parameters of the value-added production function 
,
sec
fac regFJ  CES share parameters of factors in the value-added production function 
sec
regAV  Substitution elasticity of the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regaA  Efficiency parameters of the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regAMJ  Share parameters of imports in the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regADJ  Share parameters of domestically-produced goods in the upper-level 
Armington function 
sec
regBMV  Substitution elasticity of the lower-level Armington function 
sec
regaBM  Efficiency parameters of the lower-level Armington function 
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,
sec
reg reggBMJ  Share parameters of bilateral imports in the lower-level Armington 
function 
sec
regTV  Transformation elasticity of the upper-level CET function 
sec
regaT  Efficiency parameters of the upper-level CET function 
sec
regTEJ  Share parameters of exports in the upper-level CET function 
sec
regTDJ  Share parameters of domestically-produced goods in the upper-level CET 
function 
sec
regBEV  Transformation elasticity of the lower-level CET function 
sec
regaBE  Efficiency parameters of the lower-level CET function 
,
sec
reg reggBEJ  Share parameters of bilateral exports in the lower-level CET function 
,fac regZ  Wage curve elasticity 
,fac regtrep  Replacement rates 
reg
hhmps  Households’ marginal propensity to save 
reg
hhty  Income tax rates 
sec
regtc  Commodity tax rates 
,
sec
fac regtf  Factor tax rates 
sec
regtz  Production tax rates 
,
sec
reg reggtm  Import tariff rates 
,
sec
fac regff  Fixed factor inputs demanded by each firm in imperfectly competitive 
sector sec 
sec
regLVV  Substitution elasticity between product varieties in monopolistically 
competitive sectors 
sec
regTRSPRD  Shares of international transport services provided by region reg 
,
sec,sec
reg regg
cG  International transport margin (sec) per unit of export goods secc from 
region reg to region regg  
Exogenous variables 
,fac reg
FS  Factor endowments (by region) 
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,
sec
facS reg
F  Sector-specific factor demands (by sector) 
reg
TRO  Government’s lump-sum transfers to the household 
reg
SG  Government savings 
reg
SF  Foreign savings 
sec sec$
reg
regNOF co  Number of firms in Cournot sectors 
sec sec$
reg
regPROFIT mc  Sectoral profits under monopolistic competition 
$flab flabreg regUNEMP flx  Unemployment under the flexible wage assumption 
Endogenous variables 
reg
hhPCBUD  Household consumption budget deflator 
regPCGBUD  Government consumption budget deflator 
regPS  Bank investment budget deflator 
,fac regPFM  Mobile factor prices 
,
sec
fac regPFS  Sector-specific factor prices 
sec
regPA  Armington composite commodity prices 
sec
regPZ  Output prices 
sec
regPD  Prices of domestically-produced goods delivered to the home market 
sec
regPM  Import prices in home currency 
sec
regPE  Export prices in home currency 
,
sec
reg reggPBM  Prices of bilateral imports by reg from regg (home currency) 
,
sec
reg reggPBE  Prices of bilateral exports from reg to regg (home currency) 
,
sec
reg reggPWM  Prices of bilateral imports by reg from regg (world currency) 
,
sec
reg reggPWE  Prices of bilateral exports from reg to regg (world currency) 
regEXC  Exchange rates 
,
sec
facM regF  Mobile factor demands 
sec
regQA  Armington composite commodity quantities 
sec
regQZ  Output quantities 
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sec
regQDS  Quantities of domestically-produced goods supplied to home market 
sec
regQDD  Quantities of domestically-produced goods demanded by home market 
sec
regQM  Import volumes 
sec
regQE  Export volumes 
,
sec
reg reggQBM  Bilateral import volumes by region reg from region regg 
,
sec
reg reggQBE  Bilateral export volumes from region reg to region regg 
reg
hhINC  Household income 
regTREV  Total tax revenue 
regS  Total savings 
reg
hhCBUD  Household consumption budget 
regCGBUD  Government consumption budget 
,sec
reg
hhC  Households’ consumption demands 
sec
regCG  Government’s consumption demands 
sec
regI  Bank’s investment demands 
reg
hhSHH  Household savings 
regTRNF  Government’s total transfers to the household 
,fac regUNEMP  Unemployed labour 
sec
regEDM  Price elasticity of demand for imperfectly competitive commodities 
sec sec$reg regNOF mc  Number of firms in monopolistically competitive sectors 
sec sec$reg regPROFIT co  Sectoral profits under Cournot oligopoly 
sec
regAUX  Scaling vectors 
secPTRSPG  Prices of global transport services 
secTRSPG  Quantities of global transport services 
sec
regTRSPR  Quantities of international transport services provided by region reg 
Numéraires 
reg
CPI  Laspeyre consumer price indices 
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" "THA
EXC  Exchange rate of Thailand 
Equations 
Firms’ CES factor demands: 
   
   
sec
sec
,
sec
sec , , ,
sec sec
,
sec
,
, ,
sec sec sec
,
sec
1 $ ( ) $ ( )
$ ( )
1
$ ( )
reg
reg
F
fac reg
reg
fac reg fac reg fac reg
fac reg
fac reg
F
reg fac reg fac reg
fac reg
FQZ
tf PFM facM fac PFS facS fac
F
PFM facM fac
aF F tf
PFS facS fac
V
V
J
J
§ ·¨ ¸ ¨ ¸  © ¹ 
§¨
   
©
   
sec
sec sec
1 1
, ,
secsec sec sec sec sec$ $
reg
reg reg
F
F F
fac
regfac reg reg fac reg reg regff NOF co ff NOF mc
V
V V ­ ½ª º·° °« »¸® ¾¨ ¸« »° °¹¬ ¼¯ ¿
   
¦
 
 
Firms’ zero-profit conditions: 
   
 
,
, ,
sec sec sec sec sec
,
sec
sec sec sec ,sec sec
sec
secsec sec s
$ ( )
1 1
$ ( )
$ $
fac reg
reg reg reg fac reg fac reg
fac regfac
reg reg reg reg
c c c
c
regreg reg
PFM facM fac
tz PZ QZ tf F
PFS facS fac
AUX PA io QZ
PROFIT co PROFIT mc
§ ·¨ ¸      ¨ ¸© ¹
   
 
¦
¦
ec
reg
 
Imperfectly competitive firms’ mark-up pricing conditions sec$ regic : 
  ,,sec
,
secsec
secsec
sec
, ,
sec sec
sec
sec
$ ( )
11 $ ( )$
1
1 $
fac reg
fac reg
fac regreg
reg
reg
reg
fac reg fac re
reg
reg
PFM facM fac
tf
PFS facS facco
EDM NOF
PZ
F ff
mc
EDM
§ ·¨ ¸ u­ ½ª º§ · ¨ ¸° ° « »¨ ¸ © ¹¨ ¸° °« »© ¹° °« »   ® ¾« »° °§ · « »° °¨ ¸« »° °© ¹¬ ¼¯ ¿ u
sec sec
sec sec
sec
sec sec sec ,sec sec sec
sec
$
$
reg
reg
fac g
reg reg
reg
reg reg reg reg reg
c c c
c
NOF co
NOF mc
QZ
AUX PA io tz PZ
­ ½° °° °° °° °® ¾§ ·§ ·° °¨ ¸¨ ¸° °¨ ¸¨ ¸¨ ¸° °© ¹© ¹° °¯ ¿
    
¦
¦
 
Imperfectly competitive price elasticity of demand sec$ regic : 
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sec sec sec
sec sec
sec sec sec
sec sec sec
, ,
sec sec
sec
,
sec sec
sec
sec
sec
reg reg reg
reg reg reg
reg reg reg
regg regg regg
regg reg regg reg
reg
regg regg
regg reg
reg
QDD PD QDDA A DQZ PA QA
BM BM A
PBM QBMEDM
PM QMQBM
QZ A
V V V
V V V
V
§ · ¨ ¸© ¹
 
  

  
 sec
( )
, ,
sec sec
sec sec
,sec sec sec
sec sec,se
$ sec (sec)  
1
reg
regg reggregg
reg
regg reg regg reg
regg regg
reg reg reg
hh
hh
reg
T co
D
PBM QBM
PA QA
C CG I
QZ io
Vz
­ ½° °° °° °° °§ ·¨ ¸° °¨ ¸° °° °¨ ¸® ¾¨ ¸° °¨ ¸° °¨ ¸° °¨ ¸° °¨ ¸° °¨  ¸° °¨ ¸° °© ¹¯ ¿
 
  
¦
¦

     sec sec secc $ sec (sec)  $reg reg regreg TN co LV mcV
§ ·¨ ¸ ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹

 
Scaling vectors: 
  sec11sec sec sec sec sec1$   $regLVreg reg reg reg regAUX pc co NOF mcV§ ·¨ ¸  ¨ ¸© ¹*  
Households’ CES private demands: 
,sec ,sec
sec sec sec(1 )
regD
reg
reg reg reg hh
hh hh hh reg reg reg
PCBUDC CBUD HH
tc AUX PA
V
Jª º  « »  ¬ ¼
 
Households’ budget constraints: 
sec sec sec ,sec
sec
(1 )reg reg reg reg reg reghh hh hhPCBUD CBUD tc AUX PA C     ¦  
Government’s CES public demands: 
sec sec
sec sec
regD
reg
reg reg reg
reg reg
PCGBUDCG CGBUD GV
AUX PA
V
Jª º  « »¬ ¼
 
Government’s budget constraints: 
sec sec sec
sec
reg reg reg reg regPCGBUD CGBUD AUX PA CG   ¦  
Bank’s CES investment demands: 
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sec sec
sec sec
regD
reg
reg reg reg
reg reg
PSI S I
AUX PA
V
Jª º  « »¬ ¼
 
Bank’s budget constraints: 
sec sec sec
sec
reg reg reg reg regPS S AUX PA I   ¦  
Upper-level CET functions: 
Domestically-produced good supply (1) ^ `sec$ not sec (sec)  (   (sec))regT co trspª º¬ ¼ * : 
 
^ `
sec
sec 1 sec sec
sec sec sec
sec
sec
sec
$ sec (sec)  not (   (sec))
$sec (sec)
reg
reg
T
reg regT
reg reg reg
reg
reg
reg
TD PZQDS aT QZ
PD
T co trsp
QZ TN
V
V Jª º§ ·« »  ¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼
ª º¬ ¼
ª º ¬ ¼
 *  
Domestically-produced good supply (2) sec$ sec (sec)  (   (sec))regT co trspª º¬ ¼ * : 
sec sec
reg regPD PZ  
Aggregate export supply (1) ^ `sec$ sec (sec)  not (   (sec))regT co trspª º¬ ¼ * :  
  secsec 1 sec secsec sec sec
sec
reg
reg
T
reg regT
reg reg reg
reg
TE PZQE aT QZ
PE
V
V J § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
 
Aggregate export supply (2) sec$ sec (sec)  (   (sec))regT co trspª º¬ ¼ * : 
sec sec
reg regPE PZ  
Balancing conditions for upper-level CET supplies:  
 
 
sec sec sec sec sec sec
sec sec
$sec (sec)
$ (sec)
reg reg reg reg reg reg
reg reg
PZ QZ PD QDS PE QE T
PE TRSPR trsp
    
 
 
Lower-level CET functions: 
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Bilateral export supply (1) sec$(not )regTco :  
  secsec ,1, sec secsec sec sec,
sec
reg
T
reg
T
BE
reg regg regBE
reg regg reg regT T
T T Treg regg
T
BE PEQBE aBE QE
PBE
V
V J § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
 
Bilateral export supply (2) sec$ regTco : 
,
sec sec
reg regg reg
T TPBE PE  
Balancing conditions for bilateral export supply: 
, ,
sec sec sec sec
( )
reg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T
regg reg
PE QE PBE QBE
z
  ¦  
Upper-level Armington functions: 
Domestically-produced commodity demands: 
  secsec 1 sec secsec sec sec sec
sec
$sec (sec) $sec (sec)
reg
reg
A
reg regA
reg reg reg reg
reg
AD PAQDD aA QA T QA TN
PD
V
V Jª º§ ·« » ª º   ¨ ¸ ¬ ¼« »© ¹¬ ¼
  
Aggregate import demands:  
  secsec 1 sec secsec sec sec
sec
reg
T
reg
T
A
reg regA
reg reg regT T
T T Treg
T
AM PAQM aA QA
PM
V
V J § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
 
Balancing conditions for upper-level Armington demands:  
 sec sec sec sec sec sec $sec (sec)reg reg reg reg reg regPA QA PD QDD PM QM T      
Lower-level Armington functions: 
Bilateral import demands: 
  secsec ,1, sec secsec sec sec,
sec
reg
T
reg
T
BM
reg regg regBM
reg regg reg regT T
T T Treg regg
T
BM PMQBM aBM QM
PBM
V
V J § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
 
Balancing conditions for bilateral import demands: 
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, ,
sec sec sec sec
( )
reg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T
regg reg
PM QM PBM QBM
z
  ¦  
Market-clearing conditions: 
 Factor markets $facM(fac): 
,
, ,
sec
sec
$ ( )fac regfac reg fac regF FS UNEMP flab fac ¦  
 Armington commodity markets: 
sec ,sec sec sec sec,secc secc sec
sec
reg reg reg reg reg reg reg
hh
hh c
AUX C CG I io QZ QA§ ·      ¨ ¸© ¹¦ ¦  
Domestically-produced commodity supply and demand: 
sec sec
reg regQDS QDD  
Bilateral trade: 
, ,
sec sec
reg regg regg reg
T TQBE QBM  
Balance of payments: 
   
, , , ,
sec sec sec sec
sec sec
reg regg reg regg reg regg reg regg
T T T T
T regg reg T regg reg
reg reg
reg
trsp trsp reg
trsp
QBM PWM QBE PWE
SF CPITRSPR PTRSPG
EXC
z z
§ ·  ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
  
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦
 
Wage curve and rigid wage approaches ${not flabregflx }: 
,
, ,
, ,
1$ $
0 0
flab reg
flab reg flab reg
flab flab
reg regflab reg flab reg
PFM UNEMP
rgd wcrv
PFM UNEMP
Zª º§ ·« »  ¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼
 
Rich household income: 
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> @
,
,
" " sec
,sec
sec
" ", " ", " ",
sec sec
sec
$ ( )
$ not ( ," ")
$ ( )
$
fac reg
reg fac reg
RH fac regfac
SkLab reg SkLab reg SkLab reg
reg reg
reg
PFM facM fac
INC F SameAs fac UnSkLab
PFS facS fac
trep PFM UNEMP
PROFIT co
PROFIT
ª º§ ·« »¨ ¸ ¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼
  

¦¦
+
sec
sec$ regmc
§ ·¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
¦
 
Poor household income: 
" ", " ",
" " sec
sec
" ", " ", " ",
reg UnSkLab reg UnSkLab reg
PH
UnSkLab reg UnSkLab reg UnSkLab reg
reg reg
INC F PFM
trep PFM UNEMP
TRO CPI
§ · ¨ ¸© ¹
  
 
¦
 
Household consumption budget: 
(1 )reg reg reg reg reghh hh hh hh hhPCBUD CBUD ty INC SHH      
Household savings: 
(1 )reg reg reg reghh hh hh hhSHH mps ty INCª º   ¬ ¼  
Total savings: 
( )reg reg regreg reg reghh
hh
PS S SHH SG SF CPI    ¦  
Government tax revenue: 
,
sec sec sec sec
sec
Income taxes: Commodity taxes: 
sec sec sec
sec
Production taxes: 
reg reg
reg
reg reg reg reg reg reg reg hh
hh hh
hh hh
TRY TRC
reg reg reg
TRZ
TREV ty INC tc AUX PA C
tz PZ QZ
t
     
  

¦ ¦¦
¦
	
 	

	

 
, , ,
sec sec sec
sec ( )
Import tariffs: 
, , , ,
sec sec sec
Factor taxes: 
$ ( ) $ ( )
reg
reg
reg regg reg regg reg reg regg
T T T
T regg reg
TRM
fac reg fac reg fac reg fac reg
TRF
m PWM EXC QBM
tf PFM facM fac PFS facS fac F
z
  
   
¦ ¦ 	

sec fac¦¦ 	

 
Government consumption budget:  
reg reg
reg reg reg regPCGBUD CGBUD TREV TRNF SG CPI      
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Government’s transfer to the household: 
, , ,
reg reg
reg flab reg flab reg flab reg
fllab
TRNF trep PFM UNEMP TRO CPI    ¦  
Laspeyre consumer price index: 
sec sec sec ,sec
sec
sec sec sec ,sec
sec
(1 ) 0
(1 ) 0 0 0
reg reg reg reg
hh
reg hh
reg reg reg reg
hh
hh
tc AUX PA C
CPI
tc AUX PA C
   
    
¦¦
¦¦  
Bilateral export price (home currency): 
, ,
sec sec
reg regg reg regg reg
T TPBE PWE EXC   
Bilateral import price (home currency): 
, , ,
sec sec sec(1 )reg regg reg regg reg regg regT T TPBM tm PWM EXC     
Bilateral import price (world currency): 
, , ,
sec sec ,sec
reg regg regg reg regg reg
T T trsp trsp T
trsp
PWM PWE PTRSPG G  ¦  
Shares of international transport services provided to the global transport sector: 
 reg reg regtrsp trsp trsp trsp trspPE TRSPR TRSPR PTRSPG TRSPGD     
Balancing conditions for the global transport sector: 
.¦ 
reg
reg
trsptrsp TRSPRTRSPG  
International transport margins as constant shares of bilateral export volumes: 
, ,
,sec sec
sec
( )
reg regg reg regg
trsp trsp T T
reg regg T
reg
TRSPG QBEG
z
 ¦ ¦ ¦  
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Appendix A4-3: India’s Benchmark Investment and Household Consumption 
Demands, Aggregate Import and Export, and Output by Sector (Billion US$) 
 
Source: Calibrated from GTAP 6.0 database. 
Appendix A4-4: Technical Specifications of the CGE Model Designed for 
India’s Government Revenue Rebalancing Simulations (with the Informal 
Economy) 
This appendix uses the same notation as Appendix A4-2, the only substantial modification 
being the incorporation of the informal economy, specifically defined as untaxed. 
Production 
Sectors 
Investment 
demand  
Household 
consumption 
demand 
Aggregate 
Import 
Aggregate 
export 
Output 
AGR 0.72 86.03 2.18 3.14 138.07 
NRS 0.00 8.28 2.51 1.33 19.50 
OIL 0.00 0.00 9.06 0.00 3.62 
PAGR 0.00 38.19 1.82 1.46 40.34 
OFD 0.00 7.04 0.21 2.29 10.06 
MNF 6.51 15.08 5.07 6.66 72.99 
TEX 0.02 16.33 0.95 7.44 34.73 
WAP 0.00 1.06 0.07 5.53 6.60 
CRP 1.84 5.16 6.48 6.39 50.67 
I_S 1.38 0.00 1.29 1.50 22.38 
NFM 0.00 0.00 3.27 0.68 7.46 
MVH 7.54 0.49 0.77 0.62 10.54 
ELE 6.44 1.27 3.19 0.89 6.84 
OME 21.07 0.88 6.36 3.27 28.96 
OMF 3.75 1.59 4.62 7.50 16.78 
MSR 49.87 6.81 0.11 0.03 99.24 
TRD 4.27 37.20 2.20 2.38 83.83 
TRP 2.75 21.61 2.93 2.35 68.55 
CFI 0.00 13.80 1.02 0.62 52.04 
OBS 0.00 5.29 4.96 6.28 15.80 
OSG 0.00 13.08 0.58 0.76 54.97 
DWE 0.00 24.36 0.00 0.00 24.57 
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One-Dimensional Sets: 
reg, regg Regions  
regF (  reg) Regions without the informal economy 
regI (  reg) Regions with the informal economy 
sec, secc Production sectors 
secT (  sec) Tradable sectors 
secTN (  sec) Non-traded sectors 
trsp (  sec) Transport sectors 
fac Primary factors 
facM (  fac) Mobile factors 
facS (  fac) Sector-specific factors 
flab (  fac) Labour 
hh Households 
fm Formality of economic activities 
Two-Dimensional Sets: 
sec
regpc  Perfect competition 
sec
regic  Imperfect competition 
 sec secreg regco ic  Cournot oligopoly 
 sec secreg regmc ic  Monopolistic competition 
flab
regflx  The flexible wage approach 
flab
regrgd  The rigid wage approach 
flab
regwcrv  The wage curve approach 
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Parameters 
regDV  CES substitution elasticity of final demand functions 
,sec
reg
hhHHJ  CES share parameters of household consumption 
sec
regGVJ  CES share parameters of government consumption 
sec
regIJ  CES share parameters of bank investment 
sec,sec
reg
cio  Leontief intermediate demand coefficients 
sec
regFV  CES substitution elasticity of the value-added production function 
sec
regaF  CES efficiency parameters of the value-added production function 
,
sec
fac regFJ  CES share parameters of factors in the value-added production function 
sec
regAV  Substitution elasticity of the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regaA  Efficiency parameters of the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regAMJ  Share parameters of imports in the upper-level Armington function 
sec
regADJ  Share parameters of domestically-produced goods in the upper-level 
Armington function 
sec
regBMV  Substitution elasticity of the lower-level Armington function 
sec
regaBM  Efficiency parameters of the lower-level Armington function 
,
sec
reg reggBMJ  Share parameters of bilateral imports in the lower-level Armington 
function 
sec
regTV  Transformation elasticity of the upper-level CET function 
sec
regaT  Efficiency parameters of the upper-level CET function 
sec
regTEJ  Share parameters of exports in the upper-level CET function 
sec
regTDJ  Share parameters of domestically-produced goods in the upper-level CET 
function 
sec
regBEV  Transformation elasticity of the lower-level CET function 
sec
regaBE  Efficiency parameters of the lower-level CET function 
,
sec
reg reggBEJ  Share parameters of bilateral exports in the lower-level CET function 
,fac regZ  Wage curve elasticity 
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,fac regtrep  Replacement rates 
reg
hhmps  Households’ marginal propensity to save 
reg
hhty  Income tax rates 
sec
regtc  Commodity tax rates 
,
sec
fac regtf  Factor tax rates 
sec
regtz  Production tax rates 
,
sec
reg reggtm  Import tariff rates 
,
sec
fac regff  Fixed factor inputs demanded by each firm in imperfectly competitive 
sector sec 
sec
regLVV  Substitution elasticity between product varieties in monopolistically 
competitive sectors 
sec
regTRSPRD  Shares of international transport services provided by region reg 
,
sec,sec
reg regg
cG  International transport margin (sec) per unit of export goods secc from 
region reg to region regg  
regFMV  Substitution elasticity between formal & informal goods 
,
sec,
reg hh
fmHFMJ  Share parameters of household consumption between formal & informal 
goods 
sec,
reg
fmIFMJ  Share parameters of bank investment between formal & informal goods 
,
sec,
fac reg
fmFFMJ  Share parameters of factor demands by formal & informal firms 
sec,
reg
fmaFFM  Efficiency parameters of factor demands by formal & informal firms 
,sec
c,
reg c
se fmioFM  Formal and informal intermediate inputs provided respectively to formal 
& informal firms 
Exogenous variables 
,fac reg
FS  Factor endowments (by region) 
,
sec
facS reg
F  Sector-specific factor demands (by sector) 
reg
TRO  Government’s lump-sum transfers to the household 
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reg
SG  Government savings 
reg
SF  Foreign savings 
sec sec$
reg
regNOF co  Number of firms in Cournot sectors 
sec sec$
reg
regPROFIT mc  Sectoral profits under monopolistic competition 
$flab flabreg regUNEMP flx  Unemployment under the flexible wage assumption 
Endogenous variables 
reg
hhPCBUD  Household consumption budget deflator 
regPCGBUD  Government consumption budget deflator 
regPS  Bank investment budget deflator 
,fac regPFM  Mobile factor prices 
,
sec
fac regPFS  Sector-specific factor prices 
sec
regPA  Armington composite commodity prices 
sec
regPZ  Output prices 
sec
regPD  Prices of domestically-produced goods delivered to the home market 
sec
regPM  Import prices in home currency 
sec
regPE  Export prices in home currency 
,
sec
reg reggPBM  Prices of bilateral imports by reg from regg (home currency) 
,
sec
reg reggPBE  Prices of bilateral exports from reg to regg (home currency) 
,
sec
reg reggPWM  Prices of bilateral imports by reg from regg (world currency) 
,
sec
reg reggPWE  Prices of bilateral exports from reg to regg (world currency) 
regEXC  Exchange rates 
,
sec
facM regF  Mobile factor demands 
sec
regQA  Armington composite commodity quantities 
sec
regQZ  Output quantities 
sec
regQDS  Quantities of domestically-produced goods supplied to home market 
sec
regQDD  Quantities of domestically-produced goods demanded by home market 
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sec
regQM  Import volumes 
sec
regQE  Export volumes 
,
sec
reg reggQBM  Bilateral import volumes by region reg from region regg 
,
sec
reg reggQBE  Bilateral export volumes from region reg to region regg 
reg
hhINC  Household income (only from formal sources) 
regTREV  Total tax revenue 
regS  Total savings 
reg
hhCBUD  Household consumption budget 
regCGBUD  Government consumption budget 
,sec
reg
hhC  Households’ consumption demands 
sec
regCG  Government’s consumption demands 
sec
regI  Bank’s investment demands 
reg
hhSHH  Household savings 
regTRNF  Government’s total transfers to the household 
,fac regUNEMP  Unemployed labour 
sec
regEDM  Price elasticity of demand for imperfectly competitive commodities 
sec sec$reg regNOF mc  Number of firms in monopolistically competitive sectors 
sec sec$reg regPROFIT co  Sectoral profits under Cournot oligopoly 
sec
regAUX  Scaling vectors 
secPTRSPG  Prices of global transport services 
secTRSPG  Quantities of global transport services 
sec
regTRSPR  Quantities of international transport services provided by region reg 
,
sec
reg hhPCA  Prices of aggregate consumption goods for households 
sec
regPIA  Prices of aggregate investment goods for the bank 
,
sec,
reg hh
fmCFM  Household consumption of formal and informal goods  
sec,
reg
fmIFM  Bank investment on formal and informal goods 
sec,
reg
fmPAFM  Formal and informal Armington composite commodity prices 
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sec,
reg
fmPZFM  Formal and informal output prices 
sec,
reg
fmPDFM  Formal and informal prices of domestically-produced goods delivered to 
the home market 
sec,
reg
fmQAFM  Formal and informal Armington composite commodity quantities 
sec,
reg
fmQZFM  Formal and informal output quantities 
sec,
reg
fmQDSFM  Formal and informal quantities of domestically-produced goods supplied 
to home market 
sec,
reg
fmQDDFM  Formal and informal quantities of domestically-produced goods 
demanded by home market 
,
sec,
facM reg
fmFFM  Formal and informal mobile factor demands 
sec,
reg
fmAUXFM  Scaling vectors for formal and informal goods 
,reg hhINCFI  Households’ incomes inclusive of those from informal sources 
Numéraires 
reg
CPI  Laspeyre consumer price indices 
" "THA
EXC  Exchange rate of Thailand 
Equations 
Firms’ CES factor demands in regF: 
   
   
sec
sec sec
,
sec
sec , , ,
sec sec
,
sec
1
, ,
sec sec
,sec
1 $ ( ) $ ( )
1
$ ( )
regF
regF regF
F
fac regF
regF
fac regF fac regF fac regF
fac regF
F Ffac regF fac regF
regF
fac regF
FQZ
tf PFM facM fac PFS facS fac
F
F tf
aF PFM facM fac
PFS
V
V V
J
J 
§ ·¨ ¸ ¨ ¸  © ¹ 
  


   
sec
sec
sec
1
1
,
sec
, ,
secsec sec sec sec sec
$ ( )
$ $
regF
regF
regF
F
F
F
fac
fac regF
regFfac regF regF fac regF regF regF
facS fac
ff NOF co ff NOF mc
V
V
V


­ ½ª º° °« »° °« »° °« »® ¾§ ·« »° °¨ ¸« »° °¨ ¸« »© ¹° °¬ ¼¯ ¿
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Firms’ CES factor demands in regI: 
 
 
sec
sec
,
sec,
sec, ,
,
sec
,
sec,
sec,
,
sec,
sec,
$ ( )
1 $( " ")
$ ( )
1
regI
regI
F
fac regI
fmregI
fm fac regI
fac regI
fac regI
fac regI
fm
Ffac regI
fm
regI
fm
FFMQZFM
PFM facM fac
tf fm FML
PFS facS fac
FFM
FFM
aFFM
V
V
J
J
§ ·¨ ¸¨ ¸¨ ¸ § ·¨ ¸¨ ¸¨ ¸   ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹© ¹ 
  
 
sec
sec sec
sec
1 1
,
sec
1
,
,
sec
,
secsec sec
$( " ")
$ ( )
$ ( )
$ (
regI
regI regI
regI
F
F Ffac regI
Ffac regI
fac
fac regI
regIfac regI regI
tf fm FML
PFM facM fac
PFS facS fac
ff NOF co fm
V
V V
V
 

­ ½ª º  ° °« »° °« »° °« »® ¾§ ·« »° °¨ ¸« »° °¨ ¸« »© ¹° °¬ ¼¯ ¿
 
¦
  
   ,sec sec sec
" ")
$ ( " ")fac regI regI regI
FML
ff NOF mc fm FML
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Firms’ zero-profit conditions in regF: 
   
 
,
, ,
sec sec sec sec sec
,
sec
sec sec sec ,sec sec
sec
sec sec
$ ( )
1 1
$ ( )
$
fac regF
regF regF regF fac regF fac regF
fac regFfac
regF regF regF regF
c c c
c
regF regF
PFM facM fac
tz PZ QZ tf F
PFS facS fac
AUX PA io QZ
PROFIT co PRO
§ ·¨ ¸      ¨ ¸© ¹
   
 
¦
¦
sec sec$
regF regFFIT mc
 
 
Firms’ zero-profit conditions in regI: 
 
 
sec sec, sec,
,
, ,
sec sec,
,
sec
1 $( " ")
$ ( )
                      1 $( " ")
$ ( )
                      
regI regI regI
fm fm
fac regI
fac regI fac regI
fmfac regIfac
tz fm FML PZFM QZFM
PFM facM fac
tf fm FML FFM
PFS facS fac
   
§ ·¨ ¸    ¨ ¸© ¹
¦
 
   
sec , sec , sec ,sec, sec,
sec
secsec sec sec                      $ ( " ") $ ( " ")
regI regI regI regI
c fm c fm c fm fm
c
regIregI regI regI
AUXFM PAFM ioFM QZFM
PROFIT co fm FML PROFIT mc fm FML
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Imperfectly competitive firms’ mark-up pricing conditions in regF sec$ regic : 
  ,,sec
,
secsec
secsec
sec
,
sec
sec
sec
$ ( )
11 $ ( )$
1
1 $
fac regF
fac regF
fac regFregF
regF
regF
regF
fac regF
regF
regF
PFM facM fac
tf
PFS facS facco
EDM NOF
PZ
F f
mc
EDM
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sec sec
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sec
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sec
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sec
$
$
regF
regF
fac fac regF
regF regF
regF
regF regF regF regF regF
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Imperfectly competitive firms’ mark-up pricing conditions in regI sec$ regic : 
  ,,sec
,
secsec
secsec
sec," "
sec,
sec
sec
$ ( )
1
1 $ ( )$
1
1 $
fac regI
fac regI
fac regIregI
regI
regI
regI
FML
regI
regI
PFM facM fac
tf
PFS facS facco
EDM NOF
PZFM
FFM
mc
EDM
§ ·¨ ¸  ­ ½ª º§ · ¨ ¸° °« »¨ ¸ © ¹¨ ¸° °« »© ¹° °« »  ® ¾« »° °§ ·« »° °¨ ¸« »° °© ¹¬ ¼¯ ¿
sec sec
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" " sec
sec sec
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regI
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FML
regI regI regI
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Imperfectly competitive price elasticity of demand in regF sec$ regic : 
 
 
sec sec sec
sec sec
sec sec sec
sec sec sec
, ,
sec sec
sec
sec
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sec
sec
regF regF regF
regF regF regF
regF regF regF
regg regg regg
regg regF regg regF
regg
regF
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Imperfectly competitive price elasticity of demand in regI sec$ regic : 
 sec sec
sec," "
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Scaling vectors sec$ regmc :v 
sec
1
1
sec sec," " sec$ ( ) $ ( )
regLVreg reg reg
FMLAUX regF reg AUXFM regI reg NOF
V   
Households’ CES upper-level private demands: 
 ,sec,sec sec sec sec ,sec(1 ) $ ( ) $ ( )
regD
reg reg
hh hhreg reg
hh hh reg reg reg reg
hh
HH PCBUD
C CBUD
tc AUX PA regF reg PCA regI reg
VJª º« »     « »¬ ¼
 
Households’ upper-level budget constraints: 
 sec sec sec
,sec
sec
,sec
(1 ) $ ( )
$ ( )
reg reg reg
reg reg reg
hh hh hh
reg
hh
tc AUX PA regF reg
PCBUD CBUD C
PCA regI reg
ª º§ ·  « »¨ ¸  « »¨ ¸¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼
¦  
                                                     
v
 The scaling vectors of sectors that are informal and/or under perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly are calibrated and set to 
unity, and hence are not included in this equation. 
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Households’ CES lower-level private demands (only in regI): 
 
, ,
sec, sec, ,
sec, sec
sec sec, sec,1 $( " ")
regIFM
regI hh regI hh
fmregI hh regI hh
fm regI regI regI
fm fm
HFM PCA
CFM C
tc fm FML AUXFM PAFM
VJª º« »     « »¬ ¼
 
Households’ lower-level budget constraints (only in regI): 
 , , ,sec sec sec sec, sec, sec,1 $( " ")regI hh regI hh regI regI regI regI hhfm fm fm
fm
PCA C tc fm FML AUXFM PAFM CFMª º      ¬ ¼¦  
Government’s CES public demands: 
sec
sec
sec sec sec," " sec," "$ ( ) $ ( )
regD
reg reg
reg reg
reg reg reg reg
FML FML
GV PCGBUDCG CGBUD
AUX PA regF reg AUXFM PAFM regI reg
VJª º  « »  « »¬ ¼
 
Government’s budget constraint: 
sec sec
sec
sec
sec," " sec," "
$ ( )
$ ( )
reg reg
reg reg reg
reg reg
FML FML
AUX PA regF reg
PCGBUD CGBUD CG
AUXFM PAFM regI reg
ª º§ ·« »¨ ¸  « »¨ ¸ © ¹¬ ¼
¦  
Bank’s CES upper-level investment demands: 
sec
sec
sec sec sec$ ( ) $ ( )
regD
reg reg
reg reg
reg reg reg
I PSI S
AUX PA regF reg PIA regI reg
VJª º  « » ¬ ¼
 
Bank’s upper-level budget constraints: 
 sec sec sec sec
sec
$ ( ) $ ( )reg reg reg reg reg regPS S AUX PA regF reg PIA regI reg Iª º    ¬ ¼¦  
Bank’s CES lower-level investment demands (only in regI): 
sec, sec
sec, sec
sec, sec,
regIFM
regI regI
fmregI regI
fm regI regI
fm fm
IFM PIA
IFM I
AUXFM PAFM
VJª º « »« »¬ ¼
 
Bank’s lower-level budget constraints (only in regI): 
sec sec sec, sec, sec,
regI regI regI regI regI
fm fm fm
fm
PIA I AUXFM PAFM IFM   ¦  
Upper-level CET functions: 
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Domestically-produced good supply in regF (1) ${not [secT(sec)   ( secregFco *  trsp 
(sec)) ] }: 
 
^ `
sec
sec 1 sec sec
sec sec sec
sec
sec
sec
$ sec (sec)  not (   (sec))
$sec (sec)
regF
regF
T
regF regFT
regF regF regF
regF
regF
regF
TD PZQDS aT QZ
PD
T co trsp
QZ TN
V
V Jª º§ ·« »  ¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼
ª º¬ ¼
ª º ¬ ¼
 *  
Domestically-produced good supply in regF (2) sec$ sec (sec)  (  (sec))regFT co trspª º¬ ¼ * : 
sec sec
regF regFPD PZ  
Domestically-produced good supply in regI (1) ${not [secT(sec)   ( secregIco *  trsp 
(sec))   (fm = “FML”) ] }: 
 
^ `
sec
sec 1 sec sec,
sec, sec sec,
sec,
sec
sec,
$ sec (sec)  not (   (sec))   ( " ")
$ sec (s
regI
regI
T
regI regI
T fmregI regI regI
fm fmregI
fm
regI
regI
fm
TD PZFMQDSFM aT QZFM
PDFM
T co trsp fm FML
QZFM TN
V
V Jª º§ ·« »  ¨ ¸¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼
ª º  ¬ ¼
ª º ¬ ¼
 * 
> @^ `ec)  sec (sec)  ( " ")T fm IFML * 
 
Domestically-produced good supply in regI (2) sec$ sec (sec)  (  (sec))regIT co trspª º¬ ¼ * : 
sec," " sec," "
regI regI
FML FMLPDFM PZFM  
Aggregate export supply (1) ^ `sec$ sec (sec)  not (   (sec))regT co trspª º¬ ¼ * :  
   
 
sec
sec 1 sec sec sec," "
sec sec
sec
sec sec," "
$ ( ) $ ( )
$ ( ) $ ( )
reg
reg
T
reg reg reg
T FMLreg reg
reg
reg reg
FML
TE PZ regF reg PZFM regI reg
QE aT
PE
QZ regF reg QZFM regI reg
V
V J § · ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹
 
 
Aggregate export supply (2) sec$ sec (sec)  (   (sec))regT co trspª º¬ ¼ * : 
sec sec sec," "$ ( ) $ ( )reg reg reg FMLPE PZ regF reg PZFM regI reg   
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Balancing conditions for upper-level CET supplies in regF:  
 
 
sec sec sec sec sec sec
sec sec
$sec (sec)
$ (sec)
regF regF regF regF regF regF
regF regF
PZ QZ PD QDS PE QE T
PE TRSPR trsp
    
 
 
Balancing conditions for upper-level CET supplies in regI:  
 
 
sec, sec, sec, sec,
sec sec
sec sec
$sec (sec)
                                     $( " ").
$ (sec)
regI regI regI regI
fm fm fm fm
regI regI
regI regI
PZFM QZFM PDFM QDSFM
PE QE T
fm FML
PE TRSPR trsp
  
­ ½ ° °  ® ¾° °¯ ¿
 
Lower-level CET functions: 
Bilateral export supply (1) sec$(not )regTco :  
  secsec ,1, sec secsec sec sec,
sec
reg
T
reg
T
BE
reg regg regBE
reg regg reg regT T
T T Treg regg
T
BE PEQBE aBE QE
PBE
V
V J § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
 
Bilateral export supply (2) sec$ regTco : 
,
sec sec
reg regg reg
T TPBE PE  
Balancing conditions for bilateral export supply: 
, ,
sec sec sec sec
( )
reg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T
regg reg
PE QE PBE QBE
z
  ¦  
Upper-level Armington functions: 
Domestically-produced commodity demands in regF: 
  secsec 1 sec secsec sec sec
sec
sec
$sec (sec)
$sec (sec)
regF
regF
A
regF regFA
regF regF regF
regF
regF
AD PAQDD aA QA T
PD
QA TN
V
V Jª º§ ·« »  ¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼
ª º ¬ ¼
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Domestically-produced commodity demands in regI: 
 
> @
> @
sec
sec 1 sec sec,
sec, sec sec,
sec,
sec,
$ sec (sec)  ( " ")
$ sec (sec)  ( " ")
regI
regI
A
regI regI
A fmregI regI regI
fm fmregI
fm
regI
fm
AD PAFMQDDFM aA QAFM
PDFM
T fm FML
QAFM TN fm IFML
V
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ª º  ¬ ¼

*
  
Aggregate import demands:  
   
 
sec
sec 1 sec sec sec ," "
sec sec
sec
sec sec ," "
$ ( ) $ ( )
$ ( ) $ ( )
reg
T
reg
T
A
reg reg reg
A T T T FMLreg reg
T T reg
T
reg reg
T T FML
AM PA regF reg PAFM regI reg
QM aA
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V
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Balancing conditions for upper-level Armington demands in regF:  
 sec sec sec sec sec sec $sec (sec)regF regF regF regF regF regFPA QA PD QDD PM QM T      
Balancing conditions for upper-level Armington demands in regI:  
  > @
sec, sec, sec, sec,
sec sec $ sec (sec)  ( " ")
regI regI regI regI
fm fm fm fm
regI regI
PAFM QAFM PDFM QDDFM
PM QM T fm FML
  
   
 
Lower-level Armington functions: 
Bilateral import demands: 
  secsec ,1, sec secsec sec sec,
sec
reg
T
reg
T
BM
reg regg regBM
reg regg reg regT T
T T Treg regg
T
BM PMQBM aBM QM
PBM
V
V J § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
 
Balancing conditions for bilateral import demands: 
, ,
sec sec sec sec
( )
reg reg reg regg reg regg
T T T T
regg reg
PM QM PBM QBM
z
  ¦  
Market-clearing conditions: 
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 Factor markets $facM(fac): 
,
, , ,
sec sec,
sec sec
$ ( ) $ ( ) $ ( )fac regfac reg fac reg fac regfm
fm
F regF reg FFM regI reg FS UNEMP flab fac  ¦ ¦¦  
 Armington commodity markets in regF: 
sec ,sec sec sec sec,secc secc sec
sec
regF regF regF regF regF regF regF
hh
hh c
AUX C CG I io QZ QA§ ·      ¨ ¸© ¹¦ ¦  
 Armington commodity markets in regI: 
,
sec, sec
sec, sec,
sec, sec,sec , sec ,
sec
$( " ")regI hh regIfm
hh
regI regI
fm fm
regI regI regI
fm c fm c fm
c
CFM CG fm FML
AUXFM QAFM
IFM ioFM QZFM
§ ·  ¨ ¸  ¨ ¸¨ ¸  ¨ ¸© ¹
¦
¦
 
Domestically-produced commodity supply and demand in regF: 
sec sec
regF regFQDS QDD  
Domestically-produced commodity supply and demand in regI: 
sec, sec,
regI regI
fm fmQDSFM QDDFM  
Bilateral trade: 
, ,
sec sec
reg regg regg reg
T TQBE QBM  
Balance of payments: 
   
, , , ,
sec sec sec sec
sec sec
reg regg reg regg reg regg reg regg
T T T T
T regg reg T regg reg
reg reg
reg
trsp trsp reg
trsp
QBM PWM QBE PWE
SF CPITRSPR PTRSPG
EXC
z z
§ ·  ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
  
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
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Wage curve and rigid wage approaches ${not flabregflx }: 
,
, ,
, ,
1$ $
0 0
flab reg
flab reg flab reg
flab flab
reg regflab reg flab reg
PFM UNEMP
rgd wcrv
PFM UNEMP
Zª º§ ·« »  ¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼
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Rich household income (only from formal sources): 
> @
, ,
sec
" "
, ,sec
sec," " sec
" ", " ",
$ ( ) $ ( )
$ ( ) $ ( )
$ not ( ," ")
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RH fac reg fac regfac
FML
SkLab reg SkLab reg
F regF reg PFM facM fac
INC
FFM regI reg PFS facS fac
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secsec sec sec
sec
$ $
SkLab reg
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Poor household income (only from formal sources): 
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INC PFM
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Rich household income (also from informal sources): 
> @
,
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" " sec,
,
sec
sec
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sec s
$ ( )
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RH fm fac regIfm fac
SkLab regI SkLab regI SkLab regI
regI
PFM facM fac
INCFI FFM
PFS facS fac
SameAs fac UnSkLab
trep PFM UNEMP
PROFIT co
ª º§ ·« »¨ ¸ ¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼
  
¦¦¦
+  secec sec
sec
$regIregI regIPROFIT mc¦
 
Poor household income (also from informal sources): 
" ", " ",
" " sec,
sec
" ", " ", " ",
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PH fm
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UnSkLab regI UnSkLab regI UnSkLab regI
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Household consumption budget: 
 $ ( ) $ ( )reg reg reg reg reg reg reghh hh hh hh hh hh hhPCBUD CBUD INC regF reg INCFI regI reg ty INC SHH       
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Household savings: 
 $ ( ) $ ( )reg reg reg reg reg reghh hh hh hh hh hhSHH mps INC regF reg INCFI regI reg ty INCª º    ¬ ¼  
Total savings: 
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hh
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Government tax revenue: 
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sec sec sec
sec
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, ,
sec sec
$ ( )
$ ( )
reg
hh
reg reg
reg
reg reg
FML FML
TRZ
reg regg reg regg
T T
PZ QZ regF reg
tz
PZFM QZFM regI reg
tm PWM
§ · ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹
  
¦¦
¦
 

	

,
sec
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Import tariffs: 
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Government consumption budget:  
reg reg
reg reg reg regPCGBUD CGBUD TREV TRNF SG CPI      
Government’s transfer to the household: 
, , ,
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Laspeyre consumer price index in regF: 
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Laspeyre consumer price index in regI: 
,
sec sec, sec, sec,
sec
,
sec sec, sec, sec,
sec
(1 $( " ")) 0
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Bilateral export price (home currency): 
, ,
sec sec
reg regg reg regg reg
T TPBE PWE EXC   
Bilateral import price (home currency): 
, , ,
sec sec sec(1 )reg regg reg regg reg regg regT T TPBM tm PWM EXC     
Bilateral import price (world currency): 
, , ,
sec sec ,sec
reg regg regg reg regg reg
T T trsp trsp T
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PWM PWE PTRSPG G  ¦  
Shares of international transport services provided to the global transport sector: 
 reg reg regtrsp trsp trsp trsp trspPE TRSPR TRSPR PTRSPG TRSPGD     
Balancing conditions for the global transport sector: 
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International transport margins as constant shares of bilateral export volumes: 
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